Testimonial worth

Synthese - This paper introduces and argues for the hypothesis that judgments of testimonial worth (that is, judgments of the quality of character an agent displays when testifying) are central to...     

Testimonial hinges

The paper presents an extension of the kind of hinge epistemology proposed in Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology (Coliva 2015) to the case of testimonial justification. This extension stems naturally from a reinterpretation of the classic dispute between reductionists and anti‐reductionists with respect to testimonial justification. The interesting and novel aspect of that reinterpretation is that it brings to light the deep analogy between that classic dispute and the contemporary debate between so‐called “liberals” and “conservatives” with respect to the structure of perceptual justification. The paper first presents the reinterpretation; it subsequently proposes the extension of hinge epistemology to the case of testimonial justification; it then turns to a detailed discussion of the exact “hinges” testimonial justification is taken to depend on, and closes by considering some possible objections.     

Testimonial Knowledge from Lies

Recently, Dan O’Brien has argued that there are situations in which a hearer can gain testimonial knowledge from a speaker who is lying. In order to make his case, O’Brien presents two examples where a speaker lies to a hearer, but supposedly the hearer comes to have testimonial knowledge on the basis of the lying speaker’s testimony. O’Brien claims that his examples demonstrate that lies can be used to pass on knowledge in a non-inferential fashion. I argue that O’Brien is mistaken. More specifically, I argue that the hearer’s belief in the second example that O’Brien depicts fails to meet two plausible conditions for knowledge. First, the hearer’s belief fails to satisfy the requirements of the epistemic basing relation. Second, the hearer’s belief is not safe.     

Responsibility for Testimonial Belief

According to so-called “credit views of knowledge,” knowledge is an achievement of an epistemic agent, something for which an agent is creditable or responsible. One influential criticism of the credit view of knowledge holds that the credit view has difficulty making sense of knowledge acquired from testimony. As Jennifer Lackey has argued, in many ordinary cases of the acquisition of testimonial knowledge, if anyone deserves credit for the truth of the audience’s belief it is the testimonial speaker rather than the audience, and so it isn’t clear that testimonial knowers are appropriately creditable for the truth of their beliefs. I argue that the credit view of knowledge can be saved from Lackey’s objection by focusing on the way in which testimonial knowledge is the result of an essentially social epistemic ability. While there is indeed a sense in which a testimonial knower is only partially epistemically responsible for her testimonial belief, this is consistent with the truth of her belief being creditable to her in another sense. The truth of her belief is most saliently explained by, and hence is fully creditable to, an essentially social epistemic ability, an ability that is only partially seated in the knowing subject.     

Testimonial Injustice and Mindreading

Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial responsibility is the proper corrective to testimonial injustice. She proposes a perceptual‐like “testimonial sensibility” to explain the transmission of knowledge through testimony. This sensibility is the means by which a hearer perceives an interlocutor's credibility level. When prejudice causes a hearer to inappropriately deflate the credibility attributed to a speaker, the sensibility may have functioned unreliably. Testimonial responsibility, she claims, will make the capacity reliable by reinflating credibility levels to their proper degree. I argue that testimonial sensitivity may be or involve “mindreading,” the cognitive capacity by which we predict human behavior and explain it in terms of mental states. Further, I claim that, if testimonial sensibility is or involves mindreading, and mindreading is a function of brain processes (as claimed by cognitive neuroscientists), testimonial injustice cannot be corrected by testimonial responsibility. This is because 1) it appears to rely on conscious awareness of prejudice, whereas much bias occurs implicitly, and 2) it works at the individual level, whereas testimonial injustice occurs both individually and socially. I argue that the remedy for testimonial injustice is, instead, engaging in social efforts that work below the level of consciousness.     

Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission

We often talk about knowledge being transmitted via testimony. This suggests a picture of testimony with striking similarities to memory. For instance, it is often assumed that neither is a generative source of knowledge: while the former transmits knowledge from one speaker to another, the latter preserves beliefs from one time to another. These considerations give rise to a stronger and a weaker thesis regarding the transmission of testimonial knowledge. The stronger thesis is that each speaker in a chain of testimonial transmission must know that p in order to pass this knowledge to a hearer. The weaker thesis is that at least the first speaker must know that p in order for any hearer in the chain to come to know that p via testimony. I argue that both theses are false, and hence testimony, unlike memory, can be a generative source of knowledge.     

Towards a Theory of Social Dynamics

(Résumé) Vers Une Théorie de la Dynamique Sociale

On considère la théorie pratique (“field theory”) basée sur la philosophie organismique de la biologie, la méthode hypothétique-déductive, et le langage des constructs comme l'approche la plus juste à une psychologie sociale scientifique. L'auteur examine diverses théories de la psychologie sociale et ne trouve aucunes qui satisfassent les critères qu'il a établis pour une approche théorique-pratique. Il définit ensuite le champ social et discute les variantes dynamiques topologiques et non-mesurées dans sa structure. Les concepts de région, fluidité, limite, barrière, caractère de membre (“membership character”), et direction de tension premièrement employés par K. Lewin pour la psychologie individuelle sont appliqués aux problèmes sociologiques et sociaux-psychologiques. Le problème d'une “foule” qui devient une “multitude désordonnée” est sujeté à une analyse théorique-pratique. On conclut que la méthode serait également applicable à d'autres problèmes sociaux-psychologiques et que les groupes sociaux peuvent ětre traités selon la méthode théorique-pratique. On suggère que cette approche pourrait fournir une psychologie sociale de valeur scientifique.

Brown

(Referat) NACH EINER THEORIE DER SOZIALEN DYNAMIK HIN

Eine Feldtheorie, die auf die organismische Philosophie der Biologie, die hypothetisch-deduktive Methode, und auf die Sprache der Konstrukte gegründet ist, wird als die gültigste Annährung an die wissenschaftlich-soziale Psychologie betractet. Der Autor untersuch die verschiedenen Theorien der sozialen Psychologie und findet keine, welche die Kriterien erfüllt, die er zur feldtheoretischen Annährung aufgestellt hat. Er definiert dann das soziale Feld und bespricht die topologischen und nichtmetrischen dynamischen Varianten in seinem Aufbau. Die Begriffe von Gebiet, Flüssigkeit, Grenze, Barriere, Zugehörigkeit, und Spannung, die zuerst von K. Lewin für individuelle Psychologie gebraucht waren, werden auf soziologische und sozial-psychologische Probleme angewandt. Das Problem des Uebergangs von einer Menge Leute zu einem “Mob” wird einer feldtheoretischen Untersuchung unterworfen. Es wird gefolgert, dass die Methode sich ebensogut auf andere Probleme anwenden lässt und dass soziale Gruppen feldtheoretisch behandelt werden dürften. Es wird vorgeschlagen, dass eine solche Annährung eine wissenschaftlich gülitige soziale Psychologie verschaffen könnte.

Brown     

Asymmetries of comparison

Tversky’s (1977) seminal work on directionality in judgments of similarity demonstrated that people may not judge the similarity of A to B to be equal to the similarity of B to A. In a series of studies, we investigated comparison asymmetries. In Experiment 1, our aim was to extend Tversky’s findings to a heterogeneous stimulus set, but no reliable asymmetries were observed. Experiment 2 employed a variety of comparison judgments, and, although some of these measures showed asymmetries, we still failed to observe asymmetries in rated similarity. A final attempt to obtain asymmetries used direction as a within-subjects factor, and for the first time, rating asymmetries were observed. Our data reinforce the idea of comparison asymmetries but suggest that similarity rating asymmetries are only observed under quite circumscribed conditions.     

A Typology of Ideological Attitudes Towards Social Solidarity and Social Control

Research on ideological attitudes has identified two main dimensions that refer to two fundamental features of group organization: social solidarity and social control. In response to prior research that has studied their relationship mainly from a correlational perspective, this paper introduces a social reality model based on psychological functionality of ideological attitudes. Social position variables (education, income and material vulnerability) and insecurity variables (fear of crime and distrust) are used to predict the interplay between ideological attitudes towards social solidarity and social control. Using K‐means cluster analysis, a typology with four patterns of support for solidarity and control (‘socials’, ‘repressives’, ‘minimalists’ and ‘social‐repressives’) was created, on the basis of representative survey data for the UK, France and Germany (N = 7034). Results from logistic regression analyses show that the proposed social reality model explains membership in typology categories, with similar results across the three countries. Overall, the model underscores the social origins of ideological attitudes as functional responses to perceived social reality. The paper illustrates how the social psychological study of ideological attitudes may be enriched by a typological approach that examines patterns of attitudes rather than single dimensions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Psychotherapist–Patient Testimonial Privilege

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

Asymmetries in ethics

Ethical notions such as good and bad, are often treated as though they were ‘symmetric’ in the sense of having the same moral ‘weight’, one in a positive the other in a negative sense. I argue that they are in fact ‘asymmetric’ and that the negative members of such pairs of notions are more fundamental and definite, logically speaking, and operationally more important than the positive members. Detailed arguments are given to show this for some non‐moral notions, such as life and death, health and illness; some semi‐moral notions such as pleasure and pain; and finally for the moral notions of happiness, benevolence, right, and good and their negative counterparts. One of the intentions of the article is to show that a systematic view of such asymmetries may have consequences for one's view of the proper or desirable structure of a general theory of ethics: norms stating prohibitions and norms stating permissions will be seen to be, in a sense defined in the text, more fundamental and important than norms stating ('positive') obligations.     

The Factor of Sex in Testimonial Accuracy

Abstract

The study assessed the effects of character, professional status, and intentions of a criminal on the magnitude of suggested punishment in a hypothetical experimental setting. The sample was composed of 120 male Indian undergraduates. The analysis yielded a significant main effect of intentions as well as interaction effects of Intentions × Character and of Intentions × Character × Status Factor. The results lend support to cognitive dissonance and attribution theories.     

Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of what is Said

This article discusses the following question: what epistemic relation must audiences bear to the content of assertions in order to gain testimonial knowledge? There is a brief discussion of why this issue is of importance, followed by two counterexamples to the most intuitive answer: that in order for an audience to gain testimonial knowledge that p they must know that the speaker has asserted p . It is then suggested that the argument generalises and can be made to work on different sets of assumptions about the conditions for knowledge, and the conditions under which a proposition is asserted.