Pragmatic commitments to naturalized epistemology

This essay explores numerous and complicated naturalized epistemology against the background of pragmatism. We distinguish three programmes of naturalized epistemology: strong, moderate, and weak. By considering commitments of pragmatism on which different programmes depend, we point out the close-knit relationship between pragmatism and naturalized epistemology. We also illustrate the essential origin of today’s controversy over naturalized epistemology and predict the uptrend of naturalized epistemology. __________ Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2005 (10) by Cong Hangqing, Cheng Xiaodong and Chen Haidan     

协作的自然主义

The radical forms of naturalistic epistemology look more like revolutionary manifestos than a reasonable alternatives. A modest form of naturalism is worth promoting. This modest form can cooperate with hermeneutics to solve epistemic problems, and therefore wins the title of cooperative naturalism, and benefits from the hermeneutic account of experience. Cooperative naturalism somewhat bridges the gap between analytic and continental philosophy. Translated by Wang Huaping from Ziran Bianzhengfa Tongxun 自然辩证法通讯 (Journal of Dialectics of Nature), 2006, (4): 31–36     

A post-fission perspective of the discovery of nuclear fission

Why was nuclear fission discovered under the repressive conditions of the Third Reich and not in one of the other leading countries in science? The attempts to answer this question leads to the formulation of the hypothesis that under the very special constellation of the working relations between Hahn and Meitner, the forced emigration of Meitner was advantageous insofar as it emancipated Hahn from the physical guardianship of Meitner, and liberated his chemical competence. This was a prerequisite to recognizing the presence of Barium in the debris of Uranium decay. At the same time it liberated Meitner so that she could break with the old physicalconcepts of knowledge when accepting Hahn's chemical results, and find the correct interpretation of the experiment. Moreover, Hahn's and Strassmann's inner emigration which kept them away from participating in political activities and engagements, as well as their abstinence from competing in fashionable research (which was stimulated by the increasing political isolation of Germany) helped them to concentrate on their more restricted investigations following unfashionable lines of thinking and were among the favourable conditions for making their great discovery.Based in a contribution to an International Workshop on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Discovery of Nuclear Fission, Institute of Advanced Studies, Berlin, March 1989.     

Radikaler Konstruktivismus und Konstruktionismus

Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself.     

THE HYBRIDITY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE: A RESPONSE TO LEONARDO AMBASCIANO

This article responds to Leonardo Ambasciano's review of The Scientification of Religion: An Historical Study of Discursive Change, 1800–2000 by Kocku von Stuckrad. It criticizes a narrative that presents naturalism and science as the ultimate system of knowledge. Contesting this rhetoric, the article underscores the plurality and hybridity of knowledge systems, which is the main topic of the book under review.     

A critique to the significance of Gettier counter-examples

Usually, people think that Gettier counter-examples challenged the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge and fundamentally changed the characteristic of the contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that regard for Gettier counter-examples is exaggerated, because (i) the JTB definition is neither an important nor a comprehensive one that covers all knowledge. Moreover, the significance of Gettier counter-examples is limited. (ii) The source of Gettier counter-examples lies in one arbitrary judgment, two mix-ups, three false assumptions, and a misunderstanding about the JTB definition. __________ Translated from Fudan Xuebao 复旦学报 (Fudan Journal), 2004 (5)     

Epistemology Culturalized

The anti-metaphysical intentions of naturalism can be respected without abandoning the project of a normative epistemology. The central assumptions of naturalism imply that (1.) the distinction between action and behaviour is spurious, and (2.) epistemology cannot continue to be a normative project. Difficulties with the second implication have been adressed by Normative Naturalism, but without violating the naturalistic consensus, it can only appreciate means-end-rationality. However, this does not suffice to justify its own implicit normative pretensions. According to our diagnosis, naturalism succumbs to the lure of an absolute observer's stance and thereby neglects the need for participation in communal practice. By contrast, methodical culturalism ties down the concepts of epistemology to the success of such practice. Only from this perspective, the normative force of epistemology can be appreciated. Also, the mind-body problem loosens its hold and the distinction between action and behaviour is reestablished. In the last section, the mutual relation between philosophy andscience is reconsidered. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Is understanding reducible?

ABSTRACT

Despite playing an important role in epistemology, philosophy of science, and more recently in moral philosophy and aesthetics, the nature of understanding is still much contested. One attractive framework attempts to reduce understanding to other familiar epistemic states. This paper explores and develops a methodology for testing such reductionist theories before offering a counterexample to a recently defended variant on which understanding reduces to what an agent knows.     

No Easy Argument for Two-Dimensionalism

Intentionalism about demonstratives is the view that the referent of a demonstrative is determined solely by the speaker’s intentions. Intentionalists can disagree about the nature of these intentions, but are united in rejecting the relevance of other factors, such as the speaker’s gestures, her gaze, and any facts about the addressee or the audience. In this paper, I formulate a particular version of this view, and I defend it against six objections, old and new.     

Thick Naturalism: Comments on Zygon 2000

The term naturalism arouses strong emotions; religious naturalism even more. In this essay, naturalism is explored in a variety of contexts, in contrast to supernaturalism (in metaphysics), normativism (in ethics and epistemology), and rationalism (in the philosophy of mind). It is argued that religious naturalism becomes a "thick" naturalism, a way of life rather than just a philosophical position. We can discern a subculture with a historical identity, a variety of dialects, stories that evoke attitudes and feelings, as well as more systematic theological elaborations. In this context, religious naturalists are called to thicken further the ways of life that embody their religious and naturalist sensitivities. In order to speak of a naturalist theology in this context, one has to define theology in a way that avoids assumptions regarding the supernatural; this can be achieved by presenting theologies as particular combinations of cosmologies (informed by the sciences) and axiologies (values).     

WHAT DOES EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY TELL US ABOUT PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION?

Abstract. Considerations from evolutionary biology lead Michael Ruse, among others, to a naturalistic turn in philosophy. I assess some of the pragmatic and skeptical conclusions concerning ethics, religion, and epistemology that Ruse draws from his evolutionary naturalism. Finally, I argue that there is an essential tension between science and religion which forecloses the possibility of an ultimate reconciliation between the two as they are now understood.     

DEFINING “RELIGION” AS NATURAL: A CRITICAL INVITATION TO ROBERT McCAULEY

Previous critics have argued that Robert McCauley defines religion and science selectively and arbitrarily, cutting them to fit his model in Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not. McCauley has responded that final definitions are “overrated” and that artificial distinctions can serve an important role in naturalistic investigation. I agree with this position but argue that a genealogy of the category of religion is crucial to the methodology that McCauley describes. Since the inherent ambiguity of religion will undermine any essential claims about its cognitive naturalness, I invite McCauley to consider how his research might investigate scientific and religious cognition in new terms.