略论制度伦理与德性伦理的关系

制度伦理的核心是伦理 ,其对德性伦理起作用的方式也应该是制度中的伦理因素而不是强制性规范。制度伦理以其内涵的伦理精神以及作为一种社会存在来影响个人德性。制度伦理与德性伦理相互作用并相互转化     

论技术决策及其伦理意义

技术决策是控制技术后果的重要环节.技术决策必然带来利益的得失,也就产生了伦理问题.技术决策过程的伦理问题包括技术决策伦理规范的确定以及技术决策者的伦理责任的确立等.技术决策有伦理规范的参与,其目的是要求决策主体对技术的社会后果负责,因此在实践中技术决策具有丰富的伦理意义.     

医疗技术评估的伦理思考

医疗技术的快速发展引发了诸多的社会问题.医疗技术的伦理评估有利于保持技术与社会的和谐.对技术进行伦理评估应是技术评估的重要内容.医疗技术评估中道德因素的强化有利于医疗技术评估机制的健全,确定技术的发展方向和使用范围;对主体与客体的评估有利于充实医疗技术伦理评估的内容;为医疗技术评估进行伦理建制,既要强调制度的道德根基,也要提高制度的执行力;成立医学伦理委员会,对医疗技术进行伦理审查.     

作为权宜道德的技术伦理

通过对四种传统伦理观在面对高新技术时的困惑、局限及其根源的分析,提出了以亚里士多德的智慧伦理和笛卡儿的权宜道德为基础,在尊重遗产价值和选择价值的同时,以灵活具体的道德规则代替抽象不变的道德原则和规范.发展了7条解决技术伦理问题的战略,并且强调技术伦理的有效贯彻关键在于将技术伦理变为制度伦理.     

制度伦理之我见

“制度伦理”概念的不确定性和理论的分歧 ,在一定程度上妨碍了制度伦理理论的深入发展和社会应用。目前关于制度伦理的歧义 ,均与论者所依据的理论背景和所强调的侧重点不同有关 ,并无本质的不同。根据制度伦理与社会发展的关系来理解和规定制度伦理 ,它主要应包括制度中所蕴涵的伦理目标即制度中的伦理 ,以及一定道德要求的制度化这两个方面     

脑成像技术的伦理问题

脑成像技术在医学和认知科学领域中的迅速发展存在很多伦理问题,本文对其主要的伦理问题如隐私保护、安全性、知情同意和自主性等进行了探讨.尽管有关脑成像技术的伦理问题争议不断,但就如何对其进行合理规范,促使其更好地发展是可以达成共识的.     

会聚技术的发展及其伦理规约机制

NBIC会聚技术是主导21世纪技术革命的新兴技术群,将掀开人类技术发展历史新篇章,产生比以往任何一次技术革命都更为广泛深远的影响.会聚技术带来无限机遇的同时,也正在掀开“潘多拉之盒”.会聚技术发展将逐步改造人类的遗传物质与精神世界,最终变人类自身的自然进化为完全的人工进化,进而颠覆传统自然生命神圣伦理观；会聚技术将在更广泛、更深远的意义上撼动传统道德谱系,引发道德秩序混乱.因而,在发展会聚技术的开端就应当特别关注相应的社会问题,及早开展与研发同步的相关问题研究,显得尤为紧迫与重要.有必要、也有可能建立起一套法律、伦理、监督相结合的机制去调控会聚技术的发展,并依据技术不同发展阶段构建不同的规约手段和规约机制.     

伦理生态视阈中的医学伦理精神诠释与建构

基于本体思维的"原子式探讨"不能实现医学伦理精神的现代建构.由本体伦理思维到伦理生态思维的道德哲学范式转换为探讨医学伦理精神提供了新的思维向度和价值资源.伦理生态视阈中的医学伦理精神是一个多维、多层次的张力系统,其建构在于:重建伦理主体的自身精神生态、"医学伦理-卫生经济"政策生态、医学伦理-社会文化生态.     

伦理生态视阈中的医学伦理精神诠释与建构

基于本体思维的"原子式探讨"不能实现医学伦理精神的现代建构。由本体伦理思维到伦理生态思维的道德哲学范式转换为探讨医学伦理精神提供了新的思维向度和价值资源。伦理生态视阈中的医学伦理精神是一个多维、多层次的张力系统,其建构在于:重建伦理主体的自身精神生态、"医学伦理—卫生经济"政策生态、医学伦理—社会文化生态。     

人工授精技术的公众伦理态度调查研究

人工授精技术是指运用人工技术和方法将精液注入女性生殖道内以取代性交途径使其妊娠的一种方法。它主要用于治疗来自男性原因的不育 ,根据精液来源不同 ,分为使用丈夫精子的同源人工授精 (ａｒｔｉｆｉｃｉａｌｉｎｓｅｍｉｎａｔｉｏｎｂｙｈｕｓ ｂａｎｄ ,ＡＩＨ)和使用供体精子的异源人工授精 (ａｒｔｉｆｉｃｉａｌｉｎｓｅｍｉ ｎａｔｉｏｎｂｙｄｏｎｅｒ,ＡＩＤ)。该技术至今已有 2 0 0多年的历史 ,全世界通过人工授精技术所生的孩子已达百万以上。人类精子库的建立 ,更是促进了人工授精技术的发展。据报道 ,我国的不育症发病率为 …     

Ethik in der Psychotherapie

This contribution discusses some fundamental questions of medical ethics in psychotherapy. The problems discussed arise when ?care ethics“, which is based mainly on the Hippocratic Oath as the basis of medical ethics, is rejected. After a short overview of the relevant ethical theories, we ask for values and principles which might serve as a foundation for philosophical reasoning on the doctor-patient-relationship. In particular, we discuss the role of autonomy and informed consent in this relationship, following Beauchamp’s and Childress’ ethical principlism. We try to show the limited scope of the principle of autonomy in psychotherapy. Finally, we make a plea for a dynamic conception of patient autonomy for which we offer some pragmatic reasons. To round this conception off it is illustrated by the metaphor of the lighthouse.     

Inwiefern Fordern Moderne Wissenschaft und Technik die Philosophische Ethik Heraus?

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Das Ontologische Dilemma der Normativen Ethik

The Ontological Dilemma of Normative Ethics. This paper pursues two goals. The first is to show that normative ethics is confronted with the following dilemma: to be coherent, this discipline is ontologically committed to acknowledge the existence of objective values, but, to be scientifically respectable, it is committed to repudiate such values. The second goal is to assess the possible solutions to this dilemma. To this end, the following strategies are discussed: Kant’s constructive objectivism, Jürgen Habermas’ “epistemic ersatzism”, Franz von Kutschera’s “confirmation pragmatism”, and David Brink’s “objectivist tour de force”. The paper’s conclusion is that the dilemma cannot be solved because it rests on a clash of intuitions none of which can be given up. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Die Zukunft der Ethik Albert Schweitzers

Summary The basic thought of Schweitzer's ethic, the reverence for life, has manifold significance. First, it is an appeal to our moral feeling. But secondly, Schweitzer lent this thought also a general, fundamental and therewith philosophical meaning: proceeding from the most immediate and encompassing fact of consciousness, described by him with the proposition I am life that will live in the midst of life that will live, Schweitzer believed to have found in the idea of reverence for life the fundamental principle of all morality; this consists in the fact that I experience the need to extend to all wills to live the same reverence that I extend to my own. In addition to its effect on moral feeling and on ethical theory, the future of the thought, reverence for life, also depends on its compliance in the activity of men.The future prospects of the appeal to moral feeling appear good insofar as testimonies from history permit one to assume that the awareness of the reverence for life can be awakened in all men. The ancient Greeks knew such sensibility in theaidos, Goethe in the reverence for that which is in our midst. This ever strengthening recognition among the peoples of the earth will, through historically succeeding generations, increasingly eliminate a full disregard for such reverence.Less promising are the prospects of acknowledging the reverence for life as a fundamental principle of morality. On its basis Schweitzer rests his aversion to harming anything living. He does not fail to see thereby that, in order to preserve life, we must destroy some life (at least that of plants). But, says Schweitzer, I become guilty in sacrificing life, and we must constantly remain conscious of this guilt; any attempts at justification, through considerations of differences in the value of various lives, must be rejected.However, an ambiguity in the word guilt underlies Schweitzer's position. On the one hand guilt is understood as a regrettable cause for the subsistence or eventuation of an evil, on the other as the moral reprehensibility of an attitude. Only the latter represents guilt in a moral sense. Whoever follows the necessity to destroy other, less valuable life in order to preserve his own or another life, assumes guilt only in the second sense. Therefore ethics must raise and pursue the question concerning the value priority of one life over another. This question leads to an encounter with the modern directions of ethics which proceed from the concept of value, and to the continuation of Schweitzer's ethics through this encounter. Schweitzer's explanation that life in the world is to be brought to its highest value likewise conduces to the same point, since it necessitates an investigation of the rank order of values.We can note a slow progress of the reverence for life in the private domain of human activity. On the other hand in the interrelationship of peoples there is danger of monstrous mass murder through the atomic bomb.

---

---

Text eines Vertrags in der Allg. philos.-relig. Vereinigung in München, am 14.1.1966.     

Zur Geschichte und aktuellen Situation der Ethik in der Sowjetunion

Developments in Soviet ethics have been largely, but not exclusively, determined by the official ideology. Since 1917 philosophers have debated four successive models of morality. In the first, morality was regarded as tool of the exploiting classes and thus was superseded by communism. This attitude in fact fostered moral nihilism and anarchism. In the second period of ethical reflection, morality was contrued as a social, class-relative, phenomenon, conceived in utilitarian terms. With respect to Communist morality whatever serves socialism as defined by the Communist Party acquires the force of a moral imperative. It is important to understand whether this perspective is true to Marx's views. Whereas classical ethics assumed an extraworldy foundation for morality Marx adopted the humanist, immanentist perspective, according to which morality has a pragmatic sense as an ideal, the goal of activity. Soviet ethical theory of the Stalin era did not deviate from this perspective, for which reason ethics as a professional science was entirely subordinated to Party decrees about socialism as an ideal. In the third period beginning in the mid-fifties, a new view came to the fore which was codified in the 1961 Party program: moral values are now regarded as having a specific quality, social development involves a moral dimension, and moral values exhibit an all-human import. During this period the leading issue among philosophers is the question of the essence and specificity of morality as distinct from other forms of social consciousness. Just prior to the era of perestrojka beginning in 1985 a fourth model emerged which in fact prepared in most essential respects the actual new thinking in morality. The matters under consideration had to do with the global dimensions of moral problems given the common experience and fears of humanity. For this reason morality was now seen as superseding politics. Presently, this reorientation has not only enabled abandoning attitudes favoring class morality, but thrown into relief the tragic consequences of this attitude within Soviet history.The new image of morality corresponds to abstract humanism with its stress on the person and universal values. The task before Soviet ethicians is to provide theoretical and methodological foundations for their research by which they can improve the professional quality of their work and provide the discipline with a new identity over and against Marxism.     

Die Werturteilsfrage in der Technik

Journal for General Philosophy of Science - Bei den von Ingenieuren verwendeten Dezisionsmechanismen wird aufgrund der Fortentwicklung der Technik die methodologische Sicherung der...     

德国应用伦理学近况

本文介绍了在当前德国人文社会科学面临的学科整合的背景下应用伦理学的发展近况,重点展示了应用伦理学界在"人性尊严"概念上的学术论争。     

Der Streit der russischen Marxisten um Kants Ethik

At the beginning of 20th century, there was a problem of establishing which version of the association of Kant’s and Marx’s ideas is correct. If some Legal Marxists more or less combined Kant and Marx, most Russian Social Democrats, especially Bolsheviks, were against such an association. Under the influence of G. V. Plekhanov, Russian Marxists announced a sharply critical attitude toward Kant’s philosophy. This position was reinforced by Russian philosophers, poets, and slavophiles who accused Kant of being militarist. During the World War I, both tendencies faced each other. Plekhanov’s desperate appeal to ?the simple laws or morals and justice” and Kant’s “Critique of Practical Reason”, which was supported by L. I. Axelrod, failed. It was rejected by the majority of Marxists both during the World War I and after the triumph of the 1917 October Revolution.