规则顺序与规则类型对儿童规则推理的影响

学前儿童时期是各种推理能力产生和发展的重要时期。本研究采用Frye和Zelazo等（1996）所设计的“二进二出”装置,设置了规则顺序、规则类型的规则推理任务,采用个别实验法,研究了90名3～4岁儿童规则推理能力的发展。在本研究条件下,结果发现：1．当规则呈现顺序不同时,儿童规则推理成绩差异显著,先呈现哪个规则,则利用这个规则进行推理的成绩就较好;2．不同规则类型下儿童的推理成绩差异极其显著,竖直规则下的推理任务更容易;3．3．5～4岁是儿童二维合取规则推理能力发展的快速期。     

因果条件中儿童社会信息推理的发展

采用因果条件性逻辑推理研究的一般模式,研究了儿童社会信息因果推理发展状况。实验结果表明：(1)儿童社会信息推理能力呈年级性递增。(2)社会信息的内容会影响儿童社会信息推理的能力。(3)儿童四种逻辑形式推理能力之间的差异显著．AC、DA在年级水平上差异都十分显著,但MP和MT在年级水平上差异不显著,儿童在各个年级四种推理能力之间的差异都显著,确定型和非确定型逻辑推理能力之间的差异显著。(4)逻辑形式的难度、儿童的年龄影响儿童合理化解释的类型。     

命题检验中的推理过程及困难原因的实验研究

本研究利用基于实际推理图式理论的三类四卡片问题,以９６名对四卡片问题不熟悉的大学生为样本,旨在探讨四卡片问题困难原因、推理过程,同时检验实际推理图式理论是否合理。结果表明四卡片问题相当困难,其原因有三：题意不易理解、对命题的错误表征和难以正确应用规则。要正确解决四卡片问题必须正确理解题意、正确理解规则,同时能正确地把规则应用到卡片的分析中。本研究也表明实际推理图式理论有其合理性。     

四卡问题的视角效应发生机制：领域一般性还是领域特殊性？

视角效应（Perspective Effects)是指四卡问题解决中,当被试从不同的角度对条件规则进行检验时,其选择偏向会在卡片p,q和-p,q之间发生稳定变化的现象。视角效应对四卡问题的解决有重要影响,但其存在条件及发生机制仍存在争议。本研究通过3个实验,探讨四卡问题中的视角效应。实验1和实验2采用混合实验设计,结果表明,转换社会契约、因果规则的四卡问题中,发现视角效应,抽象规则中,提供反例比提供充分必要条件更有利于产生视角效应。实验3在不同视角下研究四卡问题与条件推理的关系。结果表明,四卡问题与条件推理之间不具有逻辑一致性,产生分离现象。总之,视角效应在抽象规则和特定规则中均存在,而提供反例更有利于视角效应的产生。领域一般性或领域特殊性均不能有效解释视角效应的产生,两种机制的综合调节为解释视角效应提供新的角度。     

不同指导语对成本-收益结构条件推理的影响

该研究以社会契约问题为研究材料,对217名在校大学生进行了调查研究,旨在考查不同指导语对成本-收益结构条件推理作业成绩的影响,结果表明:(1)社会契约主效应显著,标准社会契约作业成绩好于转换社会契约;(2)不同指导语的主效应显著,证伪指导语更易于激活"辨别欺骗者程序";(3)成本-收益结构条件推理任务能有效激活"辨别欺骗者程序",以找出潜在的欺骗者。     

演绎推理的形式和内容启动加工

聚焦推理加工初期,研究通过指导语操控主观加工倾向,考察不同指导语条件下内容可信度和形式有效性对演绎推理结果的影响,检验内容和形式两类加工过程的启动加工动态变化性。结果表明,指导语条件显著影响推理初期加工。在无提示指导语和形式判定指导语条件下,推理结果受到了形式有效性和内容可信度的影响;内容判定指导语下只受到了内容可信度的影响。证明主观加工倾向影响了内容和形式的启动加工关系,支持了动态变化性的假设。     

有关条件推理中概率效应的实验研究

通过预备实验选取了四种不同条件概率的条件规则和四种不同前后件概率组合的条件规则作为实验材料,以大学生为被试,考察了两种概率因素(条件概率和前后件概率)对条件推理的演绎形式(MP、DA、AC、MT)以及变通形式(四卡问题)的影响。结果表明,两种概率因素对四种条件推理的影响都非常显著,研究进一步证实了人们对四种推理的认可程度主要与范畴前提的概率成正比的结论;但概率因素对四卡问题的解决影响不明显。     

3~4岁儿童规则因果推理能力的训练研究

学前期是儿童多种推理能力产生和发展的重要时期。本研究(以64名3岁儿童为被试,采用Frye和Zelazo等所设计的“二进二出”装置,通过对3岁儿童的规则因果推理能力进行训练,从而探索儿童规则因果推理的内在机制。在本研究条件下,结果发现:1.年龄与训练的交互效应不显著,各年龄组儿童经过训练后,成绩的提高没有显著差异;2.规则与训练的交互效应显著,竖直规则下,儿童通过训练后提高的成绩不显著,但在交叉规则下前测后测成绩差异极其显著;3.训练效应显著,暴露因果机制,给予及时反馈和阐述规则时附加手势这些信息能促进年幼儿童对高级规则的掌握。     

假言推理判定标准的发展性研究

以充分条件和必要条件假言推理题目为测验材料,对小学四年级、初中二年级、高中二年级和大学二年级共469名被试进行了测量。结果表明:(1)内容和形式两种判断标准从小学四年级就开始发展了,但是小学生和中学生还是根据经验事实来进行判断,直到大学才摆脱经验事实的束缚。(2)必要条件推理的能力发展要早于充分条件推理的能力,而且最后能够达到的水平也要高。(3)被试对规则掌握的先后顺序是肯定前件式、否认前件式、肯定后件式和否认后件式。(4)被试是否受到信念偏见效应的影响,还要看题目是否符合事实以及是否符合逻辑规则。     

基于易感人格的药物成瘾者工作记忆对执行控制功能的调节作用

为了解工作记忆在易感性人格对药物成瘾者执行控制功能和抑制性影响过程中的调节作用,采用BIS和SSS量袁以及连续操作测验（CPT）、2-back任务、威斯康星卡片分类任务（WCST）对150名药物成瘾者和100名年龄、性别及智商相匹配的非药物成瘾者实施冲动性人格、认知控制功能测试。结果发现在2-back任务正确率（工作记忆）高低不同的情况下,注意冲动性人格特质得分对执行控制功能会产生不同的影响。这说明工作记忆在冲动性人格对抑制性的影响中具有调节作用。     

道德和习俗领域幼儿义务推理的发展

采用Keller, Gummerum, Wang和Lindsey (2004)的不知情义务推理范式, 探讨了96名4、5、6岁幼儿对通过条件规则表述的鼓励性或禁止性的道德规则、以及习俗规则的义务推理能力的发展。结果表明：1)幼儿对两种不同领域规则的义务推理表现出基本一致的发展规律, 表现出显著的“角色效应”, 即多数幼儿都能指出同伴违反, 随年龄增大指出妈妈违反、双违反的人次百分比逐渐增多, 尤其是一些4岁幼儿就能正确指出道德和习俗领域中的妈妈违反, 部分5岁幼儿即可正确指出双违反。2)在不知情的义务推理范式下, 一些4岁幼儿错误指出本来是妈妈违反约定的情境中同伴违反、一些6岁幼儿错误指出本来是同伴违反约定的鼓励性规则情境中妈妈违反。3)尽管幼儿对道德和习俗规则的义务推理没有差异, 他们对不同性质社会规则的义务推理却表现出显著差异。5、6岁幼儿对禁止性的道德规则中同伴违反的检测显著低于对鼓励性的道德规则, 而6岁幼儿对双违反中妈妈违反的检测则相对更高; 6岁幼儿对习俗规则的义务推理也表现出类似的不同性质之间的差异。这些结果在一定程度上突破了以往的研究结论, 反映出幼儿对道德和习俗规则进行义务推理时表现出的跨领域的一般性及其领域内的特殊性。     

条件推理:“演绎”与“概率”两种实验研究范式之比较

本研究通过推理心理学研究中的“演绎”和“概率”两种实验范式设计对同一个班级的大学生参与者(实验一中N=57,实验二中N=43)进行先后两次有关条件推理的实验研究后,得出如下主要结果:(1)推理者在对不同的“纯形式条件命题本身的认可度”以及对由它们各自建构的同类型推理题的推理结果之间的作答反应模式之间的差异都很小且具有较高的一致性;(2)对由不同的“含具体内容的假言命题”本身的认可度之间以及由它们建构的同类型条件推理题的推理结果之间具有较大的差异性;(3)推理者对“演绎”和“概率”两种不同实验范式分别建构的内容近似的推进题进行推理时具有大致相同的作答反应趋势。由此可以推论推理者在“概率推理实验范式”中的作答或推理结果可以被视为只是对“演绎推理实验范式”的相应推理题给出“概率解”的心理加工过程。     

Perspective effects in nondeontic versions of the Wason selection task

Perspective effects in the Wason four-card selection task occur when people choose mutually exclusive sets of cards depending on the perspective they adopt when making their choice. Previous demonstrations of perspective effects have been limited to deontic contexts--that is, problem contexts that involve social duty, like permissions and obligations. In three experiments, we demonstrate perspective effects in nondeontic contexts, including a context much like the original one employed by Wason (1966, 1968). We suggest that perspective effects arise whenever the task uses a rule that can be interpreted biconditionally and different perspectives elicit different counterexamples that match the predicted choice sets. This view is consistent with domain-general theories but not with domain-specific theories of deontic reasoning--for example, pragmatic reasoning schemas and social contract theory--that cannot explain perspective effects in nondeontic contexts.     

Reasoning versus text processing in the Wason selection task: A nondeontic perspective on perspective effects

We argue that perspective effects in the Wason four-card selection task are a product of the linguistic interpretation of the rule in the context of the problem text and not of the reasoning process underlying card selection. In three experiments, participants recalled the rule they used in either a selection or a plausibility rating task. The results showed that (1) participants tended to recall rules compatible with their card selection and not with the rule as stated in the problem and (2) recall was not affected by whether or not participants performed card selection. We conclude that perspective effects in the Wason selection task do not concern how card selection is reasoned about but instead reflect the inferential text processing involved in the comprehension of the problem text. Together with earlier research that showed selection performance in nondeontic contexts to be indistinguishable from selection performance in deontic contexts (Almor & Sloman, 1996; Sperber, Cara, & Girotto, 1995), the present results undermine the claim that reasoning in a deontic context elicits specialized cognitive processes.     

Facilitation in the abstract selection task: The effects of attentional and instructional factors

The present study examined performance on Wason's four-card abstract selection task. Baseline performance is very poor, usually less than 10% correct; and this task has a long record of resistance to facilitation. It was hypothesized that the two primary sources of difficulty are selective encoding of the problem information and the lack of satisfactory analytic processing. Three experiments were conducted to test this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, performance was improved by explicating the implication rule. The majority of subjects, however, still failed to make the correct selection. Subjects were required in Experiment 2 to provide reasons for their selection or non-selection of each of the cards. This response procedure, paired with an explicated rule, led to further improvements in performance (over 50% correct selections). In Experiment 3, the influence of the type of selection instruction (true-false vs. violation) was examined. Paired with an explicated rule and the reasons response format, violation instructions led to one of the highest correct selection rates ever observed for any version of the selection task: over 80% correct. Because of the importance of this result, it was replicated twice. The results of these three experiments are discussed in terms of Johnson-Laird and Byrne's mental models theory and Evans's two-stage model of reasoning.     

Reasoning with three types of conditional: Biases and mental models

Two experiments are reported which compare conditional reasoning with three types of rule. These consist of two types of rule that have been widely studied previously, if p then q and p only if q, together with a third type, q if p. In both experiments, the p only if q type of rule yields a different pattern of performance from the two other types of rule. Experiment 1 is an abstract rule-evaluation task and demonstrates differential effects of temporal order and of suppositional bias. Experiment 2 investigates rule generation, rephrasing, and comparison, and demonstrates differential effects of temporal order and of thematic content. An analysis of the results is offered in terms of biases and mental models. Effects of rule form and context can be explained as reflecting the different sequences in which mental models are created for each rule form. However, it is necessary to consider the internal structure of individual mental models to account for effects arising from temporal ordering of rules.     

Evoking the permission schema: The impact of explicit negation and a violation-checking context

Cheng and Holyoak (1985) proposed that realistic reasoning in deontic contexts is based on pragmatic schemas such as those for assessing compliance with or violation of permission and obligation rules, and that the evocation of these schemas can facilitate performance in Wason's (1966) selection task. The inferential rules in such schemas are intermediate in generality between the content-independent rules proposed by logicians and specific cases stored in memory. In one test of their theory, Cheng and Holyoak demonstrated that facilitation could be obtained even for an abstract permission rule that is devoid of concrete thematic content. Jackson and Griggs (1990) argued on the basis of several experiments that such facilitation is not due to evocation of a permission schema, but, rather, results from a combination of presentation factors: the presence of explicit negatives in the statement of cases and the presence of a violation-checking context. Their conclusion calls into question both the generality of content effects in reasoning and the explanation of these effects. We note that Jackson and Griggs did not test whether the same combination of presentation factors would produce facilitation for an arbitrary rule that does not involve deontic concepts, as their proposal would predict. The present study tested this prediction. Moreover, we extended Jackson and Griggs' comparisons between performance with an abstract permission rule versus an arbitrary rule, introducing clarifications in the statement of each. No facilitation was observed for an arbitrary rule even when explicit negatives and a violation-checking context were used, whereas strong facilitation was found for the abstract permission rule under the same conditions. Performance on the arbitrary rule was not improved even when the instructions indicated that the rule was conditional rather than biconditional. In contrast, a small but reliable degree of facilitation was obtained for the abstract permission rule, with violation-checking content even in the absence of explicit negatives. The theory of pragmatic reasoning schemas can account for both the present findings and those reported by Jackson and Griggs.