动允直接知觉的共鸣原理

传统认知理论认为我们只能间接知觉动允,而生态认知心理学则认为对动允的知觉是个体与环境信息直接共鸣的过程。生态认知心理学首先判定动允并不是存在于我们头脑中的认识,而是实际存在于个体-环境系统中的事实,对动允的直接知觉就是对动允的检测而非推测,是对动允信息的拾取而非对记忆内容的提取。这种直接知觉表现为身体的相关动作机制（动作神经元、肌肉组织等）与环境中动允信息的共鸣。进化与学习在共鸣的形成与发展中具有重要作用。     

Perceptual resonance: action-induced modulation of perception

A direct relationship between perception and action implies bi-directionality, and predicts not only effects of perception on action but also effects of action on perception. Modern theories of social cognition have intensively examined the relation from perception to action and propose that mirroring the observed actions of others underlies action understanding. Here, we suggest that this view is incomplete, as it neglects the perspective of the actor. We will review empirical evidence showing the effects of self-generated action on perceptual judgments. We propose that producing action might prime perception in a way that observers are selectively sensitive to related or similar actions of conspecifics. Therefore, perceptual resonance, not motor resonance, might be decisive for grounding sympathy and empathy and, thus, successful social interactions.     

Do infants provide evidence that the mirror system is involved in action understanding?

The mirror neuron theory of action understanding makes predictions concerning how the limited motor repertoire of young infants should impact on their ability to interpret others’ actions. In line with this theory, an increasing body of research has identified a correlation between infants’ abilities to perform an action, and their ability to interpret that action as goal-directed when performed by others. In this paper, I will argue that the infant data does by no means unequivocally support the mirror neuron theory of action understanding and that alternative interpretations of the data should be considered. Furthermore, some of this data can be better interpreted in terms of an alternative view, which holds that the role of the motor system in action perception is more likely to be one of enabling the observer to predict, after a goal has been identified, how that goal will be attained.     

The temporal dynamics of the perceptual consequences of action-effect prediction

An essential aspect of voluntary action control is the ability to predict the perceptual effects of our actions. Although the influence of action-effect prediction on humans’ behavior and perception is unequivocal, it remains unclear when action-effect prediction is generated by the brain. The present study investigates the dynamics of action effect anticipation by tracing the time course of its perceptual consequences. Participants completed an acquisition phase during which specific actions (left and right key-presses) were associated with specific visual effects (upward and downward dots motion). In the test phase they performed a 2 AFC identification task in which they were required to indicate whether the dots moved upward or downward. To isolate any effects of action-effect prediction on perception, participants were presented with congruent and incongruent dot motion in which the association participants learned in the previous acquisition phase was respected and violated, respectively. Crucially, to assess the temporal dynamics of action prediction, congruent and incongruent stimuli were presented at different intervals before or after action execution. We observed higher sensitivity (d′) to motion discrimination in congruent vs. incongruent trials only when stimuli were presented from about 220 ms before the action to 280 ms after the action. The temporal dynamics of our effect suggest that action-effect prediction modulates perception at later stages of motor preparation.     

Prediction of external events with our motor system: towards a new framework

We cannot, in the proper sense, imitate or re-enact inanimate events, such as ocean waves rolling, or even non-human animate ones, such as dogs walking. However, we can anticipate the way they change and recent studies show that our motor system becomes involved while doing so. A novel framework is presented that accounts for these findings by generalizing a predictive account of the motor system from action to event perception. It is suggested that we predict events that we cannot reproduce ourselves by exploiting an audiomotor or visuomotor representation that never amounts to a real action because it lacks proprioceptive and other interoceptive information. This view inspires thinking beyond our customary conceptualization of a 'motor' system.     

The role of sensorimotor experience in the development of mimicry in infancy

During social interactions we often have an automatic and unconscious tendency to copy or ‘mimic’ others’ actions. The dominant view on the neural basis of mimicry appeals to an automatic coupling between perception and action. It has been suggested that this coupling is formed through associative learning during correlated sensorimotor experience. Although studies with adult participants have provided support for this hypothesis, little is known about the role of sensorimotor experience in supporting the development of perceptual‐motor couplings, and consequently mimicry behaviour, in infancy. Here we investigated whether the extent to which an observed action elicits mimicry depends on the opportunity an infant has had to develop perceptual‐motor couplings for this action through correlated sensorimotor experience. We found that mothers’ tendency to imitate their 4‐month‐olds’ facial expressions during a parent‐child interaction session was related to infants’ facial mimicry as measured by electromyography. Maternal facial imitation was not related to infants’ mimicry of hand actions, and instead we found preliminary evidence that infants’ tendency to look at their own hands may be related to their tendency to mimic hand actions. These results are consistent with the idea that mimicry is supported by perceptual‐motor couplings that are formed through correlated sensorimotor experience obtained by observing one's own actions and imitative social partners.     

How and why do infants imitate? An ideomotor approach to social and imitative learning in infancy (and beyond)

It has been proposed that already in infancy, imitative learning plays a pivotal role in the acquisition of knowledge and abilities. Yet the cognitive mechanisms underlying the acquisition of novel action knowledge through social learning have remained unclear. The present contribution presents an ideomotor approach to imitative learning (IMAIL) in infancy (and beyond) that draws on the ideomotor theory of action control and on recent findings of perception–action matching. According to IMAIL, the central mechanism of imitative and social learning is the acquisition of cascading bidirectional action–effect associations through observation of own and others’ actions. First, the observation of the visual effect of own actions leads to the acquisition of first-order action–effect associations, linking motor codes to the action’s typical visual effects. Second, observing another person’s action leads to motor activation (i.e., motor resonance) due to the first-order associations. This activated motor code then becomes linked to the other salient effects produced by the observed action, leading to the acquisition of (second-order) action–effect associations. These novel action–effect associations enable later imitation of the observed actions. The article reviews recent behavioral and neurophysiological studies with infants and adults that provide empirical support for the model. Furthermore, it is discussed how the model relates to other approaches on social-cognitive development and how developmental changes in imitative abilities can be conceptualized.     

Does motor interference arise from mirror system activation? The effect of prior visuo-motor practice on automatic imitation

Action perception may involve a mirror-matching system, such that observed actions are mapped onto the observer’s own motor representations. The strength of such mirror system activation should depend on an individual’s experience with the observed action. The motor interference effect, where an observed action interferes with a concurrently executed incongruent action, is thought to arise from mirror system activation. However, this view was recently challenged. If motor interference arises from mirror system activation, this effect should be sensitive to prior sensorimotor experience with the observed action. To test this prediction, we measured motor interference in two groups of participants observing the same incongruent movements. One group had received brief visuo-motor practice with the observed incongruent action, but not the other group. Action observation induced a larger motor interference in participants who had practiced the observed action. This result thus supports a mirror system account of motor interference.     

Bend it like Beckham: Embodying the motor skills of famous athletes

Observing an action activates the same representations as does the actual performance of the action. Here we show for the first time that the action system can also be activated in the complete absence of action perception. When the participants had to identify the faces of famous athletes, the responses were influenced by their similarity to the motor skills of the athletes. Thus, the motor skills of the viewed athletes were retrieved automatically during person identification and had a direct influence on the action system of the observer. However, our results also indicated that motor behaviours that are implicit characteristics of other people are represented differently from when actions are directly observed. That is, unlike the facilitatory effects reported when actions were seen, the embodiment of the motor behaviour that is not concurrently perceived gave rise to contrast effects where responses similar to the behaviour of the athletes were inhibited.     

Bend it like Beckham: embodying the motor skills of famous athletes

Observing an action activates the same representations as does the actual performance of the action. Here we show for the first time that the action system can also be activated in the complete absence of action perception. When the participants had to identify the faces of famous athletes, the responses were influenced by their similarity to the motor skills of the athletes. Thus, the motor skills of the viewed athletes were retrieved automatically during person identification and had a direct influence on the action system of the observer. However, our results also indicated that motor behaviours that are implicit characteristics of other people are represented differently from when actions are directly observed. That is, unlike the facilitatory effects reported when actions were seen, the embodiment of the motor behaviour that is not concurrently perceived gave rise to contrast effects where responses similar to the behaviour of the athletes were inhibited.     

The influence of motor expertise and motor experience on action and actor recognition

Two experiments examined whether different levels of motor and visual experience influence action perception and whether this effect depends on the type of perceptual task. Within an action recognition task (Experiment 1), professional basketball players and novice college students were asked to identify basketball dribbles from point-light displays. Results showed faster reaction times and greater accuracy in experts, but no advantage when observing either own or teammates’ actions compared with unknown expert players. Within an actor recognition task (Experiment 2), the same expert players were asked to identify the model actors. Results showed poor discrimination between teammates and players from another team, but a more accurate assignment of own actions to the own team. When asked to name the actor, experts recognised themselves slightly better than teammates. Results support the hypothesis that motor experience influences action recognition. They also show that the influence of motor experience on the perception of own actions depends on the type of perceptual task.     

The handedness of imagined bodies in action and the role of perspective taking

Past research at the nexus of motor control and perception investigated the role of perspective taking in many behavioral and neuroimaging studies. Some investigators addressed the issue of one's own vs. others' action imagination, but the possible effects of a front or a back view in imagining others' actions have so far been neglected. We report two 'single trial' experiments in which a total of 640 participants were asked to imagine a person performing a manual action - either in a front or in a back view - and then to indicate the hand used by the imagined person during movement execution. In such a task, we assume the existence of two distinct biases: a perceptual-mnemonic bias due to subjects' visual experience of others' actions, encouraging them to imagine right-handed movements, and a motor bias due to subjects' experience of self-made actions, encouraging them to imagine movements performed with the same hand as their dominant hand. We hypothesized that a greater involvement of motor representations in the back view compared to the front view could result in an increased correspondence between one's own manual preference and the hand used by the imagined agent in the former condition. The results of both experiments were consistent with this hypothesis, suggesting that while imagining others' actions we employ motor simulations in different degrees according to the perspective adopted.     

Expert athletes activate somatosensory and motor planning regions of the brain when passively listening to familiar sports sounds

The present functional magnetic resonance imaging study examined the neural response to familiar and unfamiliar, sport and non-sport environmental sounds in expert and novice athletes. Results revealed differential neural responses dependent on sports expertise. Experts had greater neural activation than novices in focal sensorimotor areas such as the supplementary motor area, and pre- and postcentral gyri. Novices showed greater activation than experts in widespread areas involved in perception (i.e. supramarginal, middle occipital, and calcarine gyri; precuneus; inferior and superior parietal lobules), and motor planning and processing (i.e. inferior frontal, middle frontal, and middle temporal gyri). These between-group neural differences also appeared as an expertise effect within specific conditions. Experts showed greater activation than novices during the sport familiar condition in regions responsible for auditory and motor planning, including the inferior frontal gyrus and the parietal operculum. Novices only showed greater activation than experts in the supramarginal gyrus and pons during the non-sport unfamiliar condition, and in the middle frontal gyrus during the sport unfamiliar condition. These results are consistent with the view that expert athletes are attuned to only the most familiar, highly relevant sounds and tune out unfamiliar, irrelevant sounds. Furthermore, these findings that athletes show activation in areas known to be involved in action planning when passively listening to sounds suggests that auditory perception of action can lead to the re-instantiation of neural areas involved in producing these actions, especially if someone has expertise performing the actions.     

A model for production, perception, and acquisition of actions in face-to-face communication

The concept of action as basic motor control unit for goal-directed movement behavior has been used primarily for private or non-communicative actions like walking, reaching, or grasping. In this paper, literature is reviewed indicating that this concept can also be used in all domains of face-to-face communication like speech, co-verbal facial expression, and co-verbal gesturing. Three domain-specific types of actions, i.e. speech actions, facial actions, and hand-arm actions, are defined in this paper and a model is proposed that elucidates the underlying biological mechanisms of action production, action perception, and action acquisition in all domains of face-to-face communication. This model can be used as theoretical framework for empirical analysis or simulation with embodied conversational agents, and thus for advanced human–computer interaction technologies.     

Infants' Grasp of Others' Intentions

ABSTRACT— The perception of others as intentional agents is fundamental to human experience and foundational to development. Recent research reveals that this cornerstone of social perception has its roots early in infancy, and that it is influenced by the universal, early-emerging human experience of engaging in goal-directed action. Infants' own action capabilities correlate with their emerging tendency to view others' actions as organized by goals. Moreover, interventions that facilitate new goal-directed actions alter infants' perception of those same actions in others. These effects seem to depend on the first-person aspects of infants' experience. These findings open new questions about how doing leads to knowing in the social domain.     

Dissociable neural systems support retrieval of how and why action knowledge

In everyday discourse, people typically represent actions in one of two ways: how they are performed or why they are performed. In the present study, we determined the neural systems that support these natural modes of representing actions. Participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while identifying how and why people perform various familiar actions. Identifying how actions are performed produced activity in premotor areas that support the execution of actions and in higher-order visual areas that support the perception of action-related objects; this finding supports an embodied view of action knowledge. However, identifying why actions are performed preferentially engaged areas of the brain associated with representing and reasoning about mental states; these areas were right temporoparietal junction, precuneus, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, and posterior superior temporal sulcus. Our results suggest that why action knowledge is not sufficiently constituted by information in motor and visual systems, but requires a system for representing states of mind, which do not have reliable motor correlates or visual appearance.     

The mirror reflects both ways: Action influences perception of others

Substantial evidence links perception of others’ bodies and mental representation of the observer’s own body; however, the overwhelming majority of this evidence is unidirectional, showing influence from perception to action. It has been proposed that the influence also runs from action to perception, but to date the evidence is scant. Here we report that ordinary motor actions performed by the subject affect concurrent psychophysical judgments of human-body stimuli. Subjects remained unaware of the connection between the action and the main task. The results show that perception can change as a result of the observer’s ongoing actions.     

When do we simulate non-human agents? Dissociating communicative and non-communicative actions

There is strong evidence that we automatically simulate observed behavior in our motor system. Previous research suggests that this simulation process depends on whether we observe a human or a non-human agent. Measuring a motor priming effect, this study investigated the question of whether agent-sensitivity of motor simulation depends on the specific action observed. Participants saw pictures depicting end positions of different actions on a screen. All postures featured either a human or non-human agent. Participants had to produce the matching action with their left or right hand depending on the hand presented on the screen. Three different actions were displayed: a communicative action (emblem), a transitive (goal-directed) action and an intransitive action. We found motor priming effects of similar size for human and non-human agents for transitive and intransitive actions. However, the motor priming effect for communicative actions was present for the human agent, but absent for the non-human agent. These findings suggest that biological tuning of motor simulation is highly action-selective and depends on whether the observed behavior appears to be driven by a reasonable goal.