共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Mark Sargent 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(2):237-252
This essay answers the “Bayesian Challenge,” which is an argument offered by Bayesians that concludes that belief is not relevant
to rational action. Patrick Maher and Mark Kaplan argued that this is so because there is no satisfactory way of making sense
of how it would matter. The two ways considered so far, acting as if a belief is true and acting as if a belief has a probability
over a threshold, do not work. Contrary to Maher and Kaplan, Keith Frankish argued that there is a way to make sense of how
belief matters by introducing a dual process theory of mind in which decisions are made at the conscious level using premising policies. I argue that Bayesian decision theory alone shows that it is sometimes rational to base decisions on beliefs; we do not
need a dual process theory of mind to solve the Bayesian Challenge. This point is made clearer when we consider decision levels: acting as if a belief is true is sometimes rational at higher decision levels.
相似文献
Mark SargentEmail: |
2.
Andy Egan 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):47-63
On many of the idealized models of human cognition and behavior in use by philosophers, agents are represented as having a
single corpus of beliefs which (a) is consistent and deductively closed, and (b) guides all of their (rational, deliberate,
intentional) actions all the time. In graded-belief frameworks, agents are represented as having a single, coherent distribution
of credences, which guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all of the time. It’s clear that actual
human beings don’t live up to this idealization. The systems of belief that we in fact have are fragmented. Rather than having a single system of beliefs that guides all of our behavior all of the time, we have a number of distinct,
compartmentalized systems of belief, different ones of which drive different aspects of our behavior in different contexts.
It’s tempting to think that, while of course people are fragmented, it would be better (from the perspective of rationality) if they weren’t, and the only reason why our fragmentation
is excusable is that we have limited cognitive resources, which prevents us from holding too much information before our minds
at a time. Give us enough additional processing capacity, and there’d be no justification for any continued fragmentation.
I argue that this is not so. There are good reasons to be fragmented rather than unified, independent of the limitations on
our available processing power. In particular, there are ways our belief-forming mechanisms—including our perceptual systems—could
be constructed that would make it better to be fragmented than to be unified. And there are reasons to think that some of
our belief-forming mechanisms really are constructed that way.
相似文献
Andy EganEmail: |
3.
Paul Boghossian 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):111-119
I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposition merely on the basis
of understanding it. However, I don’t think it is constitutive of them that they supply strictly foundational justification
for the propositions they justify, though I do believe that it is important that the intuition of a suitable subject be thought
of as a prima facie justification for his intuitive judgment, independently of the reliability of his underlying capacities.
I also think that we need to be able to explain how mere understanding of a proposition can confer upon us an ability to have
reliable intuitions, that we cannot simply take that idea for granted. And that when try to explain that, our best avenue
for doing so is to take the intuitions as constituting the understanding of which they are said to be a manifestation.
相似文献
Paul BoghossianEmail: |
4.
Melissa Barry 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):231-242
Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of
motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate
rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right,
either directly or by giving rise to a new desire that in turn motivates the action. I argue that the realist who adopts a
Humean model for explaining rational action will have a difficult time giving a plausible account of the role that desire
plays in this explanation. I explore four interpretations of this role and argue that none allows a Humean theory to explain
rational action as convincingly as an anti-Humean theory does. The first two models, in different ways, make acting on a reason
impossible. The third allows this possibility, but only by positing a reason-sensitive desire that itself demands an explanation.
The fourth avoids this explanatory challenge only by retreating to an empty form of the Humean view. In contrast, an anti-Humean
theory can provide an intuitively plausible explanation of rational action. I conclude that the realist about reasons should
adopt an anti-Humean theory to explain rational action.
相似文献
Melissa BarryEmail: |
5.
Thomas Grundmann 《Erkenntnis》2009,71(1):89-105
According to the received view, externalist grounds or reasons need not be introspectively accessible. Roughly speaking, from
an externalist point of view, a belief will be epistemically justified, iff it is based upon facts that make its truth objectively
highly likely. This condition can be satisfied, even if the epistemic agent does not have actual or potential awareness of
the justifying facts. No inner perspective on the belief-forming mechanism and its truth-ratio is needed for a belief to be
justified. In my view, this is not the whole story. While I agree that introspective access to our reasons is a defining feature
of justification for the access internalist, not the externalist, I will argue that even for the latter, some kind of introspective access is an epistemic desideratum. Yet, even given that I am right, the desirable might not be achievable
for us. Recent psychological research suggests that we do not dispose of reliable introspection into the sources of our own
beliefs. This seems to undermine the claim that we can introspectively know about the reasons upon which our beliefs are based.
In this paper I will therefore additionally show why these results do not threaten the kind of introspective access desirable
from an externalist point of view.
相似文献
Thomas GrundmannEmail: |
6.
Robert Audi 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(5):475-492
This paper defends a moderate intuitionism by extending a version of that view previously put forward and responding to some
significant objections to it that have been posed in recent years. The notion of intuition is clarified, and various kinds
of intuition are distinguished and interconnected. These include doxastic intuitions and intuitive seemings. The concept of
inference is also clarified. In that light, the possibility of non-inferential intuitive justification is explained in relation
to both singular moral judgments, which intuitionists do not take to be self-evident, and basic moral principles, which they
typically do take to be self-evident in a sense explicated in the paper. This explanation is accomplished in part by drawing
some analogies between moral and perceptual judgments in the light of a developmental conception of knowledge. The final section
of the paper presents a partial account of rational disagreement and indicates how the kind of intuitionist view defended
can allow for rational disagreement between apparent epistemic peers.
相似文献
Robert AudiEmail: |
7.
Advocates of the use of intuitions in philosophy argue that they are treated as evidence because they are evidential. Their
opponents agree that they are treated as evidence, but argue that they should not be so used, since they are the wrong kinds
of things. In contrast to both, we argue that, despite appearances, intuitions are not treated as evidence in philosophy whether
or not they should be. Our positive account is that intuitions are a subclass of inclinations to believe. Our thesis explains
why intuitions play a role in persuasion and inquiry, without conceding that they are evidential. The account also makes predictions
about the structure of intuitions that are confirmed by independent arguments.
相似文献
Bernard MolyneuxEmail: |
8.
S. Matthew Liao 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):247-262
Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue
that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider
and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists’ challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions.
I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that
on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and the standard philosophical practice of using intuitions as evidence
can help resolve these conflicts.
相似文献
S. Matthew LiaoEmail: URL: www.smatthewliao.com |
9.
We discuss the cable guy paradox, both as an object of interest in its own right and as something which can be used to illuminate
certain issues in the theories of rational choice and belief. We argue that a crucial principle—The Avoid Certain Frustration
(ACF) principle—which is used in stating the paradox is false, thus resolving the paradox. We also explain how the paradox
gives us new insight into issues related to the Reflection principle. Our general thesis is that principles that base your
current opinions on your current opinions about your future opinions need not make reference to the particular times in the future at which you believe you will have those opinions, but they do need to make reference to the particular degrees of belief you believe you will have in the future.
相似文献
Samuel RuhmkorffEmail: |
10.
The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments.
Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons.
We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of
moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative
mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions.
We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.
相似文献
Jeanette KennettEmail: |
11.
12.
13.
Peter Alward 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):235-255
In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis
of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the “problem of the essential indexical” reveals
is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and
an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account of belief which encompasses
both explanatory roles and which still treats belief as a two-place relation between subjects and propositions.
相似文献
Peter AlwardEmail: |
14.
Elizabeth Brake 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):243-254
This paper develops a Kantian account of the moral assessment of institutions. The problem I address is this: while a deontological
theory may find that some legal institutions are required by justice, it is not obvious how such a theory can assess institutions
not strictly required (or prohibited) by justice. As a starting-point, I consider intuitions that in some cases it is desirable
to attribute non-consequentialist moral value to institutions not required by justice. I will argue that neither consequentialist
nor virtue-ethical accounts account for these intuitions, suggesting that a distinctive deontological account is needed. The
account I give is drawn from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals; I distinguish it from Kantian views of institutions developed by Barbara Herman and Onora O’Neill. Throughout, I use marriage
as an example.
相似文献
Elizabeth BrakeEmail: |
15.
Sarah Bachelard 《Sophia》2009,48(2):105-118
A central theme in the Christian contemplative tradition is that knowing God is much more like ‘unknowing’ than it is like
possessing rationally acceptable beliefs. Knowledge of God is expressed, in this tradition, in metaphors of woundedness, darkness,
silence, suffering, and desire. Philosophers of religion, on the other hand, tend to explore the possibilities of knowing
God in terms of rational acceptability, epistemic rights, cognitive responsibility, and propositional belief. These languages
seem to point to very different accounts of how it is that we come to know God, and a very different range of critical concepts
by which the truth of such knowledge can be assessed. In this paper, I begin to explore what might be at stake in these different
languages of knowing God, drawing particularly on Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology of Christian belief. I will argue that his
is a distorted account of the epistemology of Christian belief, and that this has implications for his project of demonstrating
the rational acceptability of Christian faith for the 21st century.
相似文献
Sarah BachelardEmail: |
16.
Andrei A. Buckareff 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):143-152
Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.
相似文献
Andrei A. BuckareffEmail: Phone: +1-716-3533623 |
17.
Igor Douven 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(3):361-375
It is widely believed that the so-called knowledge account of assertion best explains why sentences such as “It’s raining
in Paris but I don’t believe it” and “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t know it” appear odd to us. I argue that the rival
rational credibility account of assertion explains that fact just as well. I do so by providing a broadly Bayesian analysis
of the said type of sentences which shows that such sentences cannot express rationally held beliefs. As an interesting aside,
it will be seen that these sentences also harbor a lesson for Bayesian epistemology itself.
相似文献
Igor DouvenEmail: |
18.
Hamid Vahid 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(3):295-313
It is not difficult to make sense of the idea that beliefs may derive their justification from other beliefs. Difficulties
surface when, as in certain epistemological theories, one appeals to sensory experiences to give an account of the structure
of justification. This gives rise to the so-called problem of ‘nondoxastic justification’, namely, the problem of seeing how
sensory experiences can confer justification on the beliefs they give rise to. In this paper, I begin by criticizing a number
of theories that are currently on offer. Finding them all wanting, I shall then offer a diagnosis of why they fail while gesturing
towards a promising way of resolving the dispute. It will be argued that what makes the problem of nondoxastic justification
a hard one is the difficulty of striking the right balance between a notion of normative justification that is content-sensitive
and truth conducive and the possibility of error while acknowledging the fact that our experiences can justify our beliefs
in cases we are hallucinating.
相似文献
Hamid VahidEmail: |
19.
Jeffrey Yoshimi 《Husserl Studies》2009,25(2):121-140
I develop a “two-systems” interpretation of Husserl’s theory of belief. On this interpretation, Husserl accounts for our sense
of the world in terms of (1) a system of embodied horizon meanings and passive synthesis, which is involved in any experience
of an object, and (2) a system of active synthesis and sedimentation, which comes on line when we attend to an object’s properties.
I use this account to defend Husserl against several forms of Heideggerean critique. One line of critique, recently elaborated
by Taylor Carman, says that Husserl wrongly loads everyday perception with explicit beliefs about things. A second, earlier
line of critique, due to Hubert Dreyfus, charges Husserl with thinking of belief on a problematic Artificial Intelligence
(AI) model which involves explicit rules applied to discrete symbol structures. I argue that these criticisms are based on
a conflation of Husserl’s two systems of belief. The conception of Husserlian phenomenology which emerges is compatible with
Heideggerean phenomenology and associated approaches to cognitive science (in particular, dynamical systems theory).
相似文献
Jeffrey YoshimiEmail: Email: |
20.
Alphonso Lingis 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(2):113-123
For Martin Heidegger the death that comes singularly for each of us summons us to exist on our own and speak in our own name.
But Gilles Delueze and Félix Guattari argue that it is a specific social machinery that summons us to speak in our own name
and answer for what we do and are. This summons is a death sentence. They enjoin us to flee this subjectification, this subjection.
They do recognize that the release of becomings in all directions can become destructive and self-destructive. There are several
weaknesses in their conception.
相似文献
Alphonso LingisEmail: |