Omnipotence

If asked to define ‘omnipotence,’ the man on the street would probably say that it’s the ability to do anything. That’s about it, he’d think; nothing more needs be said. Philosophers are never so easily satisfied. They take it as matter of professional duty to find serious problems in important concepts, and to suggest that the concept be rejected or that solutions are at hand. This paper falls into the latter camp. Beginning with a relatively simple definition of ‘omnipotence,’ increasingly complex definitions are proposed, problems are found with them, and newer, refined definitions are offered. In all, seven unsatisfactory definitions are examined before an adequate one is arrived at. Both traditional and new problems are addressed, and novel solutions are advanced. The definition argued to be adequate is itself novel, but also very much in keeping with our pre-reflective understanding of omnipotence. On the basis of the definition it’s concluded not only that an adequate definition of ‘omnipotence’ is possible, but that various problems alleged to attend attributing the notion to God can also be solved.     

Omnipotence

Recently, many philosophers have supposed that the divine attribute of omnipotence is properly understood as some kind of maximal power. I argue that all of the best known attempts to analyse omnipotence in terms of maximal power are multiply flawed. Moreover, I argue that there are compelling reasons for supposing that, on orthodox theistic conceptions, maximal power is not one of the divine attributes.     

Reconsidering Absolute Omnipotence

Philosophical debate about the problem of evil derives, in part, from differing definitions of almighty power or omnipotence. Modern atheists such as John McTaggart, J. L. Mackie, Earl Condee, and Danny Goldstick maintain that an omnipotent God must be able to accomplish anything, even if it entails a contradiction. On this account, the Christian God cannot be omnipotent and benevolent, for a benevolent, omnipotent God would have forced free agents to desist from evil and this prevented the introduction of suffering into the world. It does not matter if the idea of creating free agents that were forced to be good entails a contradiction. On this account, a God who is truly omnipotent can perform contradictory feats.
In this paper, I argue that the atheistic tradition is mistaken. In the first place, even an absolutely omnipotent God could, as an act of benevolence, create a world in which there is suffering. In the second place, I argue that the concept of absolute omnipotence is fatally flawed. An absolutely omnipotent God would lack, in a decisive sense, power. He would be weak rather than strong. So the atheist's argument fails when it is evaluated in light of a more rational account of omnipotence and when it is carefully considered on its own terms.