Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects

I argue that a solution to puzzles concerning the relationship ofobjects and their properties – a version of the `bundle' theory ofparticulars according to which ordinary objects are mereologicalfusions of monadic and relational tropes – is also a solution topuzzles of material constitution involving the allegedco-location of material objects. Additionally, two argumentsthat have played a prominent role in shaping the current debate,Mark Heller's argument for Four Dimensionalism and Peter vanInwagen's argument against Mereological Universalism, are shownto be unsound given this version of the bundle theory.     

Conservation of Physical Attributes of Animate and Inanimate Objects

Children's (N = 83 boys and girls in kindergarten and first grade) responses to a series of conservation tasks (number, length, mass, weight) which had animate and inanimate referent objects, in two experiments, showed significant differences in the proportions of conservation between animate and inanimate objects. Physical attributes were conserved more easily with inanimate objects than with animate objects, and significant conservation differences between various animate objects were found also.     

Objects and attitudes

The concept of an attitudinal object has long been present in psychoanalysis but almost entirely neglected. This omission is integral in the confusion and controversy about the object concept in general. It has left a theoretical gap which the so-called object relations theories have attempted to fill. This paper offers some preliminary suggestions for a psychoanalytic understanding of attitudes as a first level of inference in the study of relationships and their psychological basis.     

Consciousness and its Objects

Books reviewed:
Colin McGinn, Consciousness and its Objects , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2004, 256 pp. Reviewed by D. W. Hamlyn, Birkbeck College, University of London 38 Smithy Knoll Road Calver Hope Valley Derbyshire S32 3XW     

Intentional Objects

The idea of an intentional object, or an object of thought, gives rise to a dilemma for theories of intentionality. Either intentional objects are existing objects, in which case it is impossible, contrary to appearances, to think about something which does not exist. Or some intentional objects are non-existent real objects. But this requires an obscure and implausible metaphysics. I argue that the way out of this dilemma is to deny that being an intentional object is being an entity of any kind. 'Object' here does not mean thing or entity. Rather, to say that something is an intentional object is just to say that it is an object of thought (or other intentional state or act) for a subject. It is further argued that theories of intentionality should not dispense with the idea of an intentional object.     

Left and Right Hemifield Advantages of Fusions and Combinations in Audiovisual Speech Perception

If a place-of-articulation contrast is created between the auditory and the visual component syllables of videotaped speech, frequently the syllable that listeners report they have heard differs phonetically from the auditory component. These “McGurk effects”, as they have come to be called, show that speech perception may involve some kind of intermodal process. There are two classes of these phenomena: fusions and combinations. Perception of the syllable /da/ when auditory /ba/ and visual /ga/ are presented provides a clear example of the former, and perception of the string /bga/ after presentation of auditory /ga/ and visual /ba/ an unambiguous instance of the latter. Besides perceptual fusions and combinations, hearing visually presented component syllables also shows an influence of vision on audition. It is argued that these “visual” responses arise from basically the same underlying processes that yield fusions and combinations, respectively. In the present study, the visual component of audiovisually incongruous CV-syllables was presented in the left and the right visual hemifield, respectively. Audiovisual fusion responses showed a left hemifield advantage, and audiovisual combination responses a right hemifield advantage. This finding suggests that the process of audiovisual integration differs between audiovisual fusions and combinations and, furthermore, that the two cerebral hemispheres contribute differentially to the two classes of response.     

Scepticism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice

It is not unusual for epistemologists to argue that ordinary epistemic practice is a setting within which (infallibilist) scepticism will not arise. Such scepticism is deemed to be an alien invader, impugning such epistemic practice entirely from without. But this paper argues that the suggested sort of analysis overstates the extent to which ordinary epistemic practice is antipathetic to some vital aspects of such sceptical thinking. The paper describes how a gradualist analysis of knowledge can do more justice to what sceptics seek to achieve – while also showing how sceptical thinking can even be part of (and is able to have some muted epistemic impact within) ordinary epistemic practice.

Ordinary language and absolute certainty

Philosophical Studies -