Equity, justice, and altruism

According to traditional equity theory, justice is motivated by selfishness. However, critics of equity have argued that it is only one rule of justice that people can apply, and that sometimes other rules of justice are used, such as equality and need, that appear to be altruistically based; that is, they involve sharing and caring in a way that ignores contributions or “inputs” and the probability of receiving outcomes in return. Disagreements have arisen, however, as to the status of these alternative rules as elements of justice, the roles of altruism and selfishness within them, and the relative status of altruism and justice as moral principles. The main aim of this article is to help resolve some of these difficulties by examining the relationship between altruism and justice from the perspective of Wagstaff s theory of Equity as Desert (EAD). This theory integrates a number of allocation rules (including those related to the treatment of offenders) with the concepts of equal opportunity and personal responsibility. One of the advantages of this position is that it enables a conceptual and an empirical distinction to be made between helping and responsiveness to need as altruistic norms, and helping and responsiveness to need as justice norms. It is concluded that there may be something to be gained from viewing core rules of justice in the form of EAD as the sophisticated descendants of the sociobiological concept of reciprocal altruism, that is, a set of algorithms designed to limit both unbridled selfishness and indiscrimi-nate altruism.     

Excessive altruism

Altruism is an ideal which is almost universally approved. It is argued here that such almost universal acceptance of altruism may be grounded on a failure to interrogate the complexity both of the philosophical construct and of the human motivation underpinning its implementation.     

Empathy and altruism.

The psychophysiological responses of 60 subjects were measured as they observed a performer play a roulette game. Half of the subjects were led to believe that they were similar to the performer in personality and values, and half were led to believe that they were dissimilar. Half of the subjects in each condition believed that the performer won money and experienced pain as he played the game, and half believed that he performed a cognitive and motor skill task. Subjects who observed a performer who ostensibly experienced pleasure and pain exhibited greater psychophysiological reactions than subjects who did not. Subjects who believed they were similar to the performer tended to react more strongly than subjects who believed they were different from him. Similar subjects also reported identifying most with the performer and feeling the worst while he waited to receive shocks. It was concluded that the similar subjects empathized most with the performer who appeared to experience pleasure and pain. When required to make a choice between helping themselves at a cost to the performer or helping the performer at a cost to themselves, the subjects who reacted most empathically behaved most altruistically. The results were interpreted as casting some light on century-old questions about the human capacity for altruism.     

Hell,justice, and freedom

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Retributive justice, restorative justice, and forgiveness: An experimental psychophysiology analysis

This experiment assessed the emotional self-reports and physiology of justice outcomes and forgiveness responses to a common crime, using a three Justice (retributive, restorative, no justice) × 2 Forgiveness (forgiveness, none) repeated-measures design. Participants (27 males, 29 females) imagined their residence was burglarized, followed by six counterbalanced justice-forgiveness outcomes. Imagery of justice—especially restorative—and forgiveness each reduced unforgiving motivations and negative emotion (anger, fear), and increased prosocial and positive emotion (empathy, gratitude). Imagery of granting forgiveness (versus not) was associated with less heart rate reactivity and better recovery; less negative emotion expression at the brow (corrugator EMG); and less aroused expression at the eye (lower orbicularis oculi EMG when justice was absent). When forgiveness was not imagined, justice-physiology effects emerged: signs of cardiovascular stress (rate pressure products) were lower for retributive versus no justice; and sympathetic nervous system responding (skin conductance) was calmer for restorative versus retributive justice.     

Equity sensitivity versus egoism: A reconceptualization and new measure of individual differences in justice perceptions

Traditional research on equity sensitivity has defined the construct as a dispositional preference for increased work rewards and/or a preference for reduced work inputs. We note this classic definition is more consistent with the notion of egoism, and bears little conceptual relationship to equity sensitivity per se. In contrast, we here offer a redefinition of equity sensitivity as a dispositional tendency to perceive stimuli as fair versus unfair. In Study 1, a content validity analysis of the dominant equity sensitivity measure reveals that most items assess input/reward preferences (i.e., egoism), rather than a dispositional tendency to perceive things fairly. In Study 2, we develop a Neutral Objects Fairness Orientation (NOFO) questionnaire, which exhibits discriminant validity from the classic egoism-based equity sensitivity measure. Study 3 further validates the NOFO by demonstrating 3-month retest reliability and incremental validity over the traditional egoism-based measure in predicting justice perceptions. In addition, we show that the NOFO moderates/magnifies the relationship between frequency of evaluative work events and justice perceptions. Study 4 replicates results from previous studies and shows that equity sensitivity and egoism both predict employees' perceived behavioral contributions—but only equity sensitivity does so through a mechanism of justice perceptions.     

Religiousness, antisocial behavior, and altruism: genetic and environmental mediation

Although religiousness is considered a protective factor against antisocial behaviors and a positive influence on prosocial behaviors, it remains unclear whether these associations are primarily genetically or environmentally mediated. In order to investigate this question, religiousness, antisocial behavior, and altruistic behavior were assessed by self-report in a sample of adult male twins (165 MZ and 100 DZ full pairs, mean age of 33 years). Religiousness, both retrospective and current, was shown to be modestly negatively correlated with antisocial behavior and modestly positively correlated with altruistic behavior. Joint biometric analyses of religiousness and antisocial behavior or altruistic behavior were completed. The relationship between religiousness and antisocial behavior was due to both genetic and shared environmental effects. Altruistic behavior also shared most all of its genetic influence, but only half of its shared environmental influence, with religiousness.     

Normal and pathological altruism.

The psychoanalytic literature on altruism is sparse, although much has been written on this topic from a sociobiological perspective. Freud (1917) first described the concept in "Libido Theory and Narcissism." In 1946 Anna Freud coined the term "altruistic surrender" to describe the psychodynamics of altruistic behavior in a group of inhibited individuals who were neurotically driven to do good for others. The usefulness and clinical applicability of this formulation, in conjunction with the frequent coexistence of masochism and altruism, encouraged psychoanalysts to regard all forms of altruism as having masochistic underpinnings. Since then, there has been a conflation of the two concepts in much of the analytic literature. This paper reexamines the psychoanalytic understanding of altruism and proposes an expansion of the concept to include a normal form. Five types of altruism are described: protoaltruism, generative altruism, conflicted altruism, pseudoaltruism, and psychotic altruism. Protoaltruism has biological roots and can be observed in animals. In humans, protoaltruism includes maternal and paternal nurturing and protectiveness. Generative altruism is the nonconflictual pleasure in fostering the success and/or welfare of another. Conflicted altruism is generative altruism that is drawn into conflict, but in which the pleasure and satisfaction of another (a proxy) is actually enjoyed. Pseudoaltruism originates in conflict and serves as a defensive cloak for underlying sadomasochism. Psychotic altruism is defined as the sometimes bizarre forms of caretaking behavior and associated self-denial seen in psychotic individuals, and often based on delusion. We consider Anna Freud's altruistic surrender to combine features of both conflict-laden altruism and pseudoaltruism. Two clinical illustrations are discussed.     

Subjective preferences, rationality, and justice

Three main types of subjectivist ethics are distinguished and specified by the use of elementary game-theoretical notions. It will be argued that all these theories run into difficulties that cannot be overcome within the self-imposed limits of subjectivism.     

Fertility technologies and trans-kin altruism

Journal of Medical Humanities -     

Equality,priority and global justice

Derek Parfit has argued that prioritarianism “naturally” has global scope, i.e. naturally applies to everyone, irrespective of his or her particular national, state or other communal affiliation. In that respect, it differs from e.g. egalitarianism. In this article, I critically assess Parfit's argument. In particular, I argue that it is difficult to draw conclusions about the scope of prioritarianism simply from an inspection of its structure. I also make some suggestions as to what it would take to argue that prioritarianism has either global or merely domestic scope.