共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 0 毫秒
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MANUEL CAMPOS 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2003,66(3):689-708
The traditional point of view on analyticity implies that truth in virtue only of meaning entails a priori acceptability and vice versa. The argument for this claim is based on the idea that meaning as it concerns truth and meaning as it concerns competence are one and the same thing. In this paper I argue that the extensions of these notions do not coincide. I hold that truth in virtue of meaning — truth for semantic reasons—doesn't imply a priori acceptability, and that a priori reflection based only on knowledge of meaning—in the sense of competence—doesn't necessitate true conclusions.The main consequence of this view concerns conceptual analysis, as it presupposes we have a privileged—incorrigible in the face of empirical evidence—access to non-trivial truths about the world on the basis of mere a priori reflection founded on meaning. If, as I argue, such access is not incorrigible the project of conceptual analysis loses its special epistemological status. 相似文献
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Ori Simchen 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2003,37(2):278-302
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Gilead Bar-Elli 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(2):165-184
That there are analytic truths may challenge a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Unlike standard conceptions, in which
analyticity is couched in terms of “truth in virtue of meanings”, Frege’s notions of analytic and a priori concern justification,
respecting a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Where there is no justification these notions do not apply, Frege insists.
Basic truths and axioms may be analytic (or a priori), though unprovable, which means there is a form of justification which
is not (deductive) proof. This is also required for regarding singular factual propositions as a posteriori. A Fregean direction
for explicating this wider notion of justification is suggested in terms of his notion of sense (Sinn)—modes in which what the axioms are about are given—and its general epistemological significance is sketched. 相似文献
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Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock 《Husserl Studies》2008,24(2):131-140
Quine’s criticism of the notion of analyticity applies, at best, to Carnap’s notion, not to those of Frege or Husserl. The
failure of logicism is also the failure of Frege’s definition of analyticity, but it does not even touch Husserl’s views,
which are based on logical form. However, some relatively concrete number-theoretic statements do not admit such a formalization
salva veritate. A new definition of analyticity based not on syntactical but on semantical logical form is proposed and argued for.
相似文献
Guillermo E. Rosado HaddockEmail: |
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Kripke bundle [3] and C-set semantics [1] [2] are known as semantics which generalize standard Kripke semantics. In [3] and in [1], [2] it is shown that Kripke bundle and C-set semantics are stronger than standard Kripke semantics. Also it is true that C-set semantics for superintuitionistic logics is stronger than Kripke bundle semantics [5].In this paper, we show that Q-S4.1 is not Kripke bundle complete via C-set models. As a corollary we can give a simple proof showing that C-set semantics for modal logics are stronger than Kripke bundle semantics. 相似文献
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Dilip Ninan 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2018,47(1):1-16
The standard account of modal expressions in natural language analyzes them as quantifiers over a set of possible worlds determined by the evaluation world and an accessibility relation. A number of authors have recently argued for an alternative account according to which modals are analyzed as quantifying over a domain of possible worlds that is specified directly in the points of evaluation. But the new approach only handles the data motivating it if it is supplemented with a non-standard account of attitude verbs and conditionals. It can be shown the the relational account handles the same data equally well if it too is supplemented with a non-standard account of such expressions. 相似文献
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John P. Burgess 《The Philosophical quarterly》2004,54(214):38-55
Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. I argue that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory of the world. Quine's arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction, even if fully accepted, still leave room for a notion of pragmatic analyticity sufficient for the indicated purpose. 相似文献
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Dieter Freundlieb 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1987,18(1-2):110-133
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Daniel Bonevac 《Synthese》1991,87(3):331-361
I have presented much of this research in talks at the University of Costa Rica and the University of Texas at Austin. I am grateful to my audiences for their comments and advice. I would like especially to thank Luis Camacho, Nicholas Asher, and Robert Koons. Many of the ideas in the paper stem from an informal seminar on type-free theories held at the University of Texas's Center for Cognitive Science from 1984 to 1987. I am grateful to the participants in that seminar — Ignacio Angelelli, Nicholas Asher, Herbert Hochberg, Hans Kamp, Frederick Kronz, Per Lindström and Mark Sainsbury — for their many insights into type-free semantics, and to the Center for Cognitive Science for providing such a hospitable environment for this work. I have also profited from the criticisms of two anonymous referees. Finally, I am indebted to the University of Texas's University Research Institute and to the National Science Foundation's Information Science and History and Philosophy of Science programs for grant support. 相似文献
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Grzegorz Malinowski 《Studia Logica》2011,97(2):297-312
Referential semantics importantly subscribes to the programme of theory of logical calculi. Defined by Wójcicki in [8], it
has been subsequently studied in a series of papers of the author, till the full exposition of the framework in [9] and its
intuitive characterisation in [10]. 相似文献
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ABSTRACTThis article looks at four different scholarly perspectives on ‘sacred’ – the ineffable sacred, the experienced sacred, the polarized sacred and the contextualized sacred – in order to draw out their implicit presuppositions about meaning. The first two stances presuppose that meaning depends on what bits of language are about (referentialism), and the other two stances presuppose that meaning depends on relations between bits of language (holism). The article concludes three things: these prominent views of ‘sacred’ rest on usually implicit or unrecognized assumptions about the nature of meaning; some of those assumptions explain why certain theories are contentious and problematic and others ground more promising and productive approaches. 相似文献
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Eric Swanson 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2011,40(6):693-713
In his original semantics for counterfactuals, David Lewis presupposed that the ordering of worlds relevant to the evaluation of a counterfactual admitted no incomparability between worlds. He later came to abandon this assumption. But the approach to incomparability he endorsed makes counterintuitive predictions about a class of examples circumscribed in this paper. The same underlying problem is present in the theories of modals and conditionals developed by Bas van Fraassen, Frank Veltman, and Angelika Kratzer. I show how to reformulate all these theories in terms of lower bounds on partial preorders, conceived of as maximal antichains, and I show that treating lower bounds as cutsets does strictly better at capturing our intuitions about the semantics of modals, counterfactuals, and deontic conditionals. 相似文献