On the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics

In recent years, there has been growing discussion amongst philosophers about “conceptual engineering”. Put roughly, conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of concepts, or of other devices we use in thought and talk (e.g., words). This often involves attempts to modify our existing concepts (or other representational devices), and/or our practices of using them. This paper explores the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, where conceptual ethics is taken to encompass normative and evaluative questions about concepts, words, and other broadly “representational” and/or “inferential” devices we use in thought and talk. We take some of the central questions in conceptual ethics to concern which concepts we should use and what words should mean, and why. We put forward a view of conceptual engineering in terms of the following three activities: conceptual ethics, conceptual innovation, and conceptual implementation. On our view, conceptual engineering can be defined in terms of these three activities, but not in a straightforward, Boolean way. Conceptual engineering, we argue, is made up of mereologically complex activities whose parts fall into the categories associated with each of these three different activities.     

The bodily complexity of truth‐telling in qualitative research: Some implications of Gendlin's theory

Abstract

Gendlin's philosophy of the body is used as an approach to the “truth values” of qualitative research. In this view, our bodily participation in life provides a grounded quality to understanding, a shared reference point for an experientially‐grounded language that can “'work.” This understanding is a bodily‐informed practice and involves the body's access to “more than words can say.” As such, the body is intimate to understanding and such bodily‐informed sense‐making adds a dimension to the ways we have access to and present truth. Implications of this approach for qualitative methodology will be discussed, in particular the implications for the informant's task, the interviewer's task, the task of analysis and the task of the reader.     

Fictional Truth and Make-Believe

The statement “Mr. Darcy proposes to Elizabeth” seems true in Jane Austin’s Pride and Prejudice (even though it may not actually appear in the text) while the statement “Mr. Darcy is a detective” seems false. One explanation for this intuition is that when we read or talk about fictional stories, we implicitly employ the fictional operator “It is fictional that” or “It is part of the story that.” “It is fictional that Mr. Darcy proposes to Elizabeth” expresses a true proposition while “It is fictional that Mr. Darcy is a detective” does not. Fictive statements can be abbreviated as “In F, P”. Determining what statements are fictionally true in a story requires providing truth conditions for statements of the form “In F, P.” This paper proposes an analysis of truth in fiction and examines the notion of make-believe.     

Deferring to Others about One's Own Mind

Pessimists about moral testimony hold that there is something suboptimal about forming moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates an analogous claim about self‐knowledge of the reason‐responsive attitudes. When it comes to your own mind, it seems important to know things “from the inside”, in the first‐personal way, rather than putting your trust in another. After motivating pessimism, the paper offers an explanation of its truth. First‐person knowledge is distinctive because it involves knowing a state of mind and finding it intelligible from one's point of view. It concludes by considering the value of this form of self‐understanding.     

Neo‐pragmatism,Representationalism and the Emotions

This paper offers a neo‐pragmatist account of the representational character of the emotions, for those emotions that have such a character. Put most generally, neo‐pragmatism is the view that language should not be conceived primarily in terms of a robust relation of reference to or representation of antecedently given objects and properties. Rather, we should view it as a social practice that lets us do various quite different sorts of things. One of those things might be called ‘assessing representational accuracy’, but this need not be thought of in terms of a metaphysically heavyweight relation. In applying neo‐pragmatist techniques to the domain of the emotions, the result will be an alternative to currently popular accounts that individuate emotions partly in terms of what they represent. This alternative continues to allow us to use representational language in connection with some emotions. And it also helps to explain the awkwardness of representational talk in connection with other emotions: an awkwardness that was always a liability of monolithic representationalist views.     

Mental rotation and handedness: differences in object-based and egocentric transformations

This study investigates mental rotation performance of right- and left-handers in object-based and egocentric mental rotation tasks using human body stimuli with an outstretched arm in front and back view. Previous literature suggests that right-handers show a slightly better mental rotation performance than left-handers. 42 participants, 14 left-handers and 28 right-handers, completed a mental rotation task with object-based and egocentric transformation of a human figure which was displayed either in front or back view. The main result was a three-way interaction between the factors “kind of transformation”, “handedness” and “view” in a way, that right-handers show significantly faster reaction times then left-handers in front view object-based transformations because of the additional in-depth rotation for front view stimuli. This difference disappeared in egocentric tasks due to the modification of onés own perspective to solve the task. The results of this study show that right-handers not generally outperform left-handers in mental rotation tasks but only if more cognitive resources are needed.     

Christer Sjödin interviews Jan Stensson

Abstract

The author examines different definitions and applications of the terms “psychic energy” and “libido.” With regard to the “psychic energy” terminology, he shows that its application and usage relate in particular to the perspective of Brenner and not to Freud's definition. He argues that Freud uses the term “psychic energy” as a synonym for “libido,” and not “libido” as a synonym for “psychic energy.” It is demonstrated that in Freud's view, up until 1914, “libido” relates to manifestations of bodily sexual tensions, and subsequently this term applies to the manifestations of sexual energy in the psychic field. The author rejects this change in terminology and also challenges Freud's attempt to use dynamic-economic considerations as an explanatory device for epistemological reasons. Freud's concept of energy is inconsistent with the meaning of energy as defined in the physical sciences, and whereas the metapsychological topographical, dynamic, and structural viewpoints have a solid foundation in the representational world to which the psychoanalytic process affords unique access, this is not true of the economic viewpoint. It is claimed that bodily tensions only exist in the representational world in the form of affects, so that, in the author's opinion, the economic viewpoint should be abandoned in favour of an affective one. In the context of the endeavour to obtain pleasure and avoid unpleasure adduced by Freud, this viewpoint focuses on the relationships between affects and the different elements of the representational world, thereby serving as the subject of metapsychological investigation.     

On going (and getting) nowhere with our words: New skepticism about the philosophical method of cases

The philosophical “method of cases” has been the subject of intense discussion. In a recent paper, Frank Jackson attempts to vindicate the method by proposing that it is underwritten by the “representational view of language.” Jackson's proposal is potentially very significant. For if it is true, then the method of cases stands, but quite possibly also falls, with the representational view of language as characterized by Jackson. The aim of this paper is to question the philosophical method of cases by showing that it does in fact presuppose a particular view of language that is at the very least questionable, both philosophically and empirically.     

Organic imagination as intuitive intellect: Self‐knowledge and self‐constitution in Hegel's early critique of Kant

This paper concerns Hegel's early treatment of the productive imagination in his 1803–1804 Faith and Knowledge. I show how he articulates that activity in terms of a pair of speculative unities, which solve lingering problems of self‐knowledge and self‐constitution from Kant's B‐deduction. On the one hand, I argue that the familiar unity of spontaneity and receptivity makes possible knowledge of the moment of self‐positing. On the other hand, I contend that Hegel's talk of imagination as both an “organic idea” and an “intuitive intellect” refers to a self‐constituting capacity that intellects like ours possess. I show that self‐constitution is possible, for Hegel, only in so far as intellects like ours possess a capacity to unify possibility and actuality in thought, or to think themselves into being.     

Types,Tokens, and Talk about Musical Works

It has recently been suggested that the type/token theorist concerning musical works cannot come up with an adequate semantic theory of those sentences in which we purport to talk about such works. Specifically, it has been claimed that, since types are abstract entities, a type/token theorist can only account for the truth of sentences such as “The 1812 Overture is very loud” and “Bach's Two Part Invention in C has an F‐sharp in its fourth measure” by adopting an untenable semantic claim: namely, that the predicates in such sentences, once applied to musical works, undergo a systematic shift in their meanings. This article is a sustained explanation of why our talk about musical works in fact provides no problem for the type/token theorist. First, we demonstrate that the aforementioned “meaning shift” approach to the sentences’ predicates is well motivated and very credible. Second, we explain how the type/token theorist can adopt the best available version of an alternative, generic quantificational approach to such sentences. Third, we establish that other semantic theories, presented as undermining the type/token theory by giving us a reason for adopting eliminativism about types, are much less theoretically virtuous than the two theories that a type/token theorist can freely adopt.     

A priori perceptual entitlement,knowledge‐first

Tyler Burge notably offers a truth‐first account of perceptual entitlement in terms of a priori necessary representational functions and norms: on his account, epistemic normativity turns on natural norms, which turn on representational functions. This paper has two aims: first, it criticises Tyler Burge's truth‐first a priori derivation on functionalist and value‐theoretic grounds. Second, it develops a novel, knowledge‐first a priori derivation of perceptual entitlement. According to the view developed here, it is a priori that we are entitled to believe the deliverances of our perceptual belief formation system, in virtue of the latter's constitutive function of generating knowledge.     

The Problem of Prejudice: some notes on philosophical hermeneutics for broad-visioned Buddhologists

This paper examines how and why conventional truth is, in Tsong khapa's view, false and deceptive yet indeed truth that stands shoulder to shoulder with ultimate truth. The first part of the paper establishes the complementary nature of the two truths by responding to the question ‘Why is conventional truth “truth” at all?’ The discussion in the second part examines the uses of conventional discourse within the Mādhyamika philosophical framework—partly by discussing Tsong khapa's response to the question ‘Why is conventional truth “false” and “deceptive”?’, and partly by considering his views on the application of the worldly convention within the Prāsangika Mādhyamika system.     

Truth as transcendental in Thomas Aquinas

Aquinas presents his most complete exposition of the transcendentals inDe veritate 1, 1, that deals with the question “What is truth?”. The thesis of this paper is that the question of truth is essential for the understanding of his doctrine of the transcendentals. The first part of the paper (sections 1–4) analyzes Thomas's conception of truth. Two approaches to truth can be found in his work. The first approach, based on Aristotle's claim that “truth is not in things but in the mind”, leads to the idea that the proper place of truth is in the intellect. The second approach is ontological: Thomas also acknowledges that there is truth in every being. The famous definition of truth as “adequation of thing and intellect” enables him to integrate the two approaches. Truth is a relation between two terms, both of which can be called “true” because both are essential for the conformity between thing and intellect. The second part of the paper (sections 5–7) deals with the manner in which Thomas gives truth a place in the doctrine of the transcendentals, and shows that his conception of truth leads to important innovations in this doctrine: the introduction of relational transcendentals and the correlation between spirit and being. If “truth” is transcendental, it must be convertible with “being”. Sect. 6 discusses objections that Thomas advances himself to this convertibility. Sect. 7 deals with a difficulty in his account of truth as a relational transcendental. Ontological truth expresses a relation to an intellect but the relation to the human intellect is accidental for the truth of things. Essential for their truth can only be a practical intellect that causes things. In this way, Thomas argues, the divine intellect relates to all things.     

Predictive processing and the representation wars: a victory for the eliminativist (via fictionalism)

In this paper I argue that, by combining eliminativist and fictionalist approaches toward the sub-personal representational posits of predictive processing, we arrive at an empirically robust and yet metaphysically innocuous cognitive scientific framework. I begin the paper by providing a non-representational account of the five key posits of predictive processing (“prediction-signal”, “error-signal”, “prior”, “likelihood”, and “posterior probability”). Then, I motivate a fictionalist approach toward the remaining indispensable representational posits of predictive processing, and explain how representation can play an epistemologically indispensable role within predictive processing explanations without thereby requiring that representation metaphysically exists. Finally, I outline four consequences of accepting this approach and explain why they are beneficial: (1) we arrive at a victory for metaphysical eliminativism in the ‘representation wars’; (2) my account fits with extant empirical practice; (3) my account provides guidance for future research; and, (4) my account provides the beginnings of a response to Mark Sprevak’s IBE problem for fictionalist approaches toward sub-personal representation.     

Constructivism about Practical Reasons1

Philosophers commonly wonder what a constructivist theory as applied to practical reasons might look like. For the methods or procedures of reasoning familiar from moral constructivism do not clearly apply generally, to all practical reasons. The paper argues that procedural specification is not necessary, so long as our aims are not first‐order but explanatory. We can seek to explain how there could be facts of the matter about reasons for action without saying what reasons we have. Explanatory constructivism must assume constructive “norms of practical reasoning” which yield particular truths without assuming them. But philosophers often mistakenly assume that only “formal” norms of reasoning could fulfill this role. The paper describes a further possibility: norms of reasoning can be “situation‐specific” and yet retain truth‐independent authority. Though we might doubt whether such norms can be independently defended, we should not doubt the possibility or coherence of constructivism about practical reasons.     

Meaning‐Theories and the Principle of Humanity

In this paper, I briefly outline the notion of a truth‐conditional meaning‐theory and introduce two prominent problems it faces. The “extensionality problem” arises because not all correct specifications of truth‐conditions are meaning‐giving. The “explanatory problem” concerns the extent to which truth‐conditional meaning‐theories can contribute to the task of clarifying the nature of linguistic meaning. The “principle of humanity” is supposed to resolve both issues simultaneously. I argue that it fails to do so.