Albert H. Hastorf III (1921-2011)

Presents an obituary for Albert H. Hastorf III. Albert H. Hastorf III, a pioneer in the study of social percep- tion and interaction and a celebrated member of the Stanford University administration, died September 26, 2011, in Palo Alto, California. Al was known early in his career as the coauthor of one of social psychology's most famous studies-a study that vividly illustrated the constructive and potentially biased nature of perception-and his contributions to psychology and American academia were wide-ranging. Hastorf joined Stanford's faculty in 1961, serving as executive head of the Psychology Department from 1961 to 1970. He was also a founder of the university's Interdisciplinary Human Biology Program, soon one of Stanford's most popular majors and an attractive gateway for students interested in medicine. Al's unique gifts as an administrator were apparent to all who knew him. His sound judgment, personal graciousness, good humor, and unquestioned integrity made him a popular choice as dean of the School of Humanities & Sciences from 1970 to 1974 and as provost from 1980 to 1984. The esteem in which Al was held by the Stanford community was recognized with a succession of awards, including the Lloyd W. Dinkelspiel Award for Outstanding Service to Undergraduate Education and the Richard W. Lyman Award for unique and dedicated service to the university. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Remembering (Short-Term) Memory: Oscillations of an Epistemic Thing

This paper provides an interpretation of Hans-J?rg Rheinberger’s notions of epistemic things and historical epistemology. I argue that Rheinberger’s approach articulates a unique contribution to current debates about integrated HPS, and I propose some modifications and extensions of this contribution. Drawing on examples from memory research, I show that Rheinberger is right to highlight a particular feature of many objects of empirical research (“epistemic things”)—especially in the contexts of exploratory experimentation—namely our lack of knowledge about them. I argue that this analysis needs to be supplemented with an account of what scientists do know, and in particular, how they are able to attribute rudimentary empirical contours to objects of research. These contours are closely connected to paradigmatic research designs, which in turn are tied to basic methodological rules for the exploration of the purported phenomena. I suggest that we engage with such rules in order to develop our own normative (epistemological) categories, and I tie this proposal to the idea of a methodological naturalism in philosophy of science.