Statistical Evaluation of Algebraic Constraints for Social Networks

A multirelational social network on a set of individuals may be represented as a collection of binary relations. Compound relations constructed from this collection represent various labeled paths linking individuals in the network. Since many models of interest for social networks can be formulated in terms of orderings among these labeled paths, we consider the problem of evaluating an hypothesized set of orderings, termed algebraic constraints. Each constraint takes the form of an hypothesized inclusion relation for a pair of labeled paths. In this paper, we establish conditions under which sets of such constraints may be regarded as partial algebras. We describe the structure of constraint sets and show that each corresponds to a subset of consistent relation bundles between pairs of individuals. We thereby construct measures of fit for a given constraint set. Then, we show how, in combination with the assumption of various conditional uniform multigraph distributions, these measures lead to a flexible approach to the evaluation of fit of an hypothesized constraint set. Several applications are presented and some possible extensions of the approach are briefly discussed. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

Logic of paradoxes in classical set theories

According to Cantor (Mathematische Annalen 21:545–586, 1883; Cantor’s letter to Dedekind, 1899) a set is any multitude which can be thought of as one (“jedes Viele, welches sich als Eines denken läßt”) without contradiction—a consistent multitude. Other multitudes are inconsistent or paradoxical. Set theoretical paradoxes have common root—lack of understanding why some multitudes are not sets. Why some multitudes of objects of thought cannot themselves be objects of thought? Moreover, it is a logical truth that such multitudes do exist. However we do not understand this logical truth so well as we understand, for example, the logical truth ${\forall x \, x = x}$ . In this paper we formulate a logical truth which we call the productivity principle. Rusell (Proc Lond Math Soc 4(2):29–53, 1906) was the first one to formulate this principle, but in a restricted form and with a different purpose. The principle explicates a logical mechanism that lies behind paradoxical multitudes, and is understandable as well as any simple logical truth. However, it does not explain the concept of set. It only sets logical bounds of the concept within the framework of the classical two valued ${\in}$ -language. The principle behaves as a logical regulator of any theory we formulate to explain and describe sets. It provides tools to identify paradoxical classes inside the theory. We show how the known paradoxical classes follow from the productivity principle and how the principle gives us a uniform way to generate new paradoxical classes. In the case of ZFC set theory the productivity principle shows that the limitation of size principles are of a restrictive nature and that they do not explain which classes are sets. The productivity principle, as a logical regulator, can have a definite heuristic role in the development of a consistent set theory. We sketch such a theory—the cumulative cardinal theory of sets. The theory is based on the idea of cardinality of collecting objects into sets. Its development is guided by means of the productivity principle in such a way that its consistency seems plausible. Moreover, the theory inherits good properties from cardinal conception and from cumulative conception of sets. Because of the cardinality principle it can easily justify the replacement axiom, and because of the cumulative property it can easily justify the power set axiom and the union axiom. It would be possible to prove that the cumulative cardinal theory of sets is equivalent to the Morse–Kelley set theory. In this way we provide a natural and plausibly consistent axiomatization for the Morse–Kelley set theory.     

Are There Enough Injective Sets?

The axiom of choice ensures precisely that, in ZFC, every set is projective: that is, a projective object in the category of sets. In constructive ZF (CZF) the existence of enough projective sets has been discussed as an additional axiom taken from the interpretation of CZF in Martin-Löf’s intuitionistic type theory. On the other hand, every non-empty set is injective in classical ZF, which argument fails to work in CZF. The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the problem whether there are (enough) injective sets in CZF. We show that no two element set is injective unless the law of excluded middle is admitted for negated formulas, and that the axiom of power set is required for proving that “there are strongly enough injective sets”. The latter notion is abstracted from the singleton embedding into the power set, which ensures enough injectives both in every topos and in IZF. We further show that it is consistent with CZF to assume that the only injective sets are the singletons. In particular, assuming the consistency of CZF one cannot prove in CZF that there are enough injective sets. As a complement we revisit the duality between injective and projective sets from the point of view of intuitionistic type theory.     

一个含有原子的自然模型∑（A）

1989年A.Blass和A.Scedrov构造了含有原子的模型V（A）（A是所有原子的集合,参见文献[1]）并证明了V（A）是ZFA（ZFA=ZF＋A,公理A断言：存在所有原子的集合）的模型。由于集合论的公理系统GB是ZF的一个保守扩充,因此,集合论的公理系统GBA（GBA=GB＋A,其中GB是集合论的含有集合和类的哥德尔－贝奈斯公理系统）也是ZFA的一个保守扩充。本文的目的是在集合论的含有原子和集合的公理系统ZFA的自然模型V（A）的基础上,为集合论的含有原子、集合和类的公理系统GBA建立模型。因此,我们首先介绍了A.Blass和A.Scedrov的含有原子的模型V（A）;第二,给出并证明V（A）具有的一些基本性质;第三,扩充了集合论的公理系统ZFA的形式语言LZFA并定义含有原子和集合的类C;第四,构造含有原子、集合和类的模型∑（A）,称它为自然模型,最后,证明了∑（A）是GBA的模型。     

Prior distributions for random choice structures

We study various axioms of discrete probabilistic choice, measuring how restrictive they are, both alone and in the presence of other axioms, given a specific class of prior distributions over a complete collection of finite choice probabilities. We do this by using Monte Carlo simulation to compute, for a range of prior distributions, probabilities that various simple and compound axioms hold. For example, the probability of the triangle inequality is usually many orders of magnitude higher than the probability of random utility. While neither the triangle inequality nor weak stochastic transitivity imply the other, the conditional probability that one holds given the other holds is greater than the marginal probability, for all priors in the class we consider. The reciprocal of the prior probability that an axiom holds is an upper bound on the Bayes factor in favor of a restricted model, in which the axiom holds, against an unrestricted model. The relatively high prior probability of the triangle inequality limits the degree of support that data from a single decision maker can provide in its favor. The much lower probability of random utility implies that the Bayes factor in favor of it can be much higher, for suitable data.     

A linear conservative extension of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory

In this paper, we develop the system LZF of set theory with the unrestricted comprehension in full linear logic and show that LZF is a conservative extension of ZF^– i.e., the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory without the axiom of regularity. We formulate LZF as a sequent calculus with abstraction terms and prove the partial cut-elimination theorem for it. The cut-elimination result ensures the subterm property for those formulas which contain only terms corresponding to sets in ZF^–. This implies that LZF is a conservative extension of ZF^– and therefore the former is consistent relative to the latter. Hiroakira Ono     

Categoricity Theorems and Conceptions of Set

Two models of second-order ZFC need not be isomorphic to each other, but at least one is isomorphic to an initial segment of the other. The situation is subtler for impure set theory, but Vann McGee has recently proved a categoricity result for second-order ZFCU plus the axiom that the urelements form a set. Two models of this theory with the same universe of discourse need not be isomorphic to each other, but the pure sets of one are isomorphic to the pure sets of the other.This paper argues that similar results obtain for considerably weaker second-order axiomatizations of impure set theory that are in line with two different conceptions of set, the iterative conception and the limitation of size doctrine.     

Taxometric analysis of fuzzy categories: a Monte Carlo study

A small Monte Carlo study examined the performance of a form of taxometric analysis (the MAXCOV procedure) with fuzzy data sets. These combine taxonic (categorical) and nontaxonic (continuous) features, containing a subset of casts with intermediate degrees of category membership. Fuzzy data sets tended to yield taxonic findings on plot inspection and two popular consistency tests, even when the degree of fuzziness, i.e., the proportion of intermediate cases, was large. These results suggest that fuzzy categories represent a source of pseudotaxonic inferences, if on is understood in the usual binary, "either-or" fashion. This in turn implies that dichotomous causes cannot be confidently inferred when taxometric analyses yield apparently taxonic findings.     

LR度中完备链的存在性(英文)

我们证明存在一个完备实数集使得在这个完备集中任何两个实数都是LR可比较的。"在LR度中是否每个完备集都包含一个不可数的反链?"这一问题多次被提及。显然,图灵归约蕴含LR归约。但过去十年的研究表明,两者之间还是存在着显著的差异的。那么一个很自然的疑问就是,图灵度中的基本结论——每个完备集都包含两个图灵不可比实数——是否在LR度中仍为真。     

The inconsistency of higher order extensions of Martin-Löf's type theory

Martin-Löf's constructive type theory forms the basis of this paper. His central notions of category and set, and their relations with Russell's type theories, are discussed. It is shown that addition of an axiom — treating the category of propositions as a set and thereby enabling higher order quantification — leads to inconsistency. This theorem is a variant of Girard's paradox, which is a translation into type theory of Mirimanoff's paradox (concerning the set of all well-founded sets). The occurrence of the contradiction is explained in set theoretical terms. Crucial here is the way a proof-object of an existential proposition is understood. It is shown that also Russell's paradox can be translated into type theory. The type theory extended with the axiom mentioned above contains constructive higher order logic, but even if one only adds constructive second order logic to type theory the contradictions arise.     

The Representation of Belief

I derive a sufficient condition for a belief set to be representable by a probability function: if at least one comparative confidence ordering of a certain type satisfies Scott’s axiom, then the belief set used to induce that ordering is representable. This provides support for Kenny Easwaran’s project of analyzing doxastic states in terms of belief sets rather than credences.     

论基础公理与反基础公理

"循环并不可恶"。本文在此基础上讨论基础公理和反基础公理。首先指出基础公理原本就是一条有争议的公理;第二,说明基础公理的局限性;第三,详细论述反基础公理家族中的三个成员,并给出它们两两不相容的一个证明;第四,分析反基础公理导致集合论域在V=WF上不断扩张的方法,并指出这种扩张的方法与数系扩张的方法相同;最后结论:良基集合理论(ZFC)与非良基集合理论(ZFC~-+AFA(或者ZFC和ZFC~-+FAFA或者ZFC和ZFC~-+SAFA))之间的关系类似于欧几里得几何学与非欧几何学之间的关系。     

From Modal Discourse to Possible Worlds

The possible-worlds semantics for modality says that a sentence is possibly true if it is true in some possible world. Given classical prepositional logic, one can easily prove that every consistent set of propositions can be embedded in a ‘maximal consistent set’, which in a sense represents a possible world. However the construction depends on the fact that standard modal logics are finitary, and it seems false that an infinite collection of sets of sentences each finite subset of which is intuitively ‘possible’ in natural language has the property that the whole set is possible. The argument of the paper is that the principles needed to shew that natural language possibility sentences involve quantification over worlds are analogous to those used in infinitary modal logic.     

On Evans's Vague Object from Set Theoretic Viewpoint

Gareth Evans proved that if two objects are indeterminately equal then they are different in reality. He insisted that this contradicts the assumption that there can be vague objects. However we show the consistency between Evans's proof and the existence of vague objects within classical logic. We formalize Evans's proof in a set theory without the axiom of extensionality, and we define a set to be vague if it violates extensionality with respect to some other set. There exist models of set theory where the axiom of extensionality does not hold, so this shows that there can be vague objects.     

Contraction: On the Decision-Theoretical Origins of Minimal Change and Entrenchment

We present a decision-theoretically motivated notion of contraction which, we claim, encodes the principles of minimal change and entrenchment. Contraction is seen as an operation whose goal is to minimize loses of informational value. The operation is also compatible with the principle that in contracting A one should preserve the sentences better entrenched than A (when the belief set contains A). Even when the principle of minimal change and the latter motivation for entrenchment figure prominently among the basic intuitions in the works of, among others, Quine and Ullian (1978), Levi (1980, 1991), Harman (1988) and Gärdenfors (1988), formal accounts of belief change (AGM, KM – see Gärdenfors (1988); Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991)) have abandoned both principles (see Rott (2000)). We argue for the principles and we show how to construct a contraction operation, which obeys both. An axiom system is proposed. We also prove that the decision-theoretic notion of contraction can be completely characterized in terms of the given axioms. Proving this type of completeness result is a well-known open problem in the field, whose solution requires employing both decision-theoretical techniques and logical methods recently used in belief change.     

Depression and the complete state model of health

Health is a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. In order to specify the contents of this positive state, the Complete State Model of Health (CSMH) considers mental health as a series of symptoms of hedonia and positive functioning, operationalized by measures of subjective, psychological, and social well-being. This model has empirically confirmed two new axioms: (a) rather than forming a single bipolar dimension, health and illness are correlated unipolar dimensions, and (b) the presence of mental health implies positive personal and social functioning. In the present article, we have taken the CSMH as the theoretical framework for the study of depression. Confirmatory factor analyses did not support the first axiom. In fact, the model that posits that measures of mental illness and health form a single bipolar dimension provided the best fit to the data.     

What is Classical Mereology?

Classical mereology is a formal theory of the part-whole relation, essentially involving a notion of mereological fusion, or sum. There are various different definitions of fusion in the literature, and various axiomatizations for classical mereology. Though the equivalence of the definitions of fusion is provable from axiom sets, the definitions are not logically equivalent, and, hence, are not inter-changeable when laying down the axioms. We examine the relations between the main definitions of fusion and correct some technical errors in prominent discussions of the axiomatization of mereology. We show the equivalence of four different ways to axiomatize classical mereology, using three different notions of fusion. We also clarify the connection between classical mereology and complete Boolean algebra by giving two “neutral” axiom sets which can be supplemented by one or the other of two simple axioms to yield the full theories; one of these uses a notion of “strong complement” that helps explicate the connections between the theories.     

Incompatibilism proved

The consequence argument attempts to show that incompatibilism is true by showing that if there is determinism, then we never had, have or will have any choice about anything. Much of the debate on the consequence argument has focused on the “beta” transfer principle, and its improvements. We shall show that on an appropriate definition of “never have had, have or will have any choice”, a version of the beta principle is a theorem given one plausible axiom for counterfactuals (weakening). Instead of being about transfer principles, the debate should be over whether the distant past and laws are up to us.