Phenomenology and psychophysics

Recent philosophy of mind has tended to treat “inner” states, including both qualia and intentional states, as “theoretical posits” of either folk or scientific psychology. This article argues that phenomenology in fact plays a very different role in the most mature part of psychology, psychophysics. Methodologically, phenomenology plays a crucial role in obtaining psychophysical results. And more importantly, many psychophysical data are best interpreted as reporting relations between stimuli and phenomenological states, both qualitative and intentional. Three examples are used to argue for this thesis: the Weber–Fechner laws, the Craik-O’Brien–Cornsweet effect, and subjective contour figures. The phenomenological properties that play a role here do so in the role of data that ultimately constrain theoretical work (in this case theory of vision), and not as theoretical posits.     

The Value of the Virtues

Direct theories of the virtues maintain that an explanation of why some virtuous trait counts as valuable should ultimately appeal to the value of its characteristic motive or aim. In this paper I argue that, if we take the idea of a direct approach to virtue theory seriously, we should favour a view according to which virtue involves knowledge. I raise problems for recent “agent-based” and “end-based” versions of the direct approach, show how my account proves preferable to these, and defend it against a number of objections.     

Does Free Will Remain a Mystery? A Response to Van Inwagen

In this paper, I argue against Peter van Inwagen’s claim (in “Free Will Remains a Mystery”), that agent-causal views of free will could do nothing to solve the problem of free will (specifically, the problem of chanciness). After explaining van Inwagen’s argument, I argue that he does not consider all possible manifestations of the agent-causal position. More importantly, I claim that, in any case, van Inwagen appears to have mischaracterized the problem in some crucial ways. Once we are clear on the true nature of the problem of chanciness, agent-causal views do much to eradicate it.     

Gadamer and the Otherness of Nature: Elements for an Environmental Education

In this work I search for elements that contribute to the development of the ethical dimension of environmental education. I start with the existence of what C.A. Bowers calls “areas of silence” in the curriculum in both schools and universities. The reason for this silence, I argue, is to be found in the Cartesian conceptual structures of curricula. I suggest that the works of Bacon, Galileo and Descartes provoke a twofold process that I have termed the forgetting of tradition and objectification of nature. As a corrective to this process, I explore the possibilities that the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer opens for rehabilitation of tradition and de-objectification of nature. I work with the concept of the “dignity of things” present in Greek dialectics: that nature is not simply a projection of mind (as the neo-Kantians claim), but something that thought suffers. In my conclusions I argue that for nature to be reinserted into almost all areas of knowledge it is necessary that we respect “the otherness of nature.”     

Sense, nonsense, and the use of personality measures

Criticize measurement-based personality research by recounting a well-known limitation: indices of relationship are often inflated because of the similarity of content across measures of presumably different constructs. In this paper we endorse the major contention of Nicholls et al. that measurement-based research may be conducted thoughtlessly, and we extend their thinking by pointing out an important underlying issue—the problem of defining what constitutes a “syndrome.” In contrast to them, however, we argue that the problems in measurement they cite do not entail the consequences they foresee and, in addition, have limited application.     

Curriculum, Critical Common-Sensism, Scholasticism, and the Growth of Democratic Character

My paper concentrates on Peirce’s late essay, “Issues of Pragmaticism,” which identifies “critical common-sensism” and Scotistic realism as the two primary products of pragmaticism. I argue that the doctrines of Peirce’s critical common-sensism provide a host of commendable curricular objectives for democratic Bildung. The second half of my paper explores Peirce’s Scotistic realism. I argue that Peirce eventually returned to Aristotelian intuitions that led him to a more robust realism. I focus on the development of signs from the vague and indeterminate to the determinate and universal. The primary example will be the evolution of the very idea of number. I believe we will never arrive at the end of number history because we can never fully contain creativity. I draw similar conclusions for the idea of curriculum. Whether or not there is an end to the evolution of signs in Peirce is a matter of debate. I incline toward the opinion there is not, though I am unsure. I conclude by arguing that rationality itself is but the form and structure of poetic creation and that we should embrace paradox and even contradiction rather that become caught in totalizing and totalitarian end of history stories.     

Children's understanding of interpretation

The prevailing view in the study of children's developing theories of mind is that the 4-year-old's newfound understanding of false belief is the single developmental milestone marking entry into an adult “folk psychology.” We argue instead that there are at least two such watershed events. Children first develop a “copy theory” that equates the mind with a recording device capable of producing either faithful or flawed representations of reality and according to which mental states are determined entirely by the flow of information into the mind. Only later, in the early school years, do children come to appreciate, as do adults, that the mind itself can contribute to the content of mental states. This later-arriving “Interpretive Theory of Mind” allows an appreciation of the capacity for constructively interpreting and misinterpreting reality. The main finding from the six studies reported here is that children who otherwise demonstrate a clear understanding that beliefs can be false (and so deserve to be credited with a theory of mind), can nevertheless fail to appreciate even the most basic aspects of interpretation: that despite exposure to precisely the same information, two persons can still end up holding sharply different opinions about what is the self-same reality. What these studies reveal is that an interpretive theory of mind is different from, and later arriving than, an appreciation of the possibility of false belief, and contrary to competing claims, this interpretive theory actually makes its first appearance during, but not before, the early school years.     

Justification by Coherence from Scratch

In this paper we make three points about justification of propositions by coherence “from scratch”, where pieces of evidence that are coherent have no individual credibility. First, we argue that no matter how many pieces of evidence are coherent, and no matter what relation we take coherence to be, coherence does not make independent pieces of evidence with no individual credibility credible. Second, we show that an intuitively plausible informal reasoning for justification by coherence from scratch is deficient since it relies on an understanding of “individual credibility” inappropriate for justification from scratch. Third, we show that coherence, when it is recurrent, can make independent sources of evidence with no individual credibility credible. We describe specifically a case in which the same group of independent witnesses with no individual credibility repeatedly produce reports that are in agreement with each other, and their reports become credible as a result.     

Reproducing gender in counseling and psychotherapy: Understanding the problem and changing the practice

In this article I argue that the concept of gender is misunderstood by the majority of psychologists. Increasingly the term “gender” is mindlessly replacing the term “sex,” obfuscating decades of theory and research that elucidated gender as a complex social-psychological variable rather than a bifurcated individual-difference variable tied to biological sex. As a consequence, gender is largely ignored as an “active” variable in counseling research and practice. Current theory and research on gender as they apply to counseling and psychotherapy are first described. Then ways in which gender processes are often reproduced in counseling and psychotherapy and factors contributing to this practice are illuminated. Finally, areas particularly vulnerable to reproducing gender are described and some examples provided of the reproducing, and the disrupting, of gender processes in counseling.     

Goldman On Knowledge As True Belief

Alvin Goldman contends that, in addition to the familiar sense or use of the term “knowledge” according to which knowledge is at least true justified belief, there is a weaker yet strict sense or use of the term “knowledge” according to which knowledge amounts to nothing more than information-possession or mere true belief. In this paper, I argue that Goldman has failed to show that there is such a weaker sense, and that, even if he had shown this, he has not shown that this putative weaker sense is a strict one by his own criterion for strictness.     

Relative contributions of kind- and domain-level concepts to expectations concerning unfamiliar exemplars: Developmental change and domain differences

Two inferential routes allow children to produce expectations about new instances of ontological categories like “animal” and “artefact.” One is to generalise information from a “look-up table” of familiar kind-concepts. The other one is to use independent expectations at the level of ontological domains. Our experiment pits these two sources of information against each other, using a sentence-judgement task associating properties with images of familiar and unfamiliar artefacts and animals. “Strange” properties are compatible with the ontological concept, but not encountered in any familiar kind. A look-up strategy would lead children to reject them and an independent expectation strategy to accept them. In both domains, we find a difference in reaction to strange properties associated with familiar vs. unfamiliar items, which shows that even young children do use independent domain-level information. We also found a U-shaped curve in propensity to use such abstract information. In addition, animal categories are the object of much more definite domain-level expectations, which supports the notion that the animal domain is more causally integrated than the artefact domain.     

Peirce on Education: Discussion of Peirce’s Definition of a University

I write this short essay in response to Peirce, as a feminist, pragmatist, and cultural studies scholar, in the hope that it will help to bring feminism and pragmatism together. I suggest that Peirce offers marginalized and colonized people a way to argue for the importance of their input, with his theory of fallibilism, even if he still claims a position of privilege. He also offers assistance through his concept of “a community of inquirers.” It is curious that Peirce’s definition of a university argues for a split between theory and practice that his earlier work sought to heal. Peirce opened a door to help diverse scholars be able to enter the university, and find a way to address issues of power, with his youthful connecting of theory to practice, that his more senior position draws our attention away from and seeks to hold off. Fortunately, it is too late. Peirce’s youthful pragmatism has been developed in important ways by other scholars and now serves as an example of a way to do philosophy that does connect theory to practice and does seek to address real problems in diverse peoples lives, and help to find solutions that effect change.     

The False Consensus Effect and Overconfidence: Flaws in Judgment or Flaws in How We Study Judgment?

Thefalse consensus effectand theoverconfidence in judgmenteffect are often referred to as established “facts” of psychology. At present, the empirical support for these effects is inadequate and logically flawed. We argue that, absent other information, using one's own response to a situation as an observation of size 1 could be an effective use of data and could lead to anincreasein the accuracy of predicting others’ behavior. In an empirical examination of such use, we find a robustpositivecorrelation between the degree to which people believe that a majority of others are like them and their accuracy in predicting those others’ responses, whether this correlation is evaluated within items across people, across items within people, or across items across people. In addition, we show that the finding of overconfidence in judgment follows analytically from the functional relationship used to demonstrate it, a “finding” that is easily reversed by considering the inverse relationship. Specifically, we argue that regression effects account for the evidence cited in support of overconfidence. While not definitive, our empirical findings call into the question the acceptance of these two effects—as commonly defined—as facts.     

The importance of problem-driven research: Bringing Wachtel's argument into the present

There is no one best way to do psychological research. Rather, the “best” way depends on the fit to the problem. Research should be problem-driven rather than method-driven. Psychologists sometimes envy certain natural scientists, and over-reward those who do research with a surface structure more like that of research in the natural sciences, leading to sub-optimal progress in the field.     

Personality, anxiety and functional dysphonia

Psychological factors are considered for the predisposition and perpetuation of functional dysphonia. In the present study 61 patients with functional dysphonia were compared with 61 healthy controls, matched by age, sex, and occupation with respect to Cloninger’s personality model, mood, and anxiety.The patients with functional dysphonia presented significantly higher scores than the healthy controls with respect to “harm avoidance” (HA); depressive symptoms; symptoms of unspecific and general anxiety; symptoms of specific anxiety concerning “health”, “illness”, and “extraversion versus introversion”. No significant differences were found in “novelty seeking” (NS), “reward dependence” (RD), “persistence” (PE), or in state-anxiety and anxiety of social situations. These results were found considering univariate and multivariate analyses and confirm the relationship of psychological factors such as personality traits, mood, and anxiety on one hand and conversion disorder in general and functional dysphonia in particular on the other hand. This important relationship should be considered in the diagnostic and therapeutic interventions of functional dysphonia.     

Popper and Synthetic judgements A Priori

Summary  Popper uses the “Humean challenge” as a justification for his falsificationism. It is claimed that in his basic argument he confuses two different doubts: (a) the Humean doubt (Popper’s problem of induction), and (b) the “Popperean” doubt whether – presupposing that there are laws of nature – the laws we accept are in fact valid. Popper’s alleged solution of the problem of induction does not solve the problem in a straightforward way (as Levison and Salmon have remarked before). But if Popper’s solution of the Humean challenge is re-interpreted as being close to Kant’s it makes sense. Even though Popper explicitly rejects Kant’s synthetic judgements a priori, it is claimed here that this is so because he misinterprets Kant’s argument. If he had understood Kant correctly he should have been a modern “Kantianer”!     

Unsafe Knowledge

Ernest Sosa has argued that if someone knows that p, then his belief that p is “safe”. and Timothy Williamson has agreed. In this paper I argue that safety, as defined by Sosa, is not a necessary condition on knowledge – that we can have unsafe knowledge. I present Sosa’s definition of safety and a counterexample to it as a necessary condition on knowledge. I also argue that Sosa’s most recent refinements to the notion of safety don’t help him to avoid the counterexample. I consider three replies on behalf of the defender of safety, and find them all wanting. Finally, I offer a tentative diagnosis of my counterexample.     

Language skills in developmentally disabled children

Language measures of receptive and expressive vocabulary, story telling, and immediate verbal memory, as well as two perceptual tests, were administered to a group of developmentally disabled children, and three groups of normal children, one matched for chronological age, one for mean length of utterance, and one for performance on one of the perceptual tests. When diagnostic subgroups of “autism,” “childhood schizophrenia,” and “other severe disturbance” were formed using standard diagnostic tools, no language differences were found between diagnostic subgroups. When compared with the normal control groups, many of the language skills of the entire group of disabled children, and of the autistic children alone, were rather evenly delayed, showing only a relative sparing of the naming function, and a relative deficit on immediate verbal memory. Furthermore, a high correlation was found in a small subsample between the difficulty levels of morphemes in the disabled children and those reported for young normal children. Experienced special-education and early-childhood teachers could not discriminate the stories of the disabled children from those of young normal children. Analysis of the disabled children's error strategies, however, revealed features of their language not found in normal children's language: (1) extreme perseveration in test answers and stories, (2) attention to minor features of test stimuli, and (3) failure to adopt alternate, flexible communicative strategies. We conclude that the language acquisition of the developmentally disabled children is delayed but not deviant in its semantic and syntactic competence, and that current diagnostic practice does not differentiate linguistically distinct subgroups. We further argue that where developmentally disabled children do exhibit aberrant features of language, such deviance parallels similar features in other cognitive skills, and is not unique to language.