Immediate activation of stereotypical gender information

This article reports six experiments in which we explored whether gender stereotype information is typically invoked when certain role and profession terms are read and the extent to which the use of such information is under the reader's strategic control. All of the experiments used a design in which subjects had to decide whether two terms (one an occupation and one a kinship term) could refer to the same person (e.g., surgeon-brother or surgeon-sister). The presentation conditions and the instructions were varied from experiment to experiment, to try to encourage the subjects to respond strategically and to suppress their use of gender stereotypes when responding. The results support not only the hypothesis that information about the stereotypical gender associated with occupations and roles is typically incorporated into the reader's representation immediately, but also the hypothesis that such information is difficult or impossible to suppress. The implications of these findings for current theories of text processing and text representation are discussed.     

Knowledge and judgments about events that occurred prior to birth: The measurement of the persistence of information

Data from five laboratories using five different techniques were reanalyzed to measure subjects’ knowledge of events that occurred over the past 70 years. Subjects were about 20 years of age, so the measures included events that extended up to 50 years before birth. The functions relating knowledge about the events to age do not decrease precipitously at birth but gradually drop to above-chance levels. Techniques usually used to study retention within the individual can be used to study the persistence of ideas and fashions within an age cohort in a culture.     

Remembering the levels of information in words

The qualitative nature of the incidental memory trace produced by perceptual and conceptual processing within a speeded inference task was examined. Performance on recall and auditory recognition tests replicated the general finding that semantic processing leads to better retention of words than does nonsemantic processing. This pattern of results was reversed on a visual recognition test designed to measure the amount of perceptual information remembered. These data suggest that different types of processing result in different aspects of the stimulus being encoded, with conceptual processing resulting primarily in the encoding of semantic information and perceptual processing resulting primarily in the encoding of physical information. Thus, the effectiveness of a particular kind of processing for good memory performance depends on the kind of information being tested.     

Remembering the Pattern that Connects: Toward an Eco-Informed MFT

Gregory Bateson, who is regarded as one of the founders of the field of family therapy, warned about the dangers of chopping up the ecology (literally and metaphorically). Yet the ecosystem is showing signs of faltering under the pressure of human mistreatment, and increasingly people are manifesting symptoms associated with extreme disconnection from nature. Although family therapists have devoted little attention to the relationship between human and ecological planetary suffering, as systemically trained professionals MFTs are uniquely situated to see the big picture and to promote integrative healing between individual, familial, and environmental levels. This article explores some of the factors underpinning the field’s lack of attention to ecological issues and provides recommendations for how MFTs can remember the pattern that connects by cultivating a more eco-informed approach to training and clinical practice.     

Intentional forgetting can increase,not decrease,residual influences of to-be-forgotten information

Intentionally forgotten information remains in memory at essentially full strength, as measured by recognition and priming, but access to that information is impaired, as measured by recall. Given that pattern, it seemed plausible that intentionally forgotten information might have a greater impact on certain subsequent judgments than would intentionally remembered information. In 2 experiments, participants cued to forget nonfamous names were subsequently more likely to make false attributions of fame to those names than were participants instructed to remember them. These findings implicate retrieval inhibition as a potent factor in the interplay of recollection and priming in memory and judgment. They also point to possible unintended consequences of instructions to forget, suppress, or disregard in legal or social settings.     

Merging information in speech recognition: feedback is never necessary

Top-down feedback does not benefit speech recognition; on the contrary, it can hinder it. No experimental data imply that feedback loops are required for speech recognition. Feedback is accordingly unnecessary and spoken word recognition is modular. To defend this thesis, we analyse lexical involvement in phonemic decision making. TRACE (McClelland & Elman 1986), a model with feedback from the lexicon to prelexical processes, is unable to account for all the available data on phonemic decision making. The modular Race model (Cutler & Norris 1979) is likewise challenged by some recent results, however. We therefore present a new modular model of phonemic decision making, the Merge model. In Merge, information flows from prelexical processes to the lexicon without feedback. Because phonemic decisions are based on the merging of prelexical and lexical information, Merge correctly predicts lexical involvement in phonemic decisions in both words and nonwords. Computer simulations show how Merge is able to account for the data through a process of competition between lexical hypotheses. We discuss the issue of feedback in other areas of language processing and conclude that modular models are particularly well suited to the problems and constraints of speech recognition.     

Remembering changes: repetition effects in face recollection.

Two experiments examined effects of repetition and change on states of awareness in face recognition. Participants studied repeatedly presented photographs of faces, with the second presentation following either immediately after the first presentation (massed repetition) or following six intervening items (spaced repetition). To manipulate perceptual change, each repeated face was either identical or a mirror image of the first presentation. Subsequently, when recognising a face, participants indicated whether they consciously recollected its prior occurrence ("remembering") or recognised it on the basis of familiarity ("knowing"). Changes in appearance between repeated faces enhanced remember, but not know, responses, and these effects were accentuated for spaced, rather than massed, repetition. These findings suggest that distinctiveness of encoding supports the phenomenological experience of conscious remembering.     

Reasoning counterfactually: making inferences about things that didn't happen

The authors investigated the relationship between reasoners' understanding of subjunctive conditionals (e.g., if p had happened, then q would have happened) and the inferences they were prepared to endorse. Reasoners who made a counterfactual interpretation of subjunctive statements (i.e., they judged the statement to imply that p and q did not happen) endorsed different inferences than those who did not. Those who made a counterfactual interpretation were more likely to (a) judge the situation in which p and q occurred to be inconsistent with the conditional statement and (b) make negative inferences such as modus tollens (i.e., approximately q therefore approximately p). These findings occurred with familiar and unfamiliar content, affirmative and negative conditionals, and conditional and biconditional relations.     

Remembering kinds: new evidence that categories are privileged in children's thinking

What are the representations and learning mechanisms that underlie conceptual development? The present research provides evidence in favor of the claim that this process is guided by an early-emerging predisposition to think and learn about abstract kinds. Specifically, three studies (N = 192) demonstrated that 4- to 7-year-old children have better recall for novel information about kinds (e.g., that dogs catch a bug called “fep”) than for similar information about individuals (e.g., that a particular dog catches a bug called “fep”). By showing that children are particularly likely to retain information about kinds, this work not only provides a first empirical demonstration of a phenomenon that may be key to conceptual development but also makes it apparent that young children’s thinking is suffused with abstractions rather than being perceptually-based and concrete.     

Imagination inflation: Imagining a childhood event inflates confidence that it occurred

Counterfactual imaginings are known to have far-reaching implications. In the present experiment, we ask if imagining events from one’s past can affect memory for childhood events. We draw on the social psychology literature showing that imagining a future event increases the subjective likelihood that the event will occur. The concepts of cognitive availability and the source-monitoring framework provide reasons to expect that imagination may inflate confidence that a childhood event occurred. However, people routinely produce myriad counterfactual imaginings (i.e., daydreams and fantasies) but usually do not confuse them with past experiences. To determine the effects of imagining a childhood event, we pretested subjects on how confident they were that a number of childhood events had happened, asked them to imagine some of those events, and then gathered new confidence measures. For each of the target items, imagination inflated confidence that the event had occurred in childhood. We discuss implications for situations in which imagination is used as an aid in searching for presumably lost memories.     

Reading and visual memory: remembering scenes that were never seen.

In Experiment 1 (N = 16), under conditions of high memory load (60 pictures and 50 paragraphs) and a 1-week retention interval, undergraduate subjects reported their memory for photographs of scenes (cued recall and free-recall tasks). Subjects frequently reported memory for photographs that they had actually never seen, but had read about in a brief paragraph. In Experiment 2 (N = 40), the same pattern of results was obtained with immediate testing. Experiment 2 also demonstrated that the likelihood of subjects falsely attributing scene memory (based on reading) to actually having viewed a photograph was reduced when metacognitive awareness of imaging during reading was made salient. Awareness of image creation was induced by requiring subjects to rate the paragraphs with respect to imagery vividness. Although other measures of memory remained the same, subjects in the induced-imagery condition made 50% fewer confusion errors than subjects who read the paragraphs without imagery instructions. The results are discussed in the context of Johnson and Raye's (1981) reality monitoring model.     

Remembering more than meets the eye: A study of memory confusions about incomplete visual information

The purpose of this series of four experiments was to examine the possible role of spontaneous imagery in memory confusions about the way in which visual information had been experienced. After viewing pictures of familiar objects, complete or incomplete in visual form, participants were asked to remember the way in which the objects had been presented. Although, as predicted, memory for the objects themselves was quite good, participants falsely remembered seeing complete versions of pictures that were actually presented as incomplete. These false reports were observed across a variety of encoding and testing conditions. The results suggest that the false reports (referred to here as completion errors) are due to internal representations based on filling-in processes in response to the encoding of incomplete visual information. As such, the results also speak to alternative explanations for the completion errors and, more broadly, to theoretical perspectives that draw on filling-in processes when accounting for object identification and object memory.     

Remembering more than meets the eye: a study of memory confusions about incomplete visual information

The purpose of this series of four experiments was to examine the possible role of spontaneous imagery in memory confusions about the way in which visual information had been experienced. After viewing pictures of familiar objects, complete or incomplete in visual form, participants were asked to remember the way in which the objects had been presented. Although, as predicted, memory for the objects themselves was quite good, participants falsely remembered seeing complete versions of pictures that were actually presented as incomplete. These false reports were observed across a variety of encoding and testing conditions. The results suggest that the false reports (referred to here as completion errors) are due to internal representations based on filling-in processes in response to the encoding of incomplete visual information. As such, the results also speak to alternative explanations for the completion errors and, more broadly, to theoretical perspectives that draw on filling-in processes when accounting for object identification and object memory.