Children's understanding of inferential knowledge

The understanding of inference as a source of knowledge for 4- and 6-year-old children was investigated. Children and a puppet were shown 2 toys of different colors. The toys were hidden in separate plastic cans. After the puppet looked into 1 of the cans, 6-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, usually judged that the puppet knew the color of the toy in the other can as well. The finding that 6-year-olds attributed inferential knowledge to another observer is interpreted as evidence that children begin to understand the role of cognitive processes in knowledge acquisition around the age of 6 years.     

Children's event knowledge of cancer treatment

The purpose of the present study was to systematically describe the schematic organization of children's knowledge of the routine procedures they experience when being treated for cancer (leukemia) in outpatient pediatric oncology clinics. The effects of several independent variables, including age, time in treatment, prognastic condition, and gender, were tested on children's cognitive organization and recall of their experiences in oncology clinics relative to their experiences of other common recurrent events in their lives. In general, findings indicated that children between the ages 4 and 17 demonstrated well-organized knowledge about the events they experience in oncology clinics, particularly the administration of chemotherapy.     

Expertise and hierarchical knowledge representation in chess

Summary In two experiments the structure of knowledge representation in chess experts and average players was examined. Pattern-recognition theory explains expertise through the existence of many small, unrelated knowledge units. Recent research stresses the structure of knowledge representations. However, the standard paradigm does not allow for the detection of relations between chunks; the theoretical shift has to be accompanied by a methodological shift. In Experiment 1, by means of a partitioning task, evidence was provided for a hierarchical representation of chess positions. Chess masters formed larger and more complex knowledge units than average players. In Experiment 2, the typicality of the positions was varied. The more typical the positions were, the larger and more coherent the constructed knowledge units were. The greatest differences between both groups occurred in more typical positions. This reflects the experts' ability to relate several knowledge units with one another.     

Children's cognitive representation of the mathematical number line

Learning of the mathematical number line has been hypothesized to be dependent on an inherent sense of approximate quantity. Children's number line placements are predicted to conform to the underlying properties of this system; specifically, placements are exaggerated for small numerals and compressed for larger ones. Alternative hypotheses are based on proportional reasoning; specifically, numerals are placed relative to set anchors such as end points on the line. Traditional testing of these alternatives involves fitting group medians to corresponding regression models which assumes homogenous residuals and thus does not capture useful information from between‐ and within‐child variation in placements across the number line. To more fully assess differential predictions, we developed a novel set of hierarchical statistical models that enable the simultaneous estimation of mean levels of and variation in performance, as well as developmental transitions. Using these techniques we fitted the number line placements of 224 children longitudinally assessed from first to fifth grade, inclusive. The compression pattern was evident in mean performance in first grade, but was the best fit for only 20% of first graders when the full range of variation in the data are modeled. Most first graders' placements suggested use of end points, consistent with proportional reasoning. Developmental transition involved incorporation of a mid‐point anchor, consistent with a modified proportional reasoning strategy. The methodology introduced here enables a more nuanced assessment of children's number line representation and learning than any previous approaches and indicates that developmental improvement largely results from midpoint segmentation of the line.     

Children's implicit knowledge of harmony in Western music

Three experiments examined children's knowledge of harmony in Western music. The children heard a series of chords followed by a final, target chord. In Experiment 1, French 6- and 11-year-olds judged whether the target was sung with the vowel /i/ or /u/. In Experiment 2, Australian 8- and 11-year-olds judged whether the target was played on a piano or a trumpet. In Experiment 3, Canadian 8- and 11-year-olds judged whether the target sounded good (i.e. consonant) or bad (dissonant). The target was either the most stable chord in the established musical key (i.e. the tonic, based on do, the first note of the scale) or a less stable chord. Performance was faster (Experiments 1, 2 and 3) and more accurate (Experiment 3) when the target was the tonic chord. The findings confirm that children have implicit knowledge of syntactic functions that typify Western harmony.     

Kripke semantics for knowledge representation logics

This article provides an overview of development of Kripke semantics for logics determined by information systems. The proposals are made to extend the standard Kripke structures to the structures based on information systems. The underlying logics are defined and problems of their axiomatization are discussed. Several open problems connected with the logics are formulated. Logical aspects of incompleteness of information provided by information systems are considered.     

Children's spatial knowledge of their neighborhood environment

Six-, eight-, and ten-year-olds' spatial knowledge of their neighborhood was examined. Children initially made bearing and distance estimates from their homes to three distant landmarks in the neighborhood area. They were then asked how far their parents permitted them to travel in the neighborhood with freinds and by themselves and how far they actually traveled. Finally, children described how they found their way from one neighborhood location to another. There were three major findings. First, children at all age levels knew the general direction to distant landmarks, suggesting that children as young as 6-years-old can infer spatial relations in large, familiar environment. Second, activity range increased over age, with boys ranging further than girls. Third, although children took advantage of a wide variety of cues to find their way in their neighborhood, clear developmental patterns of cue utilization and ldway-findingrd strategies were not evident.     

Children's working understanding of knowledge sources: Confidence in knowledge gained from testimony

In three experiments, children aged between 3 and 5 years (N = 38, 52, 94; mean ages 3–7 to 5–2) indicated their confidence in their knowledge of the identity of a hidden toy. With the exception of some 3-year-olds, children revealed working understanding of their knowledge source by showing high confidence when they had seen or felt the toy, and lower confidence when they had been told its identity by an apparently well-informed speaker. Correct explicit source reports were not necessary for children to show relative uncertainty when the speaker subsequently doubted the adequacy of his access to the toy. After a 2-min delay, 3–4-year-olds, unlike 4–5-year-olds, failed to see the implications of the speaker's doubt about his access.     

The representation of explicit motor sequence knowledge

Much research has investigated the representation of implicitly learned motor sequences: Do subjects learn sequences of stimuli, responses, response locations, or some combination? Most of the work on this subject indicates that when sequences are learned implicitly, it is in terms of response locations. The present work investigated the representation of explicitly learned motor sequences. In four experiments, we found consistent evidence that explicitly learned sequences are represented in terms of stimulus locations. This conclusion held true for both self-report measures (subjects said that they learned stimuli) and performance measures, but when stimuli changed, performance degraded. We interpret these data in a multiple-memory-systems framework.     

The mental representation of knowledge acquired from maps

Recognition priming and distance estimation were used to investigate the mental representation of knowledge acquired from maps. In Experiment 1, recognition priming showed that cities close in route distance primed each other more than cities far in route distance, even when Euclidean distance was equated. Experiment 2 showed that this finding was robust and not an artifact of the way subjects learned the maps. Distance estimations in Experiment 1 supported the priming results. These results indicated that psychological distance in cognitive maps is primarily dependent on route distance rather than Euclidean distance.     

Children's partial knowledge of the cognitive skill of counting

Acquiring the knowledge that constitutes a cognitive skill is the issue examined in this research—in particular, the skill of counting. Two theories guided the research, one concerning partial knowledge during cognitive growth and the other concerning children's understanding of number. Preschool children were given four tasks involving counting skills in two identical testing sessions, using problem sizes ranging from 3 to 26 items. Stochastic models of data from these tasks separated two sources of instability in the children's performance: measurement error in the tools of assessment and, more interestingly, variability intrinsic to the way the children's knowledge was structured. It was hypothesized that the children's knowledge was organized as separate, modular components for knowing how to tag, partition, and stop. The results showed that development of skilled counting during the preschool years rests primarily on learning to merge and coordinate these components, rather than on acquiring the components themselves. When a task required very few components, the children consistently performed well. When relatively many components had to be coordinated, the children's performance was both lower in absolute level and more variable over testing sessions. Supplementary data suggested that preschool children also have difficulty coordinating their knowledge of cardinality with their execution of the counting process proper.     

Children's understanding of the knowledge prerequisites of drawing and pretending

Many young children will claim that someone is pretending to be something even when the person does not know what that something is. To examine whether children's failure to take knowledge prerequisites into account is part of a more fundamental problem in recognizing how mental representations constrain external ones, the authors asked children whether an artist who did not know what something was, yet whose drawing bore resemblance to it, was drawing it. The same questions were asked regarding pretending. Children performed similarly on pretending and drawing questions, and performance on both questions improved when the protagonists' point of view was emphasized. Performance for drawing improved somewhat when alternative goals were stated. Further, cross-sectional data indicated that understanding how knowledge relates to producing external representations increases gradually from age 4 to age 8, suggesting that experiential factors may be crucial to this understanding.     

Children's knowledge of the relation between intentional action and pretending

Two experiments investigated preschoolers’ understanding of the relation between pretending and intentional action. In Experiment 1, both 3- and 4-year olds recognized that characters whose actions were intended as pretense were pretending. However, children also judged that characters whose actions gave them the appearance of an entity unintentionally were pretending to be that entity. In Experiment 2, 3-year olds reliably chose a character whose pretense actions were intentional as pretending over a character whose actions were guided by another intention. These data suggest that preschoolers have some understanding of the role of intentional action in pretense.     

Children's knowledge acquisition through film: influence of programme characteristics

Several characteristics of educational programmes for children are discussed to influence learning of content. In the present study, positive effects of a preview and inserted summaries in educational films for learning are examined. A total of 127 6‐and 8‐year‐old participating children watched one of the four educational film versions: The original film (without preview and summaries), a version with a preview, with inserted summaries or with a verbal ‘preview’. One week later, children's recollection of facts was tested in a memory interview. Results show that previews and summaries in educational films can enhance learning, and that visual scene repetition appears to further boost knowledge acquisition. Formal and content characteristics of educational programmes are discussed in terms of the underlying mechanisms influencing children's cognitive processing and learning. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's knowledge of prepositional phrase structure: An experimental test

A test of prepositional phrase structure in 4- to 6-year-old children's language is reported. Children's productions of PP and verb-particle sequences were elicited. Children produced pronominal and full NP objects of sequences corresponding to PPs and verb-plus-particle in the adult grammar. Prepositions freely took both pronominal and full NP objects (He's jumping over it. He's jumping over the table). In particle verb constructions, pronominal objects were placed immediately after the verb in all but a few cases (He's pushing it overnot He's pushing over it). With full NP objects, the preference was to place the verb after the particle (He's pushing over the table). These facts support an analysis in which if the child constructs a PP-over-P—NP structure for prepositional phrases but not for verb-particle sequences, and follows adultlike rules for these structures.This research was supported in its initial stages by NIH grant No. HD90647-03 to T. Roeper and S.J. Keyser and was completed while the author was supported in part by grants from the Graduate School Research Committee of the University of Wisconsin-Madison and from the Spencer Foundation through the University of Wisconsin School of Education.     

Children's representation of symbolic and nonsymbolic magnitude examined with the priming paradigm

How people process and represent magnitude has often been studied using number comparison tasks. From the results of these tasks, a comparison distance effect (CDE) is generated, showing that it is easier to discriminate two numbers that are numerically further apart (e.g., 2 and 8) compared with numerically closer numbers (e.g., 6 and 8). However, it has been suggested that the CDE reflects decisional processes rather than magnitude representation. In this study, therefore, we investigated the development of symbolic and nonsymbolic number processes in kindergartners and first, second, and sixth graders using the priming paradigm. This task has been shown to measure magnitude and not decisional processes. Our findings revealed that a priming distance effect (PDE) is already present in kindergartners and that it remains stable across development. This suggests that formal schooling does not affect magnitude representation. No differences were found between the symbolic and nonsymbolic PDE, indicating that both notations are processed with comparable precision. Finally, a poorer performance on a standardized mathematics test seemed to be associated with a smaller PDE for both notations, possibly suggesting that children with lower mathematics scores have a less precise coding of magnitude. This supports the defective number module hypothesis, which assumes an impairment of number sense.