Children's knowledge of the relation between intentional action and pretending

Two experiments investigated preschoolers’ understanding of the relation between pretending and intentional action. In Experiment 1, both 3- and 4-year olds recognized that characters whose actions were intended as pretense were pretending. However, children also judged that characters whose actions gave them the appearance of an entity unintentionally were pretending to be that entity. In Experiment 2, 3-year olds reliably chose a character whose pretense actions were intentional as pretending over a character whose actions were guided by another intention. These data suggest that preschoolers have some understanding of the role of intentional action in pretense.     

Fantasy play in 5- and 6-year-old children

We studied the verbal pretend play of 5- and 6-year-old boys and girls to delineate age and sex differences during the later preoperational period. Sixteen children with average language ability were paired by age and sex and were videotaped for three 15-min intervals. Verbal interactions were transcribed, and the pretend play was classified as object fantasy, imaginative action plans/themes, or fantasy roles. Language used for pretend play increased in proportion to all utterances with age. Older children referred to more invented objects than younger ones but primarily in the service of realistic action formats. Girls' conversations were scored as having significantly more verbal pretending than boys' and a higher proportion of it referred to play roles. There were both age and sex differences in the types of themes, toys used, and roles enacted, including more sex-typed behavior in older children. The continued increase in the proportion of pretend play to all verbal interaction with age and the characteristics of play behavior is consistent with developmental theory.     

Fantasy Play in 5- and 6-Year-Old Children

We studied the verbal pretend play of 5- and 6-year-old boys and girls to delineate age and sex differences during the later preoperational period. Sixteen children with average language ability were paired by age and sex and were videotaped for three 15-min intervals. Verbal interactions were transcribed, and the pretend play was classified as object fantasy, imaginative action plans/themes, or fantasy roles. Language ilsed for pretend play increased in proportion to all utterances with age. Older children referred to more invented objects than younger ones but primarily in the service of realistic action formats. Girls' conversations were scored as having significantly more verbal pretending than boys' and a higher proportion of it referred to play roles. There were both age and sex differences in the types of themes, toys used, and roles enacted, including more sex-typed behavior in older children. The continued increase in the proportion of pretend play to all verbal interaction with age and the characteristics of play behavior is consistent with developmental theory.     

Modelling therapy for test anxiety: The role of model affect and consequences

This study assessed the effectiveness of modelling therapy as a treatment for test anxiety and investigated the role of model affect and consequences in determining that effectiveness. Twenty-four test anxious subjects were shown one of four one-hour modelling displays of intelligence testing sessions. The displays represented combinations of calm or anxious model affect and positive or negative consequences. Two self report and two performance measures of test anxiety were analyzed by means of a 2 × 2 vs. control group factorial design. The results indicated an overall significant improvement on modelled intelligence tests for the experimental groups vs. the control group. Differential effects were also found depending upon the characteristics of the modelling display. Viewing anxious models lead to a significant increase in introductory psychology grades and viewing negative consequences lead to a decrease in self-reported test anxiety. The present results question the notion that the most effective modelling scenes are ones displaying calm models and positive consequences (Bandura, 1969). Parallels were drawn between the results of the research and the recent success of implosively-oriented behaviour therapies.     

Two-year-olds grasp the intentional structure of pretense acts

Twenty-two- and 27-month-old children were tested for their understanding of pretending as a specific intentional action form. Pairs of superficially similar behaviors - pretending to perform an action and trying to perform that action - were demonstrated to children. The 27-month-olds, and to some degree the 22-month-olds, showed in their responses that they understood the intentional structure of both kinds of behaviors: after pretense models, they themselves performed appropriate inferential pretense acts, whereas after the trying models they properly performed the action or tried to perform it with novel means. These findings are discussed in the light of recent debates about children's developing understanding of pretense and theory of mind.     

幼儿对假装游戏中意图和行为作用的理解

关于儿童如何理解假装存在两种观点:一种观点认为幼儿能够从心理角度理解假装。另一种观点认为,幼儿只能从假装行为角度理解假装。本研究通过自制录像,考查了3～5岁幼儿对假装游戏中意图和行为作用的理解。实验中,给幼儿呈现3种不同类型的录像情境:有意图-有行为、有意图-无行为和无意图-有行为,要求幼儿回答录像中的主人公是否在假装。实验结果表明,随着幼儿年龄的增长,在录像中主人公明确表达其假装意图的情境下,幼儿能够从心理层面理解假装,并且3～4岁幼儿存在一个快速发展期;同时,假装实体的熟悉度可能影响幼儿对假装的理解。     

To be or not to be a galaprock: Preschoolers' intuitions about the importance of knowledge and action for pretending

Can someone pretend to be a galaprock without knowing what a galaprock is? Do children recognize that such knowledge is required for pretending? Three studies focusing on the relations among action, knowledge and pretending suggest that children have this understanding by age 4 years. In Study 1, 4‐year‐olds and adults willingly pretended to be moving and unmoving objects but had trouble pretending to be objects that were difficult to represent physically. In Study 2, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds claimed they could not pretend to be an unknown thing, justifying their refusals with mentalistic language indicating their ignorance of the object or its typical actions. In Study 3, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds predicted that other children who have knowledge of an object unfamiliar to the subjects themselves can nevertheless pretend to be it, whereas those lacking that knowledge cannot. The results add support to the growing literature showing that preschoolers conceptualize pretense as involving mental activity.     

Play on: Retrospective Reports of the Persistence of Pretend Play Into Middle Childhood

Piaget (1962) asserted that children stop engaging in pretend play when they enter the concrete operational stage because they become able to accommodate reality and no longer need to assimilate it to their wishes. Consistent also with the views of Vygotsky, discussion of pretend play in developmental psychology is typically confined to early childhood, yet the activity itself does not seem to be so confined. As a preliminary investigation of pretend play in middle childhood, undergraduates were asked to complete a retrospective questionnaire about their childhood pretend play. The questionnaire items queried them about the content and context of their prior pretense engagements, when and why they stopped pretending, and personality characteristics relevant to pretense and fantasy. On average, respondents reported ceasing to pretend around 11 years of age. Among the statistically significant predictors of participants’ reported ages of ceasing to pretend were gender, childhood environs, siblings’ ages, belief in fantastical entities as a child, and participants involved in the last pretend memory. This preliminary study lays a foundation for future studies exploring the role of pretending in middle childhood. Although this study suggests that pretending is still widespread in middle childhood, it sheds no light on its function. This is an important issue across all ages that future research should address.     

Young children's understanding of pretend crying: The effect of context

Reasoning about another's pretend and real crying is related to ma'ny important social cognitive abilities (e.g., emotional understanding, appearance–reality, and theory of mind). This study investigated whether children aged 6 years and younger could distinguish between instances of pretend crying and real crying as presented in stories. Sixty‐five Japanese children aged 4–6 years were given stories within two contexts (Play and Non‐play). In the Play context, the protagonist of the story was pretending to cry or really crying during a pretend play activity. In the Non‐play context, the protagonist was also pretending to cry or really crying after his/her toy had been hidden by another child. The children answered questions about these crying events. The results showed that the 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds showed significantly better understanding of pretend crying in the Play context compared to the Non‐play context. In the Non‐play context, they were significantly less likely to understand the cause of pretend crying compared to the 6‐year‐olds. The results suggest that the context of pretend play facilitates the children's understanding of pretend crying.     

Pretense,Counterfactuals, and Bayesian Causal Models: Why What Is Not Real Really Matters

Young children spend a large portion of their time pretending about non‐real situations. Why? We answer this question by using the framework of Bayesian causal models to argue that pretending and counterfactual reasoning engage the same component cognitive abilities: disengaging with current reality, making inferences about an alternative representation of reality, and keeping this representation separate from reality. In turn, according to causal models accounts, counterfactual reasoning is a crucial tool that children need to plan for the future and learn about the world. Both planning with causal models and learning about them require the ability to create false premises and generate conclusions from these premises. We argue that pretending allows children to practice these important cognitive skills. We also consider the prevalence of unrealistic scenarios in children's play and explain how they can be useful in learning, despite appearances to the contrary.     

Young children know that trying is not pretending: a test of the "behaving-as-if" construal of children's early concept of pretense

In 3 studies, young children were tested for their understanding of pretend actions. In Studies 1 and 2, pairs of superficially similar behaviors were presented to 26- and 36-month-old children in an imitation game. In one case the behavior was marked as trying (signs of effort), and in the other case as pretending (signs of playfulness). Three-year-olds, and to some degree 2-year-olds, performed the real action themselves (or tried to really perform it) after the trying model, whereas after the pretense model, they only pretended. Study 3 ruled out a simple mimicking explanation by showing that children not only imitated differentially but responded differentially with appropriate productive pretending to pretense models and with appropriate productive tool use to trying models. The findings of the 3 studies demonstrate that by 2 to 3 years of age, children have a concept of pretense as a specific type of intentional activity.     

Imitation and representational development in young children with Down syndrome

Competence in object search and pretend play are argued to reflect young children's representational abilities and appear delayed in children with Down syndrome relative to social and imitative skills. This paper explores the effects on object search and play of this social strength in children with Down syndrome. Three experiments compared performance on traditional tasks with modified tasks designed to assess the role of imitation in object search and pretend play. Children with Down syndrome, relative to typically‐developing children, were able and willing to imitate hiding actions when no object was hidden (Experiment 1). When imitation was prevented in object search, children with Down syndrome searched less effectively than typically‐developing children (Experiment 2). In play, children with Down syndrome expressed more willingness to imitate a counter‐functional action, modelled by the experimenter, despite apparent competence in spontaneous functional play (Experiment 3). These findings indicate that object search and play behaviours of children with Down syndrome rely more heavily on imitation than is the case for typically‐developing children. The implications for the development of children with Down syndrome and models of representational development are discussed.     

From fancy to reason: Scaling deaf and hearing children's understanding of theory of mind and pretence

We examined deaf and hearing children's progression of steps in theory of mind (ToM) development including their understanding of social pretending. Ninety‐three children (33 deaf; 60 hearing) aged 3–13 years were tested on a set of six closely matched ToM tasks. Results showed that deaf children were delayed substantially behind hearing children in understanding pretending, false belief (FB) and other ToM concepts, in line with their delayed uptake of social pretend (SP) play. By using a scaling methodology, we confirmed previous evidence of a consistent five‐step developmental progression for both groups. Moreover, by including social pretence understanding, both deaf and hearing children's ToM sequences were shown to extend reliably to six sequential developmental steps. Finally and focally, even though both groups' sequences were six steps long, the placement of pretence relative to other ToM milestones varied with hearing status. Deaf children understood social pretending at an earlier step in the ToM sequence than hearing children, albeit at a later chronological age. Theoretically, the findings are relevant to questions about how universal developmental progressions come together along with culturally distinctive inputs and biological factors (such as hearing loss) to set the pace for ToM development.     

The language of social pretend play

The literature dealing with the structure and communication of social pretend play activity in preschool-age children is examined. The two objectives of this review were to determine (1) whether there are any differences in the linguistic forms and expressions children use in pretend as opposed to nonpretend activity and (2) whether age-related differences appear in the language of social pretending over the preschool years. The results of a cross-sectional study of a number of linguistic features occurring in the pretend and nonpretend activities of 35 dyads of children are also presented. The evidence supports the hypotheses that the language of social pretending differs from that of other social activities at several levels of language organization and that some of these differences in the “language of social pretending” appear at different ages during the preschool years. Suggestions are made for further research on the communicative techniques by which social pretend interactions are achieved.     

The effects of modelling and instruction on the problem-solving performance of preschool children in Papua New Guinea and Australia(1)

Children from preschools in Australia (AUST) were compared with indigenous children from preschools at Hanuabada and Kaugere in Papua New Guinea (PNG). The effects of modelling and instruction, separately and together, on their performance in problem-solving tasks were evaluated. In addition, a within-culture comparison was made of the two PNG groups. ANCOVAS were computed with the factors group (PNG-AUST and Hanuabada-Kaugere), treatment condition (no modelling with no instruction, instruction alone, modelling alone, and instruction with modelling) and sex. Mental and chronological ages were included as covariates. The results showed that (a) the strategy adoptions were more frequent in the instruction with modelling and in the instruction alone conditions than in the control condition and the modelling alone condition was not different from the control condition, (b) PNG children in the three experimental conditions adopted the advocated strategy about three times as often as the Australian children, (c) no differences occurred between girls and boys in strategy adoptions but girls were quicker in completing the tasks than boys, and (d) chronological age was a predictor of group effects. These results were discussed in terms of a possible cognitive developmental mechanism in the performance of modelled behaviours.     

Parents Produce Explicit Cues That Help Toddlers Distinguish Joking and Pretending

While separate pieces of research found parents offer toddlers cues to express that they are (1) joking and (2) pretending, and that toddlers and preschoolers understand intentions to (1) joke and (2) pretend, it is not yet clear whether parents and toddlers consider joking and pretending to be distinct concepts. This is important as distinguishing these two forms of non‐literal acts could open a gateway to understanding the complexities of the non‐literal world, as well as the complexities of intentions in general. Two studies found parents offer explicit cues to help 16‐ to 24‐month‐olds distinguish pretending and joking. Across an action play study (n = 25) and a verbal play study (n = 40) parents showed more disbelief and less belief through their actions and language when joking versus pretending. Similarly, toddlers showed less belief through their actions, and older toddlers showed less belief through their language. Toddlers' disbelief could be accounted for by their response to parents' language and actions. Thus, these studies reveal a mechanism by which toddlers learn to distinguish joking and pretending. Parents offer explicit cues to distinguish these intentions, and toddlers use these cues to guide their own behaviors, which in turn allows toddlers to distinguish these intentional contexts.     

Preschooler's Understanding of the Role of Mental States and Action in Pretense

This research investigated 3- to 5-year-old's understanding of the role of intentional states and action in pretense. There are two main perspectives on how children conceptualize pretense. One view is that children understand the mental aspects of pretending (the rich interpretation). The alternative view is that children conceptualize pretense as "acting-like" and do not appreciate that the mind is crucial to pretense (the lean interpretation). The experiments in this article used a novel approach to test these two interpretations. Children were presented with two types of videotaped scenarios. In Experiment 1, children were presented with a scenario in which people wanted to be like something else (e.g., a kangaroo) and either acted like it or did not act like it. Children were asked whether the protagonists were pretending and whether they were thinking about the pretend entity. In Experiment 2, children were presented with the Experiment 1 scenarios and also with a scenario in which a person had the intention to do something else (e.g., look for her keys) but whose actions were similar to those of a pretend entity (e.g., a bear). Children were asked about the pretense, thoughts, and the intentions of the protagonists. Experiment 3 tested for the effect of asking an open-ended versus a forced-choice question on the Experiment 2 tasks. The results of this study suggest that in certain facilitating conditions (e.g., intention information salient, forced-choice question) children have an early understanding of the role of mind in pretense.     

Preschooler's Understanding of the Role of Mental States and Action in Pretense

This research investigated 3- to 5-year-old's understanding of the role of intentional states and action in pretense. There are two main perspectives on how children conceptualize pretense. One view is that children understand the mental aspects of pretending (the rich interpretation). The alternative view is that children conceptualize pretense as "acting-like" and do not appreciate that the mind is crucial to pretense (the lean interpretation). The experiments in this article used a novel approach to test these two interpretations. Children were presented with two types of videotaped scenarios. In Experiment 1, children were presented with a scenario in which people wanted to be like something else (e.g., a kangaroo) and either acted like it or did not act like it. Children were asked whether the protagonists were pretending and whether they were thinking about the pretend entity. In Experiment 2, children were presented with the Experiment 1 scenarios and also with a scenario in which a person had the intention to do something else (e.g., look for her keys) but whose actions were similar to those of a pretend entity (e.g., a bear). Children were asked about the pretense, thoughts, and the intentions of the protagonists. Experiment 3 tested for the effect of asking an open-ended versus a forced-choice question on the Experiment 2 tasks. The results of this study suggest that in certain facilitating conditions (e.g., intention information salient, forced-choice question) children have an early understanding of the role of mind in pretense.     

Extrafoveal capture of attention by emotional scenes: affective valence versus visual saliency

ABSTRACT

Pairs of emotional (pleasant or unpleasant) and neutral scenes were presented peripherally (≥5° away from fixation) during a central letter-discrimination task. Selective attentional capture was assessed by means of eye movement orienting, i.e., probability of first fixating a scene and the time until first fixation. Static and dynamic visual saliency values of the scenes were computationally modelled. Results revealed selective orienting to both pleasant and unpleasant relative to neutral scenes. Importantly, such effects remained in the absence of visual saliency differences, even though saliency influenced eye movements. This suggests that selective attention to emotional scenes is genuinely driven by the processing of affective significance in extrafoveal vision.     

Adult modelling facilitates young children's generation of novel pretend acts

The present work investigated the effect of modelling on children's pretend play behaviour. Thirty‐seven children aged between 27 and 41 months were given 4 min of free play with a dollhouse and associated toy props (pre‐modelling phase). Using dolls, an experimenter then acted out a series of vignettes involving object substitutions, imaginary play and attribution of properties. Children were subsequently provided with an additional 4 min free play (post‐modelling phase). Consistent with past research, more pretence was exhibited after modelling than before. Furthermore, in the post‐modelling phase, children were as likely to generate their own novel pretence as they were to copy the actions demonstrated by the experimenter. They also increased the number of novel symbolic acts involving imaginary play from the pre‐ to the post‐modelling phase. This study highlights how young children will not only imitate a model's demonstration of pretend acts but also use this demonstration to catalyze the creation of their own pretence. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.