话语理论与后马克思主义的哲学取向--拉克劳、墨菲的后马克思主义方法论解读

话语理论是以拉克劳、墨菲为代表的后马克思主义哲学思想的核心,是他们在现代哲学,特别是20世纪哲学的语言学转向之后试图重构其哲学基石的理论尝试和结果。具体而言,话语理论是在当代言语行为理论,特别是后期维特根斯坦语言哲学的基础上,结合后结构主义者德里达的解构思想,综合而成的一种哲学理论。它试图将“话语”(d iscourse)作为后马克思主义的基石,并服务其以“霸权”(hegemony)为核心的“政治本体论”。在拉克劳和墨菲的后马克思主义思想中,所有问题都可归结为“话语”。“话语”成了阐释后马克思主义理论的重要依据和理论参考。不仅…     

On Confucian Political Philosophy and Its Theory of Justice

Traditional Confucian political culture (including its concepts, systems, practices and folk customs) has a legacy that deserves careful reconsideration today. Its theories, institutions, and practices address the source, legitimacy, division and balance, and restriction of political power. Confucian politics is a type of “moral politics” which sticks to what ought to be and what is justifiable, and holds that political power comes from Heaven, mandate of Heaven or Dao of Heaven, which implies that justification and standards rest with the people referring to scholars peasants, workers and merchants. This type of justification is rooted in the public space and the autonomous strength of the people, and it finds guidance in the involvement, supervision, and criticism of the class of scholar-bureaucrats (shi 士). In this article, Western political philosophy will be taken as a frame of reference for evaluating Confucian conception of justice as well as Confucian ideas of distribution, fairness of opportunity, caring kindness for “the least advantaged,” and institutional construction. It will argue that the leading characteristic of Confucian political theory is that of “substantive justice.”     

BOOK REVIEWS

Hao Changchi, Politics and Human Beings. Three Dimensions in Pre-Qin Political Philosophy,政治与人：先秦政治哲学的三个维度.. Beijing： Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Chubanshe, 2012, 337pp. ISBN： 9787562043959. Hao Changchi, a leading thinker on political philosophy, takes on a thorough research project exploring Pre-Qin political philosophy and its enlightenment in this book, deviating from the usual route of emphasizing the separation of individual and public realms and centering only on freedom and equality. As the book＇s title suggests, the core issue is the relationship between human nature and political existence. Many people might define politics as an outcome of interest conflicts and negotiations, but this view overlooks the existence of concrete people. Hence, the author proposes a wholly new understanding of ＂political nature,＂ which is supposed to embody an individual＇s moral and religious life. Thus, politics is envisaged as consisting of three dimensions, and this is especially true in Pre-Qin political philosophy. According to Hao, the earliest form of politics in ancient China was an entirety composed of heavenly will, universal love and benefit for the whole world, which shaped people into three dimensions （4）. Later, the three dimensions were reduced to two, namely loyalty and filial piety, when it comes to Confucian philosophy.     

"他者"的境界与"对抗"的世界--从拉康的"他者"到拉克劳和墨菲的"社会对抗"

以拉克劳和墨菲为代表的"后马克思主义"以其理论的晦涩和复杂而著称.拉克劳坦承他们的思想来源于"现象学、后分析哲学以及其他总体上被称为后结构主义的思潮".[1]但若深入探究,精神分析理论,特别是拉康的精神分析学说也是构成了其后马克思主义理论的重要源泉.因此,考察拉康与拉克劳和墨菲之间内在联系,就构成了本文的要旨.我们认为,拉康的精神分析理论,特别是有关"他者"的理论,是拉克劳和墨菲的后马克思主义的重要理论基础,这特别体现在其核心的"对抗"思想中.本文通过对拉康"他者"概念与拉克劳和墨菲的"对抗"理论的考察,以试图沟通二者之间的内在逻辑关联,并力图阐明拉康学说对理解拉克劳和墨菲思想的重要性及其意义.     

论拉克劳、墨菲领导权理论的语言学基础

拉克劳、墨菲在《领导权与社会主义策略》中提出了一种以领导权为核心的激进民主策略,试图在迎合当代社会多样化发展的同时,保持马克思主义的激进性。应当说,这一研究代表了当代西方马克思主义的一个新方向:从文化批判转向“现实政治策略”的建构。而这种“现实政治策略”建构的基础,对于拉克劳、墨菲来说乃是语言学。本文的主要内容是揭示:语言学在何种意义上以及如何构成了拉克劳、墨菲的领导权理论的必要基础;这种领导权策略与传统马克思主义的革命策略的根本差异在何处;这种所谓的“激进的”政治策略的激进性的本质究竟是什么。一拉克劳…     

《哲学研究》1982年第1—12期分类总目录

革命的实践的唯物主义—学习《刘少 奇选集》上卷中的哲学思想 ‘””’.‘’““’“‘’‘·‘……宋士堂李德茂(1·3)试论毛泽东同志对历史唯物论的贡献 ···················。·······……贾春峰(6·3、7·25)坚持辩证唯物主义的范例—学习《中 华人民共和国宪法修改草案》的体会 ””“’‘’“”‘’“‘’、··…‘·······……王叔文(8·3)坚持求实精神—学习陈云同志 1949 至1956年的部分文稿札记…邵华泽(10·3)建设高度的社会主义民主是我们的根本 目标和根本任务···········……杨…     

新霸权理论与后马克思主义的解构逻辑

霸权(hegemony)(也译“领导权”)理论是后马克思主义的代表人物拉克劳、墨菲的核心理论。自拉克劳、墨菲1985年的《霸权与社会主义的策略》一书出版后,霸权理论在欧洲和北美都产生了很大的理论影响。拉克劳、墨菲的霸权理论是对西方马克思主义的代表人物葛兰西的霸权理论的继承和发展,所以,人们有时也把这一理论称为“新葛兰西主义”。一、从葛兰西的霸权理论到新葛兰西主义拉克劳、墨菲在《霸权与社会主义的策略》一书中详细地概述了其理论与葛兰西的霸权理论之间的内在联系与差异。众所周知,葛兰西“市民社会”理论的重要意义在于其对传统…     

Between Mind and Trace — A Research into the Theories on Xin 心 (Mind) of Early Song Confucianism and Buddhism

From Han Yu’s yuan Dao 原道 (retracing the Dao) to Ouyang Xiu’s lun ben 论本 (discussing the root), the conflicts arising from Confucianists’ rejection of Buddhism were focused on one point, namely, the examination of zhongxin suo shou 中心所守 (something kept in mind). The attitude towards the distinction between mind and trace, and the proper approach to erase the gap between emptiness and being, as well as that between the expedient and the true, became the major concerns unavoidable for various thinkers to integrate the two teachings and to propel academic development. “To understand by mind” and “to blame for matter” were of crucial methodological significance for transcendence in both Confucianism and Buddhism. The arguments of Confucian scholars like Zhang Zai and the Cheng brothers on the identity of mind and trace and the unity of void and solid are mutually manifested. The same mind with the same principle means “mind is principle.” The “common axis of Confucianism and Buddhism” exists in the emphasis on mind beyond trace. The unification of mind and trace or the accordance of body and function has actually become the cardinal foundation for the possible mergence of the Three Teachings.     

葛兰西与“后马克思主义”的生成

“后马克思主义”与新葛兰西主义是两项互相联系而又不同的理论规划。葛兰西主义不仅是“后马克思主义”的理论来源,而且它的思想方法和概念形式在一定程度上被沉积到“后马克思主义”的理论构造之中。新葛兰西主义的“接合理论”本身潜伏着解除“接合”的外在限制的离散力,而接合概念的“后马克思主义化”就是这种离散力的直接后果;葛兰西把霸权视为一种接合过程,已经预示了一种语言政治学的新视域,而后马克思义的话语政治不过是葛兰西式的语言政治学的后结构主义处理;葛兰西一直强调霸权是对其它集团的意识形态原素的接合,在他看来,成功的政治是一种具有高度兼容性的政治,它能够从异己的、反己的力量中吸收增益性的成分从而大大拓展自己的存在空间,葛兰西这种观念被拉克劳与莫菲以一种独特的形式接合到“后马克思主义”的论述之中。     

Hegel,Schelling and Laozi on Nothingness

This article looks at Hegel’s and Schelling’s discussions of Laozi’s wu 無 in History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Mythology respectively, and then relates them back to those two Western thinkers’ own understandings of the concept of nothingness. This exploration demonstrates that while Hegel sees nothingness more as a logical concept not different from being, Schelling equates Laozi’s wu with Nichtseiende of the first potency in his theory of the potencies of God. This article will further put the question in perspective by examining or speculating how the three philosophers would address the problem of ex nihilo nihil fit. Finally, it will highlight the striking similarity between the views of Schelling and Laozi regarding the role of the will or desire (yu 欲), in our knowledge about nothingness: While Schelling’s first potency, Nichtseiende, is a “not willing will,” the second potency is “willing” and therefore the beginning of existence. Laozi, on the other hand, believes that without desire we can discern the ultimate mystery, while with desire we can only see the outer fringe of things. However, Laozi differs from Schelling in that the latter’s willing God is absent in his philosophy.     

意识形态理论的当代新发展

意识形态理论是马克思主义的重要组成部分。马克思主义意识形态理论从本质上来说是一种“社会批判理论”;这种意识形态批判理论形成后,在20世纪20、30年代以卢卡奇、葛兰西等人为代表的西方马克思主义时期得到充分展开,并在随后的法兰克福学派那里发展到了一个新的高度。另外,法国著名学者阿尔都塞在葛兰西等马克思主义者的基础上,创造性地发展出了具有独特魅力的结构主义意识形态理论。20世纪70、80年代以来,随着以拉克劳和墨菲为代表的“后马克思主义”思潮的兴起,人们围绕着意识形态的不同内涵展开了激烈的交锋与对话,出现了拉克劳、墨菲…     

On the Constitution and the True Aim of The Joy of Heaven and Non-Speech： A Reinterpretation of the Debate at the Dam over the Hao River

The essay starts by questioning how the debate at the dam over the Hao River between Zhuang Zi and Hui Zi arose. It describes the source of ideas that led Zhuang Zi to speak on the enjoyment of the fish (yuzhile 鱼之乐) and points out that the meaning of the debate rests in bringing about the emergence of the true subject of “enjoyment.” It highlights this meaning by analyzing the essential content and value orientation of Zhuang Zi’s ideas on the joy of heaven (tian le 天乐) and perfect enjoyment (zhile 至乐). Following up on this thread, the essay goes further to analyze the true meaning of Zhuang Zi’s theory concerning the “great speech” of “non-speaking.” This essay holds that the debate is a parable, an external representation that unfolds an internal tension between two different levels contained within Zhuang Zi’s thought, rather than simply a debate between these two thinkers.     

On the Academic Differences between Xihe School and Zhusi School

Ever since Han Fei proposed that “Confucianism has divided into eight schools,” the divisions among Confucius’ followers have been a complicated puzzle in Chinese academic history. After the demise of Confucius, two schools, Xihe 西河 School and Zhusi 洙泗 School, founded by Zixia and Zengzi respectively, had the biggest influence. Inheriting and developing Confucianism, these two schools each had their own unique insights. If we compare their thoughts, the development of early Confucianism can be found has two different approaches: (1) Zixia attached great importance to study. He practiced Confucianism by means of learning comprehensively and belonged to the school of knowledge seeking. On the other hand, Zengzi valued one’s perfect inner personality. He paid much more attention to searching inwardly, and honored “morality” at all times. (2) Zixia paid special attention to the ritual system, emphasizing the external ritual specifications of human behavior, and advocating cultivating one’s morality from outside to inside. Zengzi maintained cultivating one’s morality from inside to outside, especially through self- reflection. (3) Zixia emphasized self-cultivating and being harmonious to others, therefore he focused on external achievements, while Zengzi paid more attention to moral integrity. (4) While Zixia rarely discussed filial piety, Zengzi regarded filial piety as the most important virtue. Since filial piety is applicable universally, Zengzi’s philosophy is a filial piety-rooted philosophy. Broadly speaking, Zengzi and Zixia’s main difference lies in their different approaches to learning. Despite these differences, as firm Confucians they are “the same in Dao and different in methods.”     

Wang Fuzhi’s Interpretation of Spirit/Shen in His Annotation on the Zhuangzi

This essay systematically explores the concept “spirit” (shen 神) in Wang Fuzhi’s Annotation on the Zhuangzi (Zhuangzi Jie 莊子解). Following Zhuangzi, Wang Fuzhi interprets spirit as a mass of vital force/jingqi, and regards spirit as the master of human life and human body. Through preserving one’s spirit, one will not only be able to preserve one’s body, but also keep all creatures immune from sickness and plague. This can be accomplished, since a well-preserved spirit will contribute harmonious and pure qi to the universe and make the whole universe more harmonious. In an effort to achieve this purpose, Wang Fuzhi proposes “forgetting all external things” and aiming for an empty and detached mind, on one hand, and asks a person to concentrate his spirit with a constant will, one the other hand. Once one’s spirit is well concentrated, one will be a spiritual person (shenren 神人), who will transcend life and death, fortune and misfortune, always living a leisurely and carefree life. One will also forget all cognitive distinctions and fully become one with the transformation of things and Heaven (tian 天). In this way, one’s spirit will achieve eternity, and fully realize the meaning of human life.     

李大钊哲学思想发展初探

武仁同志在《“五四”前后李大钊哲学思想探讨》一文(见《哲学研究》1979年第5期,以下简称武文)中,对李大钊同志在1915年至中国共产党创立这一时期,即“‘五四’前后”的哲学思想,作了深入的探讨,明确肯定了李大钊同志作为“五四”运动的旗手,传播马克思主义的先驱和中国共产党建党思想奠基人的历史地位。并着重从他的哲学思想方面论证了他作为“中国哲学史上以辩证唯物主义为武器来观察社会、认识社会和改造社会的第一个哲学家”,“中国哲学发展史的新时代的开拓者”的历史功绩。这些论述,无疑是有意义的。     

湖北省召开“两兰”精神暨典型宣传理论研讨会

党和国家领导人发出向湖北“农金卫士”杨大兰、潘星兰学习的号召后,一个学习“两兰”的活动正在全国范围内兴起,乘此东风,中国农业银行湖北省分行和湖北伦理学会等七个单位,于今年11月9日至12日在宜昌联合召开了“‘两兰’精神暨典型宣传理论研讨会”,省内90余名从事理论研究、宣传和思想政治工作的同志出席了会议,并提交论文73篇。     

欧拉伯与伊斯兰恐惧症之缘起北大核心CSSCISSCI

李明欢在其文章“欧拉伯：源起、现实与反思”一文中对“欧拉伯”一词来龙去脉有较多论述。“‘欧拉伯’（EuraNa）是由英文‘欧洲’（Europe）与‘阿拉伯’（Arabia）两词组合而成的一个新的人造词。1973年中东十月战争结束不久．法国新创刊的一份以欧阿合作为主题的时事评论杂志,以《欧拉伯》（EurabiaNewsletter）为刊名．由此正式‘制造’了这一新词。该杂志围绕当时‘欧一阿对话’（Euro-ArabDiaIogue）发表评论,并没有产生太大的社会影响。但是,‘欧拉伯’一词．却逐渐被英、法、德、荷等诸多拉丁系语言所接纳,成为一个国际性词汇。”（李明欢,2010）“然而,2005年1月出版的（（欧拉伯：欧洲一阿拉伯轴心》（以下简称（《欧拉伯》）一书,对‘欧拉伯’进行了重新解构,将其定义为‘欧洲正在阿拉伯化、伊斯兰化’的政治标签,并进而衍生出‘欧拉伯威胁论’,从而引发欧、美、中东学界、政界的广泛关注与争论,‘欧拉波’成为研究当代欧美政治的重要新概念。”（李明欢,2010）     

1988年《五台山研究》总目录

五台山研究与宣传左五台山研究会首届学术思想讨论会上的开幕词 ”””.””.’“‘’.”·‘……“……白清才(13)五台山研究观划大纲……五台山研究会(14)在五台山研究会首届学术思想讨论会上的发言 ‘”””‘”.”’‘””’·’二‘·····……任继愈(15)左五首:听拜究会首届学术思想讨论会上的闭幕词 ’‘’.””‘’“’.“””.””..’…”’二杨建峰(18)几位专家学者在五台山研究会首届学术思想讨论会 上的发言···“·.’..··“一本刊编辑部(23)庄首届甲日五台山佛教学术会议预备会上的欢迎辞 ‘”“””‘’‘””’‘’…     

A Neo-Confucian Criticism of Daoism: Wang Fuzhi’s Contradictory Remarks on the Laozi

Based on Zhu Xi’s statement that Laozi’s teachings were very cruel, Wang Fuzhi condemned Laozi as a crafty, petty person in his Confucian commentaries. Yet, he had to understand the Laozi or Daodejing sympathetically when he commented on it in Laozi Yan老子衍 (Extended Commentary on the Laozi). As a result, he showed inconsistency in his criticism and evaluation of the author. Some scholars have noted this problem but have not shed ink analyzing it. This essay finds that Wang Fuzhi’s ambiguous attitude toward Laozi results from his Confucian prejudice against other schools and his failure to grasp the breadth and depth of Laozi’s thought. From the perspective of Heaven, Laozi promoted accommodation and non-interference in self-cultivation and governance, summed up by the maxim that “the sage manages affairs without deliberation, and spreads teachings without words.” In contrast, Wang Fuzhi stuck to the distinction between Confucianism and Daoism, and tried to use humanity and ritual propriety to supplement that which Heaven does not provide; as such, he criticized Laozi as crafty and irresponsible. Wang Fuzhi’s criticism neither hits the mark regarding Laozi’s weakness nor maintains a concordance with his earlier sympathetic appraisal in Laozi Yan; the reason for this is that Wang Fuzhi could not fully grasp Laozi’s thought from a Confucian and anthropocentric perspective.     

The “Gongfu Finger” and Learning in the Analects

After having discussed three main features of Ni Peimin’s understanding of the gongfu orientation in reading the Analects, this essay examines the first of the key terms in the whole of the book, i.e., xue/”learning” (學) and critically elaborates how our understanding of Confucius could be deepened and enriched under the guidance of this new orientation which Ni calls the “gongfu finger.”