Mental imagery and pictorial memory

Previous research has failed to show consistent effects upon memory performance of individual differences in the use of mental imagery. A test of pictorial memory was devised which varied the ease with which the stimulus patterns could be verbally encoded. A factor analysis related performance in this task to a variety of other individual characteristics. The recall of material which could not be readily verbalized defined a factor within the solution which showed significant loadings of age and performance in the Progressive Matrices, but not of subjective ratings of the vividness of experienced imagery. The recall of material which could be readily verbalized did not contribute to the factorial structure of the results. It was concluded that the two sorts of pictorial material are remembered in quite different ways.     

Mental imagery and the third dimension

What sort of medium underlies imagery for three-dimensional scenes? In the present investigation, the time subjects took to scan between objects in a mental image was used to infer the sorts of geometric information that images preserve. Subjects studied an open box in which five objects were suspended, and learned to imagine this display with their eyes closed. In the first experiment, subjects scanned by tracking an imaginary point moving in a straight line between the imagined objects. Scanning times increased linearly with increasing distance between objects in three dimensions. Therefore metric 3-D information must be preserved in images, and images cannot simply be 2-D "snapshots." In a second experiment, subjects scanned across the image by "sighting" objects through an imaginary rifle sight. Here scanning times were found to increase linearly with the two-dimensional separations between objects as they appeared from the original viewing angle. Therefore metric 2-D distance information in the original perspective view must be preserved in images, and images cannot simply be 3-D "scale-models" that are assessed from any and all directions at once. In a third experiment, subjects mentally rotated the display 90 degrees and scanned between objects as they appeared in this new perspective view by tracking an imaginary rifle signt, as before. Scanning times increased linearly with the two-dimensional separations between objects as they would appear from the new relative viewing perspective. Therefore images can display metric 2-D distance information in a perspective view never actually experiences, so mental images cannot simply be "snapshot plus scale model" pairs. These results can be explained by a model in which the three-dimensional structure of objects is encoded in long-term memory in 3-D object-centered coordinate systems. When these objects are imagined, this information is then mapped onto a single 2-D "surface display" in which the perspective properties specific to a given viewing angle can be depicted. In a set of perceptual control experiments, subjects scanned a visible display by (a) simply moving their eyes from one object to another, (b) sweeping an imaginary rifle sight over the display, or (c) tracking an imaginary point moving from one object to another. Eye-movement times varied linearly with 2-D interobject distance, as did time to scan with an imaginary rifle sight; time to tract a point varied independently with the 3-D and 2-D interobject distances. These results are compared with the analogous image scanning results to argue that imagery and perception share some representational structures but that mental image scanning is a process distinct from eye movements or eye-movement commands.     

Mental imagery: in search of a theory

It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is special, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive architecture, and ones that are attributable to tacit knowledge used to simulate what would happen in a visual situation. With this distinction in mind, the paper then considers in detail the widely held assumption that in some important sense images are spatially displayed or are depictive, and that examining images uses the same mechanisms that are deployed in visual perception. I argue that the assumption of the spatial or depictive nature of images is only explanatory if taken literally, as a claim about how images are physically instantiated in the brain, and that the literal view fails for a number of empirical reasons--for example, because of the cognitive penetrability of the phenomena cited in its favor. Similarly, while it is arguably the case that imagery and vision involve some of the same mechanisms, this tells us very little about the nature of mental imagery and does not support claims about the pictorial nature of mental images. Finally, I consider whether recent neuroscience evidence clarifies the debate over the nature of mental images. I claim that when such questions as whether images are depictive or spatial are formulated more clearly, the evidence does not provide support for the picture-theory over a symbol-structure theory of mental imagery. Even if all the empirical claims were true, they do not warrant the conclusion that many people have drawn from them: that mental images are depictive or are displayed in some (possibly cortical) space. Such a conclusion is incompatible with what is known about how images function in thought. We are then left with the provisional counterintuitive conclusion that the available evidence does not support rejection of what I call the "null hypothesis"; namely, that reasoning with mental images involves the same form of representation and the same processes as that of reasoning in general, except that the content or subject matter of thoughts experienced as images includes information about how things would look.     

Mental imagery,reasoning, and blindness

Although reasoning seems to be inextricably linked to seeing in the “mind's eye”, the evidence is equivocal. In three experiments, sighted, blindfolded sighted, and congenitally totally blind persons solved deductive inferences based on three sorts of relation: (a) visuo-spatial relations that are easy to envisage either visually or spatially, (b) visual relations that are easy to envisage visually but hard to envisage spatially, and (c) control relations that are hard to envisage both visually and spatially. In absolute terms, congenitally totally blind persons performed less accurately and more slowly than the sighted on all such tasks. In relative terms, however, the visual relations in comparison with control relations impeded the reasoning of sighted and blindfolded participants, whereas congenitally totally blind participants performed the same with the different sorts of relation. We conclude that mental images containing visual details that are irrelevant to an inference can even impede the process of reasoning. Persons who are blind from birth—and who thus do not tend to construct visual mental images—are immune to this visual-impedance effect.     

Mental imagery, reasoning, and blindness

Although reasoning seems to be inextricably linked to seeing in the “mind's eye”, the evidence is equivocal. In three experiments, sighted, blindfolded sighted, and congenitally totally blind persons solved deductive inferences based on three sorts of relation: (a) visuo-spatial relations that are easy to envisage either visually or spatially, (b) visual relations that are easy to envisage visually but hard to envisage spatially, and (c) control relations that are hard to envisage both visually and spatially. In absolute terms, congenitally totally blind persons performed less accurately and more slowly than the sighted on all such tasks. In relative terms, however, the visual relations in comparison with control relations impeded the reasoning of sighted and blindfolded participants, whereas congenitally totally blind participants performed the same with the different sorts of relation. We conclude that mental images containing visual details that are irrelevant to an inference can even impede the process of reasoning. Persons who are blind from birth—and who thus do not tend to construct visual mental images—are immune to this visual-impedance effect.     

Mental scanning in auditory imagery for songs

Four experiments examined how people operate on memory representations of familiar songs. The tasks were similar to those used in studies of visual imagery. In one task, subjects saw a one-word lyric from a song and then saw a second lyric; then they had to say if the second lyric was from the same song as the first. In a second task, subjects mentally compared pitches of notes corresponding to song lyrics. In both tasks, reaction time increased as a function of the distance in beats between the two lyrics in the actual song, and in some conditions reaction time increased with the starting beat of the earlier lyric. Imagery instructions modified the main results somewhat in the first task, but not in the second, much harder task. The results suggest that song representations have temporal-like characteristics.     

Mental imagery and creativity: A meta‐analytic review study

The reports of many creative individuals suggest the use of mental imagery in scientific and artistic production. A variety of protocols have tested the association between mental imagery and creativity, but the individual differences approach has been most frequently employed. This approach is assessed here through a range of meta‐analytic tests. Database searches revealed 18 papers employing the individual differences approach that were subjected to a conservative set of selection criteria. Nine studies (1,494 participants) were included in the final analyses. A marginal, but statistically significant, Fisher's Z‐transformed correlation coefficient was revealed. Further analyses showed little difference between form and type of self‐reported imagery and divergent thinking. Explanations for the failure to account for more than 3% of the variance in the data sets are discussed in the context of anecdotal reports, task validity, and design problems.     

Representational gravity: Empirical findings and theoretical implications

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Judgment of the location of a previously viewed moving or stationary target is often displaced in the direction of implied gravitational attraction, and this has...     

Mental imagery as an emotional amplifier: application to bipolar disorder

Cognitions in the form of mental images have a more powerful impact on emotion than their verbal counterparts. This review synthesizes the cognitive science of imagery and emotion with transdiagnostic clinical research, yielding novel predictions for the basis of emotional volatility in bipolar disorder. Anxiety is extremely common in patients with bipolar disorder and is associated with increased dysfunction and suicidality, yet it is poorly understood and rarely treated. Mental imagery is a neglected aspect of bipolar anxiety although in anxiety disorders such as posttraumatic stress disorder and social phobia focusing on imagery has been crucial for the development of cognitive behavior therapy (CBT).In this review we present a cognitive model of imagery and emotion applied to bipolar disorder. Within this model mental imagery amplifies emotion, drawing on Clark's cyclical panic model [(1986). A cognitive approach to panic. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 24, 461–470]. We (1) emphasise imagery's amplification of anxiety (cycle one); (2) suggest that imagery amplifies the defining (hypo-) mania of bipolar disorder (cycle two), whereby the overly positive misinterpretation of triggers leads to mood elevation (escalated by imagery), increasing associated beliefs, goals, and action likelihood (all strengthened by imagery).Imagery suggests a unifying explanation for key unexplained features of bipolar disorder: ubiquitous anxiety, mood instability and creativity. Introducing imagery has novel implications for bipolar treatment innovation - an area where CBT improvements are much-needed.     

Mental imagery and the distinction between primary and secondary memory

Previous research has shown that the imageability of stimulus material affects the secondary memory (SM) component of free recall, but not the primary memory (PM) component, and that a negative recency effect is only observed for material of high imageability. It was found that interactive imagery instructions affected the SM component, but not the PM component; separative imagery instructions led to an increased PM component and a reduced SM component. A negative recency effect can be observed in an initial, delayed recall test. However, it is removed by imagery mnemonic instructions. This supports the idea that the negative recency effect is caused by the fact that subjects do not normally image the last few words presented in a free-recall task.     

Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics

In this paper, we challenge Jaegwon Kim’s version of neural reductionism according to which the causal powers of mental properties are pre-empted by those of neural properties. Using empirical and theoretical developments from the field of embedded cognition, we articulate and defend a notion of process externalism that extends Clark and Chalmers’ notion of an extended mind. We argue that process externalism undermines one of Kim’s key premises leading to the alternative conclusion that mental causation cannot be reduced to neural causation. Instead, mental properties have their own new causal powers just like other scientifically established macroproperties.     

Mental imagery in a visuospatial working memory task and modulation of activation

Ability to process information during a mental imagery task relying on visuospatial working memory and the advantages offered by the possibility of focusing the activation on specific items were examined in younger and older adults. The mental imagery task used for the study required participants to mentally move on a two-dimensional (5×5) or three-dimensional (3×3×3) matrix, while having to hold in memory either the whole pathway (WP condition) or just the final position reached (FP condition). The results revealed age-related differences in ability to modulate activation of visuospatial information. In particular, older adults, unlike the younger counterparts, did not benefit when the task allowed just part of the presented material to be considered. In particular, they drew less advantage from the three-dimensional matrix than the younger group. The findings are discussed in terms of the importance of processes reducing visuospatial working memory activation of irrelevant information and of the difficulties encountered by older adults in the modulation of activation.     

Neighborhood effects in reading aloud: new findings and new challenges for computational models

A word from a dense neighborhood is often read aloud faster than a word from a sparse neighborhood. This advantage is usually attributed to orthography, but orthographic and phonological neighbors are typically confounded. Two experiments investigated the effect of neighborhood density on reading aloud when phonological density was varied while orthographic density was held constant, and vice versa. A phonological neighborhood effect was observed, but not an orthographic one. These results are inconsistent with the predominant role ascribed to orthographic neighbors in accounts of visual word recognition and reading aloud. Consistent with this interpretation, 6 different computational models of reading aloud failed to simulate this pattern of results. The results of the present experiments thus provide a new understanding of some of the processes underlying reading aloud, and new challenges for computational models.     

Mental imagery of visual motion modifies the perception of roll-vection stimulation

When viewing a wide-angle visual display, which rotates in the frontoparallel plane around the line of sight, observers experience an illusory shift of the direction of gravity; this shift leads to an apparent tilt of the body and displaces allocentric space coordinates. In this study, subjects adjusted an indicator to the apparent horizontal while viewing a rotating display. To determine whether top down processes could affect the illusion, the subjects were asked to visualize a rotating configuration of dots onto a blank central portion of the moving visual field. Visualizing dots and actually viewing the dots deflected the spatial judgment in very similar ways. These results demonstrate that top down processing can affect allocentric space coordinates.     

A simple syllogism-solving test: Empirical findings and implications for g research

It has been reported that the ability to solve syllogisms is highly g-loaded. In the present study, using a self-administered shortened version of a syllogism-solving test, the BAROCO Short, we examined whether robust findings generated by previous research regarding IQ scores were also applicable to BAROCO Short scores. Five syllogism-solving problems were included in a questionnaire as part of a postal survey conducted by the Keio Twin Research Center. Data were collected from 487 pairs of twins (1021 individuals) who were Japanese junior high or high school students (ages 13–18) and from 536 mothers and 431 fathers. Four findings related to IQ were replicated: 1) The mean level increased gradually during adolescence, stayed unchanged from the 30s to the early 50s, and subsequently declined after the late 50s. 2) The scores for both children and parents were predicted by the socioeconomic status of the family. 3) The genetic effect increased, although the shared environmental effect decreased during progression from adolescence to adulthood. 4) Children's scores were genetically correlated with school achievement. These findings further substantiate the close association between syllogistic reasoning ability and g.     

Motor imagery: the relation between age and imagery capacity

The imagination of motor actions forms not only a theoretical challenge for cognitive neuroscience but may also be seen as a novel therapeutic tool in neurological rehabilitation, in that it can be used for relearning motor control after damage to the motor system. However, since the majority of rehabilitation patients consist of older individuals it is relevant to know whether the capacity of mental imaging is compromised by age. Scores on the vividness of movement imagery questionnaire were obtained for 333 participants, divided in three age groups. Results showed that elderly participants were slightly worse in motor imagery capacity than younger participants, particularly in relation to motor imagery from an internal (first person) perspective. Furthermore, a possible relation between the level of physical activities and motor imagery capacity is discussed.