“Evidence” on Characteristic Empathy: A Reply to Cross and Slee

This paper addresses a number of issues raised by Cross and Slee (1984) in their comment on Watson (1983). It clarifies the construct of characteristic empathy by comparing this variable with variables derived from interactive empathy. Various aspects of reliability as they relate to popular empathy measures are then discussed ad the particular version of the Indices studied by Watson (1983) is identified. Finally, there is a discussion of the extent to which the literature reviewed by Cross and Slee actually offers conclusive evidence about empathy measures.     

“Expanding the Frame”: Reply to Commentary

In responding to a discussion by Susi Federici-Nebbiosi of “When the Frame Doesn't Fit the Picture,” I further consider the ways in which analysts and analysands together create the best conditions for their work. I emphasize that analytic work best fulfills its potential when it grows out of a collaborative search for ways of constructing the psychoanalytic situation that are most fully and subtly responsive to the unique qualities and circumstances of each patient and analyst. Implications for psychoanalytic training of an intersubjective model of frame construction are briefly considered.     

“It All Comes Down to Imagination”: Reply to Commentary

In her generous and full discussion of my paper, Doris Brothers writes about patient's efforts to restore themselves following trauma and how that runs into walls caused by their “systemically emergent certainties.” She beautifully writes, “Since our capacity to hope depends on being able to tolerate uncertainty we sometimes join our patients in their hopelessness” (p. 231). Brothers emphasizes how Murakami can help us tolerate uncertainty. My emphasis is on how writers like Murakami help us restore our imaginative and empathic capacities. Frozen landscapes, as evoked by Murakami in “UFO in Kushiro,” are depictions of shut-down psychic states. Animated imagery helps to melt the ice, creating living motion in thought and affect. Both Brothers and I are looking at the crucial movement from simplified to complex shared states of mind. We seem at first to differ in our understanding of the function of rage in treatment, though I believe we may be discussing different clinical situations.     

Reply to Fairley and Manktelow’s comment on “Naive theories and causal deduction”

Fairley and Manktelow (1997) have mistaken an error of presentation for an error of substance. My causal theory remains the same: Causal reasoning scenarios that require the reasoner to decide whether or not an effect will occur in the presence of a viable cause trigger consideration of disabling conditions—that is, factors that could prevent the effect from occurring in the presence of a viable cause. Scenarios that require the reasoner to decide whether or not a particular cause has produced an observed effect trigger consideration of possible alternative causes. The data reported by Cummins (1995) and Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, and Rist (1991) are consistent with this theoretical analysis.     

Reply to “Expanding the Frame” by Anthony Bass and to Commentaries

In this reply I offer a short answer to the question about the theme “What do we learn from experience?” I can say that certainly the power of that particular experience with that patient made me more sensitive and careful toward similar moments with other patients. I then offer some comment on the contributions in this issue of the journal. I emphasize the interweaving of structure and process and the process of building meaning as an intersubjective achievement. I also intervene on the theme “how to transmit psychoanalytic wisdom.”     

The meaning of “Evolution”

In a recent article [Mertz 2001] in this journal I argued for the virtues of a realist ontology of relation instances (unit attributes). A major strength of this ontology is an assay of ontic ('material') predication that yields an account of individuation without the necessity of positing and defending 'bare particulars'. The crucial insight is that it is the unifying agency or combinatorial aspect of a relation instance as predicable that is for ontology the principium individuationis [Mertz 2002; 1996]. Or in short, what is ontically predicable, precisely as such, is the cause of individuation. As a preface to this positive doctrine I offered arguments against the coherence of bare particulars as defended in an article by J. P. Moreland [1998]. In a reply contained in this issue Moreland and Timothy Pickavance (hereafter M/P) propose to answer my objections [2002]. The response that follows provides reasons why, I contend, M/P have not succeeded in parrying my objections to bare particulars.     

Are beats gestures unrelated to meaning of verbal production? Comment on Mizuguchi's view

In a recent note, Mizuguchi (2006) stated that beats are not directly related to the meaning of the production of speech. We report a number of studies that suggest the existence of a clear relationship between beats and significant parts of co-occurring speech.     

A science of meaning. Can behaviorism bring meaning to psychological science?

An argument is presented for making meaning a central dependent variable in psychological science. Principles of operant psychology are then interpreted as providing a basic foundation for a science of meaning. The emphasis here is on the generality of basic operant concepts, where learning is a process of meaning making that is governed largely by natural contingencies; reinforcement is an organic process in which environment-behavior relations are selected, defined here as a dialectical process of meaning making; and reinforcers are experiential consequences with acquired, ecologically derived meanings. The author concludes with a call for a more interdisciplinary science of psychology, focusing on the individual in society.     

An alternative to grapheme-phoneme conversion rules?

When orthographic factors were tightly controlled in a lexical decision task, it was observed that orthographic similarity rather than homophony with a word led to increased reaction times to nonwords. This result suggested that the pseudohomophone effect is not a phonological effect. Instead, a conversion of the graphemes of a stimulus item into different graphemes via a set of grapheme-grapheme conversion rules was supported. When phonological factors were tightly controlled and orthographic similarity varied, evidence for the existence of grapheme-grapheme rules was provided in both a lexical decision task and a task in which subjects were required to say whether an item was pronounced in the same way as a word. Even in the latter task, in which the likelihood of phonological recoding was optimized, it appeared that grapheme-phoneme rules were rarely, if ever, used.     

“Was It Good for You?”: Reply to Commentaries

In many ways, psychoanalysis revolutionized attitudes about sexuality. Yet by undertheorizing female erotic passion and downplaying the role of the clitoris, psychoanalysis perpetuated a long historical tradition of denying essential aspects of women's sexual experience. Psychoanalysis has at times contributed to women perceiving their own bodily erotic excitement as frightening, dangerous, and out of control. In this reply to the commentaries, the authors continue to explore the ways in which women and women's experience, especially their embodied sexual experience, are so often rendered invisible.