Do priming effects in perceptual identification and word judgment reflect different underlying mechanisms?

We examined priming of orthographically illegal nonwords in a perceptual identification task and a word judgment task in undergraduate participants. In perceptual identification, priming was significant and equivalent after structural or phonological encoding. In word judgment, priming was significant after phonological encoding but not structural encoding. In a follow-up experiment in older control participants and amnesic participants, priming in word judgment was not significant. Older control participants found the stimuli more difficult to pronounce than did undergraduate participants, and word judgment priming in undergaduate participants was significant only for the stimuli that were judged easy to pronounce. These findings demonstrate that priming in perceptual identification and word judgment extends to novel stimuli that are not linked to preexisting lexical or sublexical representations but that priming occurs at different levels in the two tasks: at a featural or orthographic level in perceptual identification and at a phonological level in word judgment.     

What colour is the car? Implicit memory for colour information in children

Three experiments were conducted to examine age-related differences in colour memory. In Experiment 1, preschool age and elementary school age children were given a conceptual test of implicit colour memory (a colour-choice task). They were presented with the names or achromatic versions of previously studied coloured line drawings and asked to select an appropriate colour. Significant priming could be demonstrated: The children chose the previously seen colours more often than was expected by chance. Equivalent priming was found for both versions (pictorial and verbal) suggesting that colour priming may be conceptually mediated. Moreover, colour priming proved to be age invariant. Experiment 2 replicated and extended this finding by using a wider age group (preschool, elementary school, and young adults) and by giving a perceptual implicit task (picture identification) in addition to a verbal colour-choice task. Colour did not affect priming in the perceptual task. Whereas priming showed no developmental change, agerelated improvements were observed on an explicit colour memory task that differed only in the test instructions from the implicit colour-choice task (Experiments 2 and 3). Taken together, the results suggest that implicit colour memory may be mediated by conceptual processes that are age invariant.     

Guessing Strategies, Aging, and Bias Effects in Perceptual Identification

In the typical single-stimulus perceptual identification task, accuracy is improved by prior study of test words, a repetition priming benefit. There is also a cost, inasmuch as previously studied words are likely to be produced (incorrectly) as responses if the test word is orthographically similar but not identical to a studied word. In two-alternative forced-choice perceptual identification, a test word is flashed and followed by two alternatives, one of which is the correct response. When the two alternatives are orthographically similar, test words identical to previously studied items are identified more accurately than new words (a benefit) but tests words orthographically similar to studied words are identified less accurately than new words (a cost). Ratcliff and McKoon (in press) argue that these are bias effects that arise in the decision stage of word identification. We report five experiments that examined the alternative hypothesis that these bias effects arise from postperceptual guessing strategies. In single-stimulus perceptual identification, repetition priming benefits were equally great for young and older adults who claimed to use deliberate guessing strategies and those who did not (Experiment 1). In contrast, only groups of young and older people who claimed to deliberately guess studied words in a two-alternative forced-choice task (Experiments 2 and 5) showed reliable benefits and costs. Costs and benefits were abolished in the two-alternative forced-choice task when a very long study list was used, presumably because the increased retrieval burden made the use of deliberate guessing strategies less attractive (Experiment 3). Under conditions similar to those of Experiment 3, repetition priming was observed in single-stimulus perceptual identification (Experiment 4). These results are consistent with the view that costs and benefits in the forced-choice perceptual identification task arise from deliberate guessing strategies but that those in the single-stimulus task do not. The possibility that the observed relationship between strategy reports and priming effects reflects erroneous postexperimental assessments of strategies by participants is also considered.     

Does Scope of Attention Affect Creativity? Testing the Attentional Priming Hypothesis

Creativity is linked to broad scope of attention, a state or trait that allocates attentional resources over a wide range of perceptual stimuli. According to the attentional priming hypothesis, a mechanism underlying the creativity–attention link is that broad perceptual attention scope primes broad conceptual attention scope—the activation of a wide range of memory contents—which therefore facilitates creative ideation. This study aimed to test the hypothesis in three experiments using three manipulations and two creativity tasks. Experiment 1 used the Navon letter task to prime attention to global patterns or local details of composite stimuli and measured creativity via the task to generate alternative uses of daily objects. Experiment 2 modified a cue-size procedure in which participants repeatedly attended to large or small visual cues before a target stimulus appeared. Experiment 3 devised a manipulation that required participants to view and visualize images associated with broad or narrow attention and adopted the alternative uses task and the task to invent alien creatures. Across the experiments, although the results were in the predicted direction, they were non-significant. This study found no evidence that broadness of perceptual attention affects creativity.     

不同注意条件下的知觉启动及其机制

采用快速命名方法探讨不同注意条件下的知觉启动效应及其机制。实验中呈现一系列颜色词,要求被试分别完成集中和分散注意任务,然后进行词命名和再认测验。在词命名任务中．实验1包括旧词、重组颜色词和新词,而在实验2中重组颜色词改为新颜色词。结果表明,在实验1中,只有在集中注意条件下,被试对旧词的命名时间明显短于重组颜色词．即表现出知觉启动效应。而在实验2的两种注意条件下,被试对旧词的命名时间均明显短于新颜色词。这提示,在不同注意条件下的学习会影响其后的颜色知觉启动,并且与词和颜色的联结捆绑有关。     

Effects of color on perceptual and conceptual tests of implicit memory

Two experiments are reported that explore why recent investigations of implicit memory failed to find any effects of color information on test performance. In the first experiment, participants studied colored pictures as well as words printed in colored ink without any memory instructions. During the test phase, a verbal and a pictorial version of a color-choice task (a conceptual priming test) were compared to two perceptual tests (word-stem completion and picture-fragment identification). Similar and significant amounts of priming to color occurred in both color-choice tasks. The perceptual tests were found to be sensitive to changes in the stimulus-presentation mode from study to test, but stimuli remaining the same color and those changed to black-and-white did not differ in the priming scores. In the second experiment, a mild division of attention was introduced in the study phase. Once again, priming to color was observed only in the verbal version of a color-choice test and not in the word-stem completion test. Dividing attention did not decrease performance on both implicit tests, whereas an explicit test of color recall for studied pictures suffered from dividing attention at encoding. It is concluded that a perceptual attribute such as color may be represented and coded by conceptual processing. Furthermore, automatic (or not attention-demanding) encoding processes may suffice for later conceptual tests of implicit memory. Previous failures to find any effects of color information on implicit performance are attributed to the use of perceptual priming tests. Received: 30 June 1997 / Accepted: 20 April 1998     

In search of perceptual priming in a semantic classification task

Four experiments tested for perceptual priming for written words in a semantic categorization task. Repetition priming was obtained for low-frequency words when unrelated categorizations were performed at study and test (Experiment 1), but it was not orthographically mediated given that written-to-written and spoken-to-written word priming was equivalent (Experiments 2 and 3). Furthermore, no priming was obtained between pictures and words (Experiment 4), suggesting that the nonorthographic priming was largely phonological rather than semantic. These results pose a challenge to standard perceptual theories of priming that should expect orthographic priming when words are presented in a visual format at study and test.     

Enhanced perceptual priming for neutral stimuli occurring in a traumatic context: two experimental investigations

Intrusive memories in posttraumatic stress disorder are often triggered by stimuli that are perceptually similar to those present shortly before or during the trauma. The present study aims to examine the possible role of perceptual priming in this phenomenon. It further investigates whether the degree of perceptual priming is associated with dissociation and whether both perceptual priming and intrusive memories can be reduced through elaboration. Two experiments measured perceptual priming for neutral stimuli that immediately preceded a "traumatic" event. Volunteers (N=46, 92) watched a series of "traumatic" and neutral picture stories, and completed a blurred object identification (perceptual priming) memory task, and a recognition memory task. Participants in Experiment 1 were selected to score either high or low on the Trait Dissociation Questionnaire [Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou (2002). Dissociation and posttraumatic stress disorder: Two prospective studies of motor vehicle accident survivors. British Journal of Psychiatry, 180, 363-368]. They also completed a state dissociation measure in the session. Experiment 2 randomly allocated participants to an experimental condition designed to increase elaboration or to a control condition. This experiment also included a measure of intrusive memories. Both experiments found enhanced perceptual priming for the stimuli that immediately preceded the "traumatic" stories compared to those preceding neutral stories. Participants with high trait dissociation showed relatively stronger perceptual perceptual priming. The degree of perceptual priming for stimuli from the "traumatic" stories also correlated with state dissociation (Experiment 1). Experimental manipulation of the elaboration of the stories showed that elaboration reduced the enhanced perceptual priming effect and the relative probability of reexperiencing symptoms (Experiment 2). The results support the role of perceptual priming in intrusions after traumatic events.     

Enhanced processing fluency leads to biases in source memory

The present experiments were conducted to determine whether processing fluency affects source memory decisions. In the first three experiments, participants decided whether test items appeared in the same sensory modality (Experiments 1A, 1B) or perceptual form (font type, Experiment 2) at study and test. The results were consistent across the three studies and showed that perceptual priming leads to an increase in reports that stimuli were presented in the same sensory or perceptual form during the study and test phase. Experiment 3 showed that conceptual fluency affects source attributions in much the same way as perceptual fluency, and Experiment 4 showed that fluency is associated with a subjective experience of familiarity even when it might serve as a basis for source inference. These results are consistent with recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence that familiarity-based processes contribute to source memory decisions under some circumstances, such as when items and contexts are unitized rather than merely bound together at encoding.     

Enhanced processing fluency leads to biases in source memory

The present experiments were conducted to determine whether processing fluency affects source memory decisions. In the first three experiments, participants decided whether test items appeared in the same sensory modality (Experiments 1A, 1B) or perceptual form (font type, Experiment 2) at study and test. The results were consistent across the three studies and showed that perceptual priming leads to an increase in reports that stimuli were presented in the same sensory or perceptual form during the study and test phase. Experiment 3 showed that conceptual fluency affects source attributions in much the same way as perceptual fluency, and Experiment 4 showed that fluency is associated with a subjective experience of familiarity even when it might serve as a basis for source inference. These results are consistent with recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence that familiarity-based processes contribute to source memory decisions under some circumstances, such as when items and contexts are unitized rather than merely bound together at encoding.     

The kinds of information that support novel associative object priming and how these differ from those that support item priming

We investigated how the information that supports novel associative and item object priming differs under identical study/test conditions. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants rated the meaningfulness of sentences linking two object pictures at study. At test, they performed either a size judgement or an associative recognition memory task on intact, recombined and novel picture (Experiment 1) or word (Experiment 2) associations. Associative priming was modulated by subjective meaningfulness of the encoded links, and depended on study/test perceptual overlap. In contrast, item priming was neither affected by the meaningfulness of the sentences nor by study/test changes in the stimulus presentation format. Associative priming and recognition were behaviourally dissociated, and associative recognition was probably too slow to have seriously contaminated associative priming. In Experiment 3, participants performed a perceptually oriented task during both experimental phases, and both associative and item priming were observed. These results suggest that associative priming depends on stored associative semantic and perceptual information when the test task requires flexible retrieval of associative information. Under the same conditions, item priming may only require activation of items' semantic properties. When both study and test tasks stress perceptual processing, retrieval of perceptual information is sufficient to support both kinds of priming.     

Perceptual priming is not a necessary consequence of semantic classification of pictures

Four experiments investigated how repetition priming of object recognition is affected by the task performed in the prime and test phases. In Experiment 1 object recognition was tested using both vocal naming and two different semantic decision tasks (whether or not objects were manufactured, and whether or not they would be found inside the house). Some aspects of the data were inconsistent with contemporary models of object recognition. Specifically, object priming was eliminated with some combinations of prime and test tasks, and there was no evidence of perceptual (as opposed to conceptual or response) priming in either semantic classification task, even though perceptual identification of the objects is required for at least one of these tasks. Experiment 2 showed that even when perceptual demands were increased by brief presentation, the inside task showed no perceptual priming. Experiment 3 showed that the inside task did not appear to be based on conceptual priming either, as it was not primed significantly when the prime decisions were made to object labels. Experiment 4 showed that visual sensitivity could be restored to the inside task following practice on the task, supporting the suggestion that a critical factor is whether the semantic category is preformed or must be computed. The results show that the visual representational processes revealed by object priming depend crucially on the task chosen.     

Cross-modal priming and explicit memory in patients with verbal production deficits

Implicit memory is often thought to reflect an influence of past experience on perceptual processes, yet priming effects are found when the perceptual format of stimuli changes between study and test episodes. Such cross-modal priming effects have been hypothesized to depend upon stimulus recoding processes whereby a stimulus presented in one modality is converted to other perceptual formats. The present research examined recoding accounts of cross-modal priming by testing patients with verbal production deficits that presumably impair the conversion of visual words into auditory/phonological forms. The patients showed normal priming in a visual stem completion task following visual study (Experiment 1), but showed impairments following auditory study in both implicit (Experiment 2) and explicit (Experiment 3) stem completion. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that verbal production processes contribute to the recoding of visual stimuli and support cross-modal priming. The results also indicate that shared processes contribute to both explicit memory and cross-modal implicit memory.     

Priming on verbal perceptual tests: Roles of lexical,surface, and conceptual processes

According to a lexical-access hypothesis, priming on verbal-completion tests requires previous access to higher-order nodes such as morphemes or words. In two experiments, subjects studied words presented in printed color, either by reading the words or by naming the printed colors. In Experiment 2, some of the words were to be ignored in both study conditions. The words presented in Experiment 2 were either conceptually related or unrelated to each other. And the cues in the test phase for repeated targets were either printed in the studied color or in a different color. In both experiments, the word stems of nouns studied and of new targets were presented with word-completion instructions (implicit test of memory). Consistent with the hypothesis, the amount of priming obtained was greater in the reading than in the color-naming condition. The least amount of priming was observed for targets that were to be ignored at study. In addition, Experiment 2 showed considerable effects of surface similarity (i.e., stronger priming effects with cues whose color was not changed from the study to the test phase) and some effects of conceptual processing, as was indicated by different amounts of priming for unrelated and for related nouns. Because these two effects were observed with both types of study task, it is concluded that perceptual and conceptual processes may make independent contributions to priming effects in verbal perceptual tests. This conclusion modifies and extends the original hypothesis, according to which previous lexical access is required in order to obtain effects of perceptual or conceptual processes on the priming scores.     

What is primed in priming from imagery?

Priming from imagery is typically weaker than that from perception. This has been interpreted as resulting from weaker activation of perceptual processes. However, for imagery and perception, commonality is only half the story: Each is also characterized by specific processes. If priming can be due to both unshared and shared components of imagery and perception, then it should be possible to observe greater priming from imagery than from perception. Two new priming experiments were designed to test this hypothesis, while controlling incidental task differences. In both experiments, participants studied objects by counting their parts (from a mental image or a picture). Experiment 1 used a word-picture matching test task, which was hypothesized to depend on stimulus processing specific to perception, and Experiment 2 a size judgment test task, which was hypothesized to depend on retrieval and generation processes specific to imagery. As predicted, priming for perceived objects was greater than priming for imagined objects in the word-picture matching task. Conversely, in the size judgment task, more priming from imagery than from perception was observed. These results support the conclusions that (a) imagery and perception have substantial unshared processes, and (b) these processes contribute to priming.     

On the relationship between visual imagery and visual perception: Evidence from priming studies

Two priming experiments using a perceptual identification task were conducted to explore the functional and representational overlap between visual imagery and visual perception. The first experiment included a study phase in which primes were either perceived or imaged objects and a perceptual identification test task in which targets were parts of studied and non-studied objects. Imagery primed identification when subjects were instructed to count the parts of the imaged objects in the study phase but not when they were instructed to focus on the global shape of the imaged objects. This result suggests that imagery involves perceptual representations identical to those involved in perception. It also suggests that the representational overlap between imagery and perception depends on the type of images generated, as some images may consist in global shapes only, whereas others may consist in detailed, multi-part shapes. In the second experiment, we used whole objects as target stimuli which provided subjects with more information to identify masked targets and thereby reduced top-down processing. Priming from imagery fell beneath significance, suggesting that this sort of priming is elicited in a large part by a transfer of top-down processes from study to test.     

联想启动与知觉启动的比较研究

采用快速命名方法探讨不同加工水平对联想启动效应的影响。被试分别在深、浅加工条件下学习一系列颜色词,然后完成颜色命名和再认任务,并设立词命名任务,以比较联想启动和知觉启动的异同。结果表明,在颜色命名任务中,深、浅加工条件下均可形成对颜色词的启动效应,但浅加工条件下的再认成绩明显低于深加工,出现了联想启动和再认的分离现象。词命名表现出与颜色命名相似的结果,但它们在有意识回忆方面仍存在一定的差异,提示知觉表征系统单独并不能支持联想启动,联想启动可能是多个记忆系统共同作用的结果。     

Controlling the unconscious: attentional task sets modulate subliminal semantic and visuomotor processes differentially

Are unconscious processes susceptible to attentional influences? In two subliminal priming experiments, we investigated whether task sets differentially modulate the sensitivity of unconscious processing pathways. We developed a novel procedure for masked semantic priming of words (Experiment 1) and masked visuomotor priming of geometrical shapes (Experiment 2). Before presentation of the masked prime, participants performed an induction task in which they attended to either semantic or perceptual object features designed to activate a semantic or perceptual task set, respectively. Behavioral and electrophysiological effects showed that the induction tasks differentially modulated subliminal priming: Semantic priming, which involves access to conceptual meaning, was found after the semantic induction task but not after the perceptual induction task. Visuomotor priming was observed after the perceptual induction task but not after the semantic induction task. These results demonstrate that unconscious cognition is influenced by attentional control. Unconscious processes in perceptual and semantic processing streams are coordinated congruently with higher-level action goals.     

Associative priming in a masked perceptual identification task: Evidence for automatic processes

Two experiments investigated the influence of automatic and strategic processes on associative priming effects in a perceptual identification task in which prime-target pairs are briefly presented and masked. In this paradigm, priming is defined as a higher percentage of correctly identified targets for related pairs than for unrelated pairs. In Experiment 1, priming was obtained for mediated word pairs. This mediated priming effect was affected neither by the presence of direct associations nor by the presentation time of the primes, indicating that automatic priming effects play a role in perceptual identification. Experiment 2 showed that the priming effect was not affected by the proportion (.90 vs. .10) of related pairs if primes were presented briefly to prevent their identification. However, a large proportion effect was found when primes were presented for 1000 ms so that they were clearly visible. These results indicate that priming in a masked perceptual identification task is the result of automatic processes and is not affected by strategies. The present paradigm provides a valuable alternative to more commonly used tasks such as lexical decision.     

Contextual influences on implicit evaluation: a test of additive versus contrastive effects of evaluative context stimuli in affective priming

Drawing on two alternative accounts of the affective priming effect (spreading activation vs. response interference), the present research investigated the underlying processes of how evaluative context stimuli influence implicit evaluations in the affective priming task. Employing two sequentially presented prime stimuli (rather than a single prime), two experiments showed that affective priming effects elicited by a given prime stimulus were more pronounced when this stimulus was preceded by a context prime of the opposite valence than when it was preceded by a context prime of the same valence. This effect consistently emerged for pictures (Experiment 1) and words (Experiment 2) as prime stimuli. These results suggest that the impact of evaluative context stimuli on implicit evaluations is mediated by contrast effects in the attention to evaluative information rather than by additive effects in the activation of evaluative information in associative memory.