Is Evidence Non-Inferential?

Evidence is often taken to be foundational, in that while other propositions may be inferred from our evidence, evidence propositions are themselves not inferred from anything. I argue that this conception is false, since the non-inferential propositions on which beliefs are ultimately founded may be forgotten or undermined in the course of enquiry.     

Is Evidence Normative?

Philosophia - This paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bit of evidence nor the fact that it is evidence for a certain proposition is a normative fact,...     

Evidence against “absolute” scaling

Zwislocki and Goodman (1980) argue that there exists an “absolute coupling” of numbers to sensation magnitudes and conclude that, when subjects are left unconstrained by a designated stimulus-number pair, they may use this “absolute” scale. The purpose of the studies reported here was to test whether Zwislocki and Goodman’s (1980) absolute scaling procedure reduces contextual effects due to variations in the stimulus spacing. It was found that magnitude estimations vary as a function of the stimulus spacing, regardless of whether subjects are instructed to use a standard and modulus, and, furthermore, that category ratings yield effects of the stimulus spacing comparable to those obtained with magnitude estimations. It is argued that removing the so-called constraints of a standard and modulus does not yield an “absolute” scale of sensation. The absolute scaling procedure increases response variability and thereby lowers the power of a test for contextual effects.     

Real Evidence for the Failure of the Jamesian Perspective or More Evidence in Support of It?

Hardy and Moriarty (2006) presented evidence in support of James's (1890) individual importance hypothesis using a new methodology. Marsh (in press) criticized the Hardy and Moriarty approach, claiming that it did not constitute a valid test of the hypothesis and that in his article he had produced more evidence against it. In this article, we refute both these claims and argue instead that Marsh's individually weighted-averages method does not constitute a valid test of the hypothesis. We also assert that his new analyses actually offer further evidence in support of the Jamesian perspective. Finally, we direct attention toward questionable assumptions that appear to underpin Marsh's approach, and we try to point a way forward for future research in this area.     

Do Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence?

In 1979 astronomer Carl Sagan popularized the aphorism “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” (ECREE). But Sagan never defined the term “extraordinary.” Ambiguity in what constitutes “extraordinary” has led to misuse of the aphorism. ECREE is commonly invoked to discredit research dealing with scientific anomalies, and has even been rhetorically employed in attempts to raise doubts concerning mainstream scientific hypotheses that have substantive empirical support. The origin of ECREE lies in eighteenth-century Enlightenment criticisms of miracles. The most important of these was Hume’s essay On Miracles. Hume precisely defined an extraordinary claim as one that is directly contradicted by a massive amount of existing evidence. For a claim to qualify as extraordinary there must exist overwhelming empirical data of the exact antithesis. Extraordinary evidence is not a separate category or type of evidence--it is an extraordinarily large number of observations. Claims that are merely novel or those which violate human consensus are not properly characterized as extraordinary. Science does not contemplate two types of evidence. The misuse of ECREE to suppress innovation and maintain orthodoxy should be avoided as it must inevitably retard the scientific goal of establishing reliable knowledge.     

How many memory systems? Evidence from aging

The present research tested Tulving's (1985) ternary memory theory. Young (ages 19-32) and older (ages 63-80) adults were given procedural, semantic, and episodic memory tasks. Repetition, lag, and codability were manipulated in a picture-naming task, followed by incidental memory tests. Relative to young adults, older adults exhibited lower levels of recall and recognition, but these episodic measures increased similarly as a function of lag and repetition in both age groups. No age-related deficits emerged in either semantic memory (vocabulary, latency slopes, naming errors, and tip-of-the-tongue responses) or procedural memory (repetition priming magnitude and rate of decline). In addition to the age by memory task dissociations, the manipulation of codability produced slower naming latencies and more naming errors (semantic memory), yet promoted better recall and recognition (episodic memory). Finally, a factor analysis of 11 memory measures revealed three distinct factors, providing additional support for a tripartite memory model.     

Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?

We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence (Experiments 1 and 2A) or testimony providing causal information (Experiment 2B). Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why probabilistic evidence does not produce knowledge. The experiments instead suggest that people deny knowledge because they distrust drawing conclusions about an individual based on reasoning about the population to which it belongs, a tendency previously identified by “judgment and decision making” researchers. Consistent with this, participants were more willing to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence that is specific to a particular case (Experiments 3A and 3B).     

Is Phonology Embodied? Evidence from Mechanical Stimulation

Journal of Psycholinguistic Research - Across languages, certain syllables are systematically preferred to others (e.g., plaf?>?ptaf). Here, we examine whether these preferences...     

Is Forgotten Evidence a Problem for Evidentialism?

The “problem of forgotten evidence” is a common objection to evidentialist theories of epistemic justification. This objection is motivated by cases where someone forms a belief on the basis of supporting evidence and then later forgets this evidence while retaining the belief. Critics of evidentialist theories argue that in some of these cases the person's belief remains justified. So, these critics claim that one can have a justified belief that is not supported by any evidence the subject possesses. I argue that these critics are mistaken.     

What “Intuitions” are Linguistic Evidence?

In “Intuitions in Linguistics” (2006a) and Ignorance of Language (2006b) I took it to be Chomskian orthodoxy that a speaker’s metalinguistic intuitions are provided by her linguistic competence. I argued against this view in favor of the alternative that the intuitions are empirical theory-laden central-processor responses to linguistic phenomena. The concern about these linguistic intuitions arises from their apparent role as evidence for a grammar. Mark Textor, “Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions” (2009), argues that I have picked the wrong intuitions: I should have picked non-judgmental linguistic “seemings”. These reside between metalinguistic judgments and linguistic performances and have an epistemic authority that the orthodox view may well be able to explain. Textor seems to think that the metalinguistic intuitions are not evidence at all. I argue that he is wrong about that. More importantly, I argue that there are no “in-between” linguistic seemings with epistemic authority.     

Is Evidence Based Spiritual Care an Oxymoron?

Evidence based spiritual care utilizes empirical evidence on spirituality in addressing the spiritual needs of patients. Objections to evidence based spiritual care include issues of methodology and ethics. Reasons favoring evidence based spiritual care stem from a view that it is not an oxymoron but a paradox. An example of evidence based spiritual care is described using cardiac patients in a CCU unit. Concluding remarks note that we are at the beginning and need a new scientific/theological paradigm that integrates not separates science and theology.     

What Affects Happiness Inequality? Evidence from Japan

This paper examines the determinants of happiness inequality in Japan using unique data from the “Preference Parameters Study” of Osaka University, a nationally representative survey conducted in Japan. By estimating Recentered Influence Function regressions, we find that household income has a negative and significant effect on happiness inequality, as found for other advanced economies, though people’s perception of their relative standing in the income spectrum also matters for the dispersion of happiness. Moreover, the regression results show that the insecurity faced by people about their jobs and life after retirement is also significantly associated with the widening of happiness inequality. Such findings are cause for grave concern given that the share of irregular jobs, which tend to be low paid and insecure, in total employment significantly increased in Japan during the Lost Two Decades and that this increasing trend has not yet been reversed.     

Evidence of a metacognitive benefit to memory?

Studies of the memory-control framework have contrasted free-report and forced-report recall, with little regard to the order of these two tests. The present experiment sought to demonstrate that test order is crucial, and that this suggests a potential role for metacognitive monitoring on memory retrieval. Participants undertook tests of episodic and semantic memory in both free- and forced-report format, in one of the two potential response orders. This showed that free-report performance was more accurate if conducted prior to forced-report, rather than after it, with no cost to memory quantity. Additionally, there was a trend towards higher forced-report performance if it was preceded by an initial free-report test, a pattern revealed by a meta-analysis to be consistent with previous studies in the literature. These findings suggest a reciprocal relationship between metacognitive monitoring and early retrieval processes in memory that results in higher memory performance when monitoring is encouraged.     

What Do You Do with Misleading Evidence?

Gilbert Harman has presented an argument to the effect that if S knows that p then S knows that any evidence for not- p is misleading. Therefore S is warranted in being dogmatic about anything he happens to know. I explain, and reject, Sorensen's attempt to solve the paradox via Jackson's theory of conditionals. S is not in a position to disregard evidence even when he knows it to be misleading.     

Comparing the Actual and Expected Persuasiveness of Evidence Types: How Good are Lay People at Selecting Persuasive Evidence?

Whereas there are many publications in which argumentation quality has been defined by argumentation theorists, considerably less research attention has been paid to lay people’s considerations regarding argument quality. Considerations about strong and weak argumentation are relevant because they can be compared with actual persuasive success. Argumentation theorists’ conceptions have to some extent been shown to be compatible with actual effectiveness, but for lay people such compatibility has yet to be determined. This study experimentally investigated lay people’s expectations about the persuasiveness of anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert evidence, and compared these expectations with the actual persuasiveness of these evidence types. Dutch and French participants (N = 174) ranked four types of evidence in terms of their expected persuasiveness for eight different claims. Both cultural groups expected statistical evidence to be the most persuasive type of evidence to other people, followed by expert, causal, and, finally, anecdotal evidence. A comparison of these rankings with the results of Hornikx and Hoeken (Communication Monographs 74, 443–463, 2007, Study 1) on the actual persuasiveness of the same evidence types reveals that people’s expectations are generally accurate: How relatively persuasive they expect evidence types to be often corresponded with their actual persuasiveness.

Evidence that stakes don’t matter for evidence

Some philosophers have recently defended anti-intellectualism with respect to knowledge and evidence. In this paper, I assess anti-intellectualism about evidence, which claims a relation between one's evidence and the practical benefits or costs of being right or wrong about the propositions supported by that evidence. Proponents of anti-intellectualism generally regard their view as not at all obvious, but nonetheless strongly supported by appeal to our intuitive judgments about whether particular epistemic properties are instantiated in hypothetical cases. Anti-Intellectualism is thus taken by its proponents to be a surprising truth. I show that, though peoples’ explicit judgments about the general issue of whether or not non-epistemic factors make an epistemic difference are often in line with anti-intellectualism, their judgments about whether particular epistemic properties are instantiated in hypothetical cases do not display a pattern that would clearly support anti-intellectualism about evidence. Thus, anti-intellectualism about evidence is not entirely surprising, and intuitive assessments of hypothetical cases do not clearly support its truth.     

Are there different moral domains? Evidence from Mongolia

In this paper we report a study conducted in Mongolia on the scope of morality, that is, the extent to which people moralize different social domains. Following Turiel's moral‐conventional task, we characterized moral transgressions (in contrast to conventional transgressions) in terms of two dimensions: authority independence and generality of scope. Different moral domains are then defined by grouping such moral transgressions in terms of their content (following Haidt's classification of morally relevant domains). There are four main results of the study. First, since all five Haidtian domains were moralized by the Mongolian participants, the study provides evidence in favour of pluralism about moral domains. However, the study also suggests that the domain of harm can be reduced to the fairness domain. Furthermore, although the strong claim about reduction of all moral domains to the domain of fairness does not seem to hold a significant number of participants did indicate considerations of fairness across domains. Finally, a significant amount of participants moralized conventional transgressions a la Turiel, but it did not reach a statistical significance.