Deontic and epistemic reasoning in children revisited: Comment on Dack and Astington

Dack and Astington (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 110 2011 94–114) attempted to replicate the deontic reasoning advantage among preschoolers reported by Cummins (Memory & Cognition 24 1996 823–829) and by Harris and Nuñez (Child Development. 67 1996 572–1591). Dack and Astington argued that the apparent deontic advantage reported by these studies was in fact an artifact due to a methodological confound, namely, inclusion of an authority in the deontic condition only. Removing this confound attenuated the effect in young children but had no effect on the reasoning of 7-year-olds and adults. Thus, removing reference to authority “explains away” young children’s apparent precocity at this type of reasoning. But this explanation rests on (a) a misunderstanding of norms as targets of deontic reasoning and (b) conclusions based on a sample size that was too small to detect the effect in young children.     

Development of the deontic advantage in reasoning: Reply to Cummins

In response to Cummins’s report that comments on our article (Dack & Astington, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 2011, Vol. 110, pp. 94–114), this article clarifies our perspective on what constitutes the deontic advantage, and notes similarities and differences between Cummins’s perspective and our own. Like Cummins, we believe that young children are capable of deontic reasoning and that methodological factors alone cannot explain this ability. However, we maintain that it is important to be precise about methodology in order to facilitate investigation of how the deontic advantage changes over developmental time, and this question is our main interest, although as yet incompletely answered. Contrary to Cummins, we do not think that existing data can speak to the issue of the potential innateness of deontic reasoning. We also disagree with Cummins’s perspective on norm versus normative proposition and with some of her comparisons between deontic and epistemic phenomena.     

Evidence for an explanation advantage in naïve biological reasoning

The present studies compare young children’s explanations and predictions for the biological phenomenon of contamination. In Study 1, 36 preschoolers and 24 adults heard vignettes concerning contamination, and were asked either to make a prediction or to provide an explanation. Even 3-year-olds readily supplied contamination-based explanations, and most children mentioned an unseen mechanism (germs, contact through bodily fluids). Moreover, unlike adults who performed at ceiling across both explanation and prediction tasks, children were significantly more accurate with their explanations than their predictions. In Study 2, we varied the strength of cues regarding the desirability of the contaminated substance (N = 24 preschoolers). Although desirability affected responses, for both levels of desirability participants were significantly more accurate on explanation than prediction questions. Altogether, these studies demonstrate a significant “explanation advantage” for children’s reasoning in the domain of everyday biology.     

Influences of credibility of testimony and strength of statistical evidence on children’s and adolescents’ reasoning

According to dual-process models that include analytic and heuristic modes of processing, analytic processing is often expected to become more common with development. Consistent with this view, on reasoning problems, adolescents are more likely than children to select alternatives that are backed by statistical evidence. It is shown here that this pattern depends on the quality of the statistical evidence and the quality of the testimonial that is the typical alternative to statistical evidence. In Experiment 1, 9- and 13-year-olds (N = 64) were presented with scenarios in which solid statistical evidence was contrasted with casual or expert testimonial evidence. When testimony was casual, children relied on it but adolescents did not; when testimony was expert, both children and adolescents relied on it. In Experiment 2, 9- and 13-year-olds (N = 83) were presented with scenarios in which casual testimonial evidence was contrasted with weak or strong statistical evidence. When statistical evidence was weak, children and adolescents relied on both testimonial and statistical evidence; when statistical evidence was strong, most children and adolescents relied on it. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for dual-process accounts of cognitive development.     

The power of print: Children’s trust in unexpected printed suggestions

How do children evaluate the veracity of printed text? We examined children’s handling of unexpected suggestions conveyed via print versus orally. In Experiment 1 (N = 131), 3- to 6-year-olds witnessed a speaker either read aloud an unexpected but not completely implausible printed label (e.g., fish for a bird-like animal with some fish features) or speak the label without accompanying text. Pre-readers accepted labels in both conditions. Early readers often rejected spoken labels yet accepted them in the print condition, and in Experiment 2 (N = 55) 3- to 6-year-olds continued to apply them even after the print was obscured. Early readers accept printed testimony that they reject if only spoken, and the influence of text endures even when it is no longer visible.     

Supporting children’s counterfactual thinking with alternative modes of responding

To speculate about counterfactual worlds, children need to ignore what they know to be true about the real world. Prior studies yielding individual differences data suggested that counterfactual thinking may be related to overcoming prepotent responses. In two experiments, we manipulated how 3- to 5-year-olds responded to counterfactual conditional and syllogism tasks. In Experiment 1 (N = 39), children’s performance improved on both conditional and syllogism tasks when they responded with an arrow rather than pointing with a finger. In Experiment 2 (N = 42), 3- and 4-year-olds benefited from both an arrow manipulation and, separately, the introduction of a delay before responding. We suggest that both manipulations help children to overcome an impulsive prepotent response to counterfactual questions arising from a default assumption that information about the past is true.     

Utilizing probabilities as decision weights in closed and open information boards: A comparison of children and adults

Decisions in preschoolers (6 years), elementary schoolers (9.7 years), and adults (21 years) were studied with an information board crossing three probabilistic cues (validities: .83, .67, .50) with two options. Experiment 1 (n = 215) applied a standard version of the information board (closed presentation format), in which information must be searched sequentially and kept in mind for the decision. Experiment 2 (n = 217) applied an open format (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008), in which all information was visible during decision making. Elementary schoolers but not preschoolers benefited from an open format — indicated by an increase in using probabilities as decision weights. In the open but not closed format, choices were biased by normatively irrelevant information (the lure). Variations in the prediction patterns of the cues influenced decisions in all age groups. Effects for presentation format, pattern, and lure jointly indicate that even children are capable of considering multiple information in their decisions.     

Digit ratio (2D:4D) and sex-role orientation: Further evidence and meta-analysis

Three new studies (N = 132, 623, 1112) did not yield hypothesized associations between digit ratio (2D:4D), an assumed negative correlate of prenatal testosterone, and psychometrically measured sex-role orientation (positive association with femininity, negative ones with masculinity and masculinity-femininity difference scores) among heterosexuals of either sex. Meta-analysis of the pertinent literature (N = 6311, 28 studies from 10 countries, 46% unpublished) showed only men’s (but not women’s) left-hand (but not right-hand) 2D:4D reliably related as expected (positively) to femininity. This effect was tiny (0.14% attributable variance) and possibly non-robust (crucially dependent on one large study included). Hence, the cumulative evidence does not support systematic, robust, noteworthy within-sex correlations between 2D:4D and the masculinity/femininity personality dimensions.     

Did she mean to do it? Acquiring a folk theory of intentionality

The ability to both identify and explain others’ intentional acts is fundamental for successful social interaction. In two cross-sectional studies, we investigated 3- to 9-year-olds’ (n = 148) understanding of the folk concept of intentionality, using three types of intentionality measures. The relationship between this type of reasoning and false belief and interpretive mind understanding was also examined. Judgment of the appropriateness of an explanation was based on adult responses (n = 20). Overall, the results indicated that the ability to both identify and appropriately explain a range of intentional acts does not fully emerge until 7 years of age or later. The pattern of explanations revealed the gradual development of a folk concept of intentionality. Preschool- and early school-age children focused on the protagonists’ desires and actions, whereas 8- and 9-year-olds and adults were more likely to reference the protagonists’ awareness and skills.     

Semantic similarity of labels and inductive generalization: Taking a second look

Prior research suggests that preschoolers can generalize object properties based on category information conveyed by semantically-similar labels. However, previous research did not control for co-occurrence probability of labels in natural speech. The current studies re-assessed children’s generalization with semantically-similar labels. Experiment 1 indicated that adults made category-based inferences regardless of co-occurrence probability; however, 4-year-olds generalized with semantically-similar labels that co-occurred in child-directed speech (e.g., bunny–rabbit) but not with non-co-occurring labels (e.g., crocodile–alligator). Experiment 2 indicated that generalization with semantically-similar labels increased gradually between 4- and 6-years of age. These results are discussed in relation to theories of early learning.     

Unfair treatment and self-regulatory focus

Ample correlational evidence exists that perceived unfair treatment is negatively related to well-being, health, and goal striving but the underlying process is unclear. We hypothesized that effects are due in part to contextual priming of prevention focus and the negative consequences of chronic prevention-focused vigilance. Indeed, reasonable responses to unfair treatment—to avoid situations in which it occurs or if this is not possible, confront it head on—fit prevention self-regulatory focus response patterns. Results from three experiments support this notion. Priming stigmatized social category membership heightened students’ prevention (not promotion) focus (n = 117). Priming non-stigmatized social category membership (i.e., white) did not change prevention focus (n = 46). Priming prevention (not promotion) increased perceptions of unfair treatment (and aroused prevention-relevant fight or flight responses) in response to a negative ambiguous job situation among low and moderate income adults (n = 112).     

Gender differences in rumination: A meta-analysis

Starting in adolescence and continuing through adulthood, women are twice as likely as men to experience depression. According to the response styles theory (RST), gender differences in depression result, in part, from women’s tendency to ruminate more than men. A meta-analysis was performed to evaluate gender differences in rumination in adults (k = 59; N = 14,321); additionally, an analysis of subtypes of rumination – brooding and reflection – was conducted (k = 23). Fixed effects analyses indicated that women scored higher than men in rumination (d = .24, p < .01, SEd = .02), brooding (d = .19, p < .01, SEd = .03) and reflection (d = .17, p < .01, SEd = .03); there was no evidence of heterogeneity or publication bias across studies for these effect sizes. Although statistically significant, the effect sizes for gender differences in rumination were small in magnitude. Results are discussed with respect to the RST and gender differences in depression.     

A protean approach to social influence: Dark Triad personalities and social influence tactics

To avoid detection, those high on Dark Triad traits (i.e., narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism) may adopt a protean approach to interpersonal influence. We show the Dark Triad traits correlate with a number of unique tactics of influence (Study 1; N = 259). We show this protean approach was insensitive to differences in targets of manipulation (Study 2; N = 296). When forced to choose one tactic to solve different adaptive problems, the Dark Triad traits were correlated with unique tactical choices (Study 3; N = 268). We show these associations are generally robust to controlling for the Big Five and participants’ sex (Study 1 and 2). We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings for both life history and cheater-detection theories.     

Children’s representations of facial expression and identity: Identity-contingent expression aftereffects

This investigation used adaptation aftereffects to examine developmental changes in the perception of facial expressions. Previous studies have shown that adults’ perceptions of ambiguous facial expressions are biased following adaptation to intense expressions. These expression aftereffects are strong when the adapting and probe expressions share the same facial identity but are mitigated when they are posed by different identities. We extended these findings by comparing expression aftereffects and categorical boundaries in adults versus 5- to 9-year-olds (n = 20/group). Children displayed adult-like aftereffects and categorical boundaries for happy/sad by 7 years of age and for fear/anger by 9 years of age. These findings suggest that both children and adults perceive expressions according to malleable dimensions in which representations of facial expression are partially integrated with facial identity.     

The morality of harm

In this article, we discuss the range of concerns people weigh when evaluating the acceptability of harmful actions and propose a new perspective on the relationship between harm and morality. With this aim, we examine Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng and Fessler’s [Kelly, D., Stich, S., Haley, K., Eng, S., & Fessler, D. (2007). Harm, affect, and the moral/conventional distinction. Mind and Language, 22, 117-131] recent claim that, contrary to Turiel and associates, people do not judge harm to be authority independent and general in scope in the context of complex harmful scenarios (e.g., prisoner interrogation, military training). In a modified replication of their study, we examined participants’ judgments of harmful actions in these contexts by taking into account their explanations for their judgments. We claim that both in terms of participants’ judgments and rationales, the results largely confirm our hypothesis that actions involving harm andinjustice or rights violation are judged to be authority independent and general in scope, which is a modification of Turiel’s traditional hypothesis.     

Two are better than one: comparison influences infants' visual recognition memory

Despite a large literature on infants’ memory for visually presented stimuli, the processes underlying visual memory are not well understood. Two studies with 4-month-olds (N = 60) examined the effects of providing opportunities for comparison of items on infants’ memory for those items. Experiment 1 revealed that 4-month-olds failed to show evidence of memory for an item presented during familiarization in a standard task (i.e., when only one item was presented during familiarization). In Experiment 2, infants showed robust memory for one of two different items presented during familiarization. Thus, infants’ memory for the distinctive features of individual items was enhanced when they could compare items.     

Math in actions: Actor mode reveals the true arithmetic abilities of French-speaking 2-year-olds in a magic task

Our previous studies provide some evidence of between-language effects on arithmetic performance in 2-year-olds. French-speaking children were especially biased by the use of the word un as a cardinal value and as an article in the singular/plural opposition (1 vs. the set 2, 3, …). Here we evaluated the ability of a new action-based assessment method to avoid this bias. A total of 80 French-speaking 2- and 3-year-olds were confronted with impossible (1 + 1 = 1 or 1 + 1 = 3) and possible (1 + 1 = 2) addition problems that triggered the bias. The problems were either presented to the children by the experimenter (onlooker mode) or realized by themselves (actor mode). The 2-year-olds performed better in the actor mode than in the onlooker mode. A subtraction control with no language ambiguity (2-1 = 2 or 1) was conducted with 80 other children; both modes elicited comparable performances regardless of age. These data indicate that the actor mode is effective for assessing arithmetic ability in French-speaking 2-year-olds.     

The easily learned,easily remembered heuristic in children

A previous study with adults [Koriat, A. (2008a). Easy comes, easy goes? The link between learning and remembering and its exploitation in metacognition. Memory & Cognition, 36, 416–428] established a correlation between learning and remembering: items requiring more trials to acquisition (TTA) were less likely to be recalled than those requiring fewer trials. Furthermore, learners’ judgments of learning (JOLs) seemed to rely on the easily learned, easily remembered (ELER) heuristic, that items requiring fewer TTAs are more likely to be recalled. This study extended investigation of these effects to 2nd- and 4th-grade children. When the list included hard and easy paired-associates (Experiment 1, N = 40, 7–10 years), recall and JOL decreased with increasing TTAs for both grades, supporting the validity of the ELER heuristic and its utilization in monitoring one's own learning. When presented only with hard pairs (Experiment 2, N = 60, 7–10 years), however, 4th graders’ but not 2nd graders’ JOLs evidenced reliance on this heuristic. The results suggest an early development of metacognitive heuristics that incorporate information about the links between characteristics of the encoding process and subsequent remembering.     

Measuring implicit attitudes of 4-year-olds: the preschool implicit association test

The Preschool Implicit Association Test (PSIAT) is an adaptation of an established social cognition measure (IAT) for use with preschool children. Two studies with 4-year-olds found that the PSIAT was effective in evaluating (a) attitudes toward commonly liked objects (flowers = good) and (b) gender attitudes (girl = good or boy = good). The gender attitude PSIAT was positively correlated with corresponding explicit attitude measures and also children’s actual sex. The new implicit and explicit measures of gender attitudes demonstrated discriminant validity; each predicted variance in children’s gendered play activities beyond that predicted by the other. Discussion describes potential uses of the PSIAT to investigate development of societally significant attitudes and stereotypes at younger ages than are achievable with currently available methods.     

My people,right or wrong? Minimal group membership disrupts preschoolers’ selective trust

When preschoolers decide to trust one speaker over another, how does group membership influence their tracking of speaker reliability? In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were assigned to arbitrary groups of no social significance (0055 and 0170) and asked to endorse novel object labels provided by two ingroup members, one of whom was reliable and the second of whom was unreliable. Children selectively trusted the more reliable informant. In Experiment 2, we asked whether ingroup status or reliability would determine children's choices and found that 4-year-olds failed to trust reliable outgroup members over unreliable ingroup members (or vice versa). Experiment 3 showed that the failure of trust in Experiment 2 was not due to the mere inclusion of both ingroup and outgroup members: children presented with a control paradigm in which the ingroup members were reliable trusted reliable ingroup members over unreliable outgroup members. Children's use of reliability as an indicator of future credibility therefore appears disrupted when outgroup status and reliability are in conflict, even when group membership is arbitrary.