SLOTE'S SATISFICING CONSEQUENTIALISM

The article discusses Michael Slote's Satisficing Consequentialism, which is the view that moral agents are not required to maximise the good, but merely to produce a sufficient amount of good. It is argued that Satisficing Consequentialism is not an acceptable alternative to Maximising Consequentialism. In particular, it is argued that Satisficing Consequentialism cannot be less demanding in practice than Maximising Consequentialism without also endorsing a wide range of clearly unacceptable actions. It is then argued that Slote's inability to provide adequate reasons for moral satisficing stems from a mistaken analogy between rationality and morals. The sense of ‘good enough’ which is relevant to morality is one which focusses on the effort an agent puts in, rather than on the outcome she produces. However, replacing outcomes with efforts would undermine Slote's Consequentialist project. Finally, it is suggested that similar problems will be faced by others who seek to construct essentially Consequentialist theories which are not unduly demanding.     

A New Argument Against Rule Consequentialism

We best understand Rule Consequentialism as a theory of pattern-based reasons, since it claims that we have reasons to perform some action because of the goodness of the pattern consisting of widespread performance of the same type of action in the same type of circumstances. Plausible forms of Rule Consequentialism are also pluralist, in the sense that, alongside pattern-based reasons, they recognise ordinary act-based reasons, based on the goodness of individual actions. However, Rule Consequentialist theories are distinguished from other pluralist theories of pattern-based reasons by implausible claims about the relative importance of act-based and pattern-based reasons in different cases. Rule Consequentialists should give up these claims. They should either embrace some other pluralist pattern-based view, or reject pattern-based reasons altogether. Note, though, that these arguments apply only to compliance-based, rather than acceptance-based, versions of Rule Consequentialism. This suggests that these two kinds of theory are more different from each other than we might previously have realised.

CONSEQUENTIALISM, GROUP ACTS, AND TROLLEYS

Abstract: Multiple‐Act Consequentialism specifies that one should only defect from a group act with good consequences if one can achieve better consequences by the defecting act alone than the entire group act achieves. It also holds that when different valuable group agents of which one is part specify roles which conflict, one should follow the role in the group act with more valuable consequences. This paper develops Multiple‐Act Consequentialism as a solution to the Trolley Problem.     

Objective Consequentialism and Avoidable Imperfections

There are two distinct views on how to formulate an objective consequentialist account of the deontic status of actions, actualism and possibilism. On an actualist account, what matters to the deontic status of actions is only the value of the outcome an action would have, if performed. By contrast, a possibilist account also takes into account the value of the outcomes that an action could have. These two views come apart in their deontic verdicts when an agent is imperfect in an avoidable way, viz., when agent brings about less good than she could. In this paper, I offer an argument against actualism that draws on the connection between moral obligation and practical reasons.     

Identity-Neutral and Identity-Constitutive Reasons for Preserving Nature

abstract Environmental ethicists will often say that in dealing with natural entities we need the guidance of an ethic rooted in ‘the intrinsic value of nature’. They will add that subjectivist value theories are unable to account for the normativity of intrinsic value discourse. This preoccupation with normativity explains why many environmental ethicists favour value objectivism. As I see it, value theories must address not only the problem of normativity but also the problem of motivation. In fact, my approach to the question as to which type of value theory does most justice to our intuition regarding the value of nature is primarily in terms of the motivational perspective. I argue that neither the usual objectivist theories nor their subjectivist counterparts can accommodate and explain the fact that those who agree that nature has intrinsic value may well differ in motivation to support its preservation. I suggest that such difference in kinds of motivation is related to distinct kinds of value judgement in which belief in the intrinsic value of nature is expressed. To clarify my view I discuss the subjectivist value theory of Gerald Gaus[1]. Gaus regards the distinction between personal and impersonal value judgements to be deeply embedded in his theory. His internalism about the relation between reason and motivation however, leads him to the mistaken conclusion that independent impersonal value judgements do not provide reasons for action. Next, I introduce the distinction between identity‐neutral and identity‐constitutive reasons. This distinction allows me to formulate more clearly the differences between the kinds of reasons provided by personal and impersonal value judgements. The resulting theory explains how it is that people who do not (personally) value nature may still be motivated to support nature preservation. It also explains why not everyone who endorses natural values will join movements for the preservation of nature.     

Partiality and prejudice in trusting

You can trust your friends. You should trust your friends. Not all of your friends all of the time: you can reasonably trust different friends to different degrees, and in different domains. Still, we often trust our friends, and it is often reasonable to do so. Why is this? In this paper I explore how and whether friendship gives us reasons to trust our friends, reasons which may outstrip or conflict with our epistemic reasons. In the final section, I will sketch some related questions concerning trust based on the trustee’s race, gender, or other social identity.     

Who Are the Next Generation of Genetic Counselors? A Survey of Students

Genetic counseling students were surveyed about their backgrounds, application process to genetic counseling programs, and career motivations and plans. Program directors from 27 accredited programs were asked to distribute 362 surveys to students. Fifty-two survey items assess demographics; sources of support for pursuing a genetic counseling career (information about genetic counseling, encouragement/discouragement from others); career motivations (reasons for applying and for becoming a genetic counselor); and career certainty. Two hundred and thirty-five usable surveys were returned (64.9% usable return rate). Most respondents were Caucasian females (mean age = 25.4 years). About 13% identified as ethnic minorities, and about one-third reported family histories of a genetic condition(s). Most respondents learned about the field in classes, and most were strongly encouraged by family and friends to pursue genetic counseling. Reasons rated as most important for becoming a genetic counselor included helping others and intellectual stimulation. Recruitment, training, and research recommendations are given.     

How Satisficers Get Away with Murder

Traditional Consequentialism is based on a demanding principle of impartial maximization. Michael Slote's 'Satisficing Consequentialism' aims to reduce the demands of Consequentialism, by no longer requiring us to bring about the best possible outcome. This paper presents a new objection to Satisficing Consequentialism. We begin with a simple thought experiment, in which an agent must choose whether to save the lives of ten innocent people by using a sand bag or by killing an innocent person. The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate that, if it is to avoid making unreasonable demands, Satisficing Consequentialism must allow such an agent to kill. It is argued that this result is much more counter-intuitive than the fact that Maximizing Consequentialism permits agents to kill in order to produce the best consequences. The conclusion is that Satisficing Consequentialism is not an acceptable moral theory.     

Staying friends with ex‐romantic partners: Predictors,reasons, and outcomes

In two studies, we identified predictors of staying friends with an ex‐partner, developed and validated a measure for reasons to stay friends with exes, and examined the outcomes of staying friends. We identified four reasons to stay friends with exes: Security, Practical, Civility, and Unresolved Romantic Desires. Sex, sexual orientation, attachment styles, personality traits, time since breakup, and reasons for breakup all predicted staying friends. Staying friends due to Unresolved Romantic Desires resulted in negative outcomes, whereas staying friends due to Security and Practical reasons resulted in more positive outcomes. Staying friends due to Practical or Civility reasons resulted in the friendship being less likely to last in the long term. Implications for future research and clinical work are discussed.     

ALTRUISM AND THE GOLDEN RULE

This essay addresses recent claims about the compatibility of the sociobiological theory of reciprocal altruism with standard Western formulations of the Golden Rule. Derek Parfit claims that the theory of reciprocal altruism teaches us to be “reciprocal altruists,” who benefit only those people from whom we can reasonably expect benefits in the future. The Golden Rule, on the other hand, teaches us to benefit anyone regardless of their intention or ability to return the favor, or as Parfit puts it, the Golden Rule teaches us to be “suckers.” I argue that this distinction is founded on a misconception of the nature of the theory of reciprocal altruism, which is sociobiological as opposed to moral, and that this distinction accordingly confuses is with ought. Sociobiological theories may explain underlying psychological motivations in individuals (and perhaps even in populations), but these theories do not prescribe any sort of moral behavior. Furthermore, the theory of reciprocal altruism does not imply mental states of which agents are aware. The unconscious motivations assumed by this theory are in fact compatible with certain formulations of the Golden Rule; I will accordingly argue for the view that certain words with moral content related to the Golden Rule—such as “altruism” and “selfishness”—exist only insofar as they are social tools, which can further the self‐interests of an individual in any group.     

Reasoning about actions and obligations in first-order logic

We describe a new way in which theories about the deontic status of actions can be represented in terms of the standard two-sorted first-order extensional predicate calculus. Some of the resulting formal theories are easy to implement in Prolog; one prototype implementation—R. M. Lee's deontic expert shell DX—is briefly described.This research was partially supported by the Esprit III Basic Research Working Group No. 8319 ModelAge.     

Beyond Words: Inarticulable Reasons and Reasonable Commitments

We often come to value someone or something through experience of that person or thing. Call such an experience direct appreciation. When you appreciate something directly you may come to embrace a value that you did not previously grasp. Moreover, in a large and important subset of cases it seems you could not have fully appreciated that value, absent some such experience, merely by considering a report of the reasons or arguments that purport to justify your attitude. It follows that you will remain incapable of fully communicating the reasons for your valuing attitude to someone who lacks any such experience. Despite its ubiquity, this phenomenon goes missing in a great deal of contemporary work in ethics and political philosophy. To make sense of it we need an account of the standards governing our normative commitments that explains how we can have reasons for them without requiring articulacy about these reasons.     

Misperception of sexual and romantic interests in opposite‐sex friendships: Four hypotheses

Two online studies evaluated the misperception of sexual and romantic interests in established relationships and tested four hypotheses: a simple sex‐difference hypothesis, a projection hypothesis, a mate value hypothesis, and a mediation hypothesis. Two hundred thirty‐eight (Study 1) and 198 (Study 2) members of young adult opposite‐sex friendship dyads indicated their sexual and romantic interests in their friend and their perceptions of their friend’s sexual and romantic interests in them. Participants projected their own levels of sexual and romantic interests onto their opposite‐sex friend, mediating the following effects: males overperceived and females underperceived their friends’ sexual (but not romantic) interest, and participants of both sexes misperceived the sexual (but not romantic) interest of friends depending on the friends’ mate value.     

A Friend in Creed: Does the Religious Composition of Geographic Areas Affect the Religious Composition of a Person's Close Friends?

Numerous theories of religion rest on the assumption that the religious composition of local populations influences the religious identities of a person's close friends, but there have been few empirical tests of this assumption. Using a combination of data on the religious identity of close friends (from the 1988 and 1998 General Social Survey) and information on the religious composition of counties (from the U.S. Religious Congregations and Membership Study) we find that despite tendencies toward religious homogeneity, the religious composition of the surrounding population has an effect on the proportion of a respondent’s same‐religion friends and on the proportion of friends belonging to specific other religious groups. Local population characteristics are unrelated to the proportion of respondents’ friends known in congregational settings. Results have implications for a broad range of sociological theories of religion as well as research examining the impact of same‐congregation and same‐religion friends (e.g., health and well‐being).     

Looks and Perceptual Justification

Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks view of the justification of simple visual beliefs. According to the looks view, such beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning how the relevant things look. Unlike under classical foundationalism, under the looks view as I develop it, these reasons are public. They are public with respect to both their content and possession: with respect to content, they are not about ourselves and our experiences, and with respect to their possession, many people can have the very same looks‐related reasons.     

The Enkratic Requirement

Abstract: Agents are enkratic when they intend to do what they believe they should. That rationality requires you to be enkratic is uncontroversial, yet you may be enkratic in a way that does not exhibit any rationality on your part. Thus, what I call the enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic in the right way. In particular, I will argue that it demands that you base your belief about what you should do and your intention to do it on the same considerations. The idea is that, if you base your belief and your intention on different considerations, then you are inconsistent in your treatment of those considerations as reasons. The enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic by treating considerations consistently as reasons.     

An Examination of Disclosure of Nonsuicidal Self‐injury among University Students

Despite the widespread prevalence of nonsuicidal self‐injury (NSSI) among community‐based samples, little is known about which self‐injurers disclose their NSSI or the factors that promote disclosure among self‐injurers. To address this gap in the literature, we examined whether disclosers could be differentiated from nondisclosers on the basis of NSSI characteristics (e.g. frequency of NSSI and severity of NSSI), NSSI motivations (e.g. interpersonal and intrapersonal motivations) and psychosocial factors (e.g. suicidal ideation and self‐esteem). Participants consisted of a large sample of 268 self‐injuring undergraduate students (M_age = 19.07 years, 70.3% women) at a Canadian university. Results indicated that 57% of self‐injurers had never disclosed their NSSI to anyone. Self‐injurers were most likely to disclose to peers and romantic partners. Logistic regression analyses revealed that pain during NSSI, severity of NSSI, interpersonal motivations for engaging in NSSI, higher suicidal ideation and higher friendship quality were all associated with a greater likelihood of NSSI disclosure. Our findings suggest that individuals with severe NSSI and suicidal ideation may be more likely to disclose. Moreover, our findings underscore the importance of equipping friends and romantic partners with effective responses to NSSI disclosures to promote more formal help‐seeking behaviours among self‐injurers. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preference for Same‐ Versus Cross‐Sex Friendships1

How is preferring same‐ vs. cross‐sex friendships related to one's perceptions of these friendships? In Phase 1, college students (N = 122) listed qualities they valued in their same‐ and cross‐sex friends. In Phase 2, survey items constructed from the responses were administered to 231 students who indicated a preference for same‐ vs. cross‐sex friendship. Those who reported a preference for opposite‐sex friends rated these friendships as higher in closeness, trust, caring, having common interests, and providing narcissistic benefits, compared to those who reported a preference for same‐sex friends. Results demonstrate that gender differences often associated with close friendships are greatly attenuated and sometimes reversed when preference for same‐ vs. cross‐sex friendship is included as a moderating variable.     

Are there limits to collectivism? Culture and children's reasoning about lying to conceal a group transgression

This study explored the effects of collectivism on lying to conceal a group transgression. Seven‐, 9‐, and 11‐year‐old US and Chinese children (N=374) were asked to evaluate stories in which protagonists either lied or told the truth about their group's transgression and were then asked about either the protagonist's motivations or justification for their own evaluations. Previous research suggests that children in collectivist societies such as China find lying for one's group to be more acceptable than do children from individualistic societies such as the United States. The current study provides evidence that this is not always the case: Chinese children in this study viewed lies told to conceal a group's transgressions less favourably than did US children. An examination of children's reasoning about protagonists' motivations for lying indicated that children in both countries focused on an impact to self when discussing motivations for protagonists to lie for their group. Overall, results suggest that children living in collectivist societies do not always focus on the needs of the group. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

MULTI‐DIMENSIONAL CONSEQUENTIALISM

This article introduces and explores a distinction between multi‐dimensional and one‐dimensional consequentialist moral theories. One‐dimensional consequentialists believe that an act's deontic status depends on just one aspect of the act, such as the sum total of wellbeing it produces, or the sum total of priority‐ or equality‐adjusted wellbeing. Multi‐dimensional consequentialists believe that an act's deontic status depends on more than one aspect. They may, for instance, believe that the sum total of wellbeing produced by an act and the degree to which the wellbeing is equally distributed in the population affect the act's deontic status independently of each other. These two aspects cannot be reduced into any single (composite) aspect. Wellbeing and equality are two separate considerations that cannot be merged into some novel entity that accurately reflects both intuitions. On the multi‐dimensional view I defend, such clashes between separate aspects are irresolvable and are best accounted for by claiming that moral rightness and wrongness are non‐binary concepts. Some acts are, literally speaking, a little bit right (because they maximise wellbeing) and a little bit wrong (because they do not maximise equality). 1