新弗雷格主义对涵义的认知解释

对弗雷格式涵义的描述主义解释传统受到了克里普克和直接指称论者的深入批评。新弗雷格主义者坚持涵义的不可或缺性而建议放弃描述主义。新弗雷格主义者对弗雷格式涵义的实质内容的阐发可以解读成三种进路：一是把涵义解释成从物的思考方式或心理呈现模式;二是把涵义解释成证实性知识或作为证据的概念;三是把涵义解释成动态的信息体或文件系统。这三种理解都强调了弗雷格式涵义的认知功能,从而显示出涵义概念的语义解释和认知解释之间的紧张,以及涵义概念的内在不融贯性。二维语义学承接新弗雷格主义的立场把弗雷格式涵义拆分成认知内涵和真值条件内涵两个维度,涵义的认知层面是弗雷格式涵义的主要特征。     

概念语义与弗雷格迷题消解

弗雷格因同一替换律讨论而提出了涵义与指称的理论,这个理论后来引出了弗雷格迷题。弗雷格迷题的形成有多方原因,直接指称论对弗雷格理论批评是主要原因之一,以至于可以说,这是产生于直接指称论哲学立场的迷题。尽管如此,弗雷格理论确有不足。最重要的是,弗雷格理论只有关于涵义与指称的理论,即只有语言层面的理论,而缺少认知层面的理论。这个不足使得在弗雷格理论基础上解决同一替换律问题难有令人满意的结果,让"迷题"多添了几分"迷"的色彩。这里将给出一个新的方案:在弗雷格理论的基础上,增加有关概念的理论,以概念和内涵、涵义等这些概念的形式刻画为中心,建立可以消解弗雷格迷题的形式语义学,即概念语义。通过概念语义可以在不同层次上对弗雷格迷题的消解给出统一回答。     

论语句的涵义与指称——对弗雷格的涵义-指称理论的一些修正(英文)

弗雷格把语句的涵义看作思想,把语句的指称看作真值。本文接受弗雷格关于语句的涵义-指称的意义结构,但把语句的涵义和指称分别改为语法意义和事态。语句的真或假是语句和它所指称的事态之间的一种关系,类似于名称同它的指称对象之间的实-空关系。弗雷格关于思想的客观性转换为语法意义的客观性,体现为语言共同体成员的主体间性。本文区分了指称对象和指称意向,把指称意向定义为涵义和语境的结合,相当于弗雷格所说的判断。本文还对语句的语法意义和认识论意义作了区分。     

涵义与意谓——理解弗雷格

达米特认为,弗雷格是语言哲学之父(参见Dummett,1993)。他的语言哲学就是他的意义理论,这一理论由两部分组成,一部分是关于涵义的理论,另一部分是关于所指(达米特所说的“所指”就是本文所说的“意谓”)的理论。其中,关于所指的理论是其关于涵     

弗雷格《概念文字》理解的两点注记

文章旨在简要地讨论弗雷格《概念文字》,指出其中的两个重要但被一些国内学者误解或忽略的贡献：首先我们指出,根据Boolos等人的论证,弗雷格《概念文字》中的逻辑本质上是带完整二阶存在概括规则的二阶逻辑,这点在国内一些学者的著作与文章中存在误解;其次,我们讨论弗雷格如何用遗传性概念来定义祖先关系,进而定义自然数或有穷数,并使得数学归纳法仅根据自然数的定义就得以成立,这也为弗雷格把算术还原为逻辑奠定了基础。     

弗雷格定理:一个导言

戈特洛布·弗雷格是现代数理逻辑的奠基人,也是分析哲学的创始人之一。他的大部分工作都致力于建立一种数学哲学———逻辑主义:算术真理都是逻辑真理。长久以来,哲学家一直认为,罗素悖论彻底瓦解了弗雷格的工作。然而实际的情况是,在弗雷格那里隐藏着另一个证明:算术公理可以纯粹逻辑地从休谟原则推出。休谟原则是说,概念F的数和概念G的数相同当且仅当存在F和G之间的一一对应关系。这一结果被称为弗雷格定理,它引发了一种新的逻辑主义的兴起。     

语言分析与前语言理解——弗雷格论专名和对象

弗雷格从语言表达现象出发来理解非语言实体,开创了分析哲学之语言转向的先河。他不满以对象为定向的传统语言观,根据语言中的述谓现象,在对象之旁增添了另外一种非语言实体:函数(在语言分析中,最重要的函数是概念)。对这一做法有两种解读倾向:实在论和唯名论。本文考察了弗雷格对专名的判定标准,揭示出语言分析对前语言理解的依赖关系,最终指出,虽然弗雷格本人在任何意义上都并非一个唯名论者,但在他关于对象的理解中的确可以找出一条倾向于唯名论的道路。     

思与真--论弗雷格的"思想"概念

本文从对《思想》的解读入手,对弗雷格关于思想与真的关系和思想的存在性质的基本观点作了批判性的分析。本文认为在这些观点中存在着一个结构性的问题,进而展示了这个问题的概念背景。     

罗素的“命题”与弗雷格的“语句”之比较

语句(sentence)是语义的基本单位,语词只有在语句语境中才能获得意义。这是弗雷格(G.Frege)的一个著名观点。(Frege,1884,p.140)可见,语句在弗雷格的语言哲学或语义理论中占据多么重要的位置。然而,语句是什么,它的涵义和指称是什么,     

专名、摹状词与葛梯尔问题

论文认为葛梯尔第一个反例的实质，在于专名与摹状词之间的混用。一个专名的意义应当是在它与有关个体的关联的基础上产生的。个体提供了意义规定的基础，但个体并不等于意义本身。从本原上说，名称的确定性恰恰来自它与所指称的对象的关联性。专名的涵义是潜在的、隐而未显的，它通过摹状词来展现。专名在获得命名之后，即成为一个约定的符号。意义论的基础应当是“指称论”，而不是维特根斯坦的语言游戏说的“使用论”。     

Making Sense of Sense Containment

Proposition 5.122 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (‘If p follows from q, the sense of [p] is contained in the sense of [q]’) has been the source of much puzzlement among interpreters, so much so that no fully satisfactory account is yet available. This is unfortunate, if only because the containment account of logical consequence has a venerable tradition behind it. Pasquale Frascolla’s interpretation of proposition 5.122 is based on a valid argument and one true premise. However, the argument explains sense containment only in an indirect way, leaving some crucial questions unanswered. Besides, Frascolla does not address the issue of how to make sense containment notationally perspicuous, an essential theme in Wittgenstein’s reflections. In this paper, we elaborate on Frascolla’s account by looking at the issue through the Tractarian notion of logical space. Our analysis shows that, for containment to be fully appreciated, one should adopt a negative perspective on the notion of sense (which is taken into consideration also by Wittgenstein), in line with the exclusionary theory of conceptual content, as labelled by Ian Rumfitt. Besides this, we introduce and discuss two methods—one envisaged by Wittgenstein himself—for making sense containment notationally perspicuous.     

Proper Name Hypermnesia in an Autistic Subject

The case study of an autistic “savant” subject with person names hypermnesia is presented. NM's performance in memorizing person names is compared to that of normal controls, IQ-matched controls, and one overtrained control. The data show a selective hypermnesia for both the free recall of person names and the recognition of faces. Recall of common names and of biographical informations linked to faces is unremarkable. NM's hypermnesia is restricted to list learning as low performance is observed in face-name learning tasks. A comparison of the data with that of the overtrained control indicates that training is not responsible for NM's pattern of results. These findings, when combined with previous results involving proper names, demonstrate a double dissociation between proper names and other types of semantic and referential information. However, aspects of NM's performance pattern are more compatible with a network model of proper names than with a sequential model. We propose that the contextual regularity of proper names in ecological situations can be responsible for their high memorization by NM.     

Making Sense of Spin

‘Spin’ is a pejorative term for a ubiquitous form of communication. Spin is viewed by many as deceptive, and by others as bending or twisting the truth. But spin need not be deceptive and the metaphors are less than clear. The aim here is to clarify what spin is: spin is identified as a form of selective claim‐making, where the process of selection is governed by an intention to bring about promotional perlocutionary effects. The process of selection may pertain to aspects of some situation or phenomenon; or to the lexis used in making the claims. Not all selective promotional communication is spin. Spin involves a distinctive kind of dissociation between the speaker's first‐order interpretation and the constructed interpretation or claim offered to others. With these clarifications in place the discussion turns to the complex connections between spin, truthfulness and deception. Aspect‐selective spin can be truthful, and it need not be deceptive in its intentions or effects, but may risk deceiving audiences. Lexical spin is less readily truthful, and both forms of spin prudentially require a distinctive kind of concealment of the speaker's intentions. The account developed here does not address normative questions about whether, or how, spin might be wrong, but aims to provide a clear and adequate account of spin as a basis for addressing normative questions about spin.     

Making Sense of Truth-Makers

This essay argues that propositions are made true by facts. A proposition is the sense expressed by a statement (sentence token used to make a truth claim). Facts are positive or negative constitutive properties of the domain of discourse (usually the actual world). The presence of horses is a positive constitutive property of the world; the absence of unicorns is a negative one. This notion of constitutive properties accords well with the Hume-Kant claim that existence is not a property of any individual said to exist. While Frege held existence to be a property of concepts and Russell held it to be a property of propositional functions, our view sees existence as a property of a domain of discourse. To say that Native Dancer exists is simply to say that the world is characterized by the presence of Native Dancer; to say that Pegasus does not exist is to say the world is characterized by the absence of Pegasus. Such properties of presence and absence are facts. Facts make true propositions true; nothing makes false propositions false (they simply fail to be made true). Facts are not items in the world; they are (constitutive) properties of the world.     

Making Sense of Emergence

Philosophical Studies -     

Making Sense of Self-Esteem

Sociometer theory proposes that the self-esteem system evolved as a monitor of social acceptance, and that the so-called self-esteem motive functions not to maintain self-esteem per se but rather to avoid social devaluation and rejection. Cues indicating that the individual is not adequately valued and accepted by other people lower self-esteem and motivate behaviors that enhance relational evaluation. Empirical evidence regarding the self-esteem motive, the antecedents of self-esteem, the relation between low self-esteem and psychological problems, and the consequences of enhancing self-esteem is consistent with the theory.     

Making Sense of Animal Disenhancement

In this paper I look at moral debates about animal disenhancement. In particular, I propose that given the particular social institutions in which such disenhancement will operate, we ought to reject animal disenhancement. I do this by introducing the issue of animal disenhancement and presenting arguments in support of it, and showing that while these arguments are strong, they are unconvincing when we look at the full picture. Viewing animal disenhancement in a context such as high intensity food production, we see that the arguments in support of it fall short of other ethical considerations, leading me to conclude that the moral and pragmatic reasons weigh against animal disenhancement.