Development of affective decision making for self and other: evidence for the integration of first- and third-person perspectives

The role of perspective taking in affective decision making was studied in children at two ages (3 and 4 years) using a delay-of-gratification paradigm in which children chose between an immediate reward of lower value and a delayed reward of higher value. Half the children chose for themselves (self condition), and half chose for the experimenter (other condition). Three-year-olds chose delayed rewards in the other condition but made impulsive choices in the self condition. Compared with 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds performed better in the self condition and worse in the other condition. Results suggest that 3-year-olds took either a subjective, first-person perspective (for self) or an objective, third-person perspective (for other). Four-year-olds integrated these perspectives, considering a third-person perspective in the self condition and the experimenter's subjective perspective in the other condition (i.e., her desire for immediate gratification). This integration allowed reason to be tempered by emotion, and vice versa.     

观点采择因素对3～4岁儿童延迟满足决策的影响

通过采用延迟满足决策任务,要求儿童分别为自己和他人做出决策,本研究考察了观点采择因素对儿童情感决策发展的影响。实验一选取3岁和4岁儿童各40名,结果发现3岁儿童和4岁儿童在为自己选和为他人选两种条件下的表现均无显著差异,都倾向于做出延迟选择。实验二选取3岁和4岁儿童各60名,在为他人的选择中进一步区分了不同的观点提示条件,并增加了观点采择测验任务。结果发现,4岁儿童的观点采择能力得到了初步的发展,在不同的观点提示条件下为他人选择时分别表现出了与为自己选择不同的决策趋势;3岁儿童尚未获得观点采择能力,在各种不同观点提示条件下为自己和为他人做选择时差异均不显著。本研究结果表明,观点采择能力对儿童情感决策的影响是发展性的。随着观点采择能力的发展,儿童逐渐能够确立正确的延迟动机,为他人做出有效的决策。     

Making choices in anticipation of similar future choices can increase self-control

Two experiments tested the efficacy of linking a current choice with similar future choices as a means of increasing self-control. Participants were offered choices between smaller and sooner vs. larger and later amounts of money (Experiment 1, n = 60) or food (Experiment 2, n = 34). After a small-large pair for which the participant preferred the smaller reward was found, a choice between the same pair was offered as the 1st of 5 such choices to be offered over a period of weeks. The majority of participants in both experiments who chose between all 5 smaller and all 5 larger rewards chose the larger rewards. One third of participants in Experiment 1 who could choose independently on each pair in the series reversed their previous preference and chose the larger reward in the context of the series. These results suggest that self-control can be enhanced by viewing one's current choice as predictive of future choices.     

The Effect of Symbolic Distancing on Delay Tolerance across the Preschool Period

ABSTRACT

We aimed to longitudinally examine how symbolic distancing affects preschool children’s delay tolerance in a delay choice task. We presented children with choices between a smaller immediate reward and a larger delayed reward in conditions with either symbolic stimuli or edible rewards. Overall, symbolic distancing modulated children’s delay tolerance. In particular, whereas in the first phase (T1: 3- and 4-year-olds) children presented with edible rewards chose the larger option more often than children presented with symbolic stimuli, in the second phase (T2: 5- and 6-year-olds), there was no significant difference between children presented with symbolic stimuli and those presented with edible rewards. These results are discussed by examining how children’s delay tolerance changes during the development and comparing children to adult humans in a similar task.     

Making decisions about now and later: Development of future-oriented self-control

This study explored factors underlying preschoolers’ ability to make future-oriented choices. In a delay-of-gratification choice task, quantity and visibility of the reward was systematically varied. Participants included 90 typically developing children aged 2–4 years. Children made more choices to delay gratification as the quantity of the reward increased from 1 to 4 stickers, but covering the reward did not have an effect. The study extends previous findings on delay of gratification choice tasks in suggesting a developmental pattern beginning with an early appearing “hot” motivational system. Having children think about the present self versus the future self presumably activates a second “cool” representational system. Age differences in the development of this system and its integration with the motivational system may be at the heart of the “U” shaped function observed in the present work, one in which simpler abilities underlying self-control develop in parallel and integrate to produce more complex behaviour. The study thus contributes to our understanding of the development of future-oriented self-control, a milestone central to socialization and the definition of the self.     

Self‐Control Moderates Decision‐Making Behavior When Minimizing Losses versus Maximizing Gains

We examined (1) whether people would be more responsive to the delayed consequences of their decisions when attempting to minimize losses than when attempting to maximize gains in a history‐dependent decision‐making task and (2) how trait self‐control would moderate such an effect. In two experiments, participants performed a dynamic decision‐making task where they chose one of two options on each trial. The increasing option always gave a smaller immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to increase. The decreasing option always gave a larger immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to decrease. In Experiment 1 where the two options had equivalent expected value in the long run, participants were more prone to select the increasing option, which yielded larger benefits on future trials, in the loss‐minimization condition than in the gain‐maximization condition. Trait self‐control moderated the effect of losses by enhancing the effect for low self‐control participants while attenuating it for high self‐control participants. In Experiment 2 where selecting the increasing option was suboptimal, low self‐control participants still attempted to reduce losses on future trials by selecting the increasing option more often than high self‐control participants. These results suggest that decision makers value delayed consequences of their actions more in a losses domain relative to a gains domain and low self‐control individuals are more susceptible to such an effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Affective state and preference for immediate versus delayed reward

Fifty-two 9-year-olds were randomly assigned to success and failure treatment conditions involving acceptance or rejection of a drawing made for an art show. In a pilot study, this treatment was shown to influence significantly subjects' affective states. Just after treatment, subjects were presented with choices between pairs of small immediate and large delayed rewards. As predicted, subjects who had experienced success chose more often the large delayed reward than those who failed (p < .02). Prior expectancy for success and sex were not significantly related to choice behavior. The influence of affective state on various parameters of the choice paradigm was discussed, and other evidence was cited indicating that affective state is a major determinant of self-gratification behavior.     

Tests of an indifference rule in variable‐delay and double‐reward choice procedures with humans

Four hundred and fifty participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk across 3 experiments to test the predictions of a hyperbolic discounting equation in accounting for human choices involving variable delays or multiple rewards (Mazur, 1984, 1986). In Experiment 1, participants made hypothetical choices between 2 monetary alternatives, 1 consisting of a fixed delay and another consisting of 2 delays of equal probability (i.e., a variable‐delay procedure). In Experiment 2, participants made hypothetical monetary choices between a single, immediate reward and 2 rewards, 1 immediate and 1 delayed (i.e., a double‐reward procedure). Experiment 3 also used a double‐reward procedure, but with 2 delayed rewards. Participants in all 3 experiments also completed a standard delay‐discounting task. Finally, 3 reward amounts were tested in each type of task ($100, $1000, and $5000). In the double‐reward conditions (Experiments 2 and 3), the results were in good qualitative and quantitative agreement with Mazur's model (1984, 1986). In contrast, when participants made choices involving variable delays (Experiment 1), there was relatively poor qualitative and quantitative agreement with this model. These results, along with our previous findings, suggest the structure of questions in hypothetical tasks with humans can be a strong determinant of the choice pattern.     

风险对两类跨期选择的影响：一项ERP研究

该研究利用ERP技术,采用伴随风险的跨期选择任务比较了两类跨期选择（立即vs.延迟、延迟vs.延迟）,并探究了风险（零风险、低风险、高风险）对两者跨期选择影响的神经动力学机制。ERP结果显示,对于立即vs.延迟和延迟vs.延迟,在N2和N400上前者大于后者,在LPC上后者大于前者;风险对两者在时程上的影响趋于一致。因此,其加工可能是先对奖赏在风险维度上进行折扣,再与延迟时间进行整合形成奖赏预期,而后做出选择。     

Thinking about others and the future: Neural correlates of perspective taking relate to preferences for delayed rewards

We infer the thoughts and feelings of others by taking their perspectives. Similar processes could be used to understand how we will be affected by future events, by allowing us to take the perspective of our future self. In this paper, we test this idea using a previously presented framework for guiding predictions. The framework proposes that a shared neural mechanism is involved in controlling egocentric bias, both while shifting our perspective away from self and towards others, and while shifting our perspective from immediate to future perspectives. To test this framework, 36 adults performed an intertemporal choice task. They were then scanned using 3T functional magnetic resonance imaging while completing a false-belief “localizer” task, which requires egocentric bias control. A positive correlation was observed between the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) response during the false-belief task, and preferences for delayed rewards in intertemporal choices. A subset of participants performed the intertemporal choice task again in the scanner, which revealed that the response of the same rTPJ cluster, individually localized during the false-belief task, was higher during delayed over immediate reward choices. In addition, functional connectivity between the rTPJ and ventromedial prefrontal cortex was found to differ between immediate and delayed choices. The current results indicate an overlap in processes of egocentric bias control and those that determine preferences in intertemporal choices, offering a social cognitive explanation for why rewards are devalued with delay in temporal discounting.     

Negative affectivity predicts individual differences in decision making for preschoolers

The authors' goal in conducting this study was to explore the association between temperament and future-oriented decision making. Forty-three preschoolers (mean age = 51 months) were given a child variant of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and asked to choose between a deck with higher immediate rewards and a deck with higher future rewards. Children who were higher on the Extraversion/Surgency factor of the Child Behavior Questionnaire chose more frequently from the higher immediate rewards deck early in the game. The externalizing dimension of Negative Affectivity (anger/frustration, soothability and discomfort) made the greatest contribution to prediction of performance in the last block of the game. Children who were more easily frustrated and had difficulty regulating negative emotions chose more from the deck with higher immediate rewards. There was a significant interaction between the externalizing dimension of Negative Affectivity, the internalizing dimension of Negative Affectivity (sadness and fear) and Extraversion/Surgency on the last block. These results suggest a complex association between IGT performance and temperament in preschoolers.     

The rich get richer: Students’ discounting of hypothetical delayed rewards and real effortful extra credit

The present research compared choices among students with higher or lower grades for rewards that were devalued by imposing a delay to their receipt (Study 1) or by requiring more work for a larger reward (Study 2). In Study 1, students chose between hypothetical and noncontingent smaller immediate or larger delayed monetary rewards. In Study 2, students chose from among different amounts of real, response-contingent academic rewards (extra credit) that required different amounts of work. The results of both studies were similar: The highest scoring students discounted the value of the delayed money less than did their lower scoring counterparts, and the highest scoring students also chose to do and actually did more extra-credit work than lower scoring students did. Differences in the discounting of devalued rewards might represent a fundamental difference between the highest and lower scoring students.     

Impulsive choice and pre‐exposure to delays: iv. effects of delay‐ and immediacy‐exposure training relative to maturational changes in impulsivity

Impulsive choice describes preference for smaller, sooner rewards over larger, later rewards. Excessive delay discounting (i.e., rapid devaluation of delayed rewards) underlies some impulsive choices, and is observed in many maladaptive behaviors (e.g., substance abuse, gambling). Interventions designed to reduce delay discounting may provide therapeutic gains. One such intervention provides rats with extended training with delayed reinforcers. When compared to a group given extended training with immediate reinforcers, delay‐exposed rats make significantly fewer impulsive choices. To what extent is this difference due to delay‐exposure training shifting preference toward self‐control or immediacy‐exposure training (the putative control group) shifting preference toward impulsivity? The current study compared the effects of delay‐ and immediacy‐exposure training to a no‐training control group and evaluated within‐subject changes in impulsive choice across 51 male Wistar rats. Delay‐exposed rats made significantly fewer impulsive choices than immediacy‐exposed and control rats. Between‐group differences in impulsive choice were not observed in the latter two groups. While delay‐exposed rats showed large, significant pre‐ to posttraining reductions in impulsive choice, immediacy‐exposed and control rats showed small reductions in impulsive choice. These results suggest that extended training with delayed reinforcers reduces impulsive choice, and that extended training with immediate reinforcers does not increase impulsive choice.     

Effects of inflation on the subjective value of delayed and probabilistic rewards

In the years prior to 1994, there were very high rates of inflation in Poland, and the zloty depreciated relative to the U.S. dollar. However, the new zloty, introduced in 1995, was associated with greatly decreased rates of inflation and provided a more stable currency. We report a series of three experiments that take advantage of these changes to examine the effects of inflation on the subjective value of delayed and probabilistic rewards. Subjects were Polish citizens familiar with both zlotys and dollars. The first two experiments, conducted in 1994, used dollars and old zlotys, and the third experiment, conducted in 1996, used dollars and new zlotys. In all three experiments, the dollar and zloty rewards were of equivalent worth, according to the then current exchange rates. In Experiment 1, subjects chose between immediate and delayed rewards and, in Experiment 2, chose between certain and probabilistic rewards. The subjective value of a delayed reward was greater when its amount was specified in dollars than when it was specified in old zlotys. In contrast, the currency in which a reward was specified had no effect on the subjective value of probabilistic rewards. The results of these two experiments suggest a selective effect of inflation on decisions involving delayed rewards. This was verified in the third experiment, in which, using new zlotys, no differences in discounting were observed between the two currencies with either probabilistic or delayed rewards. Importantly, in all three experiments, the discounting of both delayed and probabilistic rewards was well described by the same simple mathematical model, suggesting that similar decision-making processes underlie both phenomena. However, the present results argue against a single-process theory in which the discounting of probabilistic rewards is derived from the discounting of delayed rewards.     

DISCOUNTING OF DELAYED FOOD REWARDS IN PIGEONS AND RATS: IS THERE A MAGNITUDE EFFECT?

Temporal discounting refers to the decrease in the present, subjective value of a reward as the time to its receipt increases. Results from humans have shown that a hyperbola-like function describes the form of the discounting function when choices involve hypothetical monetary rewards. In addition, magnitude effects have been reported in which smaller reward amounts are discounted more steeply than larger amounts. The present research examines the cross-species generality of these findings using real rewards, namely food pellets, with both pigeons and rats. As with humans, an adjusting amount procedure was used to estimate the amount of immediate reward judged equal in value to a delayed reward. Different amounts of delayed food rewards (ranging from 5 to 32 pellets in pigeons and from 5 to 20 pellets in rats) were studied at delays varying from 1 s to 32 s. A simple hyperbola, similar to the hyperbola-like mathematical function that describes the discounting of hypothetical monetary rewards in humans, described the discounting of food rewards in both pigeons and rats. These results extend the generality of the mathematical model of discounting. Rates of discounting delayed food rewards were higher for pigeons than for rats. Unlike humans, however, neither pigeons nor rats showed a reliable magnitude effect: Rate of discounting did not vary systematically as a function of the amount of the delayed reward.     

DISCOUNTING OF DELAYED REWARDS:

Abstract— In this study, children, young adults, and older adults chose between immediate and delayed hypothetical monetary rewards The amount of the delayed reward was held constant while its delay was varied All three age groups showed delay discounting, that is, the amount of an immediate reward judged to be of equal value to the delayed reward decreased as a function of delay The rate of discounting was highest for children and lowest for older adults, predicting a life-span developmental trend toward increased selfcontrol Discounting of delayed rewards by all three age groups was well described by a single function with agesensitive parameters (all R²s>94) Thus, even though there are quantitative age differences in delay discounting, the existence of an age-invanant form of discount function suggests that the process of choosing between rewards of different amounts and delays is qualitatively similar across the life span     

The development of future-oriented prudence and altruism in preschoolers

This research tested the hypothesis that prudence and altruism, in situations involving future desires, follow a similar developmental course between the ages of 3 and 5 years. Using a modified delay of gratification paradigm, 3- to 5-year-olds were tested on their ability to forgo a current opportunity to obtain some stickers in order to gratify their own future desires—or the current or future desires of a research assistant. Results showed that in choices involving current desires, altruistic behavior was unrelated to age. However, prudence and altruism involving future situations were correlated with one another and with age. Children under 4 years of age demonstrated significantly less future-oriented prudence than the older children (F(1,49) = 15.75; p < .001) and significantly less altruism involving future situations (F(1,49) = 33.24; p < .001). The data for the 3-year-olds, but not for the older children, also showed age-partialled correlations between the two future-oriented choice situations. These results suggest that between 3 and 4 years, children acquire the ability to deal with future-oriented situations through the development of some common mechanism which affects both future-oriented prudence and altruism.     

Choice between rewards differing in amount and delay: Toward a choice model of self control

A concurrent-chain procedure was used to study pigeons' choices between rewards differing in both amount and delay. The shorter delay terminated with a 2-second access to grain whereas the longer delay terminated with a 6-second access to grain. The ratio of the delays was constant within a given condition while their absolute values were varied. Over conditions, ratios of 6:1, 3:1, and 3:2 were studied. As the absolute values of the delays to reinforcement increased, preference for the longer-delayed but larger reward decreased under both the 6:1 and 3:1 ratios, but increased under the 3:2 ratio. These results are inconsistent with choice models predicting no change in preference when the ratios of delays and amounts are held constant. In addition, the change in preference under the 3:1 ratio is inconsistent with a simple multiplicative interaction of the trade off between reinforcer amount and delay, and suggests that delay is a more potent determinant of choice than is amount. These results have implications for models that view choice between small immediate rewards and large but delayed rewards as underlying the behavior commonly called self control.     

Substance use disinhibition associated with economically rational decisions to quit a boring task

Preferences for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards have been associated with a range of negative outcomes, including substance use problems. The present research investigated a potential association between substance use disinhibition and preferences for an immediate reward in a situation where the delayed reward was not the largest. Participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk were required to perform a boring, repetitive task for 25 min in order to earn a $3 bonus. Alternatively, they could quit at any time to receive half the bonus. However, when one fourth the task remained, participants were offered the choice between (a) quitting the boring task for a $3 bonus, and (b) continuing the boring task for a $3 bonus. Participants who chose the economically superior option of quitting the task scored higher on a measure of substance use disinhibition and on the Disinhibition facet of Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking Scale.     

Temporal discounting when the choice is between two delayed rewards

The present experiments extend the temporal discounting paradigm from choice between an immediate and a delayed reward to choice between 2 delayed rewards: a smaller amount of money available sooner and a larger amount available later. Across different amounts and delays, the data were consistently well described by a hyperbola-like discounting function, and the degree of discounting decreased systematically as the delay to the sooner reward increased. Three theoretical models (the elimination-by-aspects, present-value comparison, and common-aspect attenuation hypotheses) were evaluated. The best account of the data was provided by the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis, according to which the common aspect of the choice alternatives (i.e., the time until the sooner reward is available) receives less weight in the decision-making process.