Affective facilitation and inhibition of cultural influences on reasoning

Research in South Korea and the United States examined how affective states facilitate or inhibit culturally dominant styles of reasoning. According to the affect-as-information hypothesis, affective cues of mood influence judgements by serving as embodied information about the value of accessible inclinations and cognitions. Extending this line of research to culture, we hypothesised that positive affect should promote (and negative affect should inhibit) culturally normative reasoning. The results of two studies of causal reasoning supported this hypothesis. Positive and negative affect functioned like “go” and “stop” signals, respectively, for culturally typical reasoning styles. Thus, in happy (compared to sad) moods, Koreans engaged in more holistic reasoning, whereas Americans engaged in more analytic reasoning.     

Affective facilitation and inhibition of cultural influences on reasoning

Research in South Korea and the United States examined how affective states facilitate or inhibit culturally dominant styles of reasoning. According to the affect-as-information hypothesis, affective cues of mood influence judgements by serving as embodied information about the value of accessible inclinations and cognitions. Extending this line of research to culture, we hypothesised that positive affect should promote (and negative affect should inhibit) culturally normative reasoning. The results of two studies of causal reasoning supported this hypothesis. Positive and negative affect functioned like "go" and "stop" signals, respectively, for culturally typical reasoning styles. Thus, in happy (compared to sad) moods, Koreans engaged in more holistic reasoning, whereas Americans engaged in more analytic reasoning.     

Mood and global-local focus: priming a local focus reverses the link between mood and global-local processing

Positive moods promote a focus on the forest (global focus) and negative moods, a focus on the trees (local focus). Is this well-established link fixed or variable? Does it reflect a direct influence of affect, as usually assumed, or is it frequently observed simply because a global perspective is often dominant? If affect serves as information about the value of currently accessible inclinations, and a global focus is generally the default perspective, then the global focus of positive affect and local focus of negative affect might be variable rather than fixed. Two experiments tested this hypothesis using different mood inductions, different tests of global-local focus, and different methods of inducing global and local perspectives. In each, we discovered that positive affect empowered whatever focus was momentarily dominant. Thus, whether individuals in happy moods saw the forest or the trees depended only on which of the two had been primed.     

Not all happy people are lazy or stupid: Evidence of systematic processing in happy moods

Two experiments investigated the effects of mood on the use of global trait information in impression formation tasks. Participants in both experiments formed an impression of a target based on traits and a series of behaviors that were both consistent and inconsistent with the traits. In Experiment 1, participants in happy moods, relative to those in unhappy moods, made impression judgments that reflected the evaluative implications of the trait information to a greater extent than the behaviors, regardless of the order in which they received the information. In Experiment 2, both happy and sad participants engaged in systematic processing, as reflected by the recall data, but only happy participants’ recall of target information was significantly biased by the global trait information they received. These findings are consistent with the affect-as-information model in which affective cues influence the extent to which individuals rely on general knowledge and, importantly, are inconsistent with models that posit that happiness results in reduced motivation or ability to process information carefully.     

Mood and recall of autobiographical memory: the effect of focus of self-knowledge

Mood state facilitates recall of affectively congruent memories (i.e., mood-congruent recall). Mood state may also promote motivation to alleviate a negative affective state, leading to retrieval of affectively incongruent memories (i.e., mood incongruent recall). The present study demonstrates that the focus of self-knowledge influences the occurrence of both mood-congruent recall and mood-incongruent recall. Three experiments found that mood-congruent recall occurred when participants recalled their experiences from a self-aspect that was related to the elicitor of moods, whereas mood-incongruent recall occurred when they recalled their experiences from a self-aspect that was unrelated to the elicitor of moods. These results suggest that the nature of the self-aspect from which persons recall their experiences determines whether mood-congruent or mood-incongruent recall occurs.     

Emotional language processing: how mood affects integration processes during discourse comprehension

This research tests whether mood affects semantic processing during discourse comprehension by facilitating integration of information congruent with moods’ valence. Participants in happy, sad, or neutral moods listened to stories with positive or negative endings during EEG recording. N400 peak amplitudes showed mood congruence for happy and sad participants: endings incongruent with participants’ moods demonstrated larger peaks. Happy and neutral moods exhibited larger peaks for negative endings, thus showing a similarity between negativity bias (neutral mood) and mood congruence (happy mood). Mood congruence resulted in differential processing of negative information: happy mood showed larger amplitudes for negative endings than neutral mood, and sad mood showed smaller amplitudes. N400 peaks were also sensitive to whether ending valence was communicated directly or as a result of inference. This effect was moderately modulated by mood. In conclusion, the notion of context for discourse processing should include comprehenders’ affective states preceding language processing.     

The impact of negative moods on self-enhancing cognitions: the role of reflective versus ruminative mood orientations

This research program examined how self-focused attention to feelings affects the relation between mood negativity and self-enhancing thought. The primary hypothesis was that the particular manner in which people focus on their moods (reflective vs. ruminative) determines whether they reveal positive (i.e., mood-incongruent) or negative (i.e., mood-congruent) self-relevant thoughts in response to negative moods. Studies 1-4 revealed that social comparisons, temporal comparisons, and other self-enhancing cognitions (i.e., attributions, disidentification, relationship evaluations) are more likely to be mood incongruent when people adopt a reflective orientation to their negative feelings and more likely to be mood congruent when they adopt a ruminative orientation. Additionally, moods and mood orientations affected self-enhancing thoughts through the mediating influence of mood regulation goals and intentions (Studies 5 and 6).     

Effects of induced emotional state on lexical processing in younger and older adults

The authors investigated the effects of an induced emotional mood state on lexical decision task (LDT) performance in 50 young adults and 25 older adults. Participants were randomly assigned to either happy or sad mood induction conditions. An emotional mood state was induced by having the participants listen to 8 min of classical music previously rated to induce happy or sad moods. Results replicated previous studies with young adults (i.e., sad-induced individuals responded faster to sad words and happy-induced individuals responded faster to happy words) and extended this pattern to older adults. Results are discussed with regard to information processing, aging, and emotion.     

Effects of Induced Emotional State on Lexical Processing in Younger and Older Adults

The authors investigated the effects of an induced emotional mood state on lexical decision task (LDT) performance in 50 young adults and 25 older adults. Participants were randomly assigned to either happy or sad mood induction conditions. An emotional mood state was induced by having the participants listen to 8 min of classical music previously rated to induce happy or sad moods. Results replicated previous studies with young adults (i.e., sad-induced individuals responded faster to sad words and happy-induced individuals responded faster to happy words) and extended this pattern to older adults. Results are discussed with regard to information processing, aging, and emotion.     

Do you see what I see? Affect and visual information processing

Individuals in sad moods process information in a less global and more local manner than do those in happier moods. This experiment investigates whether processing speed is associated with these mood effects, whether task ambiguity moderates these mood effects, and whether making feelings appear irrelevant to the task can eliminate these mood effects. Participants in happy, sad, and neutral moods were lead to experience their feelings as being either relevant or irrelevant to a global/local processing task. As predicted, sad moods decreased global processing relative to happier moods when feelings seemed relevant to the task and when the criteria for responding were ambiguous, but not when feelings seemed irrelevant or when the criteria were unambiguous. Consistent with the idea that mood guides processing, increases in affect intensity were associated with faster reaction times. Overall, the results suggest that mood and processing effects share some core similarities with mood and judgement effects.     

Does mood state change risk taking tendency in older adults?

No study has been conducted to evaluate the influences of age differences on specific moods for risk taking tendencies. This study examined the patterns of risk taking tendencies among younger and older persons in 3 transient affective states: positive, neutral, and negative moods. By means of viewing happy, neutral, or sad movie clips, participants were induced to the respective mood. Risk taking tendencies were measured with decision tasks modified from the Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire (N. Kogan & M. A. Wallach, 1964). Consistent with the affect infusion model (J. P. Forgas, 1995), risk taking tendency was greater for those individuals who were in a happy mood than for those who were in a sad mood, for both young and older participants. However, an asymmetrical effect of positive and negative mood on risk taking tendency was identified among both the young and older participants, but in opposite directions. These results are consistent with the predictions of the negativity bias and the positivity effect found in young and older adults, respectively, and are interpreted via information processing and motivation effects of mood on the decision maker.     

Threat facilitates subsequent executive control during anxious mood

Dual competition framework (DCF) posits that low-level threat may facilitate behavioral performance by influencing executive control functions. Anxiety is thought to strengthen this effect by enhancing threat's affective significance. To test these ideas directly, we examined the effects of low-level threat and experimentally induced anxiety on one executive control function, the efficiency of response inhibition. In Study 1, briefly presented stimuli that were mildly threatening (i.e., fearful faces) relative to nonthreatening (i.e., neutral faces) led to facilitated executive control efficiency during experimentally induced anxiety. No such effect was observed during an equally arousing, experimentally induced happy mood state. In Study 2, we assessed the effects of low-level threat, experimentally induced anxiety, and individual differences in trait anxiety on executive control efficiency. Consistent with Study 1, fearful relative to neutral faces led to facilitated executive control efficiency during experimentally induced anxiety. No such effect was observed during an experimentally induced neutral mood state. Moreover, individual differences in trait anxiety did not moderate the effects of threat and anxiety on executive control efficiency. The findings are partially consistent with the predictions of DCF in that low-level threat improved executive control, at least during a state of anxiety.     

When necessity is the mother of invention: Mood and problem solving

Happy moods foster the ability to think about problems in new ways, but little is known about how sad moods affect this process. This paper investigates the hypothesis that individuals in sad moods adhere to the data and might not think about problems in new ways until they receive data indicating that it is appropriate to do so. To investigate this hypothesis, participants in happy, sad, and neutral moods completed a classic mental set task (Luchins, 1942). All mood groups were able to break the mental set and to think about the problems in a new way, but mood affected when they did so. Consistent with the idea that individuals in sad moods adhere to the data, they relied on the mental set until they received evidence that it may be problematic. In contrast, individuals in happier moods were more likely to abandon the mental set on their own, rather than wait for evidence of its inadequacy. In three follow-up experiments, when the information provided by participants’ sad feelings was rendered uninformative, the mood effect disappeared. These findings are consistent with the claim that affect influences processing only when it provides information about how to proceed.     

Daily Mood Variability: Form of Diurnal Patterns and Determinants of Diurnal Patterns

Mood and affect are often assessed in psychological research without regard for the potential influence of time of day or other environmental factors. This study examined the determinants of daily mood variability. Ninety-four subjects completed a diary every 15 min for 1 day, and subjects' moods, activities, and locations were assessed. Diurnal cycles were found for several moods (e.g., happy, tired), activities (e.g., discourse, thinking), and locations (e.g., home, work). Diurnal cycles in most moods were strongly associated with activities and location, yet diurnal cycles of some moods (rushed, sad, and tired) were not dependent on these factors. These findings have implications for mood assessment: Mood assessment performed only at particular times of day, or those relying on point assessment, may be influenced by time of day and by the activities and location of the subject.     

Mood and judgments based on sequential sampling

Different adaptive styles characterize cognition and behavior in different affective states. Whereas negative affect supports accommodation (i.e., stimulus‐driven bottom‐up processing), positive affect supports assimilation (i.e., self‐determined top‐down processing). Applying this well‐established rule to binary choices after self‐truncated information sampling, we predicted that positive mood should render choices less dependent on large samples than negative mood. Consequently, the potential primacy advantage underlying Wald's ( 1947 ) sequential testing (i.e., quick and correct decisions from the first few items in a sample) was exploited more efficiently when participants were in positive rather than negative mood. This efficient utilization of small samples in positive mood was obtained under the very conditions derived on a priori ground from a statistical model, namely, when a response criterion or threshold was high and when the true difference between choice options was relatively small. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When are moods most likely to influence consumers' product preferences? The role of mood focus and perceived relevance of moods

This program of research examined the hypothesis that moods are most likely to be used as a source of information in making evaluations and choices when consumers both focus on their moods (i.e., acknowledge and pay attention to their feelings) and perceive that moods are a relevant source of information for forming judgments. Support for this prediction was obtained when the relevance of moods was examined by manipulating relevance instructions, varying advertising cues, and manipulating product type. Further, the boundary conditions under which the combination of mood focus and perceived relevance is most influential on product preferences are identified.     

Are adolescents the victims of raging hormones: evidence for activational effects of hormones on moods and behavior at adolescence.

The literatures on hormone changes at adolescence, hormonal influences on moods and behavior in nonhuman animals and adult humans, and mood and behavioral changes at adolescence and the small but burgeoning literature on hormonal influences at adolescence are examined. The focus is on moods and behaviors often identified as typically adolescent (e.g., mood lability, mood intensity, irritability, conflict with parents) and the primary hormones of puberty (i.e., the adrenal androgens, gonadotropins, and sex steroids). Through an integration of these literatures evidence is assessed for specific hormone-mood and hormone-behavior associations, as well as for more general types of hormone-outcome relations that transcend specific hormones or outcomes. Non-biological factors that appear to be important in moderating the role of hormones in adolescent moods and behavior are identified. Implications for the design of future studies in this area are detailed.     

Happiness: When does it lead to self-indulgence and when does it lead to self-denial?

Previous research on self-gratification in children has found that happiness, compared to a neutral affective state, sometimes causes self-indulgence and sometimes causes self-denial. Review of this research led to the hypothesis that happiness leads to self-indulgence when children have no reason to believe that excessive self-gratification is morally wrong but that happiness promotes selfdenial when children fear that excessive self-gratification would violate a moral rule. In the present study, children were first placed in either a happy or neutral mood. They were then given an opportunity to help themselves freely to a reward supply, but half the children in each affect condition were warned that excessive self-gratification would violate a moral rule whereas the other half were not. In the absence of information that excessive self-gratification would violate a moral standard, happiness produced self-indulgence, but when children were told that excessive self-gratification would be wrong, happy children denied themselves significantly more than neutral-mood children. It was suggested that happiness motivates children to try to sustain their elevated mood; the behavioral route to maintaining positive mood, however, depends on how children perceive the moral implications of their actions.     

The impact of affective and cognitive focus on attitude formation

We examined the effects of unobtrusive affective and cognitive focus on attitude formation. To induce focus, participants worked on a word-search puzzle consisting of either affective (e.g., emotion) or cognitive (e.g., reasoning) words. They then read positive and negative affective and cognitive information about a new attitude object. In the affective focus condition, evaluations were more congruent with the valence of the affective information than they were in the cognitive focus condition, where evaluations were more congruent with the valence of the cognitive information than they were in the affective focus condition. Affective focus also resulted in enhanced recall of affective information. The effects on evaluations remained stable over time, whereas effects on memory disappeared. Finally, affective focus was associated with faster response times, suggesting enhanced accessibility of affect-based attitudes. The present research shows that an affective or cognitive focus leads to the formation of different attitudes.