Body image disturbance and skin bleaching

This study looks at body image disturbance among Jamaicans who bleach their skin. The hypothesis states that there is a positive relationship between skin bleaching and body image disturbance. The study used a convenience sample of 160 participants with a skin bleaching group (n = 80) and a non‐bleaching comparison group (n = 80). The instrument included demographic questions, the body image disturbance questionnaire (BIDQ), and questions about skin bleaching. The results of a t‐test revealed that the skin bleaching group (M = 1.5255, SD = 0.42169) was not significantly different from the non‐bleaching group (M = 1.4938, SD = 0.74217) in terms of body image disturbance, t(158) = 0.333, p = .740. The participants who bleached did not suffer from body image disturbance. Self‐reports revealed that they bleached to acquire beauty, attract a partner, elude the police, and market skin bleaching products. The practice was fashionable and popular and it made some participants feel good, while others were fans of a popular musical artiste who bleached his skin. The majority of participants bleached because of the perceived personal, social, and entrepreneurial benefits of the practice and not because they suffered emotional distress, anxiety, and functional impairment because of their skin colour. However, there was some level of BID among the minority of participants who argued that they bleached because they wanted to be pretty so they were emotionally distressed about there body image and experienced functional impairment.     

Social representations of educability

In the framework of the theory of social representations, the study set out to examine how Finnish parents and teachers have received a major change in educational policy. Surveys on parents' and comprehensive school teachers' views of ongoing school reforms indicated that current educational discourse is structured by two different representations — a “selective” one and a “comprehensive” one-which contain two different notions of intelligence — “natural” and “sociorelativistic”. The subjects' sociai position (socioeducational status and expertise) in the educational hierarchy tended to organize their representations. The findings indicated that the different groups have different relationships to official educational policy and to the ethos of educability embodied by the school. University of Joensuu     

Introducing the Concepts of “Positions,” “Space,” and “Worlds”: Seeing Human Being and Becoming—and Religion—in New Ways

Theories of psychological development, however diverse, often express common underlying ontological-epistemological commitments shaped by the legacies of Descartes, Newton, and Kant. Three related psychoanalytic concepts—“positions,” “space,” and “worlds”—individually and collectively sketch the contours of a different way of construing human being and becoming—a way that departs from these legacies. Implications for the study of religion of this “different way” are examined.     

Women’s Porno: The heterosexual female gaze in porn sites “for women”

The article deals with a number of Internet sites claiming to specialize in providing pornography for heterosexual women, as a vehicle to examine the nascent “gaze” and visual parameters of heterosexual female sexuality. The focus here is semiotic—looking at visual coding of website images rather than audience reception (i.e., whether heterosexual women are actually the main consumers of women’s porno). Motivation for this decision is discussed. Theoretically, the article draws from Butler’s performative notions of sexuality in anchoring discussion. The remainder of the article does a comparative textual analysis of nine pornographic Internet sites, three of which label themselves “for women.” Findings are as follows: “Women’s porno” fuses the matter and anti-matter of men’s homo- and heterosexual pornography, in the process engendering an active, sexually interested, heterosexual female gaze and typifying Butler notion of “insurrectionary speech.”     

The Priest’s Husband

Clergy self-concepts provide an important resource for research into the psychosocial pressures that often breed domestic tension and marital discord in ministerial families. More than 30 years ago the Journal of Religion and Health published (15:3, 1976) Platt and Moss’s initial study of clergy families, research focused on the self-perceptions of the wives of Episcopal priests. That investigation explored some of the intrapsychic ingredients and interpersonal concerns of these women. Oden now concentrates on clergy spouses from a different vantage—the historically recent phenomenon of the Episcopal priest’s husband. This article grows out of the first formal study of such a growing parochial reality. Husbands of priests present novel issues because there has never been anyone like them before. They are men who will inevitably find themselves confronted by congregational expectations that can modify their self-concepts and retailer their marriages, “for better or for worse”.     

Worlds,Capabilities and Well-Being

Critics suggest that without some “objective” account of well-being we cannot explain why satisfying some preferences is, as we believe, better than satisfying others, why satisfying some preferences may leave us on net worse off or why, in a range of cases, we should reject life-adjustment in favor of life-improvement. I defend a subjective welfarist understanding of well-being against such objections by reconstructing the Amartya Sen’s capability approach as a preferentist account of well-being. According to the proposed account preference satisfaction alone—possible as well as actual—is of value. States of affairs contribute to well-being because and to the extent that they satisfy actual or nearby possible preferences, and are fruitful, that is, compatible with a range states that satisfy further actual or nearby possible preferences. The proposed account solves the problem of adaptive preference. Individuals whose preferences are “deformed” are satisfied with fruitless states of affairs, which constrain their options so that they are incapable of satisfying a wide range of nearby possible preferences—preferences they “could easily have had.” Recognizing the value of capabilities as well as actual attainments allows us to explain why individuals who satisfy “deformed” or perverse preferences may not on net benefit from doing so. More fundamentally, it explains why some states are, as Sen suggests, bad, awful or gruesome while others are good, excellent or superb without appeal to any objective account of value.     

First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality

In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving force” of rationality by showing that they “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.” We argue that the proposal fails on three counts: First, we explain why demands of one’s first-personal standpoint cannot be both reason-giving and resemble requirements of rationality. Second, the proposal runs headlong into the now familiar “bootstrapping” objection that helped illuminate the need to vindicate the normativity of rationality in the first place. Lastly, even if Southwood is right—the demands of rationality just are the demands or our first-personal standpoints—the explanation as to why our standpoints generate reasons will entail that we sometimes have no reason at all to be rational.     

A secular age? Reflections on Taylor and Panikkar

During the last few years two major volumes have been published, both greatly revised versions of earlier Gifford Lectures: Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (2007) and Raimon Panikkar’s The Rhythm of Being (2010). The two volumes are similar in some respects and very dissimilar in others. Both thinkers complain about the glaring blemishes of the modern, especially the contemporary age; both deplore above all a certain deficit of religiosity. The two authors differ, however, both in the details of their diagnosis and in their proposed remedies. Taylor views the modern age—styled as “secular age”—as marked by a slide into secular agnosticism, into “exclusive humanism”, and above all into an “immanent frame” excluding theistic “transcendence”. Although sharing the concern about “loss of meaning”, Panikkar does not find its source in the abandonment of (mono)theistic transcendence; on the contrary, both radical transcendence and agnostic immanence are responsible for the deficit of genuine faith. For him, recovery of faith requires an acknowledgment of our being in the world, as part of the “rhythm of being” happening in a holistic or “cosmotheandric” mode. In classical Indian terminology, while Taylor’s emphasis on the transcendence-immanence tension reflects ultimately a dualistic perspective (dvaita), Panikkar’s holistic notion of the rhythm of being captures the core of Advaita Vendanta.     

A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics

In Morals From Motives, Michael Slote defends an agent-based theory of right action according to which right acts are those that express virtuous motives like benevolence or care. Critics have claimed that Slote’s view— and agent-based views more generally— cannot account for several basic tenets of commonsense morality. In particular, the critics maintain that agent-based theories: (i) violate the deontic axiom that “ought” implies “can”, (ii) cannot allow for a person’s doing the right thing for the wrong reason, and (iii) do not yield clear verdicts in a number of cases involving “conflicting motives” and “motivational over-determination”. In this paper I develop a new agent-based theory of right action designed to avoid the problems presented for Slote’s view. This view makes morally right action a matter of expressing an optimal balance of virtue over vice and commands agents in each situation to improve their degree of excellence to the greatest extent possible.     

Rough Sets and 3-Valued Logics

In the paper we explore the idea of describing Pawlak’s rough sets using three-valued logic, whereby the value t corresponds to the positive region of a set, the value f — to the negative region, and the undefined value u — to the border of the set. Due to the properties of the above regions in rough set theory, the semantics of the logic is described using a non-deterministic matrix (Nmatrix). With the strong semantics, where only the value t is treated as designated, the above logic is a “common denominator” for Kleene and Łukasiewicz 3-valued logics, which represent its two different “determinizations”. In turn, the weak semantics—where both t and u are treated as designated—represents such a “common denominator” for two major 3-valued paraconsistent logics. We give sound and complete, cut-free sequent calculi for both versions of the logic generated by the rough set Nmatrix. Then we derive from these calculi sequent calculi with the same properties for the various “determinizations” of those two versions of the logic (including Łukasiewicz 3-valued logic). Finally, we show how to embed the four above-mentioned determinizations in extensions of the basic rough set logics obtained by adding to those logics a special two-valued “definedness” or “crispness” operator.     

Sleeping Beauty and Self-location: A Hybrid Model

The Sleeping Beauty problem is test stone for theories about self- locating belief, i.e. theories about how we should reason when data or theories contain indexical information. Opinion on this problem is split between two camps, those who defend the “1/2 view” and those who advocate the “1/3 view”. I argue that both these positions are mistaken. Instead, I propose a new “hybrid” model, which avoids the faults of the standard views while retaining their attractive properties. This model appears to violate Bayesian conditionalization, but I argue that this is not the case. By paying close attention to the details of conditionalization in contexts where indexical information is relevant, we discover that the hybrid model is in fact consistent with Bayesian kinematics. If the proposed model is correct, there are important lessons for the study of self-location, observation selection theory, and anthropic reasoning.     

Conversation and conditionals

I outline and motivate a way of implementing a closest world theory of indicatives, appealing to Stalnaker’s framework of open conversational possibilities. Stalnakerian conversational dynamics helps us resolve two outstanding puzzles for a such a theory of indicative conditionals. The first puzzle—concerning so-called ‘reverse Sobel sequences’—can be resolved by conversation dynamics in a theory-neutral way: the explanation works as much for Lewisian counterfactuals as for the account of indicatives developed here. Resolving the second puzzle, by contrast, relies on the interplay between the particular theory of indicative conditionals developed here and Stalnakerian dynamics. The upshot is an attractive resolution of the so-called “Gibbard phenomenon” for indicative conditionals.     

论"观物"与"观无"——儒学与现象学的一种融通

In traditional Chinese expressions, guannian 观念 (ideas) are results of guan 观 (viewing). However, viewing can be understood to have two different levels of meanings: one is “viewing things,” that is, viewing with something to view; another is “viewing nothing,” that is, viewing with nothing to view. What are viewed in “viewing things” are either physical beings—all existing things and phenomena—or the metaphysical being (for example, the “Dao as a thing”). In both cases, something is being viewed. What is viewed in “viewing nothing” is the being itself, or “nothing,” in which there is nothing to view. According to Confucianism, the existence of “nothing” manifests itself as life sentiments, especially the sentiment of love, which is the very root and source of benevolence; moreover “viewing nothing” is, in essence, a perception of life. Life sentiments or the perception of life is “the thing itself ” prior to any being or any thing. Translated by Liu Huawei from Sichuan Daxue Xuebao 四川大学学报 (Journal of Sichuan University), 2006, (4): 67–74     

Equal Opportunity Objectification? The Sexualization of Men and Women on the Cover of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Rolling Stone</Emphasis>

A number of journalists and scholars have pointed to the sexual objectification of women and men in popular media to argue that Western culture has become “sexualized” or even “pornified.” Yet it is not clear whether men or women have become more frequently—or more intensely sexualized—over time. In a longitudinal content analysis of images of women and men on more than four decades of Rolling Stone magazine covers (1967–2009), we begin to answer such questions. Using a unique analytical framework that allows us to measure both the frequency and intensity of sexualization, we find that sexualized images of men and women have increased, though women continue to be more frequently sexualized than men. Yet our most striking finding is the change in how women—but not men—are sexualized. Women are increasingly likely to be “hypersexualized,” but men are not. These findings not only document changes in the sexualization of men and women in popular culture over time, they also point to a narrowing of the culturally acceptable ways for “doing” femininity as presented in popular media.     

Knowing thyself ... in private: Masturbation and philosophy

Karl Marx once compared philosophy to masturbation, essentially seeing both as privative, idealistic, and impractical activities. Indeed, many lay folk see philosophers as “wankers.” While the present state of universities does throw doubt on the liberatory character of contemporary philosophy, Marx’s jibe nonetheless mischaracterizes masturbation. This paper is a brief attempt to correct Marx’s characterization of masturbation by drawing on the work of a thinker ofter associated with “intellectual onanism”: Martin Heidegger. Speaking ontologically, Heidergger’s theories can be developed to show that masturbation it is not privative, but “stretched” in time and place. Moreover, masturbation plays a practical role in the creative development of the self, including the self’s essential bodiliness. While not necessarily defending philosophy against Marx’s charges, this paper does show how even so-called “onanistic” philosophy might be redeemed. “Only a being which, like man, ‘had’ the word... can and must ‘have’ ‘the hand’” —Martin Heidegger “I have a dangerously supple wrist.” —Friedrich Nietzsche     

An empirical test of five prominent explanations for the black–white academic performance gap

The viability of five prominent explanations for the black–white performance gap (“academic engagement,” “cultural capital,” “social capital,” “school quality” and “biased treatment”) is examined using NELS data and a LISREL model that adjusts for clustering of students within schools. Empirical models have typically assessed these factors individually—a practice that probably fosters overestimation of their explanatory power. School quality and biased treatment emerge as the primary explanations for black–white high school test performance differentials. Access to better-quality schools and receipt of more stimulating interpersonal “signals” from gatekeepers ensue from racial (and socioeconomic) privilege. Enhanced test performance in turn ensues from these resources. In essence, the explanations for the racial gap that place more emphasis on what black and white students “bring to” high school (i.e., specific levels of engagement, cultural and social capital), seem less consequential to performance differentials than “what happens to” them when they get there (i.e., quality of education provided, and race-contingent treatment received).     

The Expert Snare as an Influence Tactic: Surf,Turf, and Ballroom Demonstrations of Some Compliance Consequences of Being Altercast as an Expert

Two experiments provide evidence for a newly discovered influence tactic termed the expert snare. In the expert snare, alter—the target of influence—is cast into the role of “expert.” In that role, alter attempts to maintain status by putting on the trappings of expertise, avoiding embarrassing disclosures, and accepting absurd proposals deemed necessary to uphold the role. Surfers, Frisbee players, and recreational dancers were altercast as experts in their respective domains. Relative to controls, such “experts” were more likely to support absurd proposals within their domain of expertise such as requiring surfboard bellies to be painted yellow with purple polka dots and students to take an orientation course on the non-existent activities of Tanzimat Frisbee and root dancing.     

A developed nature: a phenomenological account of the experience of home

Though “dwelling” is more commonly associated with Heidegger’s philosophy than with that of Merleau-Ponty, “being-at-home” is in fact integral to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I consider the notion of home as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s more familiar notions of the “lived body” and the “level,” and, in particular, I consider how the unique intertwining of activity and passivity that characterizes our being-at-home is essential to our nature as free beings. I argue that while being-at-home is essentially an experience of passivity—i.e., one that rests in the background of our experience and provides a support and structure for our life that goes largely unnoticed and that is significantly beyond our “conscious” control—being-at-home is also a way of being to which we attain. This analysis of home reveals important psychological insights into the nature of our freedom as well as into the nature of the development of our adult ways of coping and behaving.