Frustration, preference and behavioural contrast

Pigeons' pecks on both a red (left-hand) and a striped (right-hand) response key were reinforced on a concurrent variable-interval 2-min. schedule until the proportion of responses given to each key had stabilized. In alternate sessions, the right-hand key was covered, while responding to a green stimulus on the left-hand key was reinforced on variable-interval 1-min. When responding to green was later extinguished, more responses were made to the striped key in reinforcement sessions, although the rate of responding to the other, red key increased. Replacing extinction during green by reinforcement returned the preference and the response rates to their previous levels. These results are compared with a previous experiment in which the striped key was not present, where a similar increase in response rate to red was observed after extinction on green. The shift in preference coupled with the usual contrast effect in the present experiment supports an interpretation of behavioural contrast in terms of the frustrative effects of extinction.     

A note on cue probability learning: what conditioning data reveal about cue contrast

In a probabilistic learning task with two complementary cues (C₁ and C₂) and two events (E₁ and E₂) the subject has a tendency to infer that E₂ will occur when C₂ occurs after he/she has observed that E₁ frequently goes with C₁. This phenomenon was termed cue contrast because it reflects the belief that C₂ contrasts with C₁ and should indicate E₂. Two kinds of predictions following from the notion of cue contrast were tested on response proportions from the first block of trials in four previously published experiments on cue probability learning. Of a total of 15 independent observations (eight within-group comparisons; seven between-group comparisons) 13 confirmed the predictions (sign test, p<0.005). It was concluded that cue utilization is both an inductive process based on association between cues and events and an inferential process based on contrast.     

A note on notes: note taking and containment

In extreme situations of massive projective identification, both the analyst and the patient may come to share a fantasy or belief that his or her own psychic reality will be annihilated if the psychic reality of the other is accepted or adopted (Britton 1998). In the example of' Dr. M and his patient, the paradoxical dilemma around note taking had highly specific transference meanings; it was not simply an instance of the generalized human response of distracted attention that Freud (1912) had spoken of, nor was it the destabilization of analytic functioning that I tried to describe in my work with Mr. L. Whether such meanings will always exist in these situations remains a matter to be determined by further clinical experience. In reopening a dialogue about note taking during sessions, I have attempted to move the discussion away from categorical injunctions about what analysis should or should not do, and instead to foster a more nuanced, dynamic, and pair-specific consideration of the analyst's functioning in the immediate context of the analytic relationship. There is, of course, a wide variety of listening styles among analysts, and each analyst's mental functioning may be affected differently by each patient whom the analyst sees. I have raised many questions in the hopes of stimulating an expanded discussion that will allow us to share our experiences and perhaps reach additional conclusions. Further consideration may lead us to decide whether note taking may have very different meanings for other analysts and analyst-patient pairs, and whether it may serve useful functions in addition to the one that I have described.