Does Purchasing Make Consumers Complicit in Global Labour Injustice?

Do consumers’ ordinary actions of purchasing certain goods make them complicit in global labour injustice? To establish that they do, two things much be shown. First, it must be established that they are not more than complicit, for example that they are not the principal perpetrators. Second, it must be established that they meet the conditions for complicity on a plausible account. I argue that Kutz’s account faces an objection that makes Lepora and Goodin’s better suited, and defend the idea that consumers are complicit in at least two of the ways distinguished by the latter. In the final section of the paper, I consider whether consumers’ responsibility for complicity in global labour injustice is likely to be as strong as responsibility from another source, namely benefiting from that injustice.     

Why We Did It: An Anscombian Account of Collective Action

Abstract

In this paper, I am concerned with persons’ capacity for joint action. I start by suggesting that approaches which seek to account for that capacity in terms of collective intentionality face a problem: there are actions that clearly seem to qualify as collective even though the involved persons cannot be said to entertain an overarching ‘We’‐intention (however one characterizes this notion). I then go on to develop an alternative account of action that loosely draws on Elizabeth Anscombe’s action theory and show how this alternative account can be applied to joint action. In so doing, I stress the importance of the phenomenal dimension of agency.     

Unintentional collective action

In this paper, I examine the manner in which analyses of the action of single agents have been pressed into service for constructing accounts of collective action. Specifically, I argue that the best analogy to collective action is a class of individual action that Carl Ginet has called ‘aggregate action.’ Furthermore, once we use aggregate action as a model of collective action, then we see that existing accounts of collective action have failed to accommodate an important class of (what I shall call) ‘unintentional collective actions.’     

Communities as conduits of harm: A social identity analysis of appraisal,coping and justice-seeking in response to historic collective victimization

Social identity approach (SIA) research shows that community members often work together to support survivors of collective victimization and rectify social injustices. However, complexities arise when community members have been involved in perpetrating these injustices. While many communities are unaware of their role in fostering victimization, others actively deny their role and responsibility to restore justice. We explore these processes by investigating experiences of community violence and collective justice-seeking among Albanian survivors of dictatorial crimes. Survivors (N = 27) were interviewed, and data were analysed using theoretical thematic analysis guided by the SIA. The analysis reveals the diverse ways communities can become harmful ‘Social Curses’. First, communities in their various forms became effective perpetrators of fear and control (e.g., exclusion and/or withholding ingroup privileges) during the dictatorship because of the close relationship between communities and their members. Second, communities caused harm by refusing to accept responsibility for the crimes, and by undermining attempts at collective action to address injustices. This lack of collective accountability also fosters survivors' feelings of exclusion and undermines their hope for systematic change. Implications for SIA processes relating to health/wellbeing (both Social Cure and Curse) are discussed. We also discuss implications for understanding collective action and victimhood.     

Individual Complicity in Collective Wrongdoing

Some instances of right and wrongdoing appear to be of a distinctly collective kind. When, for example, one group commits genocide against another, the genocide is collective in the sense that the wrongness of genocide seems morally distinct from the aggregation of individual murders that make up the genocide. The problem, which I refer to as the problem of collective wrongs, is that it is unclear how to assign blame for distinctly collective wrongdoing to individual contributors when none of those individual contributors is guilty of the wrongdoing in question. I offer Christopher Kutz’s Complicity Principle as an attractive starting point for solving the problem, and then argue that the principle ought to be expanded to include a broader and more appropriate range of cases. The view I ultimately defend is that individuals are blameworthy for collective harms insofar as they knowingly participate in those harms, and that said individuals remain blameworthy regardless of whether they succeed in making a causal contribution to those harms.     

Why Do People Engage in Collective Action? Revisiting the Role of Perceived Effectiveness

Research has shown limited support for the notion that perceived effectiveness of collective action is a predictor of intentions to engage in collective action. One reason may be that effectiveness has been in terms of whether the action will influence key decision makers. We argue that the effectiveness of collective action might be judged by other criteria, such as whether it influences third parties, builds an oppositional movement, and expresses values. Two hundred and thirty one attendees at a rally rated the effectiveness of the rally and their intentions to engage in future collective action. For those participants who were not members of an organization, intentions were linked to the perceived effectiveness of the rally in expressing values and influencing the public. For those who were members of an organization, intentions were linked only to the effectiveness of the rally in building an oppositional movement.     

群体愤怒与群体效能对集体行动的驱动：内在责任感的中介作用

采用问卷法（研究一）和实验法（研究二）探讨群体愤怒与群体效能对集体行动意愿的影响及其内在心理机制。结果表明：（1）群体愤怒与群体效能对集体行动意愿有显著的预测作用;（2）内在责任感中介群体愤怒与群体效能对集体行动意愿的影响;（3）应对群体问题的自我效能感是联接群体效能与内在责任感的桥梁（中介变量）。     

Moral Responsibility and Motivational Mechanisms

This paper provides a discussion and defense of a recent formulation of the idea that moral responsibility for actions depends on the capacity to respond to reasons. This formulation appears in several publications by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, where the authors argue that moral responsibility involves a kind of control over one’s actions which they call “guidance control.” This kind of control does not require an agent’s ability to do something different from what he actually does, but instead requires only that the actual process leading to the action be responsive in some suitable way to the reasons that the agent has for acting. After summarizing this view, I offer the following two innovations to the authors’ view: I argue that the level of control required for moral responsibility (which I call “regular reasons-responsiveness”) is much stronger than what the author’s view allows for; and 2) I give a common-sense account of the kinds of motivational mechanism relevant to moral responsibility. Given these innovations, I show that this kind of view allows us to easily answer some counterexamples that appear in the current literature on moral responsibility.     

Involvement in Ethnic Organizations and Community Activism Among Asian Immigrants in the United States

This study examines whether ethnic organization members have a lower likelihood of community activism than multiethnic organization members as predicted by social capital approaches to collective civic engagement. Community activism is measured by whether the respondent has worked with others in his or her community to solve a problem in the last 12 months. Data come from the 2008 National Asian American Survey, and the sample is limited to five major Asian immigrant groups (the Chinese, Asian Indians, Filipinos, Koreans, and the Vietnamese) for group-specific analyses. Findings suggest that membership in ethnic organizations does not necessarily diminish the probability of community activism: For the Chinese and Asian Indians, members of ethnic organizations have a higher probability of community activism than their non-joiner counterparts. Yet, consistent with the prediction of social capital approaches, there is a significant difference in the probability of community activism between members of multiethnic organizations and non-joiners for all ethnic groups, except for the Vietnamese. Nevertheless, findings show that there is no significant difference in the likelihood of community activism between members of ethnic organizations and those of multiethnic organizations for each ethnic group. Thus, data from the 2008 NAAS fail to provide compelling evidence to support the social capital argument that involvement in ethnic organizations has a significantly weaker effect on collective civic engagement than involvement in multiethnic organizations. This paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings.     

Moral responsibility,conversation, and desert: comments on Michael McKenna’s conversation and responsibility

In this paper, I engage with several of the intriguing theses Michael McKenna puts forward in his Conversation and Responsibility. For example, I examine McKenna’s claim that the fact that an agent is morally responsible for an action and the fact that an agent is appropriately held responsible explain each other. I go on to argue that despite the importance of the ability to hold people responsible, an agent’s being morally responsible for an action is explanatorily fundamental, and in this sense responsibility is response-independent. I then explore some of the specific aspects of McKenna’s conversational theory before turning to his suggestion that the conversational nature of our responsibility practices gives us special kinds of reasons for accepting that agents are deserving of the harms of blame. Finally, I conclude by raising questions for his argument that the scope of blameworthy actions extends beyond that of impermissible actions.     

不同类型集群行为的差异比较

集群行为是个体以群体成员身份参与的以改善群体地位为目标的行动。近年来, 西方心理学在集群行为领域的研究开始呈现差异化分析比较的研究趋势。根据行为模式是否符合社会规范, 可将集群行为分为常规集群行为与违规集群行为。根据参与群体的社会地位, 可将集群行为分为弱势群体集群行为与优势群体集群行为。根据集群行为的成就, 可将结果分为“成功”与“失败”两类。不同类型集群行为所涉及的心理机制、前因变量及发展趋势具有很大差异。今后的研究应探明不同类型集群行为间的内在联系, 重视文化背景因素并加强与其他学科研究成果的结合。     

A Procedural,Contextual, Action-Focused Understanding: Response to Renn and Westerman

In this reply to comments by Paul Renn and Michael Westerman, I discuss the nature of relational discourse and the various meanings of multiplicity in the relational literature. In further discussing Mitchell’s (2000) case of Connie, cited also by Renn, I highlight the ways in which Mitchell understood that Connie’s sadness was perpetuated by the ways she communicated her feelings and needs in the present. I discuss Westerman’s participatory perspective in relation to Schafer’s action language, Shapiro’s emphasis on action and responsibility, and Dollard and Miller’s conceptualizations of repression as the active behavior of not-thinking certain thoughts. I examine as well Westerman’s distinction between “self and context” and “self-in-context” formulations in relation both to the cyclical psychodynamic point of view and his own case example.     

The irreducibility of collective obligations

Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of the collective’s members. Collectivists deny this. We set out to discover who is right by way of a deontic logic of collective action that models collective actions, abilities, obligations, and their interrelations. On the basis of our formal analysis, we argue that when assessing the obligations of an individual agent, we need to distinguish individual obligations from member obligations. If a collective has a collective obligation to bring about a particular state of affairs, then it might be that no individual in the collective has an individual obligation to bring about that state of affairs. What follows from a collective obligation is that each member of the collective has a member obligation to help ensure that the collective fulfills its collective obligation. In conclusion, we argue that our formal analysis supports collectivism.

     

Why history matters for moral responsibility: Evaluating history-sensitive structuralism

Is moral responsibility essentially historical, or does an agent's moral responsibility for an action depend only on their psychological structure at that time? In previous work, I have argued that the two main (non-skeptical) views on moral responsibility and agents’ histories—historicism and standard structuralism—are vulnerable to objections that are avoided by a third option, namely history-sensitive structuralism. In this paper, I develop this view in greater detail and evaluate the view by comparing it with its three dialectical rivals: skepticism about moral responsibility, historicism, and standard structuralism. Each comparison includes discussion of new work on moral responsibility and agents’ histories, and along the way I offer new arguments for preferring history-sensitive structuralism, paying special attention to the view's explanatory power.     

With infinite utility,more needn't be better

Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties: only groups with sufficient structure—call them ‘collectives’—have the necessary agency. Moreover, if duties imply ability then moral agents (of both the individual and collectives varieties) can bear duties only over actions they are able to perform. It is thus doubtful that individual agents can bear duties to perform actions that only a collective could perform. This appears to leave us at a loss when assigning duties in circumstances where only a collective could perform some morally desirable action and no collective exists. But, I argue, we are not at a loss. This article outlines a new way of assigning duties over collective acts when there is no collective. Specifically, we should assign collectivization duties to individuals. These are individual duties to take steps towards forming a collective, which then incurs a duty over the action. I give criteria for when individuals have collectivization duties and discuss the demands these duties place on their bearers.     

Dismantling Desert

Abstract

In this paper I argue that we are never morally responsible for our actions in the sense that we justly deserve to be rewarded or punished for them. I examine two distinctions: (1) the distinction set out by Gary Watson between two distinct types of responsibility: accountability and attributability and (2) the distinction set out by Ted Honderich between origination and voluntariness. I argue that Watson’s distinction maps onto Honderich’s distinction in the sense that we can only properly be held accountable if we are the originators of our actions, and actions can be seen as attributable to us as their authors if they flow voluntarily from our endorsed beliefs, intentions and character. It seems to me that attributability and accountability can be held apart so that an action can be attributable to me without this necessarily entailing that I can properly be held accountable for it in the sense of deserving the type of praise and blame that entails retributive-style reward and punishment. I argue further that compatibilists can only properly defend the weaker attributability. If my argument is correct then the classic determinist divide collapses - since compatibilism can only properly defend voluntariness and attributability and both concepts are prima facie compatible with hard determinism. Given this (and given the standard failures of libertarianism) I argue that it is most plausible for us to be committed to a new position in the free will debate which combines the important insights of compatibilism with the intuitive force of hard determinism.     

The Effect of Group Psychotherapy in Reducing Resistance to Individual Psychotherapy: A Case Study

Abstract

Cohesion in group treatment of spouse abusers plays an important and often overlooked role. Involuntary abuser groups can benefit from cohesion, but due to their unique structure, cohesion may develop differently than in voluntary psychotherapy groups. Initially, abuser groups may develop premature levels of cohesion that can make group members unwilling to express conflict, develop intimacy, and take responsibility for their actions. Understanding the abuser personality and the unique characteristics of involuntary abuser groups can shed light on why cohesion develops the way it does and the importance it plays in abuser groups. Developing effective interventions that target premature cohesion can help the group members express conflict, develop intimacy, and take responsibility for their actions, thus bringing about therapeutic levels of cohesion.     

Collective guilt,moral outrage,and support for helping the poor: A matter of system versus in‐group responsibility framing

We examined how the framing of responsibility for reducing socio‐economic inequality affects individuals' emotional reactions towards the poor and the willingness to engage in prosocial actions. Attribution of responsibility to either the system (government and institutions), the less deprived in‐group, or the disadvantaged out‐group (poor) was measured (Study 1) and manipulated (Study 2). Consistent with our hypotheses, moral outrage was higher than collective guilt when system responsibility for inequalities was put forth, but collective guilt arose to reach the level of moral outrage when in‐group responsibility was emphasized. Moreover, distinguishing between collective guilt for action and for inaction, we found guilt for inaction more difficult and thus less likely to arise, unless responsibility was put on the in‐group. Collective emotions were also found to be negatively linked to system justification motivation illustrating the palliative function of legitimization processes. Finally, moral outrage predicted the willingness to act upon socio‐economic inequalities both when the system's and in‐group's responsibility was emphasized, whereas collective guilt for action (but not for inaction) predicted support for prosocial actions only when the in‐group's responsibility was engaged. These findings suggest that the specific group‐based emotions in response to poverty depend on whether the system or the in‐group is held responsible and differentially predict individuals' commitment to act.     

Structural Injustice and Massively Shared Obligations

It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in character. But what exactly does it mean for ‘ordinary citizens’ to have collective obligations vis‐à‐vis large‐scale injustice? In this article, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large, dispersed, and unorganised groups of people are often in a position to perform distributive collective actions. As such, ordinary citizens can have massively shared obligations to address structural injustice through distributive action, but, ultimately, such obligations are ‘collective’ only in a fairly weak sense.