Logics of some kripke frames connected with Medvedev notion of informational types

Intermediate prepositional logics we consider here describe the setI() of regular informational types introduced by Yu. T. Medvedev [7]. He showed thatI() is a Heyting algebra. This algebra gives rise to the logic of infinite problems from [13] denoted here asLM ₁. Some other definitions of negation inI() lead to logicsLM _n (n ). We study inclusions between these and other systems, proveLM _n to be non-finitely axiomatizable (n ) and recursively axiomatizable (n < ). We also show that formulas in one variable do not separateLM from Heyting's logicH, andLM _n (n < ) from Scott's logic (H+S).     

Theorizing Gender for Experimental Game Theory: Experiments with “Sex Status” and “Merit Status” in an Asymmetric Game

In experimental game-theoretic research, to the extent that sex has been considered at all, the approach has been to focus on the individual level of analysis. This paper reports the results of experiments designed to focus on sex/gender and to expand the level of analysis to include the institutional level. An asymmetric game was designed such that players in the male and female institutional locations had 3 and 2 alternatives, respectively. Players earned the institutional locations based on a test, so that top and bottom scorers respectively merited the 3- and 2-alternatives locations. Game-theoretic understandings of sex-of-player were compared to the expectations states theory concept of sex status; that is, men expect and are expected to perform more competently than women. Results indicated that top-scorer men and women behave similarly; bottom-scorer men resist their low merit status (behaving the most rationally of all player groups); bottom-scorer women accept their low merit status (behaving the most irrationally of all player groups). Whereas game theory cannot provide a coherent understanding of these findings, the concept of sex status helps to interpret the behavior of all four player groups and shows how judgments about rationality and irrationality depend critically on the interpretive framework used.     

Toward an empirical subclassification of “learning disabilitiesℍ: A psychophysiological comparison of “hyperactiveℍ and “nonhyperactiveℍ subgroups

The diagnostic category of learning disabilities is a heterogeneous one, but few empirical attempts have been made to distinguish subgroups. Recent research, however, suggests that it may be meaningful to discriminate between hyperactive and nonhyperactive learning-disabled children. In the present study, 21 learning-disabled children identified as hyperactive through teacher nominations and ratings were compared to 15 learning-disabled children identified as nonhyperactive in the same manner. The two groups differed on rated behavior, birth order, amount of prescribed stimulant medication, amount of psychosocial stress, and Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale WISC-R IQ scores. They did not differ, however, on several demographic variables, the number of perinatal complications, reading achievement, and a number of tonic and phasic measures of autonomie activity. These findings support the distinction between hyperactive and nonhyperactive subgroups of learning-disabled children, but suggest that the two subgroups may have a similar biological substrate.We wish to express our sincere appreciation to Douglas Carmichael, Martha Stewart, Kay Richmond, and the teachers of Clarke County for their kind and sophisticated assistance, and to David Coleman and David Hammer for their technical assistance.     

“Anchor-range” results with “same” and “different” responses and similar and dissimilar stimuli

Summary Blocks of pairs of dissimilar (anchor-like) circles were unexpectedly followed by single pairs of similar circles and vice versa. The dissimilar circles were 3 and 10 mm in diameter, and the similar circles were 3 and 5 mm, 5 and 7 mm, and 7 and 10 mm in diameter. In a second experiment, the dissimilar and similar circles did not overlap in size (e.g., they were 1.5 and 5 mm and 7 and 10 mm, respectively). The same responses to the unexpected same pairs of similar circles were faster than the same responses to the identical pairs in the blocks. In contrast, the different responses to the unexpected different pairs of similar circles were slower than the different responses to the identical pairs in the blocks. Similar stimuli accelerate same responses and slow down different responses. So the time results (and the error results as well) suggest that the context of the block dissimilar circles increased the perceived similarity of the unexpected similar circles. These anchor-range results are not explained by Thurstonian theories, which are based on the absolute properties of stimuli. Instead, they imply that the relation between the similar circles in the context of the relation between the dissimilar circles affected performance.     

Stuffed Cabbage in the Old New School Cafeteria

The purpose of this lecture is to celebrate the memory of Aron Gurwitsch by examining and enlarging the domain of phenomenological clarification of some elements of what Gurwitsch called the logic of reality. Chief among those elements are the nature of the taken-for-grantedness of our existential belief, the difference between presentive and non-presentive indices of reality and the ground for the self-illumination of the world of working.     

Sex differences in susceptibility to social influence

Sex differences in compliance and persuasiveness were examined while varying the sex-role relevance of the stimulus. Undergraduate students were asked to respond to opinion statements previously discussed by a fictitious group. Subjects read the group's unanimous opinion accompanying each statement and were told they would participate in a discussion with this group. Some subjects responded to statements about female sex-role relevant activities and others to statements about male sex-role relevant activities. Sex of influence source was manipulated by showing subjects all male or all female names of group members. Compliance was measured by the extent to which a subject's response approximated the group's opinion. The results show that males were more compliant than females when the stimulus statements concerned female sex-role-related activities and that females were more easily influenced when they responded to statements about male sex-role-related activities. Further, subjects were somewhat more easily persuaded by women on female sex-role-related activities and more influenced by men's opinions on issues relevant for males.In most of the social influence literature, alterations in a subject's behavior in an experimental situation has been termed conformity. However, conformity may involve either private acceptance or overt alterations in behavior without cognitive change (i.e., compliance). Throughout this article the term compliance refers to shifts in behavior toward an immediate and transitory social influence (Sherif & Sherif, 1969, p. 191).     

“Paramount reality” in Schutz and Gurwitsch

Conclusion Both Schutz and Gurwitsch describe reality as having a manifold character: Schutz speaks of multiple realities and Gurwitsch of orders of existence. Both hold that one realm of reality has a privileged status compared to the others: common everyday experience. However, in spite of this apparent convergence in their views, a closer reading of their various works reveal the important difference in what they understand under common everyday experience.For Schutz, it is the world of social action, characterized by him as paramount reality because of the constitutive processes of the experiences of time, space, sociality and meaning involved in action. For Gurwitsch, the realm of common everyday experience represents the counterpart and the origin of the constructed realm of science: therein lies its status of paramount reality. But what it really refers to is not ordinary experience, as most of his statements suggest, but pre-predicative experience, wherefrom the categories of the natural sciences, namely space and time, originate. Gurwitsch speaks of this pre-predicative experience, which he also calls primordial experience, as being essentially perceptual experience. However, he limits perceptual experience to sensory perception, leaving out the symbolic, social and action-related components of perception and becomes thus inconsistent with his adherence to the dismissal of the constancy hypothesis in his field theory of consciousness. The dismissal of the constancy hypothesis implies the recognition of the appresentational structures involving symbols, action and Others as inherent components of every perception. Schutz disagrees with Gurwitsch's reduction of the life-world Erlebnisse to sensory perception and this issue becomes the core of their debate on the phenomenon of paramount reality.     

What was Leibniz's problem about relations?

The main purpose of the article is to get clear what Leibniz's concerns about relations were. His:

Father is true of David. Son is true of Solomon. But Being a father of is not true of any individual.

Leibniz, like modern nominalist Nelson Goodman, could not allow the ordered pair . To establish this I must argue against Hidé Ishiguro's claim that Leibniz should have straightforwardly constructed a logic of relations, and Jaakko Hintikka's claim that Leibniz could have allowed the use of relational predicates in such forms as (Ex) Rax and (Ey) Ryb. I must also argue that what they say about the windowlessness doctrine (especially the as if formulation) is beside the point.I wish to thank Susan Haack for her help in turning a draft into the present paper.     

Partially-Ordered (Branching) Generalized Quantifiers: A General Definition

Following Henkins discovery of partially-ordered (branching) quantification (POQ) with standard quantifiers in 1959, philosophers of language have attempted to extend his definition to POQ with generalized quantifiers. In this paper I propose a general definition of POQ with 1-place generalized quantifiers of the simplest kind: namely, predicative, or cardinality quantifiers, e.g., most, few, finitely many, exactly , where is any cardinal, etc. The definition is obtained in a series of generalizations, extending the original, Henkin definition first to a general definition of monotone-increasing (M) POQ and then to a general definition of generalized POQ, regardless of monotonicity. The extension is based on (i) Barwises 1979 analysis of the basic case of M POQ and (ii) my 1990 analysis of the basic case of generalized POQ. POQ is a non-compositional 1st-order structure, hence the problem of extending the definition of the basic case to a general definition is not trivial. The paper concludes with a sample of applications to natural and mathematical languages.     

Toward a phenomenology of attention

There is a considerable amount of research being done on attention by cognitive psychologists. I claim that in the process of measuring and mapping consciousness, these researchers have missed important phenomenological findings. After a synopsis and illustration of the nature of attention as described by Aron Gurwitsch, I critique the assumptions of current psychological research on this topic. Included is discussion of the metaphor of attention as a beam or spotlight, the concept of selective attention as the standard accomplishment, and the cognitive bestowal of organization on otherwise unorganized data. It is concluded that cognitive psychologists and others working on attention can benefit from Gurwitsch's work, and that a credible account of attention is crucial to the success of any comprehensive statement on the nature of consciousness.     

An Analysis of Pride Systems and the Dynamics of Faith

Pride, in Western Christianity, has long been recognized as a vice and deadly sin. In this article, individual and communal pride is understood as emerging from, and supported by, a system of hierarchical valuations, which provides a subjective and intersubjective sense of self-worth along with a sense of power and privilege. A pride system is linked to, and supported by, stories and rituals that omnipotently confirm individual and communal status and power. This complex system is accompanied by a particular faith dynamic that benefits its members, yet alienates those deemed to be of lesser value. While positive valuations support a persons (and communitys) sense of self-esteem and are, more often than not, important for a sense of trust, group loyalty, and community, they are also accompanied by negative appraisals that are projected onto an other. This other is alienated from the privileges and power of those who identify with, and own, the positive valuations. Pride systems, then, are good to the extent that they shore up a sense of self and community and bad, or inherently deadly, to the extent that goodness depends on the subtle or overt alienation of a person or group.     

The analysis of experience: John Dewey and Elsie Ripley Clapp on desire and thinking, 1911

Unpublished correspondence with Elsie Ripley Clapp, along with extensive notes for a 1911 course, The Analysis of Experience, provide the context for a consideration of John Dewey's discussion of the relation between desire and thinking. Dewey's philosophic point of view is portrayed as it was developing in his own mind. The unity of thought and desire, the necessity of making objects of inquiry, the identification of thinking and acting, are themes in these materials which would appear in their published form in such works as Essays in Experimental Logic, Democracy and Education, and Human Nature and Conduct. In the unpublished materials, Dewey is seen as a naturalist at work in his laboratory, reworking his ideas and acknowledging Clapp's assistance in getting Dewey to connect practical situations in life with the philosophic distinctions under development. The 1911 materials are an excellent connection between problematics in Dewey's earlier writings on ethics, epistemology, and logic, and his later writings, on the same subjects in the 1920's and 1930's.     

Groups to Resolve Conflicts Between Groups: Diplomacy with a Therapeutic Dimension

The group self, an individual's self-perception as a member of a group, is distinguished from the group's self, a personification of the group as a person with a self. The perceived group's self of an opposing other group is often a repository for attributes group members are not ready to recognize in their own group's self. Theoretically, the need for an adversarial other to hold one's own group's unwanted attributes—and thus to complete one's own group's self—contributes, however unconsciously, to the apparent intractability of intergroup disputes. In dealing with these issues, I compare intergroup conflict resolution (ICR) groups with therapy groups, on the one hand, and advocacy groups on the other. All of this sets the stage for a presentation of two ICR projects and their analysis in group-developmental terms.     

How to frame the free will problem

Conclusion The exchange is almost complete. I have argued that if we wish to view the free will problem in a non-question-begging way, we should frame the problem in more radical terms than we usually do. If we frame the problem this way, then we discover a compelling reason for rejecting all of the familiar isms in favor of my non-realism thesis. This thesis holds that free choice has a coherent meaning just in case it is treated as a subjective term; thus, if we try to view free choice as denoting classes of entities that themselves possess the characteristic of freeness, it is logically inconsistent. My thesis is supported by a certain metaphilosophical view. I admit that this metaphilosophical view — which tries to locate everything where it belongs — is neither provable nor refutable. But if my argument in this paper is correct, when we assert any of the positions that presuppose the coherence of free will (Hard Determinism, Soft Determinism, Libertarianism, Incompatibilism, Compatibilism), we should add the fact that we have adopted a metaphilosophical view that supports these. Since these metaphilosophies are non-truth-tracking views, our joint declaration of our lower level free will theory and its supporting metaphilosophy will sound Pickwickian (e.g., I believe that Libertarianism is true and I support that view with the metaphilosophical thesis that the most important role of philosophy is not to track truth, but to create an intellectual climate best for improving the human condition.) If I have shown that my opponents are forced to such declarations, I will be satisfied.     

Chris: The “crazy” kid as a family hero

A case is discussed of an eleven-year-old schizophrenic male who had made a conscious decision several years earlier to act crazy to keep his parents from fighting and divorcing. A relabeling of his crazy behavior as that of a family hero was a first step in releasing him from marital difficulties and beginning to return him to a normal life.     

Ghost Gestures: Phenomenological Investigations of Bodily Micromovements and Their Intercorporeal Implications

This paper thematizes the operative kinaesthetic style of world-experiencing life by turning to the ongoing how of our habitual bodily comportment: to our deeply sedimented way(s) of making a body; to schematic inner vectors or tendencies toward movement that persist as bodily ghost gestures even if one is not making the larger, visible gestures they imply; and to inadvertent isometrics, i.e., persisting patterns of trying, bracing, freezing, etc. All such micromovements witness to our sociality insofar as they are not only socially shaped, but perpetuate certain styles of intercorporeal interaction and sustain certain modes of responsivity. Reactivating the sediment -- retrieving the tacit choreography of everyday life from its anonymity and sensing our ongoing ways of living out the legacy of our communal body -- not only allows one's individual bodily style to shift, but can open new possibilities for healthy interkinaesthetic comportment. Such work can thus contribute to an embodied ethics in both theory and practice.     

A calculus for the common rules of ∧ and ∨

We provide a finite axiomatization of the consequence , i.e. of the set of common sequential rules for and . Moreover, we show that has no proper non-trivial strengthenings other than and . A similar result is true for , but not, e.g., for ⁺.To the memory of Jerzy Supecki