The effect of true and false feedback on blushing in women

The effect of true and false feedback of facial blood flow on blushing and embarrassment was investigated in high (n=24) and low (n=24) scorers on the Blushing Propensity Scale. Feedback was given while the participants sang and read aloud. Blushing while singing habituated rapidly in both groups and was not affected by true feedback. Blushing still developed in high scorers when given false-negative feedback of blushing when they first sang, whereas low scorers did not blush. False-positive feedback of blushing while reading aloud increased embarrassment, but facial blood flow decreased. High scorers gave higher ratings for embarrassment and blushing than low scorers during most of the tasks. The findings suggest that people who think that they are prone to blushing feel more self-conscious but generally do not blush more intensely or frequently than people with low blushing propensity scores during clearly embarrassing or innocuous social encounters. However, expecting to blush might actually increase the likelihood of embarrassment and blushing in potentially embarrassing situations.     

The significance of blushing for fair- and dark-skinned people

Since blushing is difficult to detect in people with dark skin, their experience of blushing may differ fundamentally from people with fair skin. To investigate this issue, cheek temperature and forehead blood flow were measured in 16 Caucasians and 16 Indians during mental arithmetic and singing. Caucasians (particularly females) thought that they blushed more intensely than Indians, and also reported greater self-consciousness when singing. Vascular responses did not differ between groups. However, skin tone moderated the association between vascular responses and ratings of self-consciousness, blushing intensity, blushing propensity and fear of negative evaluation. These findings support the notion that the visibility of blushing influences the nature of emotions experienced in embarrassing social encounters.     

The relationship between blushing propensity,social anxiety and facial blood flow during embarrassment

To investigate blushing in relation to blushing propensity scores and core elements of social anxiety, facial blood flow was monitored in 86 normal volunteers during an embarrassing task (singing a children's song). Increases in facial blood flow were greater in women than men, as were scores on the Blushing Propensity and Fear of Negative Evaluation scales. In addition, high scores on the Blushing Propensity and Social Interaction Anxiety scales were associated with large increases in facial blood flow during singing. However, this appeared to be due primarily to social anxiety because the association between blushing propensity scores and changes in facial blood flow disappeared when social interaction anxiety scores were taken into account. These findings suggest that people generally base their beliefs about blushing on cues other than changes in facial blood flow. Social anxiety may augment increases in facial blood flow during embarrassment, independently of expected or perceived blushing.     

The relationship between blushing propensity, social anxiety and facial blood flow during embarrassment

To investigate blushing in relation to blushing propensity scores and core elements of social anxiety, facial blood flow was monitored in 86 normal volunteers during an embarrassing task (singing a children's song). Increases in facial blood flow were greater in women than men, as were scores on the Blushing Propensity and Fear of Negative Evaluation scales. In addition, high scores on the Blushing Propensity and Social Interaction Anxiety scales were associated with large increases in facial blood flow during singing. However, this appeared to be due primarily to social anxiety because the association between blushing propensity scores and changes in facial blood flow disappeared when social interaction anxiety scores were taken into account. These findings suggest that people generally base their beliefs about blushing on cues other than changes in facial blood flow. Social anxiety may augment increases in facial blood flow during embarrassment, independently of expected or perceived blushing.     

Blushing during social interactions in people with a fear of blushing

Changes in facial blood flow were investigated during an introductory conversation, delivering a speech, and listening to the speech afterwards in 16 people with a fear of blushing and 16 controls. It was hypothesized that fear of blushing would be associated with high ratings of self-reported blushing intensity and embarrassment during the tasks, and with persistence of the blushing reaction between tasks. Embarrassment and self-reported blushing intensity were greater in the fear-of-blushing group than in controls throughout the experiment. Increases in facial blood flow were similar in the two groups during each of the tasks. However, blushing dissipated more slowly after each task in the fear-of-blushing group than in controls, resulting in an incremental increase in facial blood flow over the course of the experiment. The slow recovery after an episode of blushing might result in physiological or social cues that help to maintain a fear of blushing.     

Blushing and physiological arousability in social phobia

Blushing is the most prominent symptom of social phobia, and fear perception of visible anxiety symptoms is an important component of cognitive behavioral models of social phobia. However, it is not clear how physiological and psychological aspects of blushing and other somatic symptoms are linked in this disorder. The authors tested whether social situations trigger different facial blood volume changes (blushing) between social phobic persons with and without primary complaint of blushing and control participants. Thirty social phobic persons. 15 of whom were especially concerned about blushing, and 14 control participants were assessed while watching an embarrassing videotape, holding a conversation, and giving a talk. Only when watching the video did the social phobic persons blush more than controls blushed. Social phobic persons who complained of blushing did not blush more intensely than did social phobic persons without blushing complaints but had higher heart rates, possibly reflecting higher arousability of this subgroup.     

The Motivated Expression of Embarrassment Following a Self-Presentational Predicament

ABSTRACT Two experiments tested hypotheses derived from an interpersonal model of embarrassment. According to this model, people who have suffered a self-presentational predicament are motivated to convey to others that they feel embarrassed as a way of repairing their social image and lowering subjective embarrassment in such situations. In Experiment 1, participants who performed an embarrassing task subsequently expressed greater embarrassment if the researcher did not already know that they were embarrassed than if she was aware of their embarrassment. Experiment 2 showed that embarrassed participants who thought that the researcher did not interpret their blushing as a sign of embarrassment subsequently engaged in alternative self-presentational tactics to improve their damaged social image.     

High blushing propensity: fearful preoccupation or facial coloration?

Twenty-seven women with high scores on the Blushing Propensity Scale (BPS) and 26 women with low BPS scores were exposed to two different video segments. One video showed the subject's own singing, recorded in a previous session and the other video showed a segment of Hitchcock's movie Psycho. During the experiment, facial coloration, facial temperature, and skin conductance level were measured. In addition, subjects' blushing intensity was judged by raters. Finally, subjects were asked to rate their blushing intensity and fear of blushing during the video presentations. Subjects generally blushed more during the presentation of their singing than during comparison stimulation, as measured physiologically. There were no between group differences in this respect. No differences were found between the two groups on raters' judgements about blushing intensity. However, high BPS subjects dramatically overestimated their blushing intensity and were more afraid of blushing than low BPS subjects. During the mere presence of the raters, high BPS subjects tended to show a relatively strong coloration. Thus, the BPS seems to reflect both a fearful preoccupation and a stronger facial coloration.     

Empathic Blushing in Friends and Strangers

Three volunteers watched a previously recorded video of one of them singing, as cheek sensors monitored their blushing. When performers watched videotapes of their performance, they blushed significantly more than strangers, but not more than their own friends, watching with them. Friends and strangers did not differ significantly in blushing, however. Skin conductance arousal responses of performers and friends, but not performers and strangers, or friends of performers and strangers, were correlated. In a second experiment, strangers who sang before watching another person sing blushed more than strangers who did not sing first, or who sang and then watched a neutral video. This suggests that performing the embarrassing act may have predisposed people to blush, perhaps empathically, later. No gender differences were seen in blushing. Embarrassability questionnaire scores did not correlate with blushing. Empathic accuracy, and associative learning, are proposed to account for the results.     

Fear of blushing: fearful preoccupation irrespective of facial coloration.

Women, with high (n = 29) and low (n = 28) fear of blushing, were exposed to a mild social stressor (watching a television test card in the presence of two male confederates) and to an intense social stressor (watching their own prerecorded 'sing' video, in the presence of two male confederates). Facial coloration and facial temperature were measured and participants rated their own blush intensity. No differences in actual blushing emerged between both groups. Meanwhile, high fearful individuals' self-reported blush intensity was significantly higher than that of low fearful individuals. Thus, fear of blushing seems to reflect a fearful preoccupation, irrespective of differential facial coloration. The present findings concord with cognitive models of social phobia.     

The long, steep path to equality: progressing on egalitarian goals

The present research examined the impact that perceived progress on egalitarian goals had on subsequent racial bias. In particular, a new bogus pipeline procedure was used to provide feedback to participants that they were becoming incrementally more egalitarian. The impact of this information on intergroup behavior and attitudes was tested. In particular, we looked at the effect of goal feedback on outgroup discrimination and ingroup favoritism, as well as implicit racial attitudes. Three studies found that participants demonstrated greater racial bias after receiving feedback that they were progressing on egalitarian goals versus either feedback that they were failing on egalitarian goals or no feedback. Specifically, participants who were told that they were progressively becoming more egalitarian sat farther away from Blacks and closer to Whites and demonstrated greater implicit racial prejudice. The implication of these findings for current theories on prejudice, intergroup relations, and social goals are discussed.     

Use of absolute and comparative performance feedback in absolute and comparative judgments and decisions

Which matters more—beliefs about absolute ability or ability relative to others? This study set out to compare the effects of such beliefs on satisfaction with performance, self-evaluations, and bets on future performance. In Experiment 1, undergraduate participants were told they had answered 20% correct, 80% correct, or were not given their scores on a practice test. Orthogonal to this manipulation, participants learned that their performance placed them in the 23rd percentile or 77th percentile, or they did not receive comparative feedback. Participants were then given a chance to place bets on two games—one in which they needed to get more than 50% right to double their money (absolute bet), and one in which they needed to beat more than 50% of other test-takers (comparative bet). Absolute feedback influenced comparative betting, particularly when no comparative feedback was available. Comparative feedback exerted weaker and inconsistent effects on absolute bets. Absolute feedback also had stronger (and more consistent) effects on satisfaction with performance and state self-esteem. Experiment 2 replicated these effects in a different university sample, and demonstrated that the effects emerge even when bets are placed after participants rate their satisfaction with their performance (although these ratings do not mediate the effect of feedback on bets). These findings suggest that information about one’s absolute standing on a dimension may be more influential than information about comparative standing, partially supporting a key tenet of Festinger’s [Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.] theory of social comparison.     

Saved by the blush: being trusted despite defecting

This study examined whether blushing after a sociomoral transgression remediates trustworthiness in an interdependent context. Participants (N = 196) played a computerized prisoner's dilemma game with a virtual opponent who defected in the second round of the game. After the defection, a photograph of the opponent was shown, displaying a blushing or a nonblushing face. In a subsequent Trust Task, the blushing opponent was entrusted with more money than the nonblushing opponent. In further support of the alleged remedial properties of the blush, participants also indicated that they trusted the blushing opponent more, expected a lower probability that she would defect again, and judged the blushing opponent more positively.     

Fear of negative evaluation augments negative affect and somatic symptoms in social-evaluative situations

The aim of this study was to determine whether fear of negative evaluation (FNE) moderates effects of eye contact on mood, bodily symptoms and physiological activity during social-evaluative situations. Facial blood flow, skin conductance, heart rate and respiration rate were recorded in 42 participants while they sang a children's song, while they were observed or made direct eye contact with the experimenter, and while they listened to an audiotape of themselves singing. Physiological responses were similar in high and low FNE groups. However, differences lay in the perception of bodily symptoms and ratings of negative affect, with the high FNE group reporting greater ratings. In addition, prior eye contact enhanced the perception of bodily symptoms in the high FNE group when they listened to the audiotape. Concern about the social consequences of displaying bodily disturbances such as trembling, blushing and sweating may explain these findings.     

I blush, therefore I will be judged negatively: influence of false blush feedback on anticipated others’ judgments and facial coloration in high and low blushing-fearfuls

In the present study, we investigate whether people attribute costs to displaying a blush. Individuals with and without fear of blushing were invited to have a short conversation with two confederates. During the conversation, half of the individuals received the feedback that they were blushing intensely. The study tested whether the belief that one is blushing leads to the anticipation that one will be judged negatively. In addition, the set-up permitted the actual physiological blush response to be investigated. In line with the model that we propose for erythrophobia, participants in the feedback condition expected the confederates to judge them relatively negatively, independent of their fear of blushing. Furthermore, sustaining the idea that believing that one will blush can act as a self-fulfilling prophecy, high-fearfuls showed relatively intense facial coloration in both conditions, whereas low-fearfuls only showed enhanced blush responses following false blush feedback.     

Effects of Self-Appraisal Information, Appraisal Purpose, and Feedback Target on Performance Appraisal Ratings

This experiment investigated the effects of three factors on performance appraisal ratings: self-appraisal information, appraisal purpose, and feedback target. Two hundred and three subjects rated a subordinate's performance on a clerical task subsequent to receiving either a high or low self-assessment. They were told they would provide performance feedback either to the experimenter (organizational agent) or their subordinate, and their ratings would be used either for an administrative decision or developmental feedback. Performance ratings were significantly higher when subjects received a favorable subordinate self-assessment than when self-assessments were unfavorable. A significant interaction was found between feedback target and the appraisal purpose. Implications for the use of self-appraisals in organizations were discussed.     

Blushing-Fearful Individuals’ Judgmental Biases and Conditional Cognitions: An Internet Inquiry

The present study examines two mechanisms that might explain why blushing-fearful individuals fear blushing: Judgmental biases for blushing in ordinary social situations that usually do not elicit a blush, and negative conditional cognitions about blushing irrespective of situation. A web-based self-report measure, linked to a German internet forum for people with fear of blushing, was completed by a group of high blushing-fearful participants (n = 155) and a low fear group (n = 61). Supporting the idea that cognitive biases are involved in fear of blushing, blushing-fearful participants showed inflated estimates of both the probability and the costs of blushing in these situations. In addition, blushing-fearful individuals were characterized by relatively negative conditional cognitions about blushing.     

Defending and reducing belief in memories: An experimental laboratory analogue

When receiving disconfirmatory social feedback about recollected events, people sometimes defend and sometimes reduce their belief that the event genuinely occurred. To improve estimates of the rates of memory defense and reduction, and of the magnitude of the change in belief in occurrence that results, in the present studies we examined the effect of disconfirmatory social challenges made to correctly recalled memories for actions performed in the lab. Adult participants performed, imagined, or heard action statements and imagined some of the initial actions multiple times. One week later, they completed a source-monitoring test and rated the actions on belief in their occurrence, recollection, visual detail, vividness, and reexperiencing. Four of the correctly recalled performed actions were challenged either prior to making the ratings during the test (Study 1, N = 44) or after making initial ratings after completing the test, following which the ratings were taken again (Study 2, N = 85). Across both studies, challenges were associated with lower belief-in-occurrence and recollection ratings on average than for control items, and belief in occurrence was affected to a greater extent than recollective features. Challenges that occurred during the test produced more instances of defense, whereas challenges that occurred after the test produced more instances of reduction. A closer analysis showed that some participants always defended, some always reduced, and some both defended and reduced belief. Responses to the first challenge positively predicted the responses to subsequent challenges. In addition, the procedure in Study 2 produced a variety of types of nonbelieved memories.     

Cognitive and social consequences of exposure to emotional narratives: Two studies on secondary social sharing of emotions

People who listen to a narrative concerning another's experience feel the urge to share in turn their experience of listening. This phenomenon is called secondary social sharing of emotion and has been widely investigated in the last ten years (Christophe & Di Giacomo, 1995; Christophe & Rimé, 1997). The present two studies aimed to provide new evidence concerning secondary social sharing of emotion. In the first study, participants were asked to recall an emotional narrative they had been told no more than three months before and to specify their social sharing about the narrative. In the second study, a diary strategy was used in order to encourage participants to recall an emotional narrative they had listened to during the day that had just elapsed. A follow‐up, three weeks after the completion of the diaries, was used to assess secondary social sharing over time. Results from both studies confirmed that secondary social sharing is a widespread phenomenon, involving many partners, mainly belonging to the circle of intimates, and affected by the intensity of listeners' emotional reactions. Adults exhibited significantly higher ratings of secondary social sharing than young people. In the first study, the valence (positive vs. negative) of the emotional experience affected secondary social sharing. However, no differences were found for sharing positive and negative experiences in the diary study.     

Children's understanding of embarrassment: Integrating mental time travel and mental state information

The current study investigated 4‐ to 8‐year‐olds’ (N = 81) understanding of embarrassment and their ability to integrate temporal and mental state information to predict and explain emotions. Participants heard stories describing characters commit trivial social transgressions, and then the next day, characters found themselves in the same situation that led to the previous transgression. For some story endings, participants were asked to predict and explain how the character felt, and for others, participants were told the character started to feel embarrassed and they were asked to explain why. Participants’ responses were coded and analysed using nonparametric statistical tests. Kruskal–Wallis analyses revealed significant developments occur between 6 and 8 years in children's understanding of embarrassment and their ability to explain individual's emotion as caused by anticipating the reoccurrence of a previous embarrassing event. Younger children demonstrated a basic knowledge of embarrassment but failed to demonstrate more advanced understanding of the emotion. Findings from the current study indicate children reach a more mature understanding of embarrassment and the implications of committing social transgressions between 7 and 8 years. Finally, the current study contributes to the literature on children's ability to infer mental states and temporally connect experiences.