共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Jean-Luc Nancy 《Topoi》2006,25(1-2):69-73
The obsession is pursued of a word, a sign, a thought that is identical with the thing it signifies, where there is no space
between the two. And the nightmare is entertained that, if such an identity is not attained, then intellectual work in general
is worth nothing and should be destroyed. 相似文献
2.
Callum David Scott 《South African Journal of Philosophy》2016,35(3):249-260
The Kantian revolution limited the possibility of ontological knowledge, severing subject from thing as is evident in its legacy in both continental and analytic philosophy. Consequently, if a thing cannot be known as it is, the philosophical status of empirical science as a study about existing natural things should be called into question. It could be construed, for instance, that a scientific theory is a construction about something to which the subjective constructor can never have ontological access. But, when empirical scientists develop evidence-based proofs for their theories the assumption of realism usually stands: scientific theories constructed by scientists are actually purported to represent natural entities back to these constructing scientists. Given that there is a danger of philosophy becoming isolated from empirical science, we attempt to bridge the gap between philosophical discourse and science-in-praxis through a recapitulation of Aquinas’ ontological epistemology. Aquinas argued for a clarified realism in which the epistemic is construed as an intersection between the thinking subject and the object. Contrary to naïve realism, then, it will be explicated how Aquinas’ realism was a precursor of “critical realism”, as he discerned the complex interaction of thinking subject and the being of the object as both bearing on the production of knowledge. 相似文献
3.
Maren Wehrle 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2020,19(3):499-521
The body is both the subject and object of intentionality: qua Leib, it experiences worldly things and qua Körper, it is experienced as a thing in the 相似文献
4.
Effects of Local and Global Context on Processing Sentences with Subject and Object Relative Clauses
An eye tracking study investigated the effects of local and global discourse context on the processing of subject and object relative clauses, whereby the contexts favored either a subject relative clause interpretation or an object relative clause interpretation. The fixation data replicated previous studies showing that object relative clause sentences were more difficult to process than subject relative sentences. Crucially, however, the reading difficulty asymmetry between subject and object relative clause sentences disappeared when the sentences were presented with a local or a global discourse context that favored the objects in the object relative clauses. These findings demonstrate that the evidence for a syntax-based account of sentence processing is found when sentences are presented in isolation. However, if sentences are placed more naturally, in context, discourse factors outweigh the initial structural assignment. 相似文献
5.
Thomas Teo 《Social and Personality Psychology Compass》2010,4(5):295-303
This article discusses the meaning of epistemological violence in the empirical social sciences. It is argued that the concept is closer to personal than to structural violence in that it has a subject, an object, and an action, even if the violence is indirect and nonphysical: the subject of violence is the researcher, the object is the Other, and the action is the interpretation of data that is presented as knowledge. Using a hypothetical example, the problem of interpretation in empirical research on the Other is discussed. Epistemological violence refers to the interpretation of social-scientific data on the Other and is produced when empirical data are interpreted as showing the inferiority of or problematizes the Other, even when data allow for equally viable alternative interpretations. Interpretations of inferiority or problematizations are understood as actions that have a negative impact on the Other. Because the interpretations of data emerge from an academic context and thus are presented as knowledge, they are defined as epistemologically violent actions. Problems, consequences, and practices surrounding this concept are discussed. 相似文献
6.
Richard Theisen Simanke 《The International journal of psycho-analysis》2017,98(6):1551-1576
This article sets out to challenge the interpretation of Freud's views on the origins of the meaning of language according to which meaning always originates from an act of naming. In Freud's terms, word‐presentations would originally denote object‐ or thing‐presentations and gain meaning through this reference. This interpretation claims that this view was already expressed in Freud's On Aphasia (1891) and influenced all his later theory of language. To oppose this claim, three conceptions proposed by Freud are discussed that strongly suggest the participation of language in the construction of the field of objects: a metapsychological hypothesis (the concepts of word‐, thing‐, and object‐presentation), the explanation of a psychopathological phenomenon (the genesis of a fetishistic object‐choice), and a concept concerning the foundations of the psychoanalytic method of dream interpretation (secondary elaboration). As a conclusion, it is argued that Freud's early views in On Aphasia (1891) can be alternatively understood such as to allow for a different view of language and its relationship with objects. 相似文献
7.
Peter Lamarque 《Metaphilosophy》2000,31(1&2):96-124
The paper examines the relation between interpretation and the objects of interpretation, principally, but not exclusively, in the realm of art. Several theses are defended: that interpretation cannot proceed without prior determination of the kind of thing being interpreted; that the mode of interpretation is determined by the nature of its object; that interpretation, of a meaning-determining rather than generic kind, focuses at the level of works , not descending to a bedrock of "mere objects"; that because works and their appropriate mode of interpretation are constituted by convention-bound practices, it follows that no clear line can be drawn between properties "in" a work and those "imputed to" it through interpretive procedures endorsed by the practice. The debate over constructivism or "imputationalism"– between Margolis and Krausz, on the one hand, and Stecker and Levinson, on the other – is engaged with an attempt to show a core of truth in each of the conflicting theories, once the right distinction between object, work, and interpretation is in place. 相似文献
8.
The idea of an intentional object, or an object of thought, gives rise to a dilemma for theories of intentionality. Either intentional objects are existing objects, in which case it is impossible, contrary to appearances, to think about something which does not exist. Or some intentional objects are non-existent real objects. But this requires an obscure and implausible metaphysics. I argue that the way out of this dilemma is to deny that being an intentional object is being an entity of any kind. 'Object' here does not mean thing or entity. Rather, to say that something is an intentional object is just to say that it is an object of thought (or other intentional state or act) for a subject. It is further argued that theories of intentionality should not dispense with the idea of an intentional object. 相似文献
9.
10.
Phil Corkum 《European Journal of Philosophy》2015,23(3):793-813
A predicate logic typically has a heterogeneous semantic theory. Subjects and predicates have distinct semantic roles: subjects refer; predicates characterize. A sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. Traditional term logic, by contrast, has a homogeneous theory: both subjects and predicates refer; and a sentence is true if the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In this paper, I will examine evidence for ascribing to Aristotle the view that subjects and predicates refer. If this is correct, then it seems that Aristotle, like the traditional term logician, problematically conflates predication and identity claims. I will argue that we can ascribe to Aristotle the view that both subjects and predicates refer, while holding that he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In particular, I will argue that Aristotle's core semantic notion is not identity but the weaker relation of constitution. For example, the predication ‘All men are mortal’ expresses a true thought, in Aristotle's view, just in case the mereological sum of humans is a part of the mereological sum of mortals. 相似文献
11.
Hannah Ginsborg 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(5):403-437
I draw a connection between the question, raised by Hume and Kant, of how aesthetic judgments can claim universal agreement, and the question, raised in recent discussions of nonconceptual content, of how concepts can be acquired on the basis of experience. Developing an idea suggested by Kant's linkage of aesthetic judgment with the capacity for empirical conceptualization, I propose that both questions can be resolved by appealing to the idea of “perceptual normativity”. Perceptual experience, on this proposal, involves the awareness of its own appropriateness with respect to the object perceived, where this appropriateness is more primitive than truth or veridicality. This means that a subject can take herself to be perceiving an object as she (and anyone else) ought to perceive it, without first recognizing the object as falling under a corresponding concept. I motivate the proposal through a criticism of Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition, which, I argue, rests on a confusion between the notion of a way something is perceived, and that of a way it is perceived as being. Whereas Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition depends on an illicit slide between these two notions, the notion of perceptual normativity allows a legitimate transition between them: if someone's perceiving something a certain way involves her taking it that she ought to perceive it that way, then she perceives the thing as being a certain way, so that the corresponding concept is available to her in perceptual experience. 相似文献
12.
《Emotion, Space and Society》2008,1(1):18-21
Potential space is the term that Winnicott uses to describe the space of good parenting, therapy, creativity and aliveness. In this paper we associate this space with love. Love is not subjective, not an emotion that one subject feels for an object or even for another subject. Love is the primordial experience of infinite space; it is not an experience of unity but a meeting of sameness and difference. In order to distinguish love from the desire that a subject might have for one thing or another, infinite space needs to be distinguished from the familiar locational form of Euclidean space. We make this argument through a case study from our research on student–teacher relations, and through the theoretical work of Buber, Winnicott and Merleau-Ponty. 相似文献
13.
If a subject who is sufficiently farsighted removes his corrective, positive, lenses and looks with one eye from a distance of one or a few meters, at a small lighted area such as the (continuously "on") indicator light of an electric toothbrush, razor, or smoke detector, and if a small object such as a pin is then moved slowly from above to below the subject's eyes (in a plane close to the eye), the subject will perceive the object moving normally from above to below until it encroaches on his view of the lighted area. The object will then be seen to encroach first on the bottom of the lighted area, and as the object continues to move down it will be seen to be moving up across the lighted area, exiting the lighted area at the top. Similarly, an object moved in front of the eye from the subject's left to his right will be seen by the subject to traverse the lighted area in the reverse direction, right to left, even though the subject moves the object himself. Also, while the object is in front of the lighted area, it is perceived as an upside down silhouette having surprisingly clear and sharp edges, and it appears to be located on the lighted area rather than close to the eye where it really is. 相似文献
14.
In this paper we aim to show an intrinsic contradiction of contemporary Metaphysical Realism by focusing on the relation between the subject and the object. Metaphysical Realism considers facts and objects as being empirical, and therefore they are considered in relation to the subject, while at the same time facts are assumed to belong to an autonomous and independent reality. However, if a real object is considered to be independent from the subject, once it enters in a relation with the latter, a real object must undergo an intrinsic transformation. However, since an object cannot avoid this transformation then recovering the real or “absolute” object from the perceived object is not possible. In this way, the inherent contradiction of the “absolute” as being determined, i.e., defined by virtue of a limit, is revealed. 相似文献
15.
JASON BAEHR 《Metaphilosophy》2010,41(1-2):189-213
Abstract: Against the background of a great deal of structural symmetry between intellectual and moral virtue and vice, it is a surprising fact that what is arguably the central or paradigm moral vice—that is, moral malevolence or malevolence proper—has no obvious or well-known counterpart among the intellectual vices. The notion of "epistemic malevolence" makes no appearance on any standard list of intellectual vices; nor is it central to our ordinary ways of thinking about intellectual vice. In this essay, I argue that there is such a thing as epistemic malevolence and offer an account of its basic character and structure. Doing so requires a good deal of attention to malevolence simpliciter . In the final section of the essay, I offer an explanation of our relative unfamiliarity with this trait. 相似文献
16.
Samuel Duncan 《Journal of applied philosophy》2020,37(5):799-817
Justifying intellectual property on the basis of labour is an understandably popular strategy, but there is a tension in basing some intellectual property claims on labour that has gone largely unnoticed in treatments of the subject: many forms of innovation cause people to lose their jobs, which seriously hampers the ability of those who lose work to productively use their own labour. This article shows that even under Lockean and other labour-based justifications of intellectual property rights those who claim property rights to innovations of this type have special obligations to compensate those who lose work because of their inventions. By examining the problem that such innovations create, I hope to contribute to larger debates about automation and the job losses it often brings. Lockean and other labour-based theories of intellectual property are generally taken to secure strong, noninstrumental rights to intellectual property if they are successful. So, if even these theories imply that those who profit from the innovations driving automation have special obligations to those left jobless by it, that is strong evidence that they do in fact have such obligations. 相似文献
17.
Sobhi Rayan 《国际科学哲学研究》2009,23(2):123-141
I endeavour in this article to present Ibn Taymiyya's theory of nominal definition as an alternative to logical definition. Ibn Taymiyya argues that nominal definition is based on concrete principles that are subject to experiment. Furthermore, the function of definition is akin to the ‘name’ because it aims at distinguishing any one object from others but not at reaching the entity of things. Nominal definition aims to define the name or the named, and this aim can be achieved by translation or by interpretation. Translation is the movement from one name to another or from one named object to another. Interpretation is movement from a name to a named object or from a named object to a name. 相似文献
18.
Helen STEWARD 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2011,6(3):390-401
The paper argues against the very commonly held view that whenever a substance may be said to be the cause of something, a
fuller and metaphysically more accurate understanding of the situation can always be obtained by looking to the properties
in virtue of which that substance was able to bring about the effect in question. Paul Humphreys’ argument that when a substance
is said to have produced an effect, it always turns out to be an aspect or property of that substance which brought about
the effect in question is examined and criticized; it is argued that it is based on an illegitimate application of Mill’s
Methods of Difference and Agreement to the case. Mill’s methods, it is suggested, are methods of empirical, not of ontological
enquiry. The paper then turns to examine an argument by Mele which appears to depend on a structurally rather similar assumption
that if there is nothing about a subject which could explain why she does one thing rather than another, it cannot really
be up to that subject which thing occurs. It is suggested that, too, the inference is faulty, and that once it is rejected,
one common objection to libertarianism—the argument from luck—might be more readily met. 相似文献
19.
Anthony Robert Booth 《Synthese》2012,187(2):509-517
To be a doxastic deontologist is to claim that there is such a thing as an ethics of belief (or of our doxastic attitudes in general). In other words, that we are subject to certain duties with respect to our doxastic attitudes, the non-compliance with which makes us blameworthy and that we should understand doxastic justification in terms of these duties. In this paper, I argue that these duties are our all things considered duties, and not our epistemic or moral duties, for example. I show how this has the surprising result that, if deontologism is a thesis about doxastic justification, it entails that there is no such thing as epistemic or moral justification for a belief that p. I then suggest why this result, though controversial, may have some salutary consequences: primarily that it helps us make some sense of an otherwise puzzling situation regarding doxastic dilemmas. 相似文献
20.
Kristie Miller 《Ratio》2008,21(1):55-63
Here is a common view. There exist things, and there exists stuff, where roughly, ‘thing’ is a count noun, and ‘stuff’ is a mass noun. Syntactically, ‘thing’ functions as a singular referring term that takes ‘a’ and ‘every’ and is subject to pluralisation, while ‘stuff’ functions as a plural referring term that takes ‘some’ and is not subject to pluralisation. Hence there exists a thing, and some stuff. Usual versions of the common view endorse two principles about portions of stuff. The first principle is that (temporal) mereological essentialism is true of portions (parcels, masses, quantities) of stuff, where mereological essentialism is the thesis that for any persisting object or portion of stuff, that object or stuff has the same parts at every time at which it exists. 1 The second principle is that portions of stuff obey a principle of stuff composition: for any two portions of stuff P1 and P2, there exists a portion of stuff that is the fusion of P1 and P2. 1 I argue that these two principles are inconsistent. In particular, since I am sympathetic to PSC, I argue that mereological essentialism is false of portions of stuff. 相似文献