Attentional bias in high- and low-anxious individuals: Evidence for threat-induced effects on engagement and disengagement

Attentional bias to threatening visual stimuli (words or pictures) is commonly present in anxious individuals, but not in non-anxious people. There is evidence to show that attentional bias to threat can be induced in all individuals when threat is imposed by threat not of symbolic nature, but by cues that predict aversive stimulation (loud noise or electric shock). However, it is not known whether attentional bias in such situations is still influenced by individual differences in anxiety. This question was addressed in two experiments using a spatial cuing task in which visual cues predicted the occurrence of an aversive event consisting of a loud human scream. Speeded attentional engagement to threat cues was positively correlated with trait anxiety in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 showed that speeded attentional engagement was present only in participants selected for high anxiety but not in low-anxious participants. In both experiments, slower disengagement from threat cues was found in all participants, irrespective of their trait anxiety levels.     

Attentional bias in high- and low-anxious individuals: evidence for threat-induced effects on engagement and disengagement

Attentional bias to threatening visual stimuli (words or pictures) is commonly present in anxious individuals, but not in non-anxious people. There is evidence to show that attentional bias to threat can be induced in all individuals when threat is imposed by threat not of symbolic nature, but by cues that predict aversive stimulation (loud noise or electric shock). However, it is not known whether attentional bias in such situations is still influenced by individual differences in anxiety. This question was addressed in two experiments using a spatial cuing task in which visual cues predicted the occurrence of an aversive event consisting of a loud human scream. Speeded attentional engagement to threat cues was positively correlated with trait anxiety in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 showed that speeded attentional engagement was present only in participants selected for high anxiety but not in low-anxious participants. In both experiments, slower disengagement from threat cues was found in all participants, irrespective of their trait anxiety levels.     

Anxiety and cognitive inhibition

In 3 experiments, the authors investigated whether anxiety proneness is associated with impaired inhibitory processing. Participants made speeded decisions requiring inhibition of threatening or neutral meanings of ambiguous words, which were inappropriate in their current context. In Experiment 1 there were no differences found in inhibitory processing associated with anxiety. However, in Experiment 2, when the capacity for controlled processing was reduced by imposition of a mental load, anxious individuals showed a response pattern consistent with a general impairment of inhibitory processing. In Experiment 3, a group who had experienced a traumatic event also showed evidence of impaired inhibition, despite the absence of additional load. Thus anxiety proneness is associated with a general deficit of inhibitory processing, but this may be revealed only under conditions that limit the availability of controlled processing resources.     

Effects of stress and anxiety on the processing of threat stimuli

Two experiments extended the work of MacLeod and Mathews (1988) and examined whether a cognitive bias for threat information is a function of state or trait anxiety. Color-naming and attention deployment tasks were used to assess the effects of a stress manipulation procedure on attentional responses in high and low trait anxious subjects. Subjects under high stress selectively allocated processing resources toward threat stimuli, irrespective of their trait anxiety level. There was no consistent evidence of a cognitive bias associated with trait anxiety, and the effect of the stress manipulation did not appear to be mediated by state anxiety. It was suggested that trait factors do not modify attentional biases associated with acute stress, but may influence such biases when stress is prolonged.     

Searching for threat

In a series of experiments, a visual search task was used to test the idea that biologically relevant threatening stimuli might be recognized very quickly or capture visuo-spatial attention. In Experiment 1, there was evidence for both faster detection and faster search rates for threatening animals than for plants. However, examination of the basis of this effect in Experiment 2 showed that it was not due to threat per se, as detection and search rate advantages were found for pleasant rather than threatening animals compared to plants. In Experiment 3, participants searched for the plants and pleasant and threatening animals used in Experiments 1 and 2, among a fixed heterogeneous selection of non-target items. There was no search rate or detection advantage for threatening animals compared to pleasant animals or plants. The same targets and non-targets as those used in Experiment 3 were also used in Experiment 4. In Experiment 4, participants searched for targets that were presented either close to or distant from an initial fixation point. There was no evidence for a "threat" detection advantage either close to or distant from the cross. Finally, an experiment was conducted in which target categories (fruit, flowers, and animals) were not pre-specified prior to each trial block. There were no differences in reaction times to detect pleasant animals, threatening animals, or fruit. We conclude that the visual search paradigm does not readily reveal any biases that might exist for threatening stimuli in the general population.     

Emotional context influences access of visual stimuli to anxious individuals' awareness

Anxiety has been associated with enhanced unconscious processing of threat and attentional biases towards threat. Here, we focused on the phenomenology of perception in anxiety and examined whether threat-related material more readily enters anxious than non-anxious individuals' awareness. In six experiments, we compared the stimulus exposures required for each anxiety group to become objectively or subjectively aware of masked facial stimuli varying in emotional expression. Crucially, target emotion was task irrelevant. We found that high trait-anxiety individuals required less sensory evidence (shorter stimulus exposure times) to become aware of the face targets. This anxiety-based difference was observed for fearful faces in all experiments, but with non-threat faces, it emerged only when these were presented among threatening faces. Our findings suggest a prominent role for affective context in high-anxiety individuals' conscious perception of visual stimuli. Possible mechanisms underlying the influence of context in lowering awareness thresholds in anxious individuals are discussed.     

Does anxiety lead to selective processing of threat-related information?

Four experiments investigating the detailed nature of the attentional bias in anxiety are reported. Previous research using the Stroop task has shown that, when compared with non-patient controls, anxious patients are relatively slower at colour naming threat-related words than non-threat words. Experiments One and Two investigated whether this apparent attentional bias is a function of anxiety per se and/or is related to patient/non-patient status. Experiment One compared colour-naming times for threat and non-threat words in low, medium and high trait anxiety normal subjects. High anxiety was not associated with slower colour-naming times for threat words. Experiment Two compared generalized anxiety disorder patients with equally anxious non-patients and found that the patients were significantly slower at colour-naming threat words. Read aloud and dwell tasks were also included in these experiments in order to identify the mechanism of Stroop interference. Experiments Three and Four investigated whether anxious patients' attentional bias is specific to threat-related material or also extends to certain positive, emotional material. In Experiment Three words used in previous Stroop studies were rated for emotionality. Threat words were more emotional, as well as more threatening, than control words, indicating that previous studies have confounded threat and emotionality. Experiment Four compared colour-naming times for threat words, equally emotional positive words, and neutral words. Consistent with the emotionality hypothesis, generalized anxiety disorder patients were slower than non-anxious controls at colour naming both threat words and positive words. The theoretical, methodological and clinical implications of these results are discussed.     

Response inhibition and attentional control in anxiety

Traditionally, anxiety has been associated with a selective attentional bias for threat and a decreased capacity in attentional control. In two different experiments, we investigated whether individuals with different levels of self-reported state anxiety (Experiment 1) and induced anxiety (Experiment 2) had impaired response inhibition processes (attentional control deficit) as characterized by a different response style in the presence of negative stimuli under low and high perceptual load conditions. A go/no-go paradigm with emotional distractors (angry, happy, and neutral faces) was used to provide measures of perceptual sensitivity, inhibition, and response style. Our findings showed that perceptual sensitivity, as assessed by the d' parameter of signal detection theory, was reduced in all participants for angry faces under low perceptual load, where enough perceptual resources were available to be attracted by distractors. Importantly, despite similar perceptual sensitivity, the beta parameter indicated that high state anxiety individuals in both experiments were less flexible at adjusting to task demands in the presence of angry face distractors by adopting a stricter criterion. Implications of findings are discussed within current models of attentional control in anxiety.     

Information from multiple modalities helps 5‐month‐olds learn abstract rules

By 7 months of age, infants are able to learn rules based on the abstract relationships between stimuli ( Marcus et al ., 1999 ), but they are better able to do so when exposed to speech than to some other classes of stimuli. In the current experiments we ask whether multimodal stimulus information will aid younger infants in identifying abstract rules. We habituated 5‐month‐olds to simple abstract patterns (ABA or ABB) instantiated in coordinated looming visual shapes and speech sounds (Experiment 1), shapes alone (Experiment 2), and speech sounds accompanied by uninformative but coordinated shapes (Experiment 3). Infants showed evidence of rule learning only in the presence of the informative multimodal cues. We hypothesize that the additional evidence present in these multimodal displays was responsible for the success of younger infants in learning rules, congruent with both a Bayesian account and with the Intersensory Redundancy Hypothesis.     

Implicit self-esteem compensation: automatic threat defense

Four experiments demonstrated implicit self-esteem compensation (ISEC) in response to threats involving gender identity (Experiment 1), implicit racism (Experiment 2), and social rejection (Experiments 3-4). Under conditions in which people might be expected to suffer a blow to self-worth, they instead showed high scores on 2 implicit self-esteem measures. There was no comparable effect on explicit self-esteem. However, ISEC was eliminated following self-affirmation (Experiment 3). Furthermore, threat manipulations increased automatic intergroup bias, but ISEC mediated these relationships (Experiments 2-3). Thus, a process that serves as damage control for the self may have negative social consequences. Finally, pretest anxiety mediated the relationship between threat and ISEC (Experiment 3), whereas ISEC negatively predicted anxiety among high-threat participants (Experiment 4), suggesting that ISEC may function to regulate anxiety. The implications of these findings for automatic emotion regulation, intergroup bias, and implicit self-esteem measures are discussed.     

Selective interpretation in anxiety: Uncertainty for threatening events

The role of event uncertainty on inferences predictive of threat was investigated in high and low trait anxious individuals. Participants read context sentences predicting threat or nonthreat outcomes. They subsequently named target words that were consistent with or unrelated to prediction. In Experiment 1, with predictability relatively low, anxious participants showed clear threat bias in their inferences: Although nonthreat targets were unaffected by context, shorter naming latencies were found for threat target words that followed a threat predicting context. A low anxiety group showed an opposite effect, that is, facilitation only for nonthreat words, suggesting an avoidance (of threat) bias. In Experiment 2, under higher predictability, this bias disappeared, as both high and low anxious groups performed similarly. The relevance of these data for different models of selective processing in anxiety is discussed. Of particular pertinence is the finding that, with increasing stimulus threat, low anxious participants no longer show avoidance; instead, they infer threat in a way similar to the high anxious. This suggests that the difference between the high and the low anxious persons resides in the threshold at which stimulus threat input is processed.     

False recognition of abstract versus common objects in older and younger adults: testing the semantic categorization account

Older adults often demonstrate higher levels of false recognition than do younger adults. However, in experiments using novel shapes without preexisting semantic representations, this age-related elevation in false recognition was found to be greatly attenuated. Two experiments tested a semantic categorization account of these findings, examining whether older adults show especially heightened false recognition if the stimuli have preexisting semantic representations, such that semantic category information attenuates or truncates the encoding or retrieval of item-specific perceptual information. In Experiment 1, ambiguous shapes were presented with or without disambiguating semantic labels. Older adults showed higher false recognition when labels were present but not when labels were never presented. In Experiment 2, older adults showed higher false recognition for concrete but not abstract objects. The semantic categorization account was supported.     

The processing of affectively valenced stimuli: The role of surprise

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that the surprise mechanism activates a threat detection system that prioritises the processing of threat-related stimuli. In Experiment 1, participants responded to a dot that appeared during the presentation of two words. In the critical trial, one of the two words was either pleasant or unpleasant. In Experiment 2, depending on the condition, the participants had to decide whether at least one of two simultaneously presented pictures depicted either a pleasant or an unpleasant stimulus. In the critical trial, both a pleasant and an unpleasant picture appeared. In both experiments, the stimuli in the critical trial were presented either during routine behaviour or in the context of a surprising event. The results showed that during routine behaviour unpleasant stimuli received more attentive resources than pleasant stimuli only if the affective valence of the stimuli was action-relevant (Experiment 2). In contrast, in the context of surprise, unpleasant words engaged more attentive resources than pleasant words although they were action-irrelevant (Experiment 1). In addition, in the context of surprise, the decision time increase was more pronounced in the pleasant than in the unpleasant experimental group. This finding was interpreted as evidence that the threat detection system of the surprise mechanism initially searches for a threat-related stimulus.     

Intentional versus unintentional use of contingencies between perceptual events

In three experiments we studied human ability to use statistical contingencies between visual stimuli (flankers and targets) to improve performance in a letter-digit classification task. We compared the performance of explicitly informed subjects with that of subjects who were told nothing of the contingencies. Simultaneous presentation of flankers and targets (Experiment 1) produced evidence of unintentional contingency use by both informed and uninformed subjects. When stimuli on trialn predicted target stimuli on trialn+1 (Experiment 2) there was no evidence of unintentional processes, but informed subjects showed strong evidence of using intentional prediction strategies. When flanker onset preceded target stimuli presentation (Experiment 3), evidence of contingency use by both informed and uninformed subjects was found, but the data illustrated qualitative differences in response style (e.g., speed-accuracy tradeoffs) between the two groups. Intentional and unintentional uses of contingencies between perceptual events are qualitatively distinct with respect to the time frame in which they can be applied and the performance patterns they produce. Finally, we argue that the unintentional processes studied here are implicit in nature.     

Naming and equivalence: Response latencies for emergent relations

In an attempt to distinguish between associative network and verbal mediation accounts of equivalence formation, three experiments were carried out in which conditional stimulus relations were established and response latencies assessed during tests for emergent relations. In Experiment 1, three groups of adults were trained with six three-member classes of visual stimuli, using different kinds of stimuli for each group: readily nameable pictograms, which were “preassociated” (Group 1); equally nameable but “non-associated” pictograms (Group 2); or non-associated “abstract” stimuli, designed to discourage the use of verbal mediators (Group 3). For those trained with pictograms, equal response latencies were observed on all tested relations, viz. trained associations, symmetry, transitivity, and transitivity with symmetry, but for subjects given abstract stimuli response latencies were greater on tests requiring transitivity. In Experiment 2 this result was replicated with methodological refinements, using only groups trained with preassociated pictograms or abstract stimuli. In Experiment 3 subjects were pretrained to label abstract stimuli with either individual names or class names. Latencies were longer for tests involving transitivity in the case of those subjects using individual names, but equal response latencies were observed on all four types of test for those using class names. The results suggest that equivalence classesMaybe supported by either an associative network or by verbal mediation, depending on stimulus conditions and the subsequent strategies employed by subjects.     

The behavioral inhibition system and the verbal information pathway to children's fears

The behavioral inhibition system (BIS) is the neurological substrate of trait anxiety and is linked to the development of anxiety disorders. Three experiments are reported that investigate the moderating influence of the BIS on 1 pathway to fear: threat information. In all studies, children were given verbal information about a set of novel animals, and their BIS sensitivity was measured. The results suggest that BIS sensitivity (a) facilitates attentional biases to stimuli associated with threat information and (b) facilitates behavioral avoidance of novel stimuli associated with threat information. This suggests a possible mechanism through which the BIS may promote the acquisition of animal fears.     

Anxiety-related threat bias in recognition memory: the moderating effect of list composition and semantic-similarity effects

Individuals with high anxiety show bias for threatening information, but it is unclear whether this bias affects memory. Recognition memory studies have shown biases for recognising and rejecting threatening items in anxiety, prompting the need to identify moderating factors of this effect. This study focuses on the role of semantic similarity: the use of many semantically related threatening words could increase familiarity for those items and obscure anxiety-related differences in memory. To test this, two recognition memory experiments varied the proportion of threatening words in lists to manipulate the semantic-similarity effects. When similarity effects were reduced, participants with high trait anxiety were biased to respond “new” to threatening words, whereas when similarity effects were strong there was no effect of anxiety on memory bias. Analysis of the data with the drift diffusion model showed that the bias was due to differences in processing of the threatening stimuli rather than a simple response bias. These data suggest that the semantic similarity of the threatening words significantly affects the presence or absence of anxiety-related threat bias in recognition memory. The results indicate that trait anxiety is associated with a bias to decide that threatening stimuli were not previously studied, but only when semantic-similarity effects are controlled. Implications for theories of anxiety and future studies in this domain are discussed.     

Attentional bias to threat: Roles of trait anxiety, stressful events, and awareness

Attentional biases for threat stimuli were assessed in high and low trait anxious subjects (n = 66) using a probe detection task. To examine the effects of trait anxiety and situational stressors, each subject was tested three times: Under no stress, laboratory-induced stress, and examination-induced stress. To evaluate the role of awareness, half the word stimuli were presented very briefly (14 msec) and masked, and the other half were presented for 500 msec without a mask. Results showed that high trait anxious subjects under exam stress showed an attentional bias towards unmasked threat stimuli compared with low trait subjects. This effect was not found under lab-induced stress, suggesting that the attentional bias for unmasked threat in high trait subjects may be a function of a prolonged stressor, rather than a transient increase in state anxiety. The results from the masked exposure condition were not predicted; high trait anxious subjects shifted attention towards the spatial location of threat words despite lack of awareness of their lexical content, but this bias was only apparent in the no-stress condition. The results are discussed in relation to recent cognitive theories of anxiety.     

Subjective shortening with filled and unfilled auditory and visual intervals in humans?

Two experiments tested humans on a memory for duration task based on the method of Wearden and Ferrara (1993), which had previously provided evidence for subjective shortening in memory for stimulus duration. Auditory stimuli were tones (filled) or click-defined intervals (unfilled). Filled visual stimuli were either squares or lines, with the unfilled interval being the time between two line presentations. In Experiment 1, good evidence for subjective shortening was found when filled and unfilled visual stimuli, or filled auditory stimuli, were used, but evidence for subjective shortening with unfilled auditory stimuli was more ambiguous. Experiment 2 used a simplified variant of the Wearden and Ferrara task, and evidence for subjective shortening was obtained from all four stimulus types.     

Infants’ representations of same and different in match- and non-match-to-sample

Three experiments investigated the representations that underlie 14-month-old infants’ and adults’ success at match-to-sample (MTS) and non-match-to-sample (NMTS) tasks. In Experiment 1, 14-month-old infants were able to learn rules based on abstract representations of sameness and/or difference. When presented with one of eighteen sample stimuli (A) and a choice between a stimulus that was the same as the sample (A) and a different stimulus (B), infants learned to choose A in MTS and B in NMTS. In Experiments 2 and 3, we began to explore the nature of the representations at play in these paradigms. Experiment 2 confirmed that abstract representations were at play, as infants generalized the MTS and NMTS rules to stimuli unseen during familiarization. Experiment 2 also showed that infants tested in MTS learned to seek the stimulus that was the same as the sample, whereas infants tested in NMTS did not learn to seek the different stimulus, but instead learned to avoid the stimulus that was the same as the sample. Infants appeared to only use an abstract representation of the relation same in these experiments. Experiment 3 showed that adult participants, despite knowing the words “same” and “different”, also relied on representations of sameness in both MTS and NMTS in a paradigm modeled on that of Experiment 2. We conclude with a discussion of how young infants may possibly represent the abstract relation same.