Newton versus Leibniz: intransparency versus inconsistency

In this paper I argue that inconsistencies in scientific theories may arise from the type of causality relation they—tacitly or explicitly—embody. All these seemingly different causality relations can be subsumed under a general strategy developed to defeat the paradoxes which inevitably occur in our experience of the real. With respect to this, scientific theories are just a subclass of the larger class of metaphysical theories, construed as theories that attempt to explain a (part of) the world consistently. All metaphysical theories share a common structural backbone specificially designed to defeat paradoxes, their often wildly diverging ontological claims notwithstanding. This common structure shapes the procedures which govern the invention of ideas in the context of such theories, by codifying some onto-logical a priori assumptions regarding the consistency of reality into its bare conceptual framework. Causality plays a key rôle here, because it implies conservation of identity, itself a far from simple notion. It imposes strong demands on the universalising power of the theories concerned. These demands are often met by the introduction of a metalevel which encompasses the notions of ‘system’ and ‘lawful behaviour’. In classical mechanics, the division between universal and particular leaves its traces in the separate treatment of cinematics and dynamics. The fundamental backbone’s specific gestalt thus functions as a theory’s individual signature and paves the way to a comparative historical approach towards their study. An important part of my paper therefore explores the strong connections between paradoxes as they appear and are dealt with in ancient philosophy and their re-appearance in early modern natural philosophy and science. This analysis is applied to the mechanical theories of Newton and Leibniz, with some surprising results.     

Animal phobias versus claustrophobias: Exteroceptive versus interoceptive cues

The overall purpose of this investigation was to examine heterogeneity among specific phobias. In particular, the goals were to compare features of fear responding between individuals fearful of claustrophobic situations and individuals fearful of spiders/snakes, and to compare their response to hyperventilation challenges. By so doing, specific predictions were tested in relation to a conceptual model of exteroceptive and interoceptive fear cues. Using a nonclinical sample, 19 subjects with spider/snake phobias, 18 nonphobies, and 9 subjects with claustrophobias were exposed on two separate occasions to a live tarantula or python, a small closet, and a hyperventilation challenge. Dependent measures included subjective anxiety, panic attacks, physical symptoms, cognitive symptoms (or, fear of symptoms) and heart rate. In addition, subjects completed a standardized self-report scale that measures fear of bodily symptoms of arousal. It was found that subjects with claustrophobia reported more physical symptoms and cognitive symptoms than did subjects with snake/spider phobias, in response to their fear-relevant stimulus. In addition, claustrophobic subjects were more fearful of hyperventilation challenges and reported more fear of bodily symptoms, than did snake/spider phobic subjects. Finally, subjects with claustrophobia were as fearful of hyperventilation as they were of their fear-relevant stimulus. Theoretical and empirical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Postmodernism versus psychotherapy

‘Postmodernism’has made a substantial impact on various schools of psychotherapy, including family therapy.‘Postmodern’therapists tend to focus on the productive capacities of language, developing narrative styles for their work.‘Postmodern’family therapy is differentiated from modernist approaches by its disavowal of truth claims and its encouragement of alternative‘voices’or narratives. In this paper, it is argued that this represents too narrow an approach to psychotherapy and to postmodernism. Postmodernism takes as a central concern the limits of symbolization, so a postmodernist therapy would deal primarily with failures of language. Language-based therapeutic procedures such as those to be found in family therapy are consequently not postmodernist. This state of affairs should be welcomed, as a truly‘postmodern’mode of therapy would probably celebrate irrationality.     

Negotiation versus influence

The bargaining and minority influence literatures offer contradictory theories for the efficacy of compromise for influence. Assuming that the relative merits of these two classes of theories lie in their concentration on the public versus the private aspect of influence, we predicted that consistency (without compromise) would be more effective for attitude change but that compromise would be more effective for public concessions. We further predicted that the timing or context of the compromise could change the meaning and the consequences of that strategy. In particular, compromise ‘at the last minute’ was assumed to be a negotiating tactic that fostered both public concessions and private attitude change. The predictions were generally confirmed.     

Knowledge versus survival

Our biological survival is often taken as an argument in favour of the validity of our present conceptual scheme and cognitive frame of reference. A twofold counterargument is offered: (1) Given any notion of ‘knowledge’, ‘insight’, etc. within our present scheme, it is possible, even plausible, that such ‘knowledge’ and ‘insight’ be extended and perfected beyond what is beneficial to the survival of mankind; (2) The alleged link between survival and veridicality is not logical but contingent and tenuously tangential. Since the prevailing scheme may prove to serve ends not just other than, but opposed to survival, e.g. the end of unmasking the world and man's lot therein, survivalism may require a radical reconsideration of that scheme, including its prejudice in favour of survival. From the point of view of all current schemes or frames of reference, such a project appears inherently paradoxical.     

Belief versus acceptance

Abstract

In this paper the problem of the relation between belief and acceptance is discussed in view of recent literature on the topic. Belief and acceptance are characterized in terms of a number of properties, which show both the similarities and the dissimilarities between these notions. In particular it is claimed — contrary to some recently expressed views — that acceptance need not be intentional action and that the differences between belief and acceptance do not boil down to the simple view that acceptance, contrary to belief, is based on the agent's direct exercise of his will. Acceptance which is not based on intentional action is shown in the paper to be especially closely related to belief, especially to linguistic belief. Thus if a person is in a non‐intentional‐ly acquired and held state of acceptance that something p, he also believes that p. Another general difference is that acceptance is language‐dependent while there can be non‐linguistic belief. Collective beliefs and acceptances are also briefly discussed in the paper Among other things, it is noted that the notion of wide as contrasted with truth‐oriented, narrow acceptance is central in the collective case.     

浪漫主义与特异功能

文学的浪漫描写与特异功能迷信是有本质区别的,可是,在一些人眼中,却把两者混为一谈,特别是那些优秀的古典文学作品,特异功能鼓噪者们拿这些名著中的浪漫主义神奇描写当作“历史证据”,大加渲染,而一些思想评论文章又把这种神     

无知与奸诈

晋代葛洪(字稚川,号抱朴子,约公元284—364年)是一位著名的中医学家、儒家和道家,著有《抱朴子外篇》、《抱朴子内篇》、《金匮药方》、《肘后备急方》、《神仙传》、《隐逸传》、《集异》等书。受其生活年代的文化背景及现实的影响,葛洪是一位颇有成就的炼丹家,然而其对封建迷信的危害却有一定的认识,并力图破除一些迷信现象。今读到其中两则故事,遂生联想,乃作札记。