ON THE EINSTELLUNG EFFECT IN PROBLEM SOLVING: Some critical remarks

Objections are raised to Luchins' interpretation of the Einstellung effect and his negative evaluation of this effect. It is proposed to shift the emphasis from behavior to perception. The subject does not develop a 'bad' habit, but acts according to the specific type of problem which the experienced situation seems to present. Two types of problems are distinguished: whole problems, in which the critical problems in the Einstellung experiments are perceived as application situations, and part problems, in which the critical problems are perceived as problems in their own right.     

Validity generalization: Some critical remarks on the Schmidt-Hunter procedure*

This article presents some critical comments on the validity generalization procedure which has been presented by Schmidt, Hunter and others. They have put forward a method for testing the hypothesis that the variance in validity coefficients across situations for job-test combinations is due to what they consider to be statistical artifacts. The Schmidt-Hunter approach is criticized on the following points: the compilation of validity data, the use of criterion measures, and the test of the hypothesis of no situational specificity. Further, the relation between the concepts ‘situational specificity’ and ‘validity generalization’ is considered. In addition, it is noted that Schmidt, Hunter and others have defined the concept ‘situation’ in a different way than classical writers. It is concluded that the Schmidt-Hunter approach to validity generalization shows fundamental shortcomings. As a consequence their far-reaching conclusions for the practice of personnel selection should be considered premature.     

In defense of liberalism: Some extended remarks

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

Wegner on hallucinations,inconsistency, and the illusion of free will. Some critical remarks

Wegner’s argument on the illusory nature of conscious will, as developed in The Illusion of Conscious Will (2002) and other publications, has had major impact. Based on empirical data, he develops a theory of apparent mental causation in order to explain the occurrence of the illusion of conscious will. Part of the evidence for his argument is derived from a specific interpretation of the phenomenon of auditory verbal hallucinations as they may occur in schizophrenia. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the validity of the evidence on auditory verbal hallucinations as employed by Wegner. I conclude that auditory hallucinations do not provide solid evidence for Wegner’s theory. Moreover, the phenomena in schizophrenia provide, in fact, an argument against part of Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation.     

Language and thought: Some remarks on Chomsky and Piaget

The author analyzes pertinent aspects of Piaget's and Chomsky's point of view on language and thought, indicating the similarities in their attempts to understand the underlying structures of both functions. The major difference between Chomsky and Piaget is that the latter considers all cognitive acquisitions, including language, to be the outcome of the gradual process of construction; whereas the former seems to be assuming as innate a general ability to synthesize the successive levels reached by an increasingly complex cognitive organization. Citing examples drawn from ongoing research in Geneva, the author also challenges Chomsky's assertion that there exist highly innate specific capacities which account for the principles underlying the development of scientific knowledge.Translated by Gilbert Voyat, Graduate Faculty, City College, and The Graduate Center of the City University of New York, in collaboration with Donald Nicholson-Smith.     

The program of geometrization of physics: Some philosophical remarks

In this paper I discuss some philosophical problems concerning the geometrization of physics, and propose that geometrization and unification are strongly combined.     

Some remarks on the kuder-richardson reliability coefficient

The Kuder-Richardson reliability coefficient is derived in a manner independent of that originally given. Various alternative forms applicable to special situations are exhibited with the purpose of making them available to others interested in using this formula. A simplification in computation is suggested for use with a calculating machine.     

Some remarks on restricting the knowability principle

The Fitch paradox poses a serious challenge for anti-realism. This paper investigates the option for an anti-realist to answer the challenge by restricting the knowability principle. Based on a critical discussion of Dummett??s and Tennant??s suggestions for a restriction desiderata for a principled solution are developed. In the second part of the paper a different restriction is proposed. The proposal uses the notion of uniform formulas and diagnoses the problem arising in the case of Moore sentences in the different status propositional letters receive. The new proposal is able to avoid some of the criticism on its predecessors.     

Some remarks on the Rationality of Induction

This paper begins with a rigorous critique of David Stove's recent bookThe Rationality of Induction. In it, Stove produced four different proofs to refute Hume's sceptical thesis about induction. I show that Stove's attempts to vindicate induction are unsuccessful. Three of his proofs refute theses that are not the sceptical thesis about induction at all. Stove's fourth proof, which uses the sampling principle to justify one particular inductive inference, makes crucial use of an unstated assumption regarding randomness. Once this assumption is made explicit, Hume's thesis once more survives.The refutation of Stove's fourth proof leads to some observations which relate Goodman's grue paradox with randomness of a sample. I formulate a generalized version of Goodman's grue paradox, and argue that whenever a sample, no matter how large, is drawn from a predetermined smaller interval of a population that is distributed over a larger interval, any conclusion drawn about the characteristics of the population based on the observed characteristics of the sample is fatally vulnerable to the generalized grue paradox.Finally, I argue that the problem of justification of induction can be addressed successfully only from a cognitive point of view, but not from a metaphysical one. That is, we may ask whether an inductive inference is justified or not within the theories or cognitive structures of a subject, but not outside them. With this realization, induction is seen as a cognitive process, not unlike vision, that is useful at times, and yet has its own illusions that may make it a serious obstacle to cognition at other times.