共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Sor-hoon Tan 《Sophia》2007,46(1):99-102
Learning from Chinese Philosophies explores early Confucianism and Daoism in order to engage today’s problems. By bringing into thoughtful play Confucian ideas
of self and society and Daoist understanding of situated self, the author uses the debate between the two philosophies to
argue for her understanding of Confucian moral thinking and Daoist metaethics. According to Lai, Daoist metaethics question
dichotomous frameworks and discuss the unity of opposites enabling dynamic interplay of nonantagonistic polarities. Lai not
only rejects comparisons of Confucianism to consequentialist and deontological moral theories, but also the view that Confucian
ethics is a form of virtue ethics. Instead, she argues that the Analects is a manual for moral decision making that requires skills “to unravel and analyse the complex features of particular situations
and to pick out those which are morally relevant.” Together, Confucianism and Daoism offer views of interdependent relationality
that help to reconceptualize contemporary problems and criticize existing thinking and practices. Lai applies what she has
learned from these two Chinese philosophies in a critique of feminist care ethics. Despite a few flaws, this is a clearly
written work with stimulating interesting ideas and it lives up to the promise of demonstrating the continued relevance of
Chinese philosophies.
相似文献
Sor-hoon TanEmail: |
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Andrew Moon 《Synthese》2012,184(3):287-297
Let ‘warrant’ denote whatever precisely it is that makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. A current
debate in epistemology asks whether warrant entails truth, i.e., whether (Infallibilism) S’s belief that p is warranted only
if p is true. The arguments for infallibilism have come under considerable and, as of yet, unanswered objections. In this
paper, I will defend infallibilism. In Part I, I advance a new argument for infallibilism; the basic outline is as follows.
Suppose fallibilism is true. An implication of fallibilism is that the property that makes the difference between knowledge
and mere belief (which I dub ‘warrant*’) is the conjunctive property being warranted and true. I show that this implication of fallibilism conflicts with an uncontroversial thesis we have learned from reflection on
Gettier cases: that nonaccidental truth is a constituent of warrant*. It follows that infallibilism is true. In the second
part of the paper, I present and criticize a new argument against infallibilism. The argument states that there are plausible
cases where, intuitively, the only thing that is keeping a belief from counting as knowledge is the falsity of that belief.
Furthermore, it is plausible that such a belief is warranted and false. So, the argument goes, infallibilism is false. I show
that this argument fails. 相似文献
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Ludger Jansen 《Topoi》2007,26(1):153-158
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John Tillson 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2018,37(5):529-536