“The Most Difficult of all Phenomenological Problems”

I argue in this essay that Edmund Husserl distinguishes three levels within time-consciousness: an absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness, the immanent acts of consciousness the flow constitutes, and the transcendent objects the acts intend. The immediate occasion for this claim is Neal DeRoo’s discussion of Dan Zahavi’s reservations about the notion of an absolute flow and DeRoo’s own efforts to mediate between Zahavi’s view and the position Robert Sokolowski and I have advanced. I argue that the flow and the tripartite distinction it introduces into consciousness is firmly grounded in Husserl’s texts and is philosophically defensible. The absolute flow is distinct but inseparable from what it constitutes. It is intentional in a nonobjectivating way, and accounts for the awareness I have of my individual acts of consciousness and of the unity and continuity of my conscious life. In its absence, consciousness would become an incoherent stream of episodic acts. There is nothing mysterious about the flow. What would be mysterious is consciousness without the flow.     

Naturalizing and Interpretive Turns in Epistemology

In this paper I want to suggest that causal and interpretive approaches to epistemology are in tension with one another. Drawing on the work of hermeneutic writers I suggest that epistemological justification is an interpretive process. The possibility of rational justification requires attention to our locatedness within the domain of reasons, into which we have been culturally initiated. The recognition that there is no transcendent processes of rational justification has to be addressed from within this framework and cannot be resolved in a naturalizing way. The turn to hermeneutics in the context of epistemology allows us to reassign a central role to experience within epistemological justification. Here the very features of experience which render problematic its role in empiricist accounts form the basis of its position in hermeneutic ones. This presents us with an immanent conception of rationality, in place of the transcendent conception which so many writers have problematized.     

The forest and the trees: Examining the association of self-compassion and its positive and negative components with psychological functioning

ABSTRACT

This paper presents two studies focusing on the link between psychological functioning and self-compassion as measured by the Self-Compassion Scale (SCS), especially in terms of SCS components that represent increased compassionate and reduced uncompassionate behavior. Study One examined this association in seven domains – psychopathology, positive psychological health, emotional intelligence, self-concept, body image, motivation, and interpersonal functioning – and found that while reduced negative self-responding had a stronger link to negative emotionality and self-evaluation than positive self-responding, they were roughly equivalent predictors in other domains. Study Two examined the association of compassionate and reduced uncompassionate behavior with sympathetic nervous system and inflammatory activity after stress, and found they equally predicted salivary alpha amylase and interleukin-6 levels in individuals after a stressful situation. Overall, results suggest that both compassionate and reduced uncompassionate self-responding are central to self-compassion and that both help to explain its link to healthy psychological functioning.     

The dynamics of standing balance

The control of standing is a complicated task that involves the action of muscles distributed over the whole body. Forces arising from gravity, external events or our own actions all tend to disturb the unstable equilibrium that preserves posture. For the central nervous system the problem of standing can be cast in terms of finding appropriate relations among body segments to maintain the desired position of the body as a whole with respect to the environment. In this review we evaluate some recent discoveries on the effects of predictable and unpredictable perturbations, and the role of perceptual information, attention and cognitive processes in the control of upright stance.     

Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness

We propose a new approach to the neuroscience of consciousness, growing out of the ‘enactive’ viewpoint in cognitive science. This approach aims to map the neural substrates of consciousness at the level of large-scale, emergent and transient dynamical patterns of brain activity (rather than at the level of particular circuits or classes of neurons), and it suggests that the processes crucial for consciousness cut across the brain–body–world divisions, rather than being brain-bound neural events. Whereas standard approaches to the neural correlates of consciousness have assumed a one-way causal-explanatory relationship between internal neural representational systems and the contents of consciousness, our approach allows for theories and hypotheses about the two-way or reciprocal relationship between embodied conscious states and local neuronal activity.     

The nested neural hierarchy and the self

In spite of enormous recent interest in the neurobiology of the self, we currently have no global models of the brain that explain how its anatomical structure, connectivity, and physiological functioning create a unified self. In this article I present a triadic neurohierarchical model of the self that proposes that the self can be understood as the product of three hierarchical anatomical systems: The interoself system, the integrative self system, and the exterosensorimotor system. An analysis of these three systems and their functional features indicates that the neural hierarchy possesses features of both non-nested and nested hierarchies that are necessary for the creation of a unified consciousness and self. These functional properties also make the central nervous system a biologically unique entity unlike anything else in nature.     

Externalized memory in slime mould and the extended (non-neuronal) mind

The hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) claims that the cognitive processes that materially realise thinking are sometimes partially constituted by entities that are located external to an agent’s body in its local environment. We show how proponents of HEC need not claim that an agent must have a central nervous system, or physically instantiate processes organised in such a way as to play a causal role equivalent to that of the brain if that agent is to be capable of cognition. Focusing on the case of spatial memory, we make our argument by taking a close look at the striking example of Physarum Polycephalum plasmodium (i.e., slime mould) which uses self-produced non-living extracellular slime trails to navigate its environment. We will argue that the use of externalized spatial memory by basal organisms like Physarum is an example of extended cognition. Moreover, it is a possible evolutionary precursor to the use of internal spatial memory and recall in animals thus demonstrating how extended cognition may have emerged early in evolutionary history.     

Neural plasticity and human development: the role of early experience in sculpting memory systems

The concept of sensitive or critical periods in the context of memory development is examined in this paper. I begin by providing examples of the role of experience in influencing sensory, linguistic and emotional functioning. This is followed by a discussion of the role of experience in influencing cognitive functioning, particularly memory. Based on this discussion, speculation is offered that the infant’s proclivity for novelty, which makes its appearance shortly after birth, provides critical input into a nervous system that will eventually be set up to learn and remember for the entire lifespan. Because learning and memory are fundamental to the survival of our species, those aspects of the nervous system that permit the encoding and retention of new information are remarkably malleable from the outset, even in the face of some types of neural trauma. This flexibility is retained for many years so long as the learning and memory ‘system’ is challenged. The implications of this model are discussed in the context of those life events that might undermine the longevity of memory systems.     

Beyond free will: The embodied emergence of conscious agency

Is it possible to reconcile the concept of conscious agency with the view that humans are biological creatures subject to material causality? The problem of conscious agency is complicated by the tendency to attribute autonomous powers of control to conscious processes. In this paper, we offer an embodied process model of conscious agency. We begin with the concept of embodied emergence – the idea that psychological processes are higher-order biological processes, albeit ones that exhibit emergent properties. Although consciousness, experience, and representation are emergent properties of higher-order biological organisms, the capacity for hierarchical regulation is a property of all living systems. Thus, while the capacity for consciousness transforms the process of hierarchical regulation, consciousness is not an autonomous center of control. Instead, consciousness functions as a system for coordinating novel representations of the most pressing demands placed on the organism at any given time. While it does not regulate action directly, consciousness orients and activates preconscious control systems that mediate the construction of genuinely novel action. Far from being an epiphenomenon, consciousness plays a central albeit non-autonomous role in psychological functioning.     

Depression in patients with spinal cord injuries: A synthesis of cognitive and somatic processes

Depression in some patients with spinal cord injuries may be clinically significant and, when present, should be treated to decrease morbidity including decreased physical functioning. Depression associated with spinal cord injury (SCI) may be misevaluated, due to (1) nonspecific multifactorial production of depression symptoms and (2) SCI-specific decrease in somatic sensory central nervous system input. The Somatic Suppression Hypothesis suggests that SCI patients have difficulty experiencing any intense emotion because of suppression of physiological arousal. In addition, cognitive processes that may reduce depression in SCI patients include: (1) attribution of somatic symptoms of depression to medical (biological) causes, (2) realistic, positive expectations for physical improvement, and (3) the perception that the disability of the SCI is only minimally related to the patient’s self-care after complete evaluation. Health personnel should accept lack of depression in SCI, and should encourage positive realistic expectations of recovery.     

Consciousness during dreams

Two aspects of consciousness are first considered: consciousness as awareness (phenomenological meaning) and consciousness as strategic control (functional meaning). As to awareness, three types can be distinguished: first, awareness as the phenomenal experiences of objects and events; second, awareness as meta-awareness, i.e., the awareness of mental life itself; third, awareness as self-awareness, i.e., the awareness of being oneself. While phenomenal experience and self-awareness are usually present during dreaming (even if many modifications are possible), meta-awareness is usually absent (apart from some particular experiences of self-reflectiveness) with the major exception of lucid dreaming. Consciousness as strategic control may also be present in dreams. The functioning of consciousness is then analyzed, following a cognitive model of dream production. In such a model, the dream is supposed to be the product of the interaction of three components: (a) the bottom-up activation of mnemonic elements coming from LTM systems, (b) interpretative and elaborative top-down processes, and (c) monitoring of phenomenal experience. A feedback circulation is activated among the components, where the top-down interpretative organization and the conscious monitoring of the oneiric scene elicitates other mnemonic contents, according to the requirements of the dream plot. This dream productive activity is submitted to unconscious and conscious processes.     

压力性生活事件对工读生毒品使用影响：有中介的调节效应

考察家庭功能对压力性生活事件与工读生毒品使用之间关系的调节效应以及领悟社会支持对此调节效应是否具有中介效应。采用压力性生活事件量表、家庭功能评定问卷、领悟社会支持问卷、毒品使用问卷对514名工读生进行研究。结果表明：（1）家庭功能对压力性生活事件与工读生毒品使用之间关系具有调节效应;（2）这种调节效应以领悟社会支持为中介变量。压力性生活事件对工读生毒品使用的影响是有中介的调节效应。     

Consciousness: A neurobiological approach

Consciousness and the disorders of consciousness can be more fully understood once they are integrated with the neurobiology of mental events. After a review of animal and human research, we found several anatomical structures in the central nervous system are required for consciousness. Identification of the critical structures, however, depends on what is meant by consciousness. In the general sense of mental responsivity, the reticular activating system must be intact. Consciousness has also been defined as the awareness of the sights, sounds, and feelings of everyday experience. In this sense, the system of sensory inputs and outputs of the anterior temporal cortex, amygdala, and the hippocampus must be functional. There is no neural evidence for “higher” consciousness.     

Neurophysiology of Rett syndrome

Neurophysiological evaluations have been widely applied in the study of Rett syndrome (RS) to provide information concerning the developmental aspects of RS; the character and extent of involvement of the central, peripheral, and autonomic nervous system pathways; and evaluation of the clinical symptomatology of RS. The electroencephalogram (EEG) is invariably abnormal and shows characteristic, though not diagnostic, changes: loss of expected developmental features; the appearance of focal, multifocal, and generalized epileptiform abnormalities; and the occurrence of rhythmic slow (theta) activity primarily in the frontal-central regions. Epileptic seizures are reported to occur frequently in RS, and partial and generalized seizures may be experienced by RS girls. However, many events presumed to be seizures have no EEG correlate during video-EEG monitoring, suggesting the possibility of a nonepileptic mechanism. Such monitoring may be necessary to determine appropriate use of antiepileptic drugs. Evoked potentials typically demonstrate intact peripheral auditory and visual pathways and suggest dysfunction of central or "higher" cortical pathways. Somatosensory-evoked potentials may be characterized by "giant" responses, suggesting cortical hyperexcitability. An increased incidence of long QT intervals during electrocardiographic recordings and diminished heart-rate variability, suggesting impairment of the autonomic nervous system, are described in RS. With the discovery of the genetic basis of RS, neurophysiological studies will provide parameters for phenotype-genotype correlations and characterization of animal models.     

Visual prediction: psychophysics and neurophysiology of compensation for time delays

A necessary consequence of the nature of neural transmission systems is that as change in the physical state of a time-varying event takes place, delays produce error between the instantaneous registered state and the external state. Another source of delay is the transmission of internal motor commands to muscles and the inertia of the musculoskeletal system. How does the central nervous system compensate for these pervasive delays? Although it has been argued that delay compensation occurs late in the motor planning stages, even the earliest visual processes, such as phototransduction, contribute significantly to delays. I argue that compensation is not an exclusive property of the motor system, but rather, is a pervasive feature of the central nervous system (CNS) organization. Although the motor planning system may contain a highly flexible compensation mechanism, accounting not just for delays but also variability in delays (e.g., those resulting from variations in luminance contrast, internal body temperature, muscle fatigue, etc.), visual mechanisms also contribute to compensation. Previous suggestions of this notion of "visual prediction" led to a lively debate producing re-examination of previous arguments, new analyses, and review of the experiments presented here. Understanding visual prediction will inform our theories of sensory processes and visual perception, and will impact our notion of visual awareness.     

A biphasic relational approach to the evolution of human consciousness

Background/objectiveHuman consciousness is arguably unique, and its features are hard to explain. Continuous and discrete accounts of consciousness are commonly viewed as incompatible, but both have limitations. Continuous accounts cannot readily account for what appears to be unique about human consciousness; discrete accounts have a hard time explaining how human consciousness could have evolved. The present position paper shows how both continuous and discontinuously elements can be combined.MethodA biphasic model is constructed by unifying complex systems theory, the evolution of symbolic reasoning as a relational extension of human cooperation, and evolutionary science. The application of this approach to modern views of consciousness is then explored.ResultsOur analysis suggests that human consciousness may be viewed as a discontinuous event, that emerged from continuous foundations. This biphasic account contains processes that can be targeted clinically. For example, developmentally delayed children with problems in consciousness may be helped by targeting the processes the present account suggests are important at different levels of complexity.ConclusionsThis biphasic relational approach fits with the evolutionary record and with data on human cognitive development. It may be useful in guiding clinical intervention.     

Assessee and Assessor Experiences of Significant Events in Psychological Assessment Feedback

Although a growing body of scholarly work explores the unique utility and therapeutic uses of psychological assessment, less work has focused specifically on feedback, with few studies that have explored empirically the underlying processes that may describe the role of feedback in a successful assessment. The purpose of this project was to add to the discourse on this topic by engaging in an empirical study exploring assessee and assessor experiences of significant events in psychological assessment feedback. The methodology is qualitative and modeled after significant events research in the study of psychotherapy process. I analyze the accounts of 6 assessment clients and 6 assessment clinicians regarding key events in their experience of feedback.     

Assessee and assessor experiences of significant events in psychological assessment feedback

Although a growing body of scholarly work explores the unique utility and therapeutic uses of psychological assessment, less work has focused specifically on feedback, with few studies that have explored empirically the underlying processes that may describe the role of feedback in a successful assessment. The purpose of this project was to add to the discourse on this topic by engaging in an empirical study exploring assessee and assessor experiences of significant events in psychological assessment feedback. The methodology is qualitative and modeled after significant events research in the study of psychotherapy process. I analyze the accounts of 6 assessment clients and 6 assessment clinicians regarding key events in their experience of feedback.     

This new science of ours: a more or less systematic history of consciousness and transcendence. Part II

Part I of this paper having postulated the locus of consciousness as residing in a field between primitive mind in participation mystique with the world and a transcendent ground of being, Part II takes up the nature of mind itself in this field in terms of in vivo experiences. Operations and manifestations of consciousness are inexhaustively explored in four venues: 1) Jung's life experiences, 2) Joseph Henderson's theory of psychic development, 3) Eric Voegelin's theory of consciousness and 4) the experiences of analytic patients in far reaches of very long analyses.     

Is overgeneral autobiographical memory an isolated memory phenomenon in major depression?

The present study explored the relation between overgeneral autobiographical memory (AM) and other aspects of memory functioning in depression. A total of 26 patients with major depressive disorder completed a set of memory tasks measuring AM specificity (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986), working memory, semantic memory, verbal learning, delayed verbal recall, recognition memory, and source memory. Reduced specificity of AM was related to poor working memory (central executive functioning) and poor source memory. The former finding conforms to the idea that the voluntary retrieval of specific autobiographical memories (AMs) involves central executive processes (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The latter finding replicates and extends recent findings suggesting that overgeneral AM is part of a broader memory deficit in retrieving the specific details of the context in which information was acquired (Ramponi, Barnard, & Nimmo-Smith, 2004). Furthermore, in line with Ramponi et al. (2004), rumination was found to be related to both overgeneral AM and poor source memory.