The Blicket Within: Preschoolers' Inferences About Insides and Causes

Four experiments examined children's inferences about the relation between objects' internal parts and their causal properties. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds recognized that objects with different internal parts had different causal properties, and those causal properties transferred if the internal part moved to another object. In Experiment 2, 4-year-olds made inferences from an object's internal parts to its causal properties without being given verbal labels for objects or being shown that insides and causal properties covaried. Experiment 3 found that 4-year-olds chose an object with the same internal part over one with the same external property when asked which object had the same causal property as the target (which had both the internal part and external property). Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrated that 4-year-olds made similar inferences from causal properties to internal parts, but 3-year-olds relied more on objects' external perceptual appearance. These results suggest that by the age of 4, children have developed an understanding of a relation between an artifact's internal parts and its causal properties.     

Stigma building blocks: how instruction and experience teach children about rejection by outgroups

Gaining an understanding of intergroup relations and outgroup rejection is an important childhood development. Children learn about rejection by outgroups via their own experiences and external instruction. A comparison of the impact of experience and instruction on first-, third-, and fifth-grade children's evaluations of rejection by outgroups in a minimal-groups paradigm suggests that the relative impact of experience and instruction differs as children age. In Study 1, younger children were more influenced by instruction, and older children were more influenced by what they experienced for themselves. In Study 2, younger children were more influenced by instruction, even when that instruction conflicted with what they experienced; older children were more influenced by their own experiences, even when those experiences contradicted what they were told to expect. These findings suggest that children begin learning about outgroup rejection through instruction but start to rely more on their own experiences as they age.     

Developmental Origins of Biological Explanations: The case of infants’ internal property bias

People’s explanations about the biological world are heavily biased toward internal, non-obvious properties. Adults and children as young as 5 years of age find internal properties more causally central than external features for explaining general biological processes and category membership. In this paper, we describe how this ‘internal property bias’ may be grounded in two different developmental precursors observed in studies with infants: (1) an early understanding of biological agency that is apparent in infants’ reasoning about animals, and (2) the acquisition of kind-based representations that distinguish between essential and accidental properties, spanning from animals to artifacts. We argue that these precursors may support the progressive construction of the notion of biological kinds and explanations during childhood. Shortly after their first year of life, infants seem to represent the internal properties of animates as more central and identity-determining that external properties. Over time, this skeletal notion of biological kinds is integrated into diverse explanations about kind membership and biological processes, with an increasingly better understanding of the causal role of internal properties.     

Teleological Essentialism

Placeholder essentialism is the view that there is a causal essence that holds category members together, though we may not know what the essence is. Sometimes the placeholder can be filled in by scientific essences, such as when we acquire scientific knowledge that the atomic weight of gold is 79. We challenge the view that placeholders are elaborated by scientific essences. In our view, if placeholders are elaborated, they are elaborated by Aristotelian essences, a telos. Utilizing the same kind of experiments used by traditional essentialists—involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), acquired traits (study 3), and inferences about offspring (study 4)—we find support for the view that essences are elaborated by a telos. And we find evidence (study 5) that teleological essences may generate category judgments.     

Psychological essentialism in children

Psychological essentialism is the idea that certain categories, such as "lion" or "female", have an underlying reality that cannot be observed directly. Where does this idea come from? This article reviews recent evidence suggesting that psychological essentialism is an early cognitive bias. Young children look beyond the obvious in many converging ways: when learning words, generalizing knowledge to new category members, reasoning about the insides of things, contemplating the role of nature versus nurture, and constructing causal explanations. These findings argue against the standard view of children as concrete thinkers, instead claiming that children have an early tendency to search for hidden, non-obvious features.     

“They Danced Around in My Head and I Learned Them”: Children's Developing Conceptions of Learning

Two studies examined how 3–6-year-olds understand the process of learning. In study 1 examined how children spontaneously talk about learning via a CHILDES language analysis. Talk about the learning process increased between the ages of 3–5. Talk specifically about learning in terms of desire decreased during this period. This suggests the possibility that desire is important to children's initial understanding of learning, and children develop an understanding that various mental states including desire, attention, and intention, play a role in the learning process. In Study 2, we presented 4- and 6-year-olds with a set of stories designed to test their understanding of the role of these mental states. In both their judgments about whether someone learns and their justifications of their responses, younger children relied more on the character's desires whereas older children were more likely to integrate desire, attention, and intention together. These data suggest that children's understanding of the process of learning is developing during the early elementary school years.     

Speaker reliability guides children's inductive inferences about novel properties

Prior work shows that children can make inductive inferences about objects based on their labels rather than their appearance (Gelman, 2003). A separate line of research shows that children's trust in a speaker's label is selective. Children accept labels from a reliable speaker over an unreliable speaker (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005). In the current paper, we tested whether 3- and 5-year-old children attend to speaker reliability when they make inductive inferences about a non-obvious property of a novel artifact based on its label. Children were more likely to use a reliable speaker's label than an unreliable speaker's label when making inductive inferences. Thus, children not only prefer to learn from reliable speakers, they are also more likely to use information from reliable speakers as the basis for future inferences. The findings are discussed in light of the debate between a similarity-driven and a label-driven approach to inductive inferences.     

True or false: do 5-year-olds understand belief?

In 3 studies (N = 188) we tested the hypothesis that children use a perceptual access approach to reason about mental states before they understand beliefs. The perceptual access hypothesis predicts a U-shaped developmental pattern of performance in true belief tasks, in which 3-year-olds who reason about reality should succeed, 4- to 5-year-olds who use perceptual access reasoning should fail, and older children who use belief reasoning should succeed. The results of Study 1 revealed the predicted pattern in 2 different true belief tasks. The results of Study 2 disconfirmed several alternate explanations based on possible pragmatic and inhibitory demands of the true belief tasks. In Study 3, we compared 2 methods of classifying individuals according to which 1 of the 3 reasoning strategies (reality reasoning, perceptual access reasoning, belief reasoning) they used. The 2 methods gave converging results. Both methods indicated that the majority of children used the same approach across tasks and that it was not until after 6 years of age that most children reasoned about beliefs. We conclude that because most prior studies have failed to detect young children's use of perceptual access reasoning, they have overestimated their understanding of false beliefs. We outline several theoretical implications that follow from the perceptual access hypothesis.     

Reliance on visual and verbal information across ontological kinds: What do children know about animals and machines?

In two experiments, we systematically examined the reliance on visual (external shape and features) and verbal (origins and internal structure) information in isolation, and together in the identification of animals and machines by 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, and adults. Experiment 1 examined the use of visual and verbal information independently in a visual classification task, a verbal classification task, and an induction task. Experiment 2 examined the relative weighting of visual and verbal information in an induction task and a categorization task. The three most important findings from Experiment 1 were that (a) children and adults can use either visual or verbal information to distinguish animals from machines; (b) all age groups classified items with mixed visual information as machines, a tendency that increased with age; and (c) with age, children became increasingly able to induce non-obvious properties, especially the non-obvious properties of machines. The findings from Experiment 2 indicate that the youngest and oldest participants relied on both visual and verbal information in the identification of animals and machines in categorization and induction tasks. Five-year-olds, however, relied only on visual information. As in Experiment 1, we observed a tendency to judge items with contrasting information as machines, suggesting that individuals utilize a more strict definition (both visually and verbally) for the category of animals. We discuss the implication of these results with respect to developmental differences in the use of perceptual and conceptual information across the ontological distinction between artifacts and natural kinds.     

First Principles Organize Attention to and Learning About Relevant Data: Number and the Animate-Inanimate Distinction as Examples

Early cognitive development benefits from nonlinguistic representations of skeletal sets of domain-specific principles and complementary domain-relevant data abstraction processes. The principles outline the domain, identify relevant inputs, and structure coherently what is learned. Knowledge acquisition within the domain is a joint function of such domain-specific principles and domain-general learning mechanisms. Two examples of early learning illustrate this. Skeletal preverbal counting principles help children sort different linguistic strings into those that function as the conventional count-word as opposed to labels for objects in the child's linguistic community. Skeletal causal principles, working with complementary perceptual processes that abstract information about biological and nonbiological conditions and patterns of movement, lead to the rapid acquisition of knowledge about the animate-inanimate distinction. By 3 years of age children con soy whether photographs of unfamiliar nonmammalian animals, mammals, statues, and wheeled objects portray objects capable or incapable of self-generated motion. They also generate answers to questions about the insides of animate items more readily than ones about the insides of inanimate items. Although these children already ore articulate about matters relevant to a theory of action, their limited knowledge of growth illustrates that early skeletal principles do not rule out the need to acquire new principles, in this case ones that underlie a biological account of animacy (Carey, 1985).     

Bears are for boys: Metaphorical associations in young children's gender stereotypes

Objects may be gender typed by virtue of their use by or association with one sex or the other or because they embody qualities that show a nonliteral or metaphorical correspondence to characteristics of or beliefs about males and females. For Study 1, we developed the Gender Stereotyping Test, a sorting task with which we determined that 4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds make use of both types of information in assigning objects or qualities to each sex. Study 2 replicated results with a new group of 4-year-olds and found that children whose test scores indicated at least some knowledge of gender identity were more likely to gender type metaphorical, but not conventional, items than those whose scores failed to indicate stable and constant knowledge of gender identity. In Study 3, which used a truncated version of the sorting task, children at age 3 made minimal use of either type of information. Gender stereotypes are considered in terms of recent theories of metaphor as a conceptual mechanism by which what is known in or about one domain is projected to another domain for the purpose of understanding.     

Appearance questions can be misleading: a discourse-based account of the appearance-reality problem

Preschoolers' success on the appearance-reality task is a milestone in theory-of-mind development. On the standard task children see a deceptive object, such as a sponge that looks like a rock, and are asked, "What is this really?" and "What does this look like?" Children below 412 years of age fail saying that the object not only is a sponge but also looks like a sponge. We propose that young children's difficulty stems from ambiguity in the meaning of "looks like." This locution can refer to outward appearance ("Peter looks like Paul") but in fact often refers to likely reality ("That looks like Jim"). We propose that "looks like" is taken to refer to likely reality unless the reality is already part of the common ground of the conversation. Because this joint knowledge is unclear to young children on the appearance-reality task, they mistakenly think the appearance question is about likely reality. Study 1 analyzed everyday conversations from the CHILDES database and documented that 2 and 3-year-olds are familiar with these two different uses of the locution. To disambiguate the meaning of "looks like," Study 2 clarified that reality was shared knowledge as part of the appearance question, e.g., "What does the sponge look like?" Study 3 used a non-linguistic measure to emphasize the shared knowledge of the reality in the appearance question. Study 4 asked children on their own to articulate the contrast between appearance and reality. At 91%, 85%, and 81% correct responses, children were at near ceiling levels in each of our manipulations while they failed the standard versions of the tasks. Moreover, we show how this discourse-based explanation accounts for findings in the literature. Thus children master the appearance-reality distinction by the age of 3 but the standard task masks this understanding because of the discourse structure involved in talking about appearances.     

Development of the concept of family in elementary school children

Two studies were conducted to examine the relation of age, gender, and family structure to children's understanding of the concept of family. In Study 1,387 children in Grades 1 through 6 were asked to classify various groupings of individuals as constituting or not constituting a family. Results showed both age and gender differences in children's conceptions of families: Younger children, especially boys, generally used concrete, absolute criteria for defining a family; younger girls were similar to older children in that they were more likely to employ abstract, relational criteria for family definition. Results also showed that children's own family structure was not related to their family definitions. In Study 2, 64 children from the original sample were given a measure of cognitive ability to examine whether differences in cognitive development or differences in socialization were a likely source of younger girls' more advanced understanding. Gender differences in cognitive ability did not emerge, suggesting that the gender effects in Study 1 reflected differences in the socialization of boys and girls. Implications of the findings for understanding children's reactions to family disruption are discussed.     

积极道德情绪和年龄对3-5岁幼儿安慰行为的影响

大量研究已经表明,消极道德情绪可以促进幼儿的亲社会行为,但积极道德情绪对幼儿亲社会行为的促进作用仍然缺乏全面探索。安慰行为是幼儿的典型亲社会行为,本研究使用实验法,采取想象启动和实际启动两种范式,考察积极道德情绪对3-5岁257名幼儿的安慰行为的影响。研究发现,幼儿的安慰行为发展具有年龄特征,4岁是幼儿安慰行为发展的转变关键期,更有意义的是,研究证明积极道德情绪对幼儿的安慰行为具有促进效应。本研究结果能为有效培养儿童的安慰行为提供有益建议。     

Gender-linked differences in the incidental memory of children and adults

The hunter-gatherer theory (M. Eals & I. Silverman, 1994, Ethology and Sociobiology, 15, 95-105) predicts that females should have better incidental memory for objects and locations than males. We tested this prediction with 3- to 6-year-old children (Study 1) and adults (Study 2). In Study 1, 80 children were asked to recognize 18 gender-stereotyped toys which they had previously seen in a playroom for 2 min. In Study 2, 40 adults were asked to recall the identity and location of 30 gender-stereotyped objects which they had previously seen in an office for 2 min. Analyses in both studies indicated that females and males remembered more toys or objects congruent with their own sex but that there was no overall advantage for females. Implications for the hunter-gatherer theory, gender-schema theory, and our understanding of the development of incidental memory are discussed.     

Preschoolers' interpretations of gesture: label or action associate?

This study explores a common assumption made in the cognitive development literature that children will treat gestures as labels for objects. Without doubt, researchers in these experiments intend to use gestures symbolically as labels. The present studies examine whether children interpret these gestures as labels. In Study 1 two-, three-, and four-year olds tested in a training paradigm learned gesture–object pairs for both iconic and arbitrary gestures. Iconic gestures became more accurate with age, while arbitrary gestures did not. Study 2 tested the willingness of children aged 40–60 months to fast map novel nouns, iconic gestures and arbitrary gestures to novel objects. Children used fast mapping to choose objects for novel nouns, but treated gesture as an action associate, looking for an object that could perform the action depicted by the gesture. They were successful with iconic gestures but chose objects randomly for arbitrary gestures and did not fast map. Study 3 tested whether this effect was a result of the framing of the request and found that results did not change regardless of whether the request was framed with a deictic phrase (“this one 〈gesture〉”) or an article (“a 〈gesture〉”). Implications for preschool children’s understanding of iconicity, and for their default interpretations of gesture are discussed.     

Of Men and Money: Characteristics of Occupations that Affect the Gender Differentiation of Children’s Occupational Interests

Occupational interests become gender differentiated during childhood and remain so among adults. Two characteristics of occupations may contribute to this differentiation: the gender of individuals who typically perform the occupation (workers’ gender) and the particular goals that the occupation allows one to fulfill, such as the opportunity to help others or acquire power (value affordances). Two studies tested hypotheses about whether U.S. 6- to 11-year-olds show gender differences in their interest in novel jobs that were depicted as (a) being performed by men versus women and (b) affording money, power, family, or helping values. In Study 1, 98 children rank-ordered their preferences for experimentally-manipulated novel jobs, and they answered questions about their occupational values and the value affordances of jobs in which men and women typically work. In Study 2, a second sample of 65 children was used to test the replicability of findings from Study 1. As hypothesized, children were more interested in jobs depicted with same- than other-gender workers in both studies. Boys showed greater interest than did girls in novel jobs depicted as affording money in Study 1, but not Study 2. Explicit knowledge that men and women typically work in jobs that afford differing values increased with participants’ age.     

Children's understanding of physical illnesses and psychological states

Abstract

The present study set out to compare 5.7, and 9-year-old children's understanding of a physical illness (chicken pox) with their understanding of a psychological state (depression). In addition, information about personal experience of the illnesses and external sources of information was elicited, in order to assess the effects of both age and experience. Children at all ages showed a basic intact knowledge of both chicken pox and depression, although older children had a more sophisticated understanding of depression, and had acquired this knowledge from a greater number of sources. The clinical implications of the findings, and their relationship to both neo-Piagetian and more recent theories of conceptual development in childhood are discussed.     

Developmental changes in judgments of authentic objects

This study examined the development of an understanding of authenticity among 112 children (preschoolers, kindergarten, 1st graders, and 4th graders) and 119 college students. Participants were presented with pairs of photographs depicting authentic and non-authentic objects and asked to pick which one belongs in a museum and which one they would want to have. Results suggest that both children and adults recognize the special nature of authentic objects by reporting that they belong in a museum. However, this belief broadens with age, at first just for famous associations (preschool), then also for original creations (kindergarten), and finally for personal associations as well (4th grade). At all ages, an object's authentic nature is distinct from its desirability. Thus, from an early age, children appear to understand that the historical path of an authentic object affects its nature. This work demonstrates the importance of non-obvious properties in children's concepts. For preschool as well as older children, history (a non-visible property) adds meaning beyond the material or functional worth of an object.     

The Development of Children's Understanding of False Belief and the Appearance-Reality Distinction

Recent research has shown parallels between the development of young children's understanding of false belief and their understanding of the appearance-reality distinction. First, both develop between 3 and 4–5 years of age and develop concurrently in individual children. Second, the younger children's difficulties with both concepts seem genuine and deep-seated. Finally, these difficulties are general, in the sense of being evident in a variety of types of beliefs and appearances. Most researchers in this area believe that these developments are mediated by an emerging representational conception of the mind.