脑机增强：公平问题及其反思

脑机接口增强性应用引起了人们的广泛热议。相比以治疗为目的的应用,当脑机接口用于增强健全人的身体和心理等功能时,所带来的问题可能更多、更复杂,容易带来公平上的问题和挑战。面对这些问题和挑战,需要辩证地分析,客观、理性地看待。从根本上讲,导致这些不公平不在技术本身。因此,需要深刻反思脑机增强公平问题产生根源的同时,也需要从两方面予以应对,一是重视脑机增强的公平风险,二是明确脑机增强的使用范围,避免滥用。     

现象学视域中的医患关系——兼论图姆斯对"典型化"的分析

自然思维对认识不加批判,以有限的经验得出"客观真理".接受过专门训练的医生基于自然思维态度来理解疾病.生活世界是前科学、前理论的世界,具有主观性、直观性,患者是基于生活世界的态度来体验疾病.尽管"典型化"为双方交流提供了基础,但两者共享世界毕竟有限,因此,在此层面上,双方交流就不太容易.     

聆听疯癫——现象学视域下的精神疾病

福柯认为,通过对疾病意识的分析,现象学可完成精神疾病研究对其提出的两个重要任务：理解精神疾病意识、重构精神疾病的领域。借助胡塞尔的时间意识理论,疾病世界的“封闭性”与疾病生活中诸对象的混乱性,乃至其与世界的关系,都可以从现象学方面得到说明。通过胡塞尔与列维纳斯的相关理论,疯癫最终被视为自我与他者关系的特殊样态,它深刻的根植于“思”之内。因此,对精神疾病的理解——对病人的聆听——根本上就是对交互主体性的世界的分析。最终这项研究也有可能指明现象学、谱系学以及精神分析交汇的路标。     

现象学视域下的友爱、真理与语言

真理问题素来是西方哲学领域不容回避且又不易解决的难题。用现象学的眼光来看,真理不是传统形而上学尤其是近现代意识主体主义形而上学框架中的表象论真理,即先验、孤独、抽象的意识主体对持存、超越的存在之精确再现或理性规定。相反,存在是运动着的过程,真理乃运动着的存在之发生事件。这种真理观既关乎语言,也关乎语言性、历史性的人类此在朝向存在的“举止”或“心态”,甚至关乎不同此在之间的恰当关系。由此,常遭意识主体主义形而上学忽略或抵制的友爱和语言,逐渐进入真理问题的核心地带,成为真理之呈现的重要方式、场合或条件。当然,由于海德格尔、伽达默尔和德里达三位现象学家对作为运动的存在及其具体发生方式,有着不同的理解和刻画,对西方现代性社会危机中人类个体的存在方式及责任,也有着侧重不一的病理学诊断,友爱和语言在他们的真理之思中也呈现出一些不同的形态、特征和模式。     

作为现象学问题的世界

哲学发端于对世界本源的惊异,可以说,世界问题与哲学本身一样古老.然自19世纪传统哲学接受实证主义方案以来,世界问题已近乎被遗忘.只有到了胡塞尔那里,世界问题才重新被置于哲学运思的核心.在胡塞尔看来,世界起源于意识的成就.世界作为视域总是已预先被给予在我们的经验中,只有澄清了这一普遍视域的起源,现象学从主体性的意向成就出发去揭示世界起源的任务才能被完成,而这只有在实行了现象学还原以后的构造性分析中才能实现.胡塞尔的分析首先着力于澄清前哲学的对世界的理解,这样做的主要目的是要获得先验现象学对世界进行构造分析的主导线索,借以通达现象学意义上的世界概念.     

经验现象学心理学:乔治对胡塞尔现象学的继承与发展

美国现象学心理学家阿米多·乔治基于科学和心理学视角所提出的经验现象学心理学是对胡塞尔现象学的继承和发展。这表现为:在批判对象上,从胡塞尔的反二元论细化为反自然科学心理学;在出发点和基本原则上,将胡塞尔的生活世界、意向性、还原等概念从超验层面放置到经验层面;在研究方法上,从胡塞尔的描述还原过程转向具体的描述现象学心理学方法。本质上,乔治的经验现象学心理学与胡塞尔的现象学一脉相承,不仅完美地展示了后者的基本原理,更在具体概念和操作应用上充实且超越了后者。     

人类增强技术的伦理考量

人类增强技术作为利用高新技术提高人类机体功能或能力的一种技术干预手段,是对人类身体进行的一种技术上的改变,这必然在“人是什么”、社会公平、安全与自主权等方面引发一定的社会伦理问题。而这正是对“人是目的,而不仅仅是手段”这一绝对律令的违背。由此需要对人类增强技术进行全面的评估,从坚守“增强底线原则”、相关法规的制定和加强伦理审查等方面采取有效对策,预防或减少不良后果的产生。这样才能保证人类增强技术的发展做到有效性与合理性、真理性与价值性、安全性与效益性的完美统一。     

现象学心理学与经验的世界

本文阐释胡塞尔的现象学心理学在胡塞尔现象学中不明确的定位,说明它如何衔接超越论现象学和经验科学,并特别凸显经验的世界这个概念在其中所扮演的角色。论文主要分成两个部分:第一部分探究现象学心理学和超越论现象学之间的关系,说明"现象学心理学如何是超越论现象学的预备",以及"现象学心理学如何平行于超越论现象学"这两个问题;第二部分阐述胡塞尔如何藉由经验的世界此概念来为事实科学奠定基础。     

研究生社会主义核心价值观教育:现象学的视域

现象学要求面向事情本身。从现象学上看,社会主义核心价值观的事情本身是由国家、社会、公民等构成的时空境域,是人本真生存的家园,也是国家富强、民族振兴、人民幸福的中国梦。在市场经济的冲击下,一些研究生被异化为"常人","常人"被闲谈控制,科学价值观缺失。一些研究生身上不同程度地存在着理想信念模糊、劳动观念淡薄、学术道德失范、知行不够统一等问题。研究生只有面向社会主义核心价值观的事情本身,对其先行视见、先行掌握、先行领会,才能把社会主义核心价值观内化为素养、外化为行动,才能找回本真自我,塑造成理想的人格。     

论政治现象学视野下的公民教育的目的和实践

政治现象学把政治看作人存在的一种基本样式,倡导一种回归生活世界的政治,一种协商民主的政治.这对理解公民教育很有启发意义.从政治现象学的角度看,公民教育意味着通过协商民主的教育生活,培养具有参与、享受和推进社会民主能力及品德的现代公民.     

人工智能时代增强技术的实践挑战与应对策略

科学技术的发展将颠覆人类已有的认知常态,使人类面临重要的转折。人类增强技术对于科技伦理、自由主义以及公平正义的挑战,使得人与技术之间的关系发生了质的转变,给人类社会的发展带来了某种不确定性和风险性。对于人类增强技术的研发需要进行差异化管理,即遵循差别原则;在实践应用层面上需要充分考虑安全性的问题,也就是要遵循安全原则;在立法层面上需要对人类增强技术进行相应的技术立法,从而为增强技术的发展和实践应用提供良好的法律环境。

     

纳米认知增强技术的伦理考量

纳米认知增强技术是在纳米尺度上对大脑进行直接干预,从而提升正常个体认知功能的技术。该技术以其在微观环境下的高效和精准而独得宠爱,但也可引发安全和风险、自主和尊严、公平与正义以及“过时人”方面的伦理问题。在该技术的开发和将来应用过程中,必须遵循生命伦理原则,并从风险评估、伦理审查、研发主体和使用主体的道德约束和责任感、监管体系、社会价值导向和舆论环境等多角度、全方位入手,实施积极有效的对策,以使其始终沿着促进人类福祉的道路发展。

     

Sacrifice In Hegel's Phenomenology Of Spirit

In this paper I rely on recent literature that emphasises the importance of recognition in Hegel's philosophy in order to apply the recognition-theoretic approach to the notion of sacrifice in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Firstly, I conduct a preliminary analysis by examining the general meaning of sacrifice as a form of determinate negation. Secondly, I focus on two phenomenological moments (the struggle between ‘faith’ and ‘pure insight’, and the cult) in order to answer the question, ‘Is a real (effective and unselfish) sacrifice possible?’ Finally, I argue that sacrifice should be considered as a Darstellung, and I explain the twofold connection between sacrifice and recognition. I conclude that there is no sacrifice without recognition, and the process of recognition is intrinsically sacrificial.     

Discussion about the Triple Foundational Relationship between Intellect,Emotion, and Willing from the Perspective of the Phenomenology of Consciousness

There are at least three foundational relationships between the three conscious acts of intellect, emotion, and willing. Section 2 covers the structural foundational relationship (Brentano and Husserl in his early period): all conscious acts are intentional and can be divided into objectifying (intuition and representation) and non-objectifying acts (emotion and willing). Because a non-objectifying act cannot constitute an object, things must be based on objectifying acts and the object constituted by the latter; in this sense, a non-objectifying act is rooted in an objectifying one. Section 3 explains the genetic foundational issue with consciousness (Husserl in his later period, Scheler, and Heidegger): the stream of consciousness has its earliest origins and follows a process where it gradually unfolds. The earliest origin is the intentional willing, followed by nonintentional feelings, and, finally, the representation and thinking of willing. Intentional activity taking place afterward must be based on the conscious activity that has come already. Section 4 points out that, apart from the two aforementioned kinds of foundational relationships (i.e. structural and genetic), a third foundational relationship (i.e. dynamic) can also be found between the conscious acts of intellect, emotion, and willing in the Consciousness-only school (a Buddhist tradition in the East). In a continuous activity, the foundational relationship between the three aspects of intellect, emotion, and willing always remains encased in dynamic changes, and the change of primary and secondary roles (i.e. a change in the foundational relationship) could happen at any time. From this perspective, one can explain and resolve the confrontation and conflicts between the two former foundational relationships.     

从技术哲学的角度看医学影像学的发展

医学影像学是医学的一个重要组成部分, 通过阐述医学影像学与两次科技革命的发展历程, 明确医学影像学的发展与两次科技革命密不可分, 并在此基础上, 运用技术哲学的观点, 从哲学的角度分析医学影像学的发展阶段, 医学影像学经历了从技术工具化医学影像发展阶段到技术主体化医学影像发展阶段的过程, 并据此推测, 未来的发展方向将是以人文关怀为指导的技术人文化医学影像, 以求指导未来医学影像新技术的开发与应用。     

Phenomenology and the project of naturalization

In recent years, more and more people have started talking about the necessity of reconciling phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalistic models of consciousness? Is it possible to naturalize phenomenology? Given the transcendental philosophically motivated anti-naturalism found in many phenomenologists such a naturalization proposal might seem doomed from the very start, but in this paper I will examine and evaluate some possible alternatives.     

Theosis and Human Enhancement

Recent theological work on the meaning of theosis or deification has largely ignored today’s cultural context in which ordinary Christians are expected to put theosis into practice. The widespread use of various technologies of human enhancement creates expectations that might distort the interpretation of theosis. Human enhancement technologies tend to feed off the desire to expand the self, while theosis is grounded in the idea that true divinization means becoming like God in God’s own kenosis of self-giving love. The theology of theosis is a call to empty the self, not to expand it. If theosis defines the Christian life, the use of human enhancement technology is largely a matter of indifference.     

The Potential Transformation of Our Species by Neural Enhancement

ABSTRACT. Neural enhancement represents recovery of function that has been lost due to injury or disease pathology. Restoration of functional ability is the objective. For example, a neuroprosthetic to replace a forearm and hand lost to the ravages of war or industrial accident. However, the same basic constructs used for neural enhancement after injury could amplify abilities that are already in the natural normal range. That is, neural enhancement technologies to restore function and improve daily abilities for independent living could be used to improve so-called normal function to ultimate function. Approaching that functional level by use and integration of technology takes us toward the concept of a new species. This new subspecies—homo sapiens technologicus—is one that uses technology not just to assist but to change its own inherent biological function. The author uses examples from prosthetics and neuroprosthetics to address the issue of the limitations of constructs on the accepted range of human performance ability and aims to provide a cautionary view toward reflection on where our science may take the entire species.