Are Lovers Ever One? Reconstructing the Union Theory of Love

Current analytical philosophies of romantic love tend to identify the essence of such love with one specific element, such as concern for the beloved person, valuing the beloved person or the union between the lovers. This paper will deal with different forms of the union theory of love which takes love to be the physical, psychic or ontological union of two persons. Prima facie, this theory might appear to be implausible because it has several contra-intuitive implications, and yet, I submit, it is more coherent and attractive than it seems to be. I shall distinguish three specific models and thereby offer a differentiated account of the union theory which has not previously been provided in the literature (1). I will claim that two of these models (the strong ontological model and the striving model) should be rejected (2). I shall then defend the third model (the moderate ontological model) against certain possible objections (3); but nevertheless, I shall conclude by showing how this model, too, faces further significant objections which ultimately expose the limits of the union theory of love (4). In conclusion, I will sketch the outlines of a non-reductive cluster theory of love.     

Chemical Dependency and Eating Disorders: Are They Really so Different?

A biopsychosocial perspective is developed to help counselors integrate assessment, treatment, evaluation, and research with chemical dependency and eating disorders addictions. Although different in content and symptoms, the underlying similarities between these clinical syndromes are clearly seen through this paradigm.     

What Are You Really Saying? Associations between Shyness and Verbal Irony Comprehension

Verbal irony exploits the ambiguity inherent in language by using the discrepancy between a speaker's intended meaning and the literal meaning of his or her words to achieve social goals. Irony provides a window into children's developing pragmatic competence. Yet, little research exists on individual differences that may disrupt this understanding. For example, verbal irony may challenge shy children, who tend to interpret ambiguous stimuli as being threatening and who have difficulty mentalizing in social contexts. We examined whether shyness is related to the interpretation of ironic statements. Ninety‐nine children (8–12 year olds) listened to stories wherein one character made either a literal or ironic criticism or a literal or ironic compliment. Children appraised the speaker's belief and communicative intention. Shyness was assessed using self‐report measures of social anxiety symptoms and shy negative affect. Shyness was not related to children's comprehension of the counterfactual nature of ironic statements. However, shyness was related to children's ratings of speaker meanness for ironic statements. Thus, although not related to the understanding that speakers intended to communicate their true beliefs, shyness was related to children's construal of the social meaning of irony. Such subtle differences in language interpretation may underlie some of the social difficulties facing shy children. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are Men and Women Really That Different? Examining Some of Sexual Strategies Theory (SST)��s Key Assumptions about Sex-Distinct Mating Mechanisms

Sexual Strategies Theory (SST; Buss and Schmitt 1993) suggests that, typically, men more so than women are more likely to spend proportionately more of their mating effort in short-term mating, lower their standards in short-term compared to long-term mating, feel reproductively constrained, and seek, but certainly not avoid, sex if pregnancy is likely in short-term relationships. A series of 4 survey studies each containing hundreds of college student participants from the western portion of the United States were conducted to test these hypotheses. The findings are inconsistent with SST but are consistent with Attachment Fertility Theory (AFT; Miller et al. 2005) that argues for relatively few evolved gender differences in mating strategies and preferences.     

Pigeons and Children: What Are the Differences?

The Psychological Record -     

Does the Cover Letter Really Matter?

Many journals require a covering letter alongside the submission process. Some of them, particularly elitist journals, pay a particular attention to the cover letter to such extent an editor may decide not to send a paper out for external peer-review because of a ‘bad’ or absence of a covering letter. As stated in the instructions of many journals, the goal of the covering letter is to emphasize the novelty and to communicate the potential implications of the reported findings. Authors are also invited to tell the handling editor how the topic is related to the journal’s scope and to demonstrate how the results fit in broader context of the literature. Here, I briefly discuss if the cover letter is really necessary.     

How Emotional Are Populists Really? Factors Explaining Emotional Appeals in the Communication of Political Parties

Are populists really more emotional than mainstream parties? The alleged link between populism and emotional communication has barely been subject to systematic empirical scrutiny. I use literature on populist communication and appraisal theory to generate expectations about which political parties use which emotional appeals. I test these claims by applying a novel emotional dictionary to a large set of text data including more than 700,000 press releases and tweets from three European countries. As expected, I find that populist parties use significantly more negative emotional appeals (anger, fear, disgust, sadness) and less positive emotional appeals (joy, enthusiasm, pride, hope) than mainstream parties. Furthermore, I find that political actors adapt the usage of emotional appeals to different purposes depending on the communication medium and the politicians' status level. This study entails important implications for the research on emotional appeals in politics and populist communication.     

Religious Belief and Freedom of Expression: Is Offensiveness Really the Issue?

An objection frequently brought against critical or satirical expressions, especially when these target religions, is that they are ‘offensive’. In this article, I indicate why the existence of diverse and conflicting beliefs gives people an incentive to formulate their complaints in the language of offence. But I also cast doubt on whether people, in saying they are offended really mean to present that as the foundation of their complaint and, if they do, whether their complaint should weigh with us. These doubts do not apply to everything we might find offensive; in particular, they do not apply to simple cases of ‘sensory offence’; but they do apply to ‘belief-based offence’. Relying on offence also implies, inequitably, that different faiths should be differently protected depending on their susceptibility to offence; and the faithful themselves should worry about the flimsiness of claims based on ‘bare knowledge’ offence. I propose a principle of respect for beliefs as a differently grounded and more plausible reason for curbing our treatment of others’ beliefs. However, that principle has a limited compass and is hemmed in by the claims of free expression. It is also less suited to dictating the content of law than to influencing our conduct within the law.     

Paul and the Revisionists: Did Luther Really Get it All Wrong?

Abstract : After the advent of the “new perspective” on Paul as explicated in E. P. Sanders, Krister Stendahl, and N.T. Wright, we need to ask: did Luther get Paul right? In this essay, Donfried analyzes N.T. Wright along with David Brondos on whether Paul—and Luther—properly interpreted concepts such as “law” or “justification” in light of ancient Judaism(s). In contrast to the “new perspective,” Donfried argues that Paul got the Judaisms of his own era right and Luther got Paul right: we are justified or rightwised before God because of the presence of Jesus Christ in the faith of the one who believes.     

What Kind of Theory is the Humean Theory of Motivation?

I consider an underappreciated problem for proponents of the Humean theory of motivation (HTM). Namely, it is unclear whether is it to be understood as a largely psychological or largely metaphysical theory. I show that the psychological interpretation of HTM will need to be modified in order to be a tenable view and, as it will turn out, the modifications required render it virtually philosophically empty. I then argue that the largely metaphysical interpretation is the only a plausible interpretation of HTM's central claim that desires are necessary conditions for motivation. This interpretation also fits better with the important roles that HTM plays in both moral psychological and metaethical debates. 1     

Who Are the Handicapped?

Counselors and psychologists are increasingly involved with handicapped persons. The definition of various handicapping conditions is a major source of professional concern—what constitutes a disability and in what way(s) it impairs academic, social, or occupational functioning changes in relation to several variables. The more common and widely accepted categories of disability are intended to provide the reader with a basis for better understanding of the articles in this issue.