The ecstatic and the theory of Jacques Lacan

Historically, psychology attempted to become a science of the mind, but failed for various reasons. These included (a) the apparent barrier between objective and subjective data, (b) ignoring of individual differences, (c) experimenter bias, (d) culture boundedness, (e) insufficient training of observers, and (f) a limited, Newtonian physics view of reality. This article argues that humanistic and transpersonal psychology can lead the way to a more comprehensive and effective science of mind because we have new methods today to deal more effectively with the limits imposed by these problems.     

Gender and Transference

Despite an early interest, Freud explicitly rejected philosophy, because of its “speculative” character. He struggled with balancing the intellectual appeal of philosophy with the certainty he hoped to find in positivist science. Putting aside the scientific status of Freud's work, the author re-examines Freud's attitude towards philosophy. Failing to recognize the assumptions of his investigations, Freud segregated psychoanalysis from philosophy on the charge that philosophers equated mind with consciousness, putatively propounded unfounded speculations, and assumed false conclusions about comprehensiveness. However, Freud never completely abandoned his initial philosophical proclivities. His own contributions to cultural history, social philosophy, notions of personal identity, and the humanistic thrust of psychoanalysis, demonstrate that he continued to address his earliest interests in philosophical questions. The author elucidates the philosophical complexity of psychoanalysis and concludes that a reconsideration of Freud's self-appraisal of his intellectual commitments is warranted.     

Il’enkov on Education

The philosophy of education is among the least celebrated sub-disciplines of Anglo-American philosophy. Its neglect is hard to reconcile, however, with the fact that human beings owe their distinctive psychological powers to cumulative cultural evolution, the process in which each generation inherits the collective cognitive achievements of previous generations through cultural, rather than biological, transmission. This paper examines the work of Eval’d Il’enkov, who, unlike his Anglo-American counterparts, maintains that education, broadly understood, is central to issues in epistemology and philosophy of mind. I expound Il’enkov’s position and defend it from five objections: (1) that Il’enkov treats education as a vehicle of social engineering; (2) that he is unduly preoccupied with controlling human development; (3) that he implausibly portrays the mind as a tabula rasa; (4) that his position is utopian; and (5) that it is technocratic. Defending Il’enkov illuminates a variety of issues about the objectives and ideals of education, formal and informal. I conclude that Il’enkov’s ideas, if complemented by those of other thinkers, Russian and Western, can help rejuvenate philosophy of education and reinstate the field at the centre of philosophical inquiry.     

INTERNISTS OF THE MIND OR PHYSICIANS OF THE SOUL: DOES PSYCHIATRY NEED A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY?

Although psychiatry is interested in what both body and mind contribute to behavior, it sometimes emphasizes one more than the other. Since the early 1980s, American psychiatry has shifted its interest from mind and psyche to body and brain. Neuroscience and psychopharmacology are increasingly at the core of psychiatry. Some experts claim that psychiatry is no longer interested in problems in living and positive goals such as mental health, happiness, and morality but rather has narrowed its focus to mental disorders addressed with psychotropic drugs. In view of this trend, psychiatry needs to confront two questions in social philosophy. If it is no longer directly concerned with health and happiness, how does it relate to these positive goals? And how does it relate as a medical institution to religious institutions, schools, and other organizations that directly promote health, happiness, morality, and the purposes of life? It is not enough for psychiatry to renounce its moral role; its practices still shape cultural values. Psychiatry should take more responsibility for developing a public philosophy that addresses these issues.     

Embodied Cultural Cognition: Situating the Study of Embodied Cognition in Socio‐Cultural Contexts

Embodiment research has demonstrated that cognition is grounded in bodily interactions with the environment and that abstract concepts are tied to the body’s sensory and motor systems. Building upon this embodiment perspective and advancing our understanding, we discuss the extension of embodied cultural cognition. We propose that some associations between bodily experiences and abstract concepts are not randomly formed; rather, the development of such associations is situated in a socio‐cultural context, informed by cultural imperatives, values, and habits. We draw evidence supporting this view of embodied cultural cognition in body–mind linkages manifested in construal of emotions, time perception, person perception, social power, and moral reasoning. To further extend this research avenue that synthesizes the studies of embodied cognition and culture, we also suggest potential future research directions inspired by this view. This embodied cultural cognition account is useful in understanding and organizing accumulating discoveries of cultural variations in embodiments; it also highlights the social situatedness of embodied cognition and is, therefore, highly compatible with theorizing and research in social and cultural psychology.     

The mesmerists inquire about “Oriental mind powers”: West meets East in the search for the universal trance

Contemporary interest in Asian meditation raises questions about when Westerners began investigating these practices. A synopsis of Western‐originating scientific meditation research is followed by a brief introduction to mesmerism. Next, the unappreciated ways the mesmerists explored Oriental mind powers is recounted. How the mesmerists' cultural positioning, philosophy, and interest in mind—body practices facilitated their inquiries of Oriental medicine and Hindu contemplative practices is explored, followed by a consideration of why these investigations were unique for the era. The way this work subverted Western cultural imperialism is examined. A consideration of the historical continuities and discontinuities between the mesmerists' inquiries and twentieth‐century meditation research concludes the article. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Parasites of the mind. Why cultural theorists need the meme’s eye view

Are there any such things as mind parasites? By analogy with biological parasites, such cultural items are supposed to subvert or harm the interests of their host. The hypothesis of cultural parasitism has appeared in different guises in the burgeoning field of cultural evolution. To unpack the notion of mind parasites, we first clear some conceptual ground around the concept of cultural adaptation and its relation to human agency. We then formulate Millikan’s challenge: how can cultural items develop novel purposes of their own, cross-cutting or subverting our own personal purposes? If this central challenge is not met, talk of cultural ‘parasites’ or ‘selfish memes’ remains vacuous. First, we discuss why other attempts to answer Millikan’s challenge have failed. In particular, we put to rest the claims of panmemetics, a somewhat sinister worldview according to which human culture is nothing more than a swarm of selfish agents, plotting and scheming behind the scenes. Next, we reject a more reasonable, but still overly permissive approach to mind parasites, which equates them with biologically maladaptive culture. Finally, we present our own answer to Millikan’s challenge: certain systems of misbelief can be fruitfully treated as cultural parasites, designed by cultural evolution to subvert the interests of their human hosts. As a proof of concept, we discuss witchcraft beliefs in early modern Europe, and show how the meme’s eye view promises to shed new light on a mystery that historians and social scientists have been wrestling with for decades.     

惠能“心量广大”的文化心理学解读

惠能及其开创的禅宗的核心思想“明心见性”是明白“心量广大”。它包括如下几层含义:(1)“本心”中所包含的估量标准或尺度广大;(2)“心”度量、衡量、审度的对象众多,范围广大;(3)“心”的容量广大;(4)人心的耐受程度和转化能力强大;(5)人心的范围广大和创造力强大;(6)人的心态积极强大。“心量广大”具体体现在平常心、包容心或宽容心、认知力、精神力、心理能量等几个方面。“心量广大”具有浓郁的中国文化特色,蕴含有“自强不息,厚德载物”的中国文化精神,“道德自律和躬身自省”的中国文化伦理与价值追求,“以人为本的人道主义和人文情怀”的中国文化核心思想理念。由此来看,惠能的“心量广大”思想在当代社会仍具有积极的现实价值,对当代文化建设,社会道德构建等有积极作用。     

Epistemology of AI Revisited in the Light of the Philosophy of Information

Artificial intelligence has often been seen as an attempt to reduce the natural mind to informational processes and, consequently, to naturalize philosophy. The many criticisms that were addressed to the so-called “old-fashioned AI” do not concern this attempt itself, but the methods it used, especially the reduction of the mind to a symbolic level of abstraction, which has often appeared to be inadequate to capture the richness of our mental activity. As a consequence, there were many efforts to evacuate the semantical models in favor of elementary physiological mechanisms simulated by information processes. However, these views, and the subsequent criticisms against artificial intelligence that they contain, miss the very nature of artificial intelligence, which is not reducible to a “science of the nature”, but which directly impacts our culture. More precisely, they lead to evacuate the role of the semantic information. In other words, they tend to throw the baby out with the bath-water. This paper tries to revisit the epistemology of artificial intelligence in the light of the opposition between the “sciences of nature” and the “sciences of culture”, which has been introduced by German neo-Kantian philosophers. It then shows how this epistemological view opens on the many contemporary applications of artificial intelligence that have already transformed—and will continue to transform—all our cultural activities and our world. Lastly, it places those perspectives in the context of the philosophy of information and more particularly it emphasizes the role played by the notions of context and level of abstraction in artificial intelligence.     

心理学文化转向中的方法论难题及整合策略

近20多年来心理学的文化转向研究基本上扫清了许多外围障碍,但也暴露出了一些深层次的发展难题,如心理学的文化研究在实现科学观的转变过程中如何避免限制与泛化之问的矛盾：人类文化心理的普适性与差异性关系难以在实践操作层面上得到有效实现;后现代及全球化文化背景下加剧了心理学的对立与分歧。求得这一难题有效解决之关键在于改变滞后的科学观．深化阐述性与规范性心理文化层面研究的理论力度。     

What shall we do with emergence? A survey of a fundamental issue in the metaphysics and epistemology of science

A survey of some recent literature on the concept of emergence provides a case study of an important issue in the general metaphysics and epistemology of science. Emergentism has often been motivated by the desire to avoid excessive reductionism in the philosophy of mind and culture and in the respective fields of the philosophy of science—philosophy of psychology and of the human and social sciences. Philosophers employing the concept of emergence usually argue that there are several ‘levels’ of reality and that the entities and properties of the ‘higher’ levels (e.g., mentality) emerge from those of the ‘lower’ ones (e.g., the physical universe). The standard division between ontological and epistemological approaches to this concept is shown to be inadequate through a critical discussion of emergence from the perspective of a pragmatist philosophy of science. It is argued that emergence should be conceived of both ontologically and epistemologically, because there is no humanly possible point of view for ontologizing about the way the world is structured in itself, entirely independently of our epistemic standpoints. Emergence thus turns out to be an example of the way in which the ‘pre-critical’ dispute between dogmatic metaphysics and skeptical reactions to it (which Kant famously wanted to overcome) still dominates philosophy of science. Hence, the problems of emergence and realism are observed to be intimately connected.     

医学人文教育困境之根源研究

医学人文教育必须奠基于人文教育的基础之上,通过对人文教育和医学人文教育根本要义的解析提出造成我国医学人文教育今天的困境原因有三:文化断层使得我国大学教育丧失人文教育之根;实利原则严重侵蚀我国教育制度,医学院校难以独善其身;文理分科和医学教育专业化使我国医学人文教育难有立足之居。     

On radicalizing behaviorism: A call for cultural analysis

Our culture at large continues many practices that work against the well-being of its members and its chances for survival. Our discipline has failed to realize its potential for contributing to the understanding of these practices and to the generation of solutions. This failure of realization is in part a consequence of the general failure of behavior analysts to view social and cultural analysis as a fundamental component of radical behaviorism. This omission is related to three prevailing practices of our discipline. First, radical behaviorism is characteristically defined as a "philosophy of science," and its concerns are ordinarily restricted to certain epistemological issues. Second, theoretical extensions to social and cultural phenomena too often depend solely upon principles derived from the analysis of behavior. Third, little attention has been directed at examining the relationships that do, or that should, exist between our discipline and related sciences. These practices themselves are attributed to certain features of the history of our field. Two general remedies for this situation are suggested: first, that radical behaviorism be treated as a comprehensive world view in which epistemological, psychological, and cultural analyses constitute interdependent components; second, that principles derived from compatible social-science disciplines be incorporated into radical behaviorism.     

The Social Sciences,Philosophy, and the Cultural Turn in the 1930s USDA

One of the more unusual attempts by the American state to mobilize academic expertise unfolded in the late 1930s, when the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) hired scholars in the “culture and personality” fields and philosophy to aid its efforts to promote economic, social, and cultural change in the countryside. USDA progressives also reached out to disciplinary scholars in other ways as they sought to institute a deliberative mode of planning in local communities and to remake the curricula of the land‐grant colleges in support of that project. These USDA initiatives and scholars’ responses reveal that scientific knowledge was mobilized in the 1930s not just for the instrumental purpose of regulating economic behavior but also to explain and legitimate federal programs and to inform ambitious projects for cultural change. At the USDA, as at many other sites between the wars, scientific thinkers turned to the social sciences and philosophy in order to understand and then change the public mind.     

试析现代西方心理学的文化转向

西方心理学正在展现出对文化影响日渐增加的关注。这种文化转向既有科学哲学和历史的原因,也受到世界范围内心理学本土化运动的影响。文化转向的主要表现是：(1)对心理学自然科学模式的反思与诘难;(2)多元文化心理学的兴起;(3)跨文化心理学面临的批评及其转变;(4)认知心理学、发展心理学和健康心理学等分支领域对文化影响的关注。作者认为,文化的转向对于西方心理学的发展具有积极的意义。     

消亡抑或复兴：人本心理学的未来

人本心理学在20世纪末遭遇了内外两方面的危机。但其形成的社会文化与心理学基础依然存在。主流心理学,特别是积极心理学的发展还为她提供了复兴机遇。在未来,人本心理学家需要重审自身使命,明晰研究主题,完善研究方法,保持开放态度,强化组织管理,以推动人本心理学走上复兴之路。     

Mind, self, and consciousness as discourse

The present paper argues for the essential relationship between discourse and the human mind. Drawing upon the critical insights from a range of social sciences including Cultural Psychology and Discourse Studies, I outline in the first part of the paper a discursive account of the mind—of cognition, emotion, self and consciousness and the like: the human mind is constituted in text and talk which are situated in cultural and historical context. The discursive account is based on a social constructionist view of the human cultural world as meanings constructed primarily through linguistic communication in order to accomplish interactional purposes. The central argument here will be that our thinking and feeling are discursive by nature and in origin. Specifically, our minds are (a) derived from, (b) constrained by, (c) utilized in (d) modelled upon, (e) distributed through, and (f) begun with discourse. In the second part, I try to show how, in modern Western linguistics, metaphors from the natural sciences have come to define, and become part of, “the human mind” itself.     

An Epistemological Basis For Linking Philosophy and Literature

In this article I attempt to present an explanation that integrates the five features needed for the cognitive (knowledge-yielding) linking of philosophy and literature. These features are, first, explaining how a literary work can support a general claim. Second, explaining what is uniquely gained through concentrating on such support patterns as they appear in aesthetic contexts in particular. Third, explaining how features of aesthetic response are connected with knowledge. Four, maintaining a distinction between manipulation and adequate persuasion. Five, achieving all this without invoking what David Novitz has called "a shamelessly functional and didactic view of literature."     

A Social Psychology of Cultural Dynamics: Examining How Cultures Are Formed,Maintained, and Transformed

Social psychological research on culture has mainly focused on differences in psychological processes between cultural groups. However, in the globalizing world today, a complementary approach to culture, a social psychology of cultural dynamics, is emerging as a critical research program. Adopting a neo‐diffusionist meta‐theory of culture, it regards culture as emerging from the processes of cultural transmission in situated social activities, and examines the dynamics involved in the formation, maintenance, and transformation of culture over time. The paper reviews recent research on culture in this perspective and makes suggestions about future directions.     

Zombies and the Case of the Phenomenal Pickpocket

A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some important positions in the philosophy of mind. We could embrace radical skepticism about our own consciousness, or maintain the complete and total infallibility of our beliefs about our own phenomenal experiences. I argue that we should actually reject the logical possibility of zombies.