共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 109 毫秒
1.
Jay Newhard 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):345-352
Contextual theories of truth are motivated primarily by the resolution they provide to paradoxical reasoning about truth.
The principal argument for contextual theories of truth relies on a key intuition about the truth value of the proposition
expressed by a particular utterance made during paradoxical reasoning, which Anil Gupta calls “the Chrysippus intuition.”
In this paper, I argue that the principal argument for contextual theories of truth is circular, and that the Chrysippus intuition
is false. I conclude that the philosophical motivation for contextual theories of truth fails.
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Jay NewhardEmail: |
2.
Peter A. Graham 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):65-82
David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with
anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is
untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on
to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view.
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Peter A. GrahamEmail: |
3.
Sandra E. Marshall 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):253-257
Since I do not disagree with the line of argument taken by Kramer and the distinctions he draws between the different ways
rules can be ‘mind-independent’, my comments focus on some of the complexities involved in the application of his distinctions.
I suggest that law, properly understood as a system of rules/conventions is both existentially and observationally weakly mind independent, but nonetheless objective.
相似文献
Sandra E. MarshallEmail: |
4.
Jens Johansson 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):87-89
Many philosophers maintain that artworks, such as statues, are constituted by other material objects, such as lumps of marble.
I give an argument against this view, an argument which appeals to mereological simples.
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Jens JohanssonEmail: |
5.
Joel Thomas Tierno 《Sophia》2008,47(2):223-230
In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning
the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from free will does not adequately
explain the distribution of moral evil in the world. I maintain that the third critique, like Trakakis’ earlier critiques,
is unconvincing. I remain convinced that my original argument regarding the inadequacy of the traditional argument from free
will is compelling. The argument from freedom of the will, considered in itself, is unpersuasive.
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Joel Thomas TiernoEmail: |
6.
Michael Martin 《Sophia》2007,46(1):75-77
In this note I show that Noreen Johnson misunderstands my argument and consequently fails to refute my thesis that God’s omnipotence
conflicts with his omniscience.
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Michael MartinEmail: |
7.
André Juthe 《Argumentation》2009,23(2):133-169
This paper discusses the method when an argument is refuted by a parallel argument since the flaw of the parallel argument
is clearly displayed. The method is explicated, examined and compared with two other general methods.
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André JutheEmail: |
8.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(2):169-179
Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. I argue for
the view that lack of freedom to do otherwise undermines the truth of judgments of practical reason. Thus, assuming that determinism
expunges alternative possibilities, determinism undercuts the truth of such judgments. I propose, in addition, that if practical
reason is associated with various values in a specified way, then determinism precludes such values owing to determinism's
imperiling practical reason.
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Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
9.
Jacob Busch 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):55-65
The underdetermination of theory by data argument (UD) is traditionally construed as an argument that tells us that we ought
to favour an anti-realist position over a realist position. I argue that when UD is constructed as an argument saying that
theory choice is to proceed between theories that are empirically equivalent and adequate to the phenomena up until now, the
argument will not favour constructive empiricism over realism. A constructive empiricist cannot account for why scientists
are reasonable in expecting one theory to be empirically adequate rather than another, given the criteria he suggests for
theory choice.
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Jacob BuschEmail: |
10.
Steven A. Jauss 《Philosophia》2008,36(3):285-298
According to what Robert Stecker dubs the “ethical-aesthetic interaction” thesis, the ethical defects of a literary work can
diminish its aesthetic value. Both the thesis and the only prominent argumentative strategy employed to support it the affective
response argument have been hotly debated; however, Stecker has recently argued that the failure of the ARA does not undermine
the thesis, since the argument “fails to indentify the main reason [the thesis] holds, when it in fact does.” I critically
examine Stecker’s objection to the familiar versions of the affective response argument and the line of support for ethical-aesthetic
interaction he proposes to install in their place. I conclude that neither is compelling; however, an important insight can
be salvaged from his positive proposal, and I argue that the insight does, in fact, point toward a novel defense of the thesis.
相似文献
Steven A. JaussEmail: |
11.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):1-19
The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents
any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could
have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct
Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing
counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes.
相似文献
Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
12.
Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the (KK) principle (roughly, that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows that p) should be rejected. We analyze Williamson’s argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly
stated this premise no longer supports the argument against (KK). After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we
reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge
from prior knowledge by deduction.
相似文献
Levi Spectre (Corresponding author)Email: |
13.
Michael Weber 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(2):209-226
Larry Temkin has shown that Derek Parfit’s well-known Mere Addition Paradox suggests a powerful argument for the intransitivity
of the relation “better than.” The crux of the argument is the view that equality is essentially comparative, according to
which the same inequality can be evaluated differently depending on what it is being compared to. The comparative view of
equality should be rejected, I argue, and hence so too this argument for intransitivity.
相似文献
Michael WeberEmail: |
14.
Luca Moretti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):229-246
Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional
fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno’s argument relies on
a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, Nous, 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth should probably be
abandoned. I argue however that the antirealist is not committed to a controversial reading of counterfactuals presupposed
in Brogaard and Salerno’s proof, and that the antirealist can in principle adopt an alternative reading that makes this proof
invalid. My conclusion is that no reductio of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth has yet been provided.
相似文献
Luca MorettiEmail: |
15.
Charles B. Cross 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(2):173-188
In this essay I renew the case for Conditional Excluded Middle (CXM) in light of recent developments in the semantics of the
subjunctive conditional. I argue that Michael Tooley’s recent backward causation counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis comparative
world similarity semantics undermines the strongest argument against CXM, and I offer a new, principled argument for the validity
of CXM that is in no way undermined by Tooley’s counterexample. Finally, I formulate a simple semantics for the subjunctive
conditional that is consistent with both CXM and Tooley’s counterexample.
相似文献
Charles B. CrossEmail: |
16.
Husserl’s Discovery of Philosophical Discourse 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Robert Sokolowski 《Husserl Studies》2008,24(3):167-175
Husserl’s Idea of Phenomenology is his first systematic attempt to show how phenomenology differs from natural science and in particular psychology. He does
this by the phenomenological reduction. One of his achievements is to show that the formal structures of intentionality are
more akin to logic than to psychology. I claim that Husserl’s argument can be made more intuitive if we consider phenomenology
to be the study of truth rather than knowledge, and if we see the reduction as primarily a modification in our vocabulary
and discourse and not as simply a change in attitude. I briefly compare Husserl’s concept of philosophy with those of Plato
and Kant.
相似文献
Robert SokolowskiEmail: |
17.
Rasmus Thybo Jensen 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(3):371-388
I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational
motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous
preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest
we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance
both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.
相似文献
Rasmus Thybo JensenEmail: |
18.
Lloyd Hawkeye Robertson 《Journal of religion and health》2007,46(3):449-461
Many lay writers have claimed that psychologists and other scientists need to integrate something called “spirituality” into
their work. This spirituality, usually undefined, is not something the truth of which may be determined by scientific means,
yet it should be called upon to guide or govern our actions in certain all-important ways. This paper deconstructs two such
calls that, in the end, are based on the notion of revealed, or religiously held, truth. A paradigm by which spirituality
can be investigated integrating the individual self with culture is proposed, and use of this paradigm when considering modernization
and supply-side theses of religious propagation is suggested.
相似文献
Lloyd Hawkeye RobertsonEmail: |
19.
Simon Roberts-Thomson 《Res Publica》2008,14(2):69-82
The institution of slavery is an unjust institution. The aim of this paper is to provide an explanation of why it is unjust.
I argue that slavery is unjust because it makes it impossible for slaves to realise both their interest in self-respect and
their interest in being at home in the world. Furthermore, I argue that this explanation of the injustice of slavery also
provides us with an argument for political equality.
相似文献
Simon Roberts-ThomsonEmail: |
20.
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):157-173
It is tempting to think that multi premise closure creates a special class of paradoxes having to do with the accumulation
of risks, and that these paradoxes could be escaped by rejecting the principle, while still retaining single premise closure.
I argue that single premise deduction is also susceptible to risks. I show that what I take to be the strongest argument for
rejecting multi premise closure is also an argument for rejecting single premise closure. Because of the symmetry between
the principles, they come as a package: either both will have to be rejected or both will have to be revised.
相似文献
Maria Lasonen-AarnioEmail: |