共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Andrea Viggiano 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(2):213-224
In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral
terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes
with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions
confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about
moral terms, in order to show that this theory runs against our linguistic intuitions about such terms. My claim is that the
Horgan–Timmons argument does not work. I concede that their thought experiment is a good way to test the applicability of
the theory of direct reference to moral terms, and argue that the upshot of their experiment is not what they claim it is:
our linguistic intuitions about Moral Twin Earth are parallel to, not different from, our intuitions about Twin Earth.
相似文献
Andrea ViggianoEmail: |
2.
Frances Howard-Snyder 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):1-15
This paper discusses the Principle of Normative Invariance: ‘An action’s moral status does not depend on whether or not it
is performed.’ I show the importance of this principle for arguments regarding actualism and other variations on the person-affecting
restriction, discuss and rebut arguments in favor of the principle, and then discuss five counterexamples to it. I conclude
that the principle as it stands is false; and that if it is modified to avoid the counterexamples, it is gutted of any interest
or power.
相似文献
Frances Howard-SnyderEmail: |
3.
Elizabeth Brake 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):243-254
This paper develops a Kantian account of the moral assessment of institutions. The problem I address is this: while a deontological
theory may find that some legal institutions are required by justice, it is not obvious how such a theory can assess institutions
not strictly required (or prohibited) by justice. As a starting-point, I consider intuitions that in some cases it is desirable
to attribute non-consequentialist moral value to institutions not required by justice. I will argue that neither consequentialist
nor virtue-ethical accounts account for these intuitions, suggesting that a distinctive deontological account is needed. The
account I give is drawn from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals; I distinguish it from Kantian views of institutions developed by Barbara Herman and Onora O’Neill. Throughout, I use marriage
as an example.
相似文献
Elizabeth BrakeEmail: |
4.
Liezl van Zyl 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):91-104
In this paper I argue that the disagreement between modern moral philosophers and (some) virtue ethicists about whether motive
affects rightness is a result of conceptual disagreement, and that when they develop a theory of ‘right action,’ the two parties
respond to two very different questions. Whereas virtue ethicists tend to use ‘right’ as interchangeable with ‘good’ or ‘virtuous’
and as implying moral praise, modern moral philosophers use it as roughly equivalent to ‘in accordance with moral obligation.’
One implication of this is that the possibility of an act being right by accident does not pose a problem for consequentialism
or deontology. A further implication is that it reveals a shortcoming in virtue ethics, namely that it does not—yet needs
to—present an account of moral obligation.
相似文献
Liezl van ZylEmail: |
5.
We have two aims in this paper. The first is negative: to demonstrate the problems in Bernard Gert’s account of common morality,
in particular as it applies to professional morality. The second is positive: to suggest a more satisfactory explanation of
the moral basis of professional role morality, albeit one that is broadly consistent with Gert’s notion of common morality,
but corrects and supplements Gert’s theory. The paper is in three sections. In the first, we sketch the main features of Gert’s
account of common morality in general. In the second, we outline Gert’s explanation of the source of professional moral rules
and demonstrate its inadequacy. In the third section, we provide an account of our own collectivist needs-based view of the
source of the role-moral obligations of many professional roles, including those of health care professionals.
相似文献
Andrew AlexandraEmail: |
6.
7.
Skeptical Theism and God’s Commands 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stephen Maitzen 《Sophia》2007,46(3):237-243
According to Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy, adherents of skeptical theism will find their sense of moral obligation undermined
in a potentially ‘appalling’ way. Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea disagree, claiming that God’s commands provide skeptical
theists with a source of moral obligation that withstands the skepticism in skeptical theism. I argue that Bergmann and Rea
are mistaken: skeptical theists cannot consistently rely on what they take to be God’s commands.
相似文献
Stephen MaitzenEmail: |
8.
David Merli 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):535-556
Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational
and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers’ eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation
or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession
of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence against
conceptual-role and informational atomist approaches to understanding our moral concepts. Conceptual role approaches fail
because they cannot account for shared concepts among speakers with different commitments to the practical and conative ramifications
of moral judgments. Informational atomist views fail because speakers need not be locked on to the same moral properties to
share moral concepts.
相似文献
David MerliEmail: |
9.
Patricia Sheridan 《Sophia》2007,46(3):263-275
Hutcheson’s theory of morality shares far more common ground with Clarke’s morality than is generally acknowledged. In fact,
Hutcheson’s own view of his innovations in moral theory suggest that he understood moral sense theory more as an elaboration
and partial correction to Clarkean fitness theory than as an outright rejection of it. My aim in this paper will be to illuminate
what I take to be Hutcheson’s grounds for adopting this attitude toward Clarkean fitness theory. In so doing, I hope to bring
to light an otherwise unexpected continuity between moral sense theory and the moral rationalism to which it is usually opposed,
and, in so doing, draw attention to the anti-sceptical realism that lies at the heart of both accounts.
相似文献
Patricia SheridanEmail: |
10.
David Phillips 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):457-468
I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue
that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated
by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism,
the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism
by invoking an instrumentalist theory like Williams’. I argue that this is a serious strategic mistake.
相似文献
David PhillipsEmail: |
11.
Douglas W. Portmore 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(4):369-388
In this paper, I argue that those moral theorists who wish to accommodate agent-centered options and supererogatory acts must
accept both that the reason an agent has to promote her own interests is a nonmoral reason and that this nonmoral reason can
prevent the moral reason she has to sacrifice those interests for the sake of doing more to promote the interests of others
from generating a moral requirement to do so. These theorists must, then, deny that moral reasons morally override nonmoral
reasons, such that even the weakest moral reason trumps the strongest nonmoral reason in the determination of an act’s moral
status (e.g., morally permissible or impermissible). If this is right, then it seems that these theorists have their work
cut out for them. It will not be enough for them to provide a criterion of rightness that accommodates agent-centered options
and supererogatory acts, for, in doing so, they incur a debt. As I will show, in accommodating agent-centered options, they
commit themselves to the view that moral reasons are not morally overriding, and so they owe us an account of how both moral
reasons and nonmoral reasons come together to determine an act’s moral status.
相似文献
Douglas W. PortmoreEmail: |
12.
Obstetric Ultrasound and the Technological Mediation of Morality: A Postphenomenological Analysis 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Peter-Paul Verbeek 《Human Studies》2008,31(1):11-26
This article analyzes the moral relevance of technological artifacts and its possible role in ethical theory, by taking the
postphenomenological approach that has developed around the work of Don Ihde into the domain of ethics. By elaborating a postphenomenological
analysis of the mediating role of ultrasound in moral decisions about abortion, the article argues that technologies embody
morality and help to constitute moral subjectivity. This technological mediation of the moral subject is subsequently addressed
in terms of Michel Foucault’s ethical position, in which ethics is about actively co-shaping one’s moral subjectivity. Integrating
Foucauldian ethics and postphenomenology, the article argues that the technological mediation of moral subjectivity should
be at the heart of an ethical approach that takes the moral dimensions of technology seriously.
相似文献
Peter-Paul VerbeekEmail: |
13.
Ásta Sveinsdóttir 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):135-148
In this article I introduce a certain kind of anti-realist account of what makes a property essential to an object and defend
it against likely objections. This account, which I call a ‘conferralist’ account, shares some of the attractive features
of other anti-realist accounts, such as conventionalism and expressivism, but I believe, not their respective drawbacks.
相似文献
ásta SveinsdóttirEmail: |
14.
Lisa Rivera 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(1):69-87
When a person gives up an end of crucial importance to her in order to promote a moral aim, we regard her as having made a
moral sacrifice. The paper analyzes these sacrifices in light of some of Bernard Williams’ objections to Kantian and Utilitarian
accounts of them. Williams argues that an implausible consequence of these theories is that that we are expected to sacrifice
projects that make our lives worth living and contribute to our integrity. Williams’ arguments about integrity and meaning
are shown to be unconvincing when the content of projects is left open. However, a look at his later arguments suggests a
reason to be concerned about defensible ethical projects as understood through what he refers to as “the morality system”.
The problem for theories of this type turns out to be not merely conflicts between ethical projects and moral demands but
making sense of some of the ethically relevant features of these projects. Accommodations to moral theories that leave room
for ethical projects may be insufficient to explain such features, for example in cases where agents demand more of themselves
than the theories require. Making the theories more demanding is also problematic. Williams’ view about the role ethics plays
in our conception of the life we want to lead provides a better account of these cases.
相似文献
Lisa RiveraEmail: |
15.
Shannon Vallor 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):1-15
Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian
phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states.
By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications
of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of
consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of the very phenomenological evidences
Dennett’s method consigns to the realm of fiction. Thus heterophenomenology, qua scientific method, is incoherent.
相似文献
Shannon VallorEmail: |
16.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
相似文献
Stewart CohenEmail: |
17.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
相似文献
Jeff WisdomEmail: |
18.
Emotional expressions of moral value 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Julie Tannenbaum 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):43-57
In “Moral Luck” Bernard Williams describes a lorry driver who, through no fault of his own, runs over a child, and feels “agent-regret.”
I believe that the driver’s feeling is moral since the thought associated with this feeling is a negative moral evaluation
of his action. I demonstrate that his action is not morally inadequate with respect his moral obligations. However, I show
that his negative evaluation is nevertheless justified since he acted in way that does not live up to his moral values. I
then use this distinctive negative moral evaluation to distinguish agent-regret from guilt and mere regret.
相似文献
Julie TannenbaumEmail: |
19.
Kelly Becker 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):245-260
There’s something deeply right in the idea that knowledge requires an ability to discriminate truth from falsity. Failing
to incorporate some version of the discrimination requirement into one’s epistemology generates cases of putative knowledge
that are at best problematic. On the other hand, many theories that include a discrimination requirement thereby appear to
entail violations of closure. This prima facie tension is resolved nicely in Jonathan Schaffer’s contrastivism, which I describe
herein. The contrastivist take on relevant alternatives is implausible, however, and this then threatens to undermine contrastivism’s
anti-skeptical results.
相似文献
Kelly BeckerEmail: |
20.
According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational (the realists go that bit right) but its metaphysical presuppositions
are wildly implausible (the non-cognitivists got that bit right). This is the basis of Mackie’s now famous error theory: that
moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive
moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that
Mackie’s approach can be vindicated by a fictionalist account of moral discourse. And Mark Kalderon has argued that moral
fictionalism is attractive quite independently of Mackie’s error-theory. Kalderon argues that the Frege–Geach problem shows
that we need moral propositions, but that a fictionalist can and should embrace propositional content together with a non-cognitivist
account of acceptance of a moral proposition. Indeed, it is clear that any fictionalist is going to have to postulate more
than one kind of acceptance attitude. We argue that this double-approach to acceptance generates a new problem – a descendent
of Frege–Geach – which we call the acceptance–transfer problem. Although we develop the problem in the context of Kalderon’s
version of non-cognitivist fictionalism, we show that it is not the non-cognitivist aspect of Kalderon’s account that generates
the problem. A closely related problem surfaces for the more typical variants of fictionalism according to which accepting
a moral proposition is believing some closely related non-moral proposition. Fictionalists of both stripes thus have an attitude
problem.
相似文献
Graham OddieEmail: |