Using relations within conceptual systems to translate across conceptual systems

According to an "external grounding" theory of meaning, a concept's meaning depends on its connection to the external world. By a "conceptual web" account, a concept's meaning depends on its relations to other concepts within the same system. We explore one aspect of meaning, the identification of matching concepts across systems (e.g. people, theories, or cultures). We present a computational algorithm called ABSURDIST (Aligning Between Systems Using Relations Derived Inside Systems for Translation) that uses only within-system similarity relations to find between-system translations. While illustrating the sufficiency of a conceptual web account for translating between systems, simulations of ABSURDIST also indicate powerful synergistic interactions between intrinsic, within-system information and extrinsic information.     

Defining and measuring conceptual knowledge in mathematics

A long tradition of research on mathematical thinking has focused on procedural knowledge, or knowledge of how to solve problems and enact procedures. In recent years, however, there has been a shift toward focusing, not only on solving problems, but also on conceptual knowledge. In the current work, we reviewed (1) how conceptual knowledge is defined in the mathematical thinking literature, and (2) how conceptual knowledge is defined, operationalized, and measured in three mathematical domains: equivalence, cardinality, and inversion. We uncovered three general issues. First, few investigators provide explicit definitions of conceptual knowledge. Second, the definitions that are provided are often vague or poorly operationalized. Finally, the tasks used to measure conceptual knowledge do not always align with theoretical claims about mathematical understanding. Together, these three issues make it challenging to understand the development of conceptual knowledge, its relationship to procedural knowledge, and how it can best be taught to students. In light of these issues, we propose a general framework that divides conceptual knowledge into two facets: knowledge of general principles and knowledge of the principles underlying procedures.     

Towards a distributed account of conceptual knowledge

How is conceptual knowledge organized and represented? Are domains (such as living things) and categories (such as tools, fruit) represented explicitly or can domain and category structure emerge out of a distributed system? Taken at face value, evidence from brain-damaged patients and neuroimaging studies suggests that conceptual knowledge is explicitly structured in independent content-based stores. However, recent analyses of the fine-grained details of semantic impairments, combined with research using connectionist modelling, suggest a different picture - one in which concepts are represented as patterns of activation over multiple semantic properties within a unitary distributed system. Within this context, category-specific deficits emerge as a result of differences in the structure and content of concepts rather than from explicit divisions of conceptual knowledge in separate stores.     

Relations among conceptual knowledge, procedural knowledge, and procedural flexibility in two samples differing in prior knowledge

Competence in many domains rests on children developing conceptual and procedural knowledge, as well as procedural flexibility. However, research on the developmental relations between these different types of knowledge has yielded unclear results, in part because little attention has been paid to the validity of the measures or to the effects of prior knowledge on the relations. To overcome these problems, we modeled the three constructs in the domain of equation solving as latent factors and tested (a) whether the predictive relations between conceptual and procedural knowledge were bidirectional, (b) whether these interrelations were moderated by prior knowledge, and (c) how both constructs contributed to procedural flexibility. We analyzed data from 2 measurement points each from two samples (Ns = 228 and 304) of middle school students who differed in prior knowledge. Conceptual and procedural knowledge had stable bidirectional relations that were not moderated by prior knowledge. Both kinds of knowledge contributed independently to procedural flexibility. The results demonstrate how changes in complex knowledge structures contribute to competence development.     

Integrating conceptual knowledge within and across representational modalities

Research suggests that concepts are distributed across brain regions specialized for processing information from different sensorimotor modalities. Multimodal semantic models fall into one of two broad classes differentiated by the assumed hierarchy of convergence zones over which information is integrated. In shallow models, communication within- and between-modality is accomplished using either direct connectivity, or a central semantic hub. In deep models, modalities are connected via cascading integration sites with successively wider receptive fields. Four experiments provide the first direct behavioral tests of these models using speeded tasks involving feature inference and concept activation. Shallow models predict no within-modal versus cross-modal difference in either task, whereas deep models predict a within-modal advantage for feature inference, but a cross-modal advantage for concept activation. Experiments 1 and 2 used relatedness judgments to tap participants’ knowledge of relations for within- and cross-modal feature pairs. Experiments 3 and 4 used a dual-feature verification task. The pattern of decision latencies across Experiments 1–4 is consistent with a deep integration hierarchy.     

Language-based access to gestural components of conceptual knowledge

We report two experiments in which production of articulated hand gestures was used to reveal the nature of gestural knowledge evoked by sentences referring to manipulable objects. Two gesture types were examined: functional gestures (executed when using an object for its intended purpose) and volumetric gestures (used when picking up an object simply to move it). Participants read aloud a sentence that referred to an object but did not mention any form of manual interaction (e.g., Jane forgot the calculator) and were cued after a delay of 300 or 750 ms to produce the functional or volumetric gesture associated with the object, or a gesture that was unrelated to the object. At both cue delays, functional gestures were primed relative to unrelated gestures, but no significant priming was found for volumetric gestures. Our findings elucidate the types of motor representations that are directly linked to the meaning of words referring to manipulable objects in sentences.     

Expertise-related differences in conceptual and ontological knowledge in the legal domain

Little research has been conducted on expertise-related differences in conceptual and ontological knowledge in law, even though this type of knowledge is prerequisite for correctly interpreting and reasoning about legal cases, and differences in conceptual and ontological knowledge structures between students and between students and teachers, might lead to miscommunication. This study investigated the extent and organisation of conceptual and ontological knowledge of novices, advanced students, and experts in law, using a card-sorting task and a concept-elaboration task. The results showed that novices used more everyday examples and were less accurate in their elaborations of concepts than advanced students and experts, on top of that, the organisation of their knowledge did not overlap within their group (i.e., no “shared” ontology). Experts gave more judicial examples based on the lawbook and were more accurate in their elaborations than advanced students, and their knowledge was strongly overlapping within their group (i.e., strong ontology). Incorrect conceptual knowledge seems to impede the correct understanding of cases and the correct application of precise and formal rules in law.     

PSN: A prolog declarative model of conceptual knowledge

This paper introduces a declarative model of semantic memory, called PSN, written in Prolog. It is shown to be a descendant of Quillian’s (1969) Teachable Language Comprehender (TLC) in its structuring of knowledge as a conceptual reticulum and in its use of spreading activation as a retrieval mechanism. PSN goes beyond TLC, however, in its ability to instantiate the essential benchmark properties of human semantic retrieval. As such, it can provide cognitive science with a normative model on which to assess further research and it demonstrates the value of the Prolog language for modeling psychological processes.     

Taxonomic and thematic organisation of proper name conceptual knowledge

We report the investigation of the organisation of proper names in two aphasic patients (NBC and FBI). The performance of both patients on spoken word to written word matching tasks was inconsistent, affected by presentation rate and semantic relatedness of the competing responses, all hallmarks of a refractory semantic access dysphasia. In a series of experiments we explored the semantic relatedness effects within their proper name vocabulary, including brand names and person names. First we demonstrated the interaction between very fine grain organisation and personal experience, with one patient with a special interest in the cinema demonstrating higher error rates when identifying the names of actors working in a similar film genre (e.g., action movies: Arnold Schwarzenegger, Bruce Willis, Sylvester Stallone, Mel Gibson) than those working in different genres (e.g., Arnold Schwarzenegger, Gregory Peck, Robin Williams, Gene Kelly). Second we compared directly two potential principles of semantic organisation - taxonomic and thematic. Furthermore we considered these principles of organisation in the context of the individuals' personal knowledge base. We selected topics matching the interests and experience of each patient, namely cinema and literature (NBC) and naval history (FBI). The stimulus items were arranged in taxonomic arrays (e.g., Jane Austen, Emily Bronte, Agatha Christie), thematic arrays (e.g., Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice, Mr Darcy), and unrelated arrays (e.g., Jane Austen, Wuthering Heights, Hercule Poirot). We documented that different patterns of taxonomic and thematic organisation were constrained by whether the individual has limited knowledge, moderate knowledge or detailed knowledge of a particular vocabulary. It is suggested that moderate proper name knowledge is primarily organised by taxonomy whereas extensive experience results in a more detailed knowledge base in which theme is a powerful organising principle.     

Category-specific naming and modality-specific imagery

Some attempts to explain category-specific disorders have stressed how different modality knowledge bases (i.e., visual knowledge vs motoric/functional knowledge) may underlie the distinction between living and nonliving things. This study examined 60 normal subjects for the relationship between picture naming in four subcategories (animals, fruit/vegetables, praxic and nonpraxic objects) and imagery vividness in seven modalities. Participants made more nonliving than living errors; and females made more nonliving errors than males. There was a significant correlation between naming of animals and fruits/vegetables and visual imagery vividness; however, this association was also significant for praxic and nonpraxic object naming. There was no evidence of associations between kinesthetic imagery and praxic object naming or gustatory/olfactory imagery and fruit/vegetable naming. These findings accord with the notion of a general association between visual imagery and picture naming, but provide no support for more specific links between modality-specific imagery vividness and naming in different categories.     

Knowledge is power: How conceptual knowledge transforms visual cognition

In this review, we synthesize the existing literature demonstrating the dynamic interplay between conceptual knowledge and visual perceptual processing. We consider two theoretical frameworks that demonstrate interactions between processes and brain areas traditionally considered perceptual or conceptual. Specifically, we discuss categorical perception, in which visual objects are represented according to category membership, and highlight studies showing that category knowledge can penetrate early stages of visual analysis. We next discuss the embodied account of conceptual knowledge, which holds that concepts are instantiated in the same neural regions required for specific types of perception and action, and discuss the limitations of this framework. We additionally consider studies showing that gaining abstract semantic knowledge about objects and faces leads to behavioral and electrophysiological changes that are indicative of more efficient stimulus processing. Finally, we consider the role that perceiver goals and motivation may play in shaping the interaction between conceptual and perceptual processing. We hope to demonstrate how pervasive such interactions between motivation, conceptual knowledge, and perceptual processing are in our understanding of the visual environment, and to demonstrate the need for future research aimed at understanding how such interactions arise in the brain.     

Common and modality-specific processes in the mental lexicon

Eight experiments were conducted to resolve: (1) empirical inconsistencies in repetition effects under intermodality conditions in word identification and lexical decision, and (2) an associated theoretical conflict concerning lexical organization. The results demonstrated that although more facilitation occurs under visual-prime/visual-test (VV) conditions than under auditory-prime/visual-test (AV) conditions, significant repetition facilitation also occurs under AV conditions. The results also indicated that: repetition effects observed for the VV and AV conditions apply to high- as well as to low-frequency words; they are insensitive to a variety of encoding tasks designed to emphasize different properties of words; and they are unaffected by differences in the ease of encoding of isolated auditory and visual words. The results are consistent with the existence of both modality-specific and common or modality-free processes in word recognition, in which word-frequency effects are restricted to the second and, by implication, lexical stage.     

Categorical flexibility in preschoolers: contributions of conceptual knowledge and executive control

The current study evaluated the relative roles of conceptual knowledge and executive control on the development of categorical flexibility, the ability to switch between simultaneously available but conflicting categorical representations of an object. Experiment 1 assessed conceptual knowledge and executive control together; Experiment 2 differentiated conceptual knowledge from costly executive processes. In Experiment 1, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds were given a three‐choice (taxonomic, thematic, and nonassociate) match‐to‐sample task and asked to match two associates. In Experiment 2, same‐aged children were assessed on another match‐to‐sample task that reduced executive costs by presenting thematic and taxonomic associates on separate trials. By comparing performance across tasks, age‐related changes resulting from conceptual knowledge and executive control indicated that conceptual knowledge of superordinate relations showed gains between 3 and 4 years, whereas gains in executive control were seen between 4 and 5 years, suggesting a décalage in the development of conceptual and executive processes underlying categorical flexibility.     

Relationships between perceptual and conceptual mediational systems in young children

Children aged 48–77 months were afforded experience in either color oddity or nominal class sorting prior to a transfer task testing the ability to apply the oddity rule (“which one doesn't belong”) to three picture arrays where solution was based on nominal class membership. The youngest children in the sample did not benefit from either perceptual rule experience or nominal sorting experience. Subsequent age groups benefited first from the nominal sorting treatment, then from both perceptual rule and nominal sorting activities, and finally the older children did not require priming in either the perceptual or nominal domain for success on the transfer task.     

Mental colors,conceptual overlap,and discriminating knowledge of particulars

I respond to the separate commentaries by Jacob Berger, Charlie Pelling, and David Pereplyotchik on my paper, “Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.” I resist Berger’s suggestion that mental colors ever enter consciousness without accompaniment by deployments of concepts of their extra-mental counterparts. I express concerns about Pelling’s proposal that a more uniform conceptualist treatment of phenomenal sorites can be gained by a simple appeal to the partial overlap of the extensions of some concepts. I question the relevance to perceptual consciousness of the arguments for demonstrative concepts that Pereplyotchik attacks.     

The organization of conceptual knowledge: the evidence from category-specific semantic deficits

Questions about the organization of conceptual knowledge in the human brain can be addressed by studying patients with category-specific semantic deficits: disproportionate and even selective impairment of conceptual knowledge of one category of objects compared with other categories. Recently, consensus has emerged regarding the basic facts of category-specific semantic deficits: (1) the categories that can be disproportionately impaired or spared are 'animals', 'fruit/vegetables', and 'artifacts'; and (2) category-specific semantic deficits are not associated with disproportionate deficits for a type or modality of knowledge. Together with findings in functional neuroimaging, these data indicate a complex organization of conceptual knowledge characterized by several independent dimensions of organization.     

A conceptual framework for establishing trust in real world intelligent systems

Intelligent information systems that contain emergent elements often encounter trust problems because results do not get sufficiently explained and the procedure itself can not be fully retraced. This is caused by a control flow depending either on stochastic elements or on the structure and relevance of the input data. Trust in such algorithms can be established by letting users interact with the system so that they can explore results and find patterns that can be compared with their expected solution. Reflecting features and patterns of human understanding of a domain against algorithmic results can create awareness of such patterns and may increase the trust that a user has in the solution. If expectations are not met, close inspection can be used to decide whether a solution conforms to the expectations or whether it goes beyond the expected. By either accepting or rejecting a solution, the user’s set of expectations evolves and a learning process for the users is established. In this paper we present a conceptual framework that reflects and supports this process. The framework is the result of an analysis of two exemplary case studies from two different disciplines with information systems that assist experts in their complex tasks.