Accuracy of feeling-of-knowing judgments for predicting perceptual identification and relearning

The feeding of knowing refers to predictions about subsequent memory performance on previously nonrecalled items. The most frequently investigated type of subsequent performance has been recognition. The present research explored predictive accuracy with two new feeling-of-knowing criterion tests (in addition to recognition): relearning and perceptual identification. In two experiments, people attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions such as, "What is the capital of Australia?", then made feeling-of-knowing predictions for all nonrecalled answers, and finally had a criterion test to assess the accuracy of the feeling-of-knowing predictions. Experiment 1 demonstrated that perceptual identification can be employed successfully as a criterion test for the feeling of knowing. This opens a new way for metamemory research via perception. Moreover, the feeling-of-knowing accuracy for predicting perceptual identification was not significantly correlated with the feeling-of-knowing accuracy for predicting recognition, in accord with the idea that these two tests assess memory differently. Experiment 2 demonstrated that relearning performance can also be predicted by feeling-of-knowing judgments. Both experiments showed that there is a positive relationship between the feeling of knowing and the amount of time elapsing before a memory search is terminated during recall. Further analyses showed that this relationship is substantial for nonrecalled items for which the person did not guess an answer (omission errors), but the relationship is null or negative for nonrecalled items that the person guessed incorrectly (commission errors). Several theoretical mechanisms that may underlie the feeling of knowing are proposed.     

A mechanism for the direct perception of change: the example of bacterial chemotaxis

The relationship between the behavior of single-celled organisms and cognition in higher animals is explored. Recent research and theory in bacterial chemotaxis are presented, together with a discussion of the implications of chemotaxis for perceptual theory. A number of parallels between chemotaxis and perception in higher organisms are drawn. It is suggested that Koshland's model of the chemical processes controlling chemotaxis is an example of a mechanism for direct perception of change and can help elucidate Runeson's work on 'smart mechanisms' of perception. It is argued, more generally, that the growing body of knowledge about the perceptual activities of lower organisms should be used to broaden the factual base on which theories of perception are constructed: eg explication of perceptual parallels between humans and lower organisms should help clarify the nature of these phenomena in humans and, perhaps, help in the development of theories of greater generality. Also, the debate between direct and indirect theories of perception may be advanced by analysis of the specific mechanisms used by lower organisms. Contrasts to mediated perception are pointed out and arguments for the relative simplicity and explanatory power of theories of direct perception are provided.     

Unity of perception

Perceptual scientists have recently enjoyed success in constructing mathematical theories for specific perceptual capacities, capacities such as stereovision, auditory localization, and color perception. Analysis of these theories suggests that they all share a common mathematical structure. If this is true, the elucidation of this structure, the study of its properties, the derivation of its consequences, and the empirical testing of its predictions are promising directions for perceptual research. We consider a candidate for the common structure, a candidate called an "observer". Observers, in essence, perform inferences; each observer has a characteristic class of perceptual premises, a characteristic class of perceptual conclusions, and its own functional relationship between these premises and conclusions. If observers indeed capture the structure common to perceptual capacities, then each capacity, regardless of its modality or manner of instantiation, can be described as some observer. In this paper we develop the definition of an observer. We first consider two examples of perceptual capacities: the measurement of visual motion, and the perception of depth from visual motion. In each case, we review a formal theory of the capacity and abstract its structural essence. From this essence we construct the definition of observer. We then exercise the definition in discussions of transduction, perceptual illusions, perceptual uncertainty, regularization theory, the cognitive penetrability of perception, and the theory neutrality of observation.     

The role of perceptual load in inattentional blindness

Perceptual load theory offers a resolution to the long-standing early vs. late selection debate over whether task-irrelevant stimuli are perceived, suggesting that irrelevant perception depends upon the perceptual load of task-relevant processing. However, previous evidence for this theory has relied on RTs and neuroimaging. Here we tested the effects of load on conscious perception using the "inattentional blindness" paradigm. As predicted by load theory, awareness of a task-irrelevant stimulus was significantly reduced by higher perceptual load (with increased numbers of search items, or a harder discrimination vs. detection task). These results demonstrate that conscious perception of task-irrelevant stimuli critically depends upon the level of task-relevant perceptual load rather than intentions or expectations, thus enhancing the resolution to the early vs. late selection debate offered by the perceptual load theory.     

Is perception informationally encapsulated? The issue of the theory‐ladenness of perception

Fodor has argued that observation is theory neutral, since the perceptual systems are modular, that is, they are domain-specific, encapsulated, mandatory, fast, hard-wired in the organism, and have a fixed neural architecture. Churchland attacks the theoretical neutrality of observation on the grounds that (a) the abundant top-down pathways in the brain suggest the cognitive penetration of perception and (b) perceptual learning can change in the wiring of the perceptual systems. In this paper I introduce a distinction between sensation, perception, and observation and I argue that although Churchland is right that observation involves top-down processes, there is also a substantial amount of information in perception which is theory-neutral. I argue that perceptual learning does not threaten the cognitive impenetrability of perception, and that the neuropsychological research does not provide evidence in favor of the top-down character of perception. Finally, I discuss the possibility of an off-line cognitive penetrability of perception.     

Motor activation from visible speech: evidence from stimulus response compatibility

In speech perception, phonetic information can be acquired optically as well as acoustically. The motor theory of speech perception holds that motor control structures are involved in the processing of visible speech, whereas perceptual accounts do not make this assumption. Motor involvement in speech perception was examined by showing participants response-irrelevant movies of a mouth articulating /ba/ or /da/ and asking them to verbally respond with either the same or a different syllable. The letters "Ba" and "Da" appeared on the speaker's mouth to indicate which response was to be performed. A reliable interference effect was observed. In subsequent experiments, perceptual interference was ruled out by using response-unrelated imperative stimuli and by preexposing the relevant stimulus information. Further, it was demonstrated that simple directional features (opening and closing) do not account for the effect. Rather, the present study provides evidence for the view that visible speech is processed up to a late, response-related processing stage, as predicted by the motor theory of speech perception.     

Continuous flash suppression and monocular pattern masking impact subjective awareness similarly

Peters and Lau (eLife, 4, e09651, 2015) found that when criterion bias is controlled for, there is no evidence for unconscious visual perception in normal observers, in the sense that they cannot directly discriminate a target above chance without knowing it. One criticism of that study is that the visual suppression method used, forward and backward masking (FBM), may be too blunt in the way it interferes with visual processing to allow for unconscious forced-choice discrimination. To investigate this question, we compared FBM directly to continuous flash suppression (CFS) in a two-interval forced-choice task. Although CFS is popular, and may be thought of as a more powerful visual suppression technique, we found no difference in the degree of perceptual impairment between the two suppression types. To the extent that CFS impairs perception, both objective discrimination and subjective awareness are impaired to similar degrees under FBM. This pattern was consistently observed across three experiments in which various experimental parameters were varied. These findings provide evidence for an ongoing debate about unconscious perception: normal observers cannot perform forced-choice discrimination tasks unconsciously.     

Affective state influences perception by affecting decision parameters underlying bias and sensitivity

Studies of the effect of affect on perception often show consistent directional effects of a person's affective state on perception. Unpleasant emotions have been associated with a "locally focused" style of stimulus evaluation, and positive emotions with a "globally focused" style. Typically, however, studies of affect and perception have not been conducted under the conditions of perceptual uncertainty and behavioral risk inherent to perceptual judgments outside the laboratory. We investigated the influence of perceivers' experienced affect (valence and arousal) on the utility of social threat perception by combining signal detection theory and behavioral economics. We compared 3 perceptual decision environments that systematically differed with respect to factors that underlie uncertainty and risk: the base rate of threat, the costs of incorrect identification threat, and the perceptual similarity of threats and nonthreats. We found that no single affective state yielded the best performance on the threat perception task across the 3 environments. Unpleasant valence promoted calibration of response bias to base rate and costs, high arousal promoted calibration of perceptual sensitivity to perceptual similarity, and low arousal was associated with an optimal adjustment of bias to sensitivity. However, the strength of these associations was conditional upon the difficulty of attaining optimal bias and high sensitivity, such that the effect of the perceiver's affective state on perception differed with the cause and/or level of uncertainty and risk.     

Representation,Presentation and the Epistemic Role of Perceptual Experience

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the representational theory of perception, on which the world is represented as being a certain way in perceptual experience, cannot explain how there can be a genuinely epistemic connection between experience and belief. I try to show that we are positively required to deny that perceptual consciousness is contentful if we want to make its fitness for epistemic duties intelligible. (So versions of the representational theory on which experience has a merely causal purchase on belief are not considered.) But my aim is not just negative. I try to defeat representationalism in such a way as to motivate a robustly presentational theory of perception. According to such a theory, perceptions are relations not between a subject and a content but between a subject and an ordinary object (such that if the relation holds at t, an appropriate subject and object must exist at t, and the object must be presented to the subject). I end by sketching an account of perceptual experience that is meant to show that, contrary to a very popular misconception, there is a way to conceive perceptual consciousness as relational and presentational (not intentional and representational) that does not succumb to the celebrated ‘myth of the Given’.     

Processing steps in perception of speech sounds]

The aim of this study is to investigate whether speech sounds--as is stated by the widely accepted theory of categorical perception of speech--can be perceived only as instances of phonetic categories, or whether physical differences between speech sounds lead to perceptual differences regardless of their phonetic categorization. Subjects listened to pairs of synthetically generated speech sounds that correspond to realizations of the syllables "ba" and "pa" in natural German, and they were instructed to decide as fast as possible whether they perceived them as belonging to the same or to different phonetic categories. For 'same'-responses reaction times become longer when the physical distance between the speech sounds is increased; for 'different'-responses reaction times become shorter with growing physical distance between the stimuli. The results show that subjects can judge speech sounds on the basis of perceptual continua, which is inconsistent with the theory of categorical perception. A mathematical model is presented that attempts to explain the results by postulating two interacting stages of processing, a psychoacoustical and a phonetic one. The model is not entirely confirmed by the data, but it seems to deserve further consideration.     

Perceiving the intensity of light

The relationship between luminance (i.e., the photometric intensity of light) and its perception (i.e., sensations of lightness or brightness) has long been a puzzle. In addition to the mystery of why these perceptual qualities do not scale with luminance in any simple way, "illusions" such as simultaneous brightness contrast, Mach bands, Craik-O'Brien-Cornsweet edge effects, and the Chubb-Sperling-Solomon illusion have all generated much interest but no generally accepted explanation. The authors review evidence that the full range of this perceptual phenomenology can be rationalized in terms of an empirical theory of vision. The implication of these observations is that perceptions of lightness and brightness are generated according to the probability distributions of the possible sources of luminance values in stimuli that are inevitably ambiguous.     

On the possibility of "smart" perceptual mechanisms

Abstract.— A basic feature of some modem theories of perception is the notion of complex or higher order variables which are considered basic for perception. A distinction between "rote" and "smart" mechanisms is introduced and it is suggested that perception consists of smart mechanisms which directly register complex variables. A model of a perceiver, based on the smart polar planimeter, is constructed and used to illustrate the possible consequences of smart perceptual mechanisms for research in areas such as psychophysics, cognition, attention, and perceptual development and learning.     

A perception theory in mind–body medicine: guided imagery and mindful meditation as cross-modal adaptation

A new theory of mind–body interaction in healing is proposed based on considerations from the field of perception. It is suggested that the combined effect of visual imagery and mindful meditation on physical healing is simply another example of cross-modal adaptation in perception, much like adaptation to prism-displaced vision. It is argued that psychological interventions produce a conflict between the perceptual modalities of the immune system and vision (or touch), which leads to change in the immune system in order to realign the modalities. It is argued that mind–body interactions do not exist because of higher-order cognitive thoughts or beliefs influencing the body, but instead result from ordinary interactions between lower-level perceptual modalities that function to detect when sensory systems have made an error. The theory helps explain why certain illnesses may be more amenable to mind–body interaction, such as autoimmune conditions in which a sensory system (the immune system) has made an error. It also renders sensible erroneous changes, such as those brought about by “faith healers,” as conflicts between modalities that are resolved in favor of the wrong modality. The present view provides one of very few psychological theories of how guided imagery and mindfulness meditation bring about positive physical change. Also discussed are issues of self versus non-self, pain, cancer, body schema, attention, consciousness, and, importantly, developing the concept that the immune system is a rightful perceptual modality. Recognizing mind–body healing as perceptual cross-modal adaptation implies that a century of cross-modal perception research is applicable to the immune system.     

A Theory of Perceptual Objects

Objects are central in visual, auditory, and tactual perception. But what counts as a perceptual object? I address this question via a structural unity schema, which specifies how a collection of parts must be arranged to compose an object for perception. On the theory I propose, perceptual objects are composed of parts that participate in causally sustained regularities. I argue that this theory falls out of a compelling account of the function of object perception, and illustrate its applications to multisensory perception. I also argue that the account avoids problems faced by standard views of visual and auditory objects.     

Perception and Action Are Inseparable

In her article, Michaels (2000) defined action as "a temporally bounded, observable, goal-directed movement (or non-movement) that entails intention, the detection of information, and a lawful relation between that information and the movement" (p. 251). She defined perception as "the detection of information" (p. 244). This forces one to conclude that it is impossible to study action separately from perception. We argue that perceptual judgments are communicated by movements and that it is impossible to distinguish movements reporting perceptual judgments from other movements, so we conclude that the reverse also is true: It is impossible to study perception separately from action.     

Conventional naturalism: A perceptualist account of pictorial representation

This paper proposes that pictures are functional objects which figure in norm‐governed practices of usage yet whose specific function is to present the world as it looks to acculturated perceivers. Pictorial content presents the way the world looks to a subject's acculturated perceptual grasp. Hence, pictorial content needs to be explained in terms of a theory of perceptual content, but a novel theory which departs from the two‐stage sensation‐based approach to perception and the polarization between naturalism and conventionalism that it engenders. Following a diagnosis of this polarization, I invoke a novel theory of perception that explains perceptual content as conceptually articulated and determinate in character. I show that (1) pictures present content of the same distinctive determinate type as perceptual content; and that (2) pictures do so by invoking perceptual experience and perceptual processes that are of the same kind as those invoked by actual scenes. This perceptualist approach considers and explains the role of norms as well as of the nature of our visual processes, allowing us to allocate the insights of both conventionalism and naturalism to their proper theoretical roles.     

网络词语与非网络词语的知觉差异:时间知觉、空间距离知觉与知觉范围

根据具身认知理论,人们的认知会受到身体活动的影响。网络环境下人的身体活动受到限制,因而其认知活动与非网络环境存在很大的差异。本研究目的在于考察人们对网络词语与非网络的日常词语的时间知觉,空间距离知觉与知觉范围是否有差异。结果发现被试对网络词语的时间知觉更长;网络词语的空间距离感与日常词语没有显著差异;在启动网络词语之后,被试的知觉范围缩小,对中心刺激的反应显著快于边缘刺激。本研究发现了网络词语加工在时间知觉和知觉范围上的变化。     

Direct perception and the predictive mind

Predictive approaches to the mind claim that perception, cognition, and action can be understood in terms of a single framework: a hierarchy of Bayesian models employing the computational strategy of predictive coding. Proponents of this view disagree, however, over the extent to which perception is direct on the predictive approach. I argue that we can resolve these disagreements by identifying three distinct notions of perceptual directness: psychological, metaphysical, and epistemological. I propose that perception is plausibly construed as psychologically indirect on the predictive approach, in the sense of being constructivist or inferential. It would be wrong to conclude from this, however, that perception is therefore indirect in a metaphysical or epistemological sense on the predictive approach. In the metaphysical case, claims about the inferential properties of constructivist perceptual mechanisms are consistent with both direct and indirect solutions to the metaphysical problem of perception (e.g. naïve realism, representationalism, sense datum theory). In the epistemological case, claims about the inferential properties of constructivist perceptual mechanisms are consistent with both direct and indirect approaches to the justification of perceptual belief. In this paper, I demonstrate how proponents of the predictive approach have conflated these distinct notions of perceptual directness and indirectness, and I propose alternative strategies for developing the philosophical consequences of the approach.