Sensitivity and Higher‐Order Knowledge

Vogel, Sosa, and Huemer have all argued that sensitivity is incompatible with knowing that you do not believe falsely, therefore the sensitivity condition must be false. I show that this objection misses its mark because it fails to take account of the basis of belief. Moreover, if the objection is modified to account for the basis of belief then it collapses into the more familiar objection that sensitivity is incompatible with closure. (But that is an objection which sensitivity theorists are already prepared to meet, one way or another.)     

Higher‐Order Defeat is Object‐Independent

Higher‐order defeat occurs when one loses justification for one's beliefs as a result of receiving evidence that those beliefs resulted from a cognitive malfunction. Several philosophers have identified features of higher‐order defeat that distinguish it from familiar types of defeat. If higher‐order defeat has these features, they are data an account of rational belief must capture. In this article, I identify a new distinguishing feature of higher‐order defeat, and I argue that on its own, and in conjunction with the other distinguishing features, it favors an account of higher‐order defeat grounded in non‐evidential, ‘state‐given reasons’ for belief.     

A Contextualist Approach to Higher‐Order Vagueness

According to contextualism about vagueness, the content of a vague predicate is context sensitive. On this view, when item a is in the penumbra of the vague predicate ‘F’, speakers may (truly) utter ‘Fa’, or they may (truly) utter ‘not‐Fa’, without contravening the literal meaning of ‘F’. Unlike its more popular variants, the version of contextualism I defend rejects the principle of tolerance, a principle according to which small differences should not affect the applicability of a vague predicate. My goal is to show how such a rejection allows for a plausible treatment of higher‐order vagueness, and for a dissolution of paradoxes of higher‐order vagueness.     

Epistemic Warrants and Higher‐Order Theories of Conscious Perception

We present a new account of perceptual consciousness, one which gives due weight to the epistemic commitment of normal perception in familiar circumstances. The account is given in terms of a higher‐order attitude for which the subject has an immediate perceptual epistemic warrant in the form of an appropriate first‐order perception. We develop our account in contrast to Rosenthal's higher‐order account, rejecting his view of consciousness in virtue of so‐called ‘targetless’ higher‐order states. We explain the key notion of an immediate perceptual warrant and show both that it requires the content of the higher‐order attitude to match that of the first‐order perception, and also that it gives a new perspective on the intimate relationship, rightly emphasised by Rosenthal, between consciousness and a subject's testimony as to ‘how it is with her’.     

Higher‐Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation

Currently, one of the most influential theories of consciousness is Rosenthal's version of higher‐order‐thought (HOT). We argue that the HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one‐component and a two‐component view. We further argue that the two‐component view is more consistent with his effort to promote HOT as an explanatory theory suitable for application to the empirical sciences. Unfortunately, the two‐component view seems incapable of handling a group of counterexamples that we refer to as cases of radical confabulation. We begin by introducing the HOT theory and by indicating why we believe it is open to distinct interpretations. We then proceed to show that it is incapable of handling cases of radical confabulation. Finally, in the course of considering various possible responses to our position, we show that adoption of a disjunctive strategy, one that would countenance both one‐component and two‐component versions, would fail to provide any empirical or explanatory advantage.     

Higher‐Order Factor Structures and Intercorrelations of the 16PF5 and FIRO‐B

This study investigated the intercorrelations and the independent and combined factor structures of the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire Fifth Edition (16PF5) and the Fundamental Interpersonal Orientation‐Behaviour Scale (FIRO‐B). Four thousand four hundred and fourteen U.S. participants completed these measures as part of executive assessments between 1994 and 2003. Exploratory factor analyses supported the five‐factor higher‐order structure of the 16PF5; however, the three‐component structure for the FIRO‐B was not supported. A six‐factor structure was found to underlie the variance in the measures in combination. Five of these were close to the 16PF5 higher‐order structure, but a sixth factor labelled Social Independence also emerged. This new factor consisted of the 16PF5 primaries of Liveliness and Social Boldness, and the FIRO‐B Wanted Control scale.     

How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher‐Order Evidence

Certain plausible evidential requirements and coherence requirements on rationality seem to yield dilemmas of rationality (in a specific, objectionable sense) when put together with the possibility of misleading higher‐order evidence. Epistemologists have often taken such dilemmas to be evidence that we're working with some false principle. In what follows I show how one can jointly endorse an evidential requirement, a coherence requirement, and the possibility of misleading higher‐order evidence without running afoul of dilemmas of rationality. The trick lies in observing the difference between attitudes it is rational to hold (= propositional justification) and rationally holding those attitudes (= doxastic justification).     

Keeping it Real: Intentional Inexistents,Fineness‐of‐Grain,and the Dilemma for Extrinsic Higher‐Order Representational Theories

According to the standard argument from targetless higher‐order representations, the possibility of such representations presents a dilemma for higher‐order theorists. In this article I argue that there are two theoretically well‐motivated replies to the standard argument. Consequently, the standard argument against higher‐order theories fails. I then go on to argue that while certain versions of higher‐order theory can adequately respond to the standard argument, they both, nevertheless, fail to explain the fineness‐of‐grain that phenomenally conscious experience appears to have.     

Personality Correlates of Midlife Cardiometabolic Risk: The Explanatory Role of Higher‐Order Factors of the Five‐Factor Model

Varying associations are reported between Five‐Factor Model (FFM) personality traits and cardiovascular disease risk. Here, we further examine dispositional correlates of cardiometabolic risk within a hierarchical model of personality that proposes higher‐order traits of Stability (shared variance of Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, inverse Neuroticism) and Plasticity (Extraversion, Openness), and we test hypothesized mediation via biological and behavioral factors. In an observational study of 856 community volunteers aged 30–54 years (46% male, 86% Caucasian), latent variable FFM traits (using multiple‐informant reports) and aggregated cardiometabolic risk (indicators: insulin resistance, dyslipidemia, blood pressure, adiposity) were estimated using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The cardiometabolic factor was regressed on each personality factor or higher‐order trait. Cross‐sectional indirect effects via systemic inflammation, cardiac autonomic control, and physical activity were tested. CFA models confirmed the Stability “meta‐trait,” but not Plasticity. Lower Stability was associated with heightened cardiometabolic risk. This association was accounted for by inflammation, autonomic function, and physical activity. Among FFM traits, only Openness was associated with risk over and above Stability, and, unlike Stability, this relationship was unexplained by the intervening variables. A Stability meta‐trait covaries with midlife cardiometabolic risk, and this association is accounted for by three candidate biological and behavioral factors.     

Non‐Classical Knowledge

The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely‐held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single‐premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit. I develop a consistent theory validating all these principles by combining Hartry Field's theory of truth with a modal enrichment developed for a different purpose by Michael Caie. The only casualty is classical logic: the theory avoids paradox by using a weaker‐than‐classical K₃ logic. I then assess the philosophical merits of this approach. I argue that, unlike the traditional semantic paradoxes involving extensional notions like truth, its plausibility depends on the way in which sentences are referred to—whether in natural languages via direct sentential reference, or in mathematical theories via indirect sentential reference by Gödel coding. In particular, I argue that from the perspective of natural language, my non‐classical treatment of knowledge as a predicate is plausible, while from the perspective of mathematical theories, its plausibility depends on unresolved questions about the limits of our idealized deductive capacities.     

You'd Better Ask an Expert: Mitigating the Comprehensibility Effect on Laypeople's Decisions About Science‐Based Knowledge Claims

Research shows that laypeople rely more on their capabilities to make decisions about science‐based knowledge claims after reading comprehensible compared with less comprehensible topic information. This can be problematic, because complex science‐based issues usually cannot be understood fully without experts' further advice. The present study investigated whether making readers aware of the ‘epistemic topic complexity’ of an issue (i.e., the extent of existing topic knowledge, the complexity of relationships between concepts, and the existence of multiple expert perspectives) can mitigate this influence of comprehensibility. Undergraduate students read comprehensible or less comprehensible health texts with topic knowledge being described as complex, uncomplex, or not described at all. They reported whether they agreed with the claim and would rely on their decision. Results showed that after reading comprehensible information, participants' reliance on their decision increased less when they considered topic knowledge to be complex. Practical implications of the findings are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

First Order Common Knowledge Logics

In this paper we investigate first order common knowledge logics; i.e., modal epistemic logics based on first order logic with common knowledge operators. It is shown that even rather weak fragments of first order common knowledge logics are not recursively axiomatizable. This applies, for example, to fragments which allow to reason about names only; that is to say, fragments the first order part of which is based on constant symbols and the equality symbol only. Then formal properties of "quantifying into" epistemic contexts are investigated. The results are illustrated by means of epistemic representations of Nash Equilibria for finite games with mixed strategies.