Neurocognitive control in dance perception and performance

Dance is a rich source of material for researchers interested in the integration of movement and cognition. The multiple aspects of embodied cognition involved in performing and perceiving dance have inspired scientists to use dance as a means for studying motor control, expertise, and action-perception links. The aim of this review is to present basic research on cognitive and neural processes implicated in the execution, expression, and observation of dance, and to bring into relief contemporary issues and open research questions. The review addresses six topics: 1) dancers' exemplary motor control, in terms of postural control, equilibrium maintenance, and stabilization; 2) how dancers' timing and on-line synchronization are influenced by attention demands and motor experience; 3) the critical roles played by sequence learning and memory; 4) how dancers make strategic use of visual and motor imagery; 5) the insights into the neural coupling between action and perception yielded through exploration of the brain architecture mediating dance observation; and 6) a neuroesthetics perspective that sheds new light on the way audiences perceive and evaluate dance expression. Current and emerging issues are presented regarding future directions that will facilitate the ongoing dialog between science and dance.     

Know thy sound: Perceiving self and others in musical contexts

This review article provides a summary of the findings from empirical studies that investigated recognition of an action's agent by using music and/or other auditory information. Embodied cognition accounts ground higher cognitive functions in lower level sensorimotor functioning. Action simulation, the recruitment of an observer's motor system and its neural substrates when observing actions, has been proposed to be particularly potent for actions that are self-produced. This review examines evidence for such claims from the music domain. It covers studies in which trained or untrained individuals generated and/or perceived (musical) sounds, and were subsequently asked to identify who was the author of the sounds (e.g., the self or another individual) in immediate (online) or delayed (offline) research designs. The review is structured according to the complexity of auditory–motor information available and includes sections on: 1) simple auditory information (e.g., clapping, piano, drum sounds), 2) complex instrumental sound sequences (e.g., piano/organ performances), and 3) musical information embedded within audiovisual performance contexts, when action sequences are both viewed as movements and/or listened to in synchrony with sounds (e.g., conductors' gestures, dance). This work has proven to be informative in unraveling the links between perceptual–motor processes, supporting embodied accounts of human cognition that address action observation. The reported findings are examined in relation to cues that contribute to agency judgments, and their implications for research concerning action understanding and applied musical practice.     

The motor theory of social cognition: a critique

Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our understanding of human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of the mirror system, first discovered in the brain of non-human primates, provides an observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the motor simulation of the agent's observed movements. This discovery has raised the prospects of a motor theory of social cognition. In humans, social cognition includes the ability to mindread, and many motor theorists of social cognition try to bridge the gap between motor cognition and mindreading by endorsing a simulation account of mindreading. Here, we question the motor theory of social cognition and give reasons for our skepticism.     

Action, mindreading and embodied social cognition

One of the central insights of the embodied cognition (EC) movement is that cognition is closely tied to action. In this paper, I formulate an EC-inspired hypothesis concerning social cognition. In this domain, most think that our capacity to understand and interact with one another is best explained by appeal to some form of mindreading. I argue that prominent accounts of mindreading likely contain a significant lacuna. Evidence indicates that what I call an agent??s actional processes and states??her goals, needs, intentions, desires, and so on??likely play important roles in and for mindreading processes. If so, a full understanding of mindreading processes and their role in cognition more broadly will require an understanding of how actional mental processes interact with, influence, or take part in mindreading processes.     

Weaving the fabric of social interaction: Articulating developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience in the domain of motor cognition

In this article, we bring together recent findings from developmental science and cognitive neuroscience to argue that perception-action coupling constitutes the fundamental mechanism of motor cognition. A variety of empirical evidence suggests that observed and executed actions are coded in a common cognitive and neural framework, enabling individuals to construct shared representations of self and other actions. We review work to suggest that such shared representations support action anticipation, organization, and imitation. These processes, along with additional computational mechanisms for determining a sense of agency and behavioral regulation, form the fabric of social interaction. In addition, humans possess the capacity to move beyond these basic aspects of action analysis to interpret behavior at a deeper level, an ability that may be outside the scope of the mirror system. Understanding the nature of shared representations from the vantage point of developmental and cognitive science and neuroscience has the potential to inform a range of motor and social processes. This perspective also elucidates intriguing new directions and research questions and generates specific hypotheses regarding the impact of early disorders (e.g., developmental movement disorders) on subsequent action processing.     

Perceptual resonance: action-induced modulation of perception

A direct relationship between perception and action implies bi-directionality, and predicts not only effects of perception on action but also effects of action on perception. Modern theories of social cognition have intensively examined the relation from perception to action and propose that mirroring the observed actions of others underlies action understanding. Here, we suggest that this view is incomplete, as it neglects the perspective of the actor. We will review empirical evidence showing the effects of self-generated action on perceptual judgments. We propose that producing action might prime perception in a way that observers are selectively sensitive to related or similar actions of conspecifics. Therefore, perceptual resonance, not motor resonance, might be decisive for grounding sympathy and empathy and, thus, successful social interactions.     

Motor imagery and higher-level cognition: four hurdles before research can sprint forward

Traditionally, higher-level cognition has been described as including processes such as attention, memory, language, and decision-making. However, motor processing and motor imagery are important aspects of cognition that have typically been considered outside of the traditional view. Recent research has demonstrated that there may be a critical functional relationship between motor imagery and other higher-level cognitive processes. Here we present a review of the extant literature on motor imagery and cognition, as well as outline four hurdles that must be addressed before the field investigating the influence of motor-based processes on higher-level cognition can be moved forward. These hurdles include problems distinguishing between visual and motor processes, addressing the differences in tasks and stimuli used to evoke motor imagery, accounting for individual differences in motor imagery ability, and identifying the appropriate neural correlates. It is important that these hurdles are addressed in future research so we can sprint forward and further our knowledge about this interesting relationship.     

Beyond sensorimotor segregation: On mirror neurons and social affordance space tracking

Mirror neuron research has come a long way since the early 1990s, and many theorists are now stressing the heterogeneity and complexity of the sensorimotor properties of fronto-parietal circuits. However, core aspects of the initial ‘mirror mechanism’ theory, i.e. the idea of a symmetric encapsulated mirroring function translating sensory action perceptions into motor formats, still appears to be shaping much of the debate. This article challenges the empirical plausibility of the sensorimotor segregation implicit in the original mirror metaphor. It is proposed instead that the teleological organization found in the broader fronto-parietal circuits might be inherently sensorimotor. Thus the idea of an independent ‘purely perceptual’ goal understanding process is questioned. Further, it is hypothesized that the often asymmetric, heterogeneous and contextually modulated mirror and canonical neurons support a function of multisensory mapping and tracking of the perceiving agents affordance space. Such a shift in the interpretative framework offers a different theoretical handle on how sensorimotor processes might ground various aspects of intentional action choice and social cognition. Mirror neurons would under the proposed “social affordance model” be seen as dynamic parts of larger circuits, which support tracking of currently shared and competing action possibilities. These circuits support action selection processes—but also our understanding of the options and action potentials that we and perhaps others have in the affordance space. In terms of social cognition ‘mirror’ circuits might thus help us understand not only the intentional actions others are actually performing—but also what they could have done, did not do and might do shortly.     

Social Cognition Permeates Social Psychology: Motivated Mental Processes Guide the Study of Human Social Behavior

Social cognition provides a metatheoretical approach to understanding the mental underpinnings of human social behavior. This paper reviews some of the major themes in social cognition research, tracing its progression from a methodological hybrid between cognitive and social psychology to a major foundation of social psychology. We stress the most recent trend in social cognition research – the motivated tactician theme – which focuses on the roles of motives and goals in people's mental processes and social behavior; examples from our laboratory illustrate this theme. Our brief historical overview emphasizes diversity within the social cognition approach; its applicability to multiple psychological and social issues; and directions for collaboration with other notable research traditions, particularly cross-cultural perspectives.     

Action mechanisms for social cognition: behavioral and neural correlates of developing Theory of Mind

Many psychological theories posit foundational links between two fundamental constructs: (1) our ability to produce, perceive, and represent action; and (2) our ability to understand the meaning and motivation behind the action (i.e. Theory of Mind; ToM). This position is contentious, however, and long‐standing competing theories of social‐cognitive development debate roles for basic action‐processing in ToM. Developmental research is key to investigating these hypotheses, but whether individual differences in neural and behavioral measures of motor action relate to social‐cognitive development is unknown. We examined 3‐ to 5‐year‐old children's (N = 26) EEG mu‐desynchronization during production of object‐directed action, and explored associations between mu‐desynchronization and children's behavioral motor skills, behavioral action‐representation abilities, and behavioral ToM. For children with high (but not low) mu‐desynchronization, motor skill related to action‐representation abilities, and action‐representation mediated relations between motor skill and ToM. Results demonstrate novel foundational links between action‐processing and ToM, suggesting that basic motor action may be a key mechanism for social‐cognitive development, thus shedding light on the origins and emergence of higher social cognition.     

Is the glass half empty or half full and does it even matter? Cognition,emotion, and psychopathology

ABSTRACT

This contribution examines the outcomes of recent decades of research on the interaction between cognition and emotion and how it has informed our understanding and treatment of emotional disorders with a special focus on depression. The review identifies important challenges to this work including the dynamic nature of cognitive processes and emotional responding, the bidirectional relation of cognition and emotion, the need for new tasks and for studies conducted outside of the laboratory, and the consideration of context such as interpersonal factors. Examining interactions between cognition and emotion and integrating basic research on cognition into the scientific understanding of emotional difficulties in psychopathology has contributed in many ways to what the field currently knows about the origins and the treatment of emotional disorders. Important challenges lie ahead – especially the integration of this work into the development of novel treatment approaches.     

Embodied Cultural Cognition: Situating the Study of Embodied Cognition in Socio‐Cultural Contexts

Embodiment research has demonstrated that cognition is grounded in bodily interactions with the environment and that abstract concepts are tied to the body’s sensory and motor systems. Building upon this embodiment perspective and advancing our understanding, we discuss the extension of embodied cultural cognition. We propose that some associations between bodily experiences and abstract concepts are not randomly formed; rather, the development of such associations is situated in a socio‐cultural context, informed by cultural imperatives, values, and habits. We draw evidence supporting this view of embodied cultural cognition in body–mind linkages manifested in construal of emotions, time perception, person perception, social power, and moral reasoning. To further extend this research avenue that synthesizes the studies of embodied cognition and culture, we also suggest potential future research directions inspired by this view. This embodied cultural cognition account is useful in understanding and organizing accumulating discoveries of cultural variations in embodiments; it also highlights the social situatedness of embodied cognition and is, therefore, highly compatible with theorizing and research in social and cultural psychology.     

Reintegrating the Study of Accuracy Into Social Cognition Research

Understanding the contents of other minds is a vital and ubiquitous task that humans perform with impressive skill. As such, it is surprising that the majority of social cognition research—whether behavioral or neuroscientific—focuses on the processes people use when attempting to understand each other while ignoring how well those attempts fare. Here we review historical reasons for the contemporary dominance of process-oriented research as well as the resurgence in the last decades of new approaches to studying interpersonal accuracy. Although in principle both the accuracy-oriented and process-oriented approaches study related aspects of the same phenomena, in practice they have made strikingly little contact with each other. We argue that integrating these approaches could expand our understanding of social cognition, both by suggesting new ways to synthesize extant data and generate novel predictions and lines of research, and by providing a framework for accomplishing such an integration. This integration can be especially useful in highlighting the deeply contextualized nature of the relationships between social cognitive processes, accuracy, and adaptive social behavior.     

Intentional action processing results from automatic bottom-up attention: An EEG-investigation into the Social Relevance Hypothesis using hypnosis

Social stimuli grab our attention. However, it has rarely been investigated how variations in attention affect the processing of social stimuli, although the answer could help us uncover details of social cognition processes such as action understanding. In the present study, we examined how changes to bottom-up attention affects neural EEG-responses associated with intentional action processing. We induced an increase in bottom-up attention by using hypnosis. We recorded the electroencephalographic μ-wave suppression of hypnotized participants when presented with intentional actions in first and third person perspective in a video-clip paradigm. Previous studies have shown that the μ-rhythm is selectively suppressed both when executing and observing goal-directed motor actions; hence it can be used as a neural signal for intentional action processing. Our results show that neutral hypnotic trance increases μ-suppression in highly suggestible participants when they observe intentional actions. This suggests that social action processing is enhanced when bottom-up attentional processes are predominant. Our findings support the Social Relevance Hypothesis, according to which social action processing is a bottom-up driven attentional process, and can thus be altered as a function of bottom-up processing devoted to a social stimulus.     

The psychology of memory,extended cognition,and socially distributed remembering

This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive complementarity argument, say that they agree with it completely: but they describe it as “a non-revolutionary approach” which leaves “the cognitive psychology of memory as the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous systems.” In response, we carve out, on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism. Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny’s account of the “scaffolded mind” (this issue), we develop a multidimensional framework for understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technological and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more “revolutionary” metaphysical claims about the partial constitution of cognitive processes by external resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence or transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical results as evidence against the idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin. We respond with a more principled, representative survey of the scientific psychology of memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of collaborative recall and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying conditions for mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended, embedded, and distributed cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact with independently motivated research programs in the cognitive psychology of memory.     

Action observation produces motor resonance in Parkinson's disease

Observation of movement activates the observer's own motor system, influencing the performance of actions and facilitating social interaction. This motor resonance is demonstrated behaviourally through visuomotor priming, whereby response latencies are influenced by the compatibility between an intended action and an observed (task‐irrelevant) action. The impact of movement disorders such as Parkinson's disease (PD) on motor resonance is unclear, as previous studies of visuomotor priming have not separated imitative compatibility (specific to human movement) from general stimulus‐response compatibility effects. We examined visuomotor priming in 23 participants with mild‐to‐moderate PD and 24 healthy older adults, using a task that pitted imitative compatibility against general stimulus‐response compatibility. Participants made a key press after observing a task‐irrelevant moving human finger or rectangle that was either compatible or incompatible with their response. Imitative compatibility effects, rather than general stimulus‐response compatibility effects, were found specifically for the human finger. Moreover, imitative compatibility effects did not differ between groups, indicating intact motor resonance in the PD group. These findings constitute the first unambiguous demonstration of imitative priming in both PD and healthy ageing, and have implications for therapeutic techniques to facilitate action, as well as the understanding of social cognition in PD.     

从动作模仿到社会认知：自我-他人控制的作用

在社会互动中, 人们具有自动模仿他人动作的倾向。尽管这种自动模仿有利于个体理解他人动作的感受, 但有时也会与自身的动作意图产生冲突。因此我们需要将自身动作意图与他人动作进行区分并调控二者之间的冲突。这种能力被称为自我-他人控制(self-other control, SOC)。与动作模仿控制相同, 心理理论、观点采择和共情等更高级的社会认知同样涉及对自我和他人信息的加工。很多证据表明, SOC可能是一种领域普遍的(domain-general)加工机制, 即在动作模仿控制和其他社会认知中, 大脑对自我和他人双方信息的区分和冲突调控共用同一套SOC系统。最近一些研究发现, 相比于抑制自身优势反应的抑制控制(inhibitory control), SOC是社会认知中一个更为关键的影响因素, 抑制控制对社会认知的作用受到SOC的调节。此外, SOC的领域普遍性提示我们, 未来可以通过简单的动作模仿控制训练, 来为社会认知受损个体(如孤独症和述情障碍者)进行康复训练。     

Finding "meaning" in psychology: a lay theories approach to self-regulation, social perception, and social development

Much of psychology focuses on universal principles of thought and action. Although an extremely productive pursuit, this approach, by describing only the "average person," risks describing no one in particular. This article discusses an alternate approach that complements interests in universal principles with analyses of the unique psychological meaning that individuals find in their experiences and interactions. Rooted in research on social cognition, this approach examines how people's lay theories about the stability or malleability of human attributes alter the meaning they give to basic psychological processes such as self-regulation and social perception. Following a review of research on this lay theories perspective in the field of social psychology, the implications of analyzing psychological meaning for other fields such as developmental, cultural, and personality psychology are discussed.     

Agenda 2000—communication: language as an implementational device for cognition

The aim of this paper is to identify the functions of social cognition in a communication context. It is argued that social cognition is for the regulation of adaptive action and makes use of external devices (e.g. language) to implement action. First, the complexity of communication as a social achievement is discussed to prepare the ground for examining the link between language, cognition and communication. The implementational devices (language) of social cognition are addressed next. On the basis of these considerations a message‐modulation model is proposed to conceptualize the interplay between language, cognition, motivation and communication. The application of this model to research on the transmission and maintenance of stereotypes illustrates the types of open research issues and directions that may be possible routes for future work. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.