MORE ABOUT JUDGMENT AND REASON

Abstract: This paper is a response to Siegel 2004 . I take Siegel's remarks as a basis for clarifying, defending, and further developing my account of the role of judgment in a theory of rationality.     

Epistemic Rationality

Many epistemologists and philosophers of science, especially those with “naturalist” inclinations, argue that if there is to be any such thing as normativity or rationality in these domains, it must be instrumental—roughly, a matter of goal satisfaction—rather than something involving normative “oughts” that are independent of the satisfaction of our epistemic, cognitive, or other ends. This paper argues that while such an instrumental conception of epistemic rationality is perfectly respectable, even insofar as it concerns specifically epistemic ends, it cannot be the whole story about such normativity. Rather, it must be accompanied by a “categorical,” goal‐independent sort of normativity that cannot be reduced to instrumental rationality, both because instrumental rationality itself depends on a noninstrumental relationship between a belief/claim/theory and the evidence that renders it rational, and because the epistemic rationality of many beliefs is independent of the goals of their believers.     

Gert on Subjective Practical Rationality

The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.

Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom

There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be. Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons, though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing the core truths of both camps.

Resilience and Rationality

In this article, I consider the relationship between rationality and resilience. First, I outline six responses to life’s adversities: (a) a true disturbed response; (b) a feigned disturbed response; (c) a feigned indifferent response; (d) a true healthy response; (e) a feigned healthy response; and (f) a mixed response. These responses underpin two rational resilience credos, which will be then outlined: an ideal rational resilience credo and a realistic rational resilience credo. The implications of these credos for coaching will be explored.     

Rational Thought And Rational Behavior: A Review Of Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox.

Standard economic theory says that the rational approach to a decision is to weigh all alternatives on all relevant dimensions and then to select the one with the highest weight. Such a procedure would maximize subjective expected utility. But, because of constraints on time and available information, people and other animals often bypass this process by using “fast and frugal” heuristics to make decisions. Rationality is thus said to be “bounded” by time and information constraints. The articles in this book describe and organize common heuristics. They show that use of such heuristics is generally the best approach to many real world problems and therefore not irrational. Heuristics evolved, they say, not as deviations from rationality but as aids to rationality in cases where the standard model would have proved to be too slow or inefficient. Although the approach of almost all of the authors of these papers is that of cognitive psychology—a focus on internal cognitive mechanisms—their findings and even their theories may be interpreted in terms of reinforcement and punishment acting on behavioral patterns.     

善的多元论与合理性

当代西方伦理学家布兰特和罗尔斯,一个注重现实的伦理道德规范,一个深究善的合理性之所在,都是既诉诸现实的人类理性、又关注社会生活实际,但分别独特地阐明了善恶规则的多元性与道德善的合理性,并致力于解答个人与社会、功利与道德、情感与理性、个人的自由平等与社会公平正义等的矛盾统一.他们的基本出发点和主要理论极富启发意义,而缺乏历史观的共同缺陷则是我们应当引以为戒的.     

Rationality and Synchronic Identity

Many requirements of rationality rely for their application on facts about identity at a time. Take the requirement not to have contradictory beliefs. It is irrational if a single agent believes P and believes ～P, but it is not irrational if one agent believes P and another believes ～P. There are puzzle cases, however, in which it is unclear whether we have a single agent, or instead two or more. I consider and reject possible criteria of identity at a time before proposing a pluralist alternative on which there are vastly more agents than we might have thought. This pluralist thesis is analogous to mereological universalism, on which there are all sorts of strange disconnected objects of which we don’t usually take note. I conclude by giving a pragmatic account of which of these rational agents it makes sense to attend to, by appealing the purposes that we have in employing rationally evaluative language.     

Test of the Ratio Judgment Hypothesis

The hypothesis that we are capable of judging ratios of subjective intensities is widely used in psychology. Here, experimental results are reported that more stringently verify prior findings that people respond to sensory intensity differences while they execute the task of judging sensory intensity ratios. This verification was made on brightness and heaviness and for verbal and matching responses, suggesting that the results may be general for both sensory intensive dimensions and response systems. The results have implications for the comparisons of scores on evaluation scales based on ratio judgment.     

决策与决策执行的关系——一种行动理性的观点

本文以分析决策与执行的关系为出发点,对人类理性的本质进行了讨论。指出决策研究中存在的“理性分析范式”偏面地把认知分析当作人类理性的本质,忽视了行动的作用,提出了人类理性是“行动理性”的思想。行动既是一种分析方法,是人们深化对客观世界的认识,理解决策问题的独特手段,也是人们创造外界环境、实现决策目标的有效途径。由此提出,决策研究,尤其是组织决策研究,应该重视“行动分析范式”。     

Instrumental Rationality and Carroll's Tortoise

Some philosophers have tried to establish a connection between the normativity of instrumental rationality and the paradox presented by Lewis Carroll in his 1895 paper “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” I here examine and argue against accounts of this connection presented by Peter Railton and James Dreier before presenting my own account and discussing its implications for instrumentalism (the view that all there is to practical rationality is instrumental rationality). In my view, the potential for a Carroll-style regress just shows us that since instrumental rationality involves a higher-order commitment to combine our willing an end with our taking the necessary means, it therefore cannot, on pain of regress, itself be added as a conjunct to one of the elements to be combined. This view does not support instrumentalism.     

Rationality and reflection

Christine Korsgaard claims that an agent is less than fully rational if she allows some attitude to inform her deliberation even though she cannot justify doing so. I argue that there is a middle way, which Korsgaard misses, between the claim that our attitudes neither need nor admit of rational assessment, on the one hand, and Korsgaard's claim that the attitudes which inform our deliberation always require justification, on the other: an agent needs reasons to opt out of her concerns – not reasons to opt into them or to stay in. As long as an agent has no good reason to abandon some concern of hers, she is reasonable to harbour it, and to allow it to inform her view of what reasons she has. A rational agent must therefore have the capacity to form higher-order attitudes toward her concerns; but rationality only requires that she exercise that capacity when she has some good reason to do so.     

论情绪的生态理性

生态理性强调环境对人的塑造作用,强调人在适应环境过程中获得的功能作用.该文在全面解读生态理性内涵的基础上,从两个方面寻找证据论证情绪具有生态理性：（1）情绪是环境自然塑造的结果,携带着丰富的环境信息;（2）情绪的功能反映环境结构,自动调节人类行为。在上述论证的基础上,我们尝试提出情绪影响个体行为的工作机制,并在一定范围内分析了不良情绪与生态理性之间的关系。     

风险沟通与公众理性

突发风险事件所导致的恐慌,其危害程度可能远远大于风险事件本身。当灾害突然降临的时候,公众能够启动理性的程度是应对危机的重要基础。文章提出了公众理性的概念,并界定和探讨了公众理性的构成以及公众理性的干扰因素;同时,通过SARS事件,着重分析了风险沟通的性质、特点,以及风险沟通对公众理性干预的可能途径和条件;目的是为总结SARS风险危机和建立应对突发风险事件的心理系统提供理论依据,以更好地促进我国在风险沟通领域的研究与实践。     

判断与决策中的锚定效应

versky和Kahneman提出锚定与调整启发式以来,锚定效应在不同领域判断与决策研究中得到广泛验证,提出了不同类型的锚定效应、多种研究范式、心理机制的不同理论观点,以及锚定效应作为有关心理现象的内在作用机制。文章阐述了锚定效应的最新研究进展,提出应深化对锚的种类和形态研究,以丰富的技术手段发展锚定效应神经心理机制研究,系统地进行锚定效应影响因素研究,深入探讨锚定现象对人的心理与行为的正负面影响以及锚定效应与其他有关心理现象间的关系     

制造疾病：工具理性的泛滥

工具理性的泛滥导致医疗的商品化和技术主体化,产生“制造疾病”的现象层出不穷。究其原因概括为：其一,求“效率”过程无意中“制造疾病”;其二,为追求利益最大化有意“制造疾病”,将科学简单地等同于数据,认为科学可以解释一切疾病,无视患者自愈的能力,将“正常”的生命现象视为疾病;其三,视人为物,为社会管理“制造疾病”。医者应将自己的工具理性,约束在为患者谋利的价值理性之下,弘扬医学人文去遏制制造疾病的恶行。

     

道德判断的分级现象

Blair(1996)发现即使没有心理理论的孤独症儿童,也具备道德判断能力。而Kahn(2004)认为没有心理理论就不可能完成道德判断。已有研究表明,道德判断可能需要一定程度的心理理论。孤独症儿童心理理论存在困难,影响他们理解道德情景并进行正确的道德判断,但这是否与任务的要求道德判断能力的程度不同有关呢?研究增加道德情景的复杂程度,进一步考察儿童道德判断规律。结果发现,道德判断有分级现象,第一级是直接对道德行为进行判断,孤独症和正常儿童都能完成该任务,可能是以原始情绪为基础的;第二级道德判断是对简单道德情景进行判断,需要以心理理论为基础,只有正常儿童才能完成;而对行为与意图不一致的复杂道德判断则需要以更加丰富的经历或者经验为基础,但其属于三级道德判断还是二级道德判断的高级形式还需要进一步的研究。     

词频和年级对FOK判断的影响

本实验以识记材料的词频高低和被试年级为自变量对被试元记忆监测的FOK(feeling of knowing)判断进行研究。实验采用Hart提出的RJR(回忆—FOK判断—标准测验 )的经典范式。结果表明 :被试的年级影响FOK判断等级和准确性 ,大学生的FOK判断等级和准确性均高于高一年级学生 ;识记材料词频影响FOK判断等级的高低 ,不影响FOK判断准确性 ,被试对高频词对的FOK判断等级高于对低频词对的FOK判断等级 ,但FOK判断准确性无明显差异。     

Threats to Democratic Rationality

This article examines trends that are impacting democratic rationality. It is found that the trends are almost uniformly negative. Viewed from within the legislative branch, trends are negatively impacting legislators’ time, complexifying problems, constraining options, and limiting the evaluation of options. Trends external to the legislative branch are reducing citizen participation and knowledge about public affairs, skewing the balance of power among the branches and states, and decreasing accountability of public officials. In combination, democratic rationality, the process of making good, efficient, and timely decisions to promote higher quality of life and the public good, is seriously threatened. Recommendations include public financing of campaigns, more structured legislative decision-making processes, simplification tests for all new legislation and regulations, and a major new initiative to foster public involvement in public decision making.     

Multiplicity of Emotions in Moral Judgment and Motivation

Multiple moral emotions were examined from a dynamic motivational framework through two hypothetical dilemmas that originate from the cognitive-developmental research program in morality. A questionnaire based on recognition task measurement of moral motivation and emotions was administered to 546 college students. As part of the dynamic complexity of moral motivation, intrapersonal operation of multiple emotions were expected and found toward each emotion target in each judgment context. Compassion and distress were among the most important moral emotions. Relatively strong degrees of anger and hate were reported toward the victimizers in ways that distinguished judgment choices. Participants distinguished a variety of positive emotions from anger and hate through differential associations with judgment choices. The study revealed orderly patterns of variability in the multiplicity of moral emotional experience based on relations with specific emotion targets, judgment choices, and developmental quality of moral motivation. The overall developmental quality of moral motivation was negatively associated with hate and positively associated with anger toward the victimizers. Emotional awareness was also found to be positively related to the developmental quality of moral motivation. Exploring the intrapersonal multiplicity of moral emotional experience has important implications for understanding the complexity of moral decision making and motivation.