A procedure for the incremental construction of a knowledge space

Knowledge spaces are structures for the efficient assessment of the knowledge state of a student in a given field of knowledge. Existing procedures for constructing a knowledge space by querying an expert assume that the domain of questions is known in advance, and that it is fixed during the whole query process. The outcome of these procedures is a knowledge space on the questions in that domain. If the original domain is extended with new questions, a new knowledge space on the extended domain can be produced by expert query. Since in this case a knowledge space for the original domain already exists, the available information can be used to extend the existing space in an efficient way, thus avoiding to apply expert query from scratch. Existing procedures do not provide an explicit way to use such information. Although these procedures can be adapted to this purpose, in this paper a new query algorithm that is specifically tailored for the problem above mentioned is presented.     

Studies of inference from lack of knowledge

Two experiments were performed to investigate the conditions affecting lack-of-knowledge inferences. The lack-of-knowledge inference is a metainference, an inference based on knowledge about one’s own knowledge, in which the absence of information concerning a possible assertion is taken as evidence that the assertion is false. In Experiment 1, it was shown that lack of knowledge about an assertion decreases subjects’ ratings of the likelihood that the assertion is true. The more important the assertion and the more expert the person who lacks knowledge, the more certain is the lack-of-knowledge inference, as measured by a decrease in the rated likelihood of the assertion. In Experiment 2, a hypothesis about the nature of self-judgments of expertise was tested. This intrinsic observation hypothesis states that expertise relevant to an assertion is determined by the number of similar assertions from the same domain that the person can retrieve. The hypothesis was ruled out by the results of Experiment 2. Other possibilities for the manner in which self-judgments of this kind are made are discussed.     

Aiding self-knowledge

ABSTRACT

Some self-knowledge must be arrived at by the subject herself, rather than being transmitted by another’s testimony. Yet in many cases the subject interacts with an expert in part because she is likely to have the relevant knowledge of their mind. This raises a question: what is the expert’s knowledge like that there are barriers to simply transmitting it by testimony? I argue that the expert’s knowledge is, in some circumstances, proleptic, referring to attitudes the subject would hold were she to reflect in certain ways. The expert’s knowledge cannot be transmitted by testimony because self-knowledge cannot be proleptic.     

I Talked to a Genius and All I Got was Knowledge

Bryan Frances’s recent argument is for the epistemic position called Live Skepticism. The Live Skepticism Argument (LSA) attempts to establish a restricted set of skeptical conclusions. The LSA’s “skeptical hypotheses” are scientific and philosophical positions that are “live actual possibilities” in an intellectual community. In order to “rule out” live hypotheses, an expert must know them to be false. However, since these are live hypotheses in this expert’s intellectual community—endorsed by others who have parallel levels of knowledge, intelligence, and understanding—this expert is unable to rule them out. Consistent with the LSA is the outcome that people not exposed to these live hypotheses can know what these experts cannot. However, in this paper, I defeat the LSA by developing and defending a counterexample that focuses on the phenomenon of genius testimony. Everyone, including the LSA’s proponent, can and should allow that expertise comes in degrees. While in many cases a person’s intelligence, understanding, and knowledge are parallel to others in the field, there are some who are extraordinary in their intelligence, understanding, and knowledge (geniuses). If an expert meets with a genius, it is possible that the genius provides this individual with beliefs that can rule out a skeptical hypothesis. Therefore, an expert can have knowledge, even if the skeptical hypothesis is live and endorsed by others who have parallel levels of knowledge, intelligence, and understanding. After providing this counterexample, I present three potential objections, and show how people can know global warming exists and that smoking does not give someone cancer. I conclude by defending this counterexample from a likely reply by proponents of the LSA involving luck and knowledge.     

Development of knowledge bases and the reliability of a decision support system for behavioral treatment consultation for persons with mental retardation: The Mental Retardation-Expert

The development of expert and decision support systems requires the collection, organization, codification, and storage of a body of specialized knowledge. The development, using reconstructive methods, of two such knowledge bases, the first containing the current scientific literature and the second containing an expert’s knowledge, is described for an automated decision support system, the Mental Retardation-Expert. This system provides practitioners with assistance in the treatment of aggressive, self-injurious, and destructive behaviors displayed by individuals with mental retardation or developmental disabilities. The average interobserver reliability of the expert knowledge base ranged from 92.5% to 95.0% when calculated across four clinicians’ assessments of 31 abstracted cases.     

If it's an animal it has axons: Experience and culture in preschool children's reasoning about animates

To claim that young children's biological thought is anthropocentric or that their induction depends on similarity rather than categories is to overlook the role of experience in reasoning. We tested four groups of 4-year-olds differing in two aspects of exposure to biological information: (a) their direct experience with nature (urban versus rural) and (b) biological expertise of their parents (expert biologists versus laypeople). We used a modified version of a novel feature projection task—in which projections are made from humans, mammals and insects to an array of nine targets representing various ontological kinds. Children's exposure to biology had consequences on their patterns of induction. There was an effect of parents’ expertise: laypeople's children's projections were based on similarity, while experts’ children's projections were based on the category animal. There was also an effect of direct experience: rural children were more restricted in their responses than were urban children. Although we found asymmetries in projections between humans and animals, humans were not a better source of knowledge about animates than were mammals or insects. These results show that the early emergence of domain specific biological thought and the use of biological categories in induction are highly contingent on children's experience.     

Extroversion Personality,Domain Knowledge,and the Creativity of New Product Development Engineers

Creativity refers to a person’s thinking of new and useful ideas at work. Drawing on the personality literature, this study proposes that employees with high extroversion personality will exchange job relevant information with colleagues to generate creativity. Drawing on the information exchange theory, this study further proposes that the effect of extroversion personality with creativity via information exchange will be stronger for workers with insufficient domain knowledge. Data collected from Taiwanese new product development engineers support our hypotheses. Previous research found that extroverted persons perform more creatively because they are more confident in their abilities. This study further demonstrates that, after controlling for self-efficacy, extroverted engineers can still think of creative ideas via exchanging information with colleagues. Although domain knowledge has been shown as crucial to creativity, few studies have explored how to stimulate creative ideas from workers with insufficient domain knowledge. This study demonstrates a useful substitute for domain knowledge, namely the extroversion personality, which may inspire creativity via exchanging information with colleagues.     

A U-shaped model for the development of intuition by level of expertise

Based on a review of the literature, this paper proposes a non-linear U-shaped model of intuition development influenced by an individual's level of expertise within a given subject area. Two qualitatively different types of intuition are described: immature intuition and mature intuition, each differentiated by the level of expertise of the individual in a specific subject area. Immature intuition is most available when an individual is a novice in a given knowledge domain, where his/her analytical knowledge of the subject does not interfere with the ability to make novel insights. Mature intuition is more rare and is most available when an individual is more of an expert in the subject area with well-developed relevant knowledge structures. Issues regarding the viability of this preliminary model are discussed.     

Expert knowledge as mnemonic cues

It is proposed that expert knowledge can operate as a cognitive cueing structure for the acquisition and retention of new information in memory. Two experiments are reported which demonstrate that expert knowledge about football and clothing can act as mnemonic cues for the recall of information newly associated with that knowledge. In Experiment 1 expert terms from the domains of football and clothing and those neutral nouns paired with them were both better recalled by experts than by non-experts. In Experiment 2 passages containing information contrary to factual knowledge about football and clothing were recalled better by experts than by non-experts, in spite of the fact that information in the passages contradicted what the experts already knew. The results of the two experiments were interpreted as showing that expert knowledge provides mental cues that have desirable mnemonic properties such as constructibility, associability, discriminability and invertibility. Also, the interpretation of expert knowledge as a cognitive cueing structure is compared to Ausubel's ideas regarding advance organizers.     

Information technology in municipal environmental policy: Automated registration,sure, but what about expert systems?

Dutch municipalities are confronted with an increased number of prescribed environmental tasks and also with a growing demand, both from the central government and environmental pressure groups, to undertake environmental activities on their own initiative. This development over-taxed the information management of most municipalities. In the past few years, computer technology was introduced to relieve part of this pressure (e.g., by automation of registration systems). In this article we present a classification of computer applications for environmental management, investigate their possible impact on the environmental knowledge and information system, and distinguish between a formal and informal knowledge domain. Special attention will be paid to expert systems.     

Time’s up! Involvement of metamemory knowledge,executive functions,and time monitoring in children’s prospective memory performance

This study examined time-based prospective memory (PM) in children and explored the possible involvement of metamemory knowledge and executive functions in the use of an appropriate time-monitoring strategy depending on the ongoing task’s difficulty. Specifically, a sample of 72 typically developing children aged 4, 6, and 9 years old were given an original PM paradigm composed of both an ongoing procedural activity and a PM task. Half of the participants (expert group) were trained in the ongoing activity before the prospective test. As expected, results show that time monitoring had a positive effect on children’s PM performance. Furthermore, mediation analyses reveal that strategic time monitoring was predicted by metamemory knowledge in the expert group but only by executive functions in the novice group. Overall, these findings provide interesting avenues to explain how metamemory knowledge, strategy use, and executive functions interact to improve PM performance during childhood.     

Modellierung von Fehlkonzepten in einer algebraischen Wissensstruktur

An extension of the theory of knowledge spaces by Doignon &; Falmagne (1985) is presented that tries to account for subjects’ typical errors and wrong answers. This extension concerns two major points: The usual dichotomous item format (right/wrong) is generalized to polytomous response categories, and the theoretical structure (knowledge, skills, misconceptions) is clearly separated from the empirical structure (observable solution behavior, subject’s responses). Using examples from a set of questions about properties of simple electric circuits the general method is demonstrated. Axioms of an algebraic structure known as “information system” (Scott, 1982) are shown to provide an appropriate characterization of the theoretical domain. The structural properties of the data, on the other hand, can be derived from assumptions about the influence of knowledge and misconceptions on specific answers for a set of questions.     

Expertise effects in the Moses illusion: detecting contradictions with stored knowledge

People frequently miss contradictions with stored knowledge; for example, readers often fail to notice any problem with a reference to the Atlantic as the largest ocean. Critically, such effects occur even though participants later demonstrate knowing the Pacific is the largest ocean (the Moses Illusion) [Erickson, T. D., &; Mattson, M. E. (1981). From words to meaning: A semantic illusion. Journal of Verbal Learning &; Verbal Behavior, 20, 540–551]. We investigated whether such oversights disappear when erroneous references contradict information in one's expert domain, material which likely has been encountered many times and is particularly well-known. Biology and history graduate students monitored for errors while answering biology and history questions containing erroneous presuppositions (“In what US state were the forty-niners searching for oil?”). Expertise helped: participants were less susceptible to the illusion and less likely to later reproduce errors in their expert domain. However, expertise did not eliminate the illusion, even when errors were bolded and underlined, meaning that it was unlikely that people simply skipped over errors. The results support claims that people often use heuristics to judge truth, as opposed to directly retrieving information from memory, likely because such heuristics are adaptive and often lead to the correct answer. Even experts sometimes use such shortcuts, suggesting that overlearned and accessible knowledge does not guarantee retrieval of that information.     

Expert systems: A cognitive science perspective

The theory and technology of knowledge-based systems are intrinsically interdisciplinary and are closely related to the formalisms of cognitive psychology. In this paper, strategies of incorporating intelligence into a computer program are described along with a common architecture for expert systems, including choices of representation and inferential methods. The history of the field is traced from its origins in metamathematics and Newell and Simon’s (1961) GENERAL PROBLEM SOLVER to the Stanford Heuristic Programming Project that produced DENDRAL and MYCIN (Buchanan & Shortliffe, 1984). MYCIN gave rise to EMYCIN and a shell technology that has radically reduced the development time and cost of expert systems. Methodology and concepts are illustrated by transactions with a shell developed for graduate education and a demonstration knowledge base for the diagnosis of senile dementia. Knowledge-based systems and conventional programs are compared with respect to formalisms employed, applications, program characteristics, procedures supplied by the development environment, consistency, certainty, flexibility, and programmer’s viewpoint. The technology raises basic questions for cognitive psychology concerning knowledge and expertise.     

线索冲突情境下幼儿对不同领域知识的选择性信任特点

探讨幼儿在准确性线索和共识线索冲突情境下对自然与社会领域知识的选择性信任特点。实验1探究幼儿在线索冲突情境下对自然领域知识的选择性信任,选取88名4~6岁幼儿,采用对物品命名的方法,结果发现4岁幼儿依据共识线索进行信任判断,而5~6岁幼儿依据准确性线索进行信任判断;实验2探究幼儿在线索冲突情境下对社会领域知识的选择性信任,选取94名4-6岁幼儿,采用对人格特质命名的方法,结果发现4岁幼儿依据共识线索进行信任判断,5岁幼儿对两类线索没有做出偏向性选择,6岁幼儿依据准确性线索进行信任判断。实验3采用被试内设计,探讨5岁幼儿对两个领域知识的选择性信任,验证了实验1和实验2的相关结果。结论:在线索冲突情境下幼儿对不同领域知识的选择性信任具有不同的年龄发展特点。     

Three dimensions of expertise

Psychologists and philosophers tend to treat expertise as a property of special individuals. These are individuals who have devoted much more time than the general population to the acquisition of their specific expertises. They are often said to pass through stages as they move toward becoming experts, for example, passing from an early stage, in which they follow self-conscious rules, to an expert stage in which skills are executed unconsciously. This approach is ‘one-dimensional’. Here, two extra dimensions are added. They are drawn from the programme known as Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE) and its ‘Periodic Table of Expertises’. SEE, which is sociological, and/or Wittgensteinian, in inspiration, takes expertise to be the property of groups; there are ‘domains’ of expertise. Under SEE, level of expertise grows with embedding in the society of domain experts; the key is the transmission of domain-specific tacit knowledge. Thus, one extra dimension is degree of exposure to tacit knowledge. Under SEE, domains can be big or small so there can be ‘ubiquitous tacit knowledge’, such as natural-language-speaking or other elements of general social behaviour, which belong to every member of a society. The second extra dimension is, therefore, ‘esotericity’. The resulting three-dimensional ‘expertise-space’ can be explored in a number of ways which reveal the narrowness of the analysis and the mistakes that have been made under the one-dimensional model.     

Influence of Domain Knowledge on Monitoring Performance Across the Life Span

Two studies were conducted to investigate effects of domain knowledge on metacognitive monitoring across the life span in materials of different complexity. Participants from 4 age groups (3rd-grade children, adolescents, younger and older adults) were compared using an expert–novice paradigm. In Study 1, soccer experts’ and novices’ ease-of-learning judgments (EOLs), judgments of learning (JOLs), and confidence judgments (CJs) were contrasted when memorizing soccer-related word pairs. In Study 2, monitoring judgments (i.e., a rating of global comprehension, JOLs, and CJs) were collected in regards to a soccer-related narrative. The results of both approaches showed that experts’ better memory performance obtained in both studies was not always accompanied by advantages in monitoring performance. In Study 1, experts of all ages outperformed novices in monitoring accuracy. In Study 2, no benefits of expertise on monitoring were found; in children, novices even surpassed experts in monitoring quality. In both studies, the most consistent influence of previous domain knowledge on monitoring performance concerned more optimistic judgments of experts compared with novices, regardless of stimuli and recall format. In sum, our results document a twofold effect of expertise on monitoring. Although domain-specific knowledge enhances monitoring performance in some situations, more optimistic estimates, presumably due to the application of a familiarity heuristic, typically reduce experts’ monitoring accuracy.     

Transmuted Expertise: How Technical Non-Experts Can Assess Experts and Expertise

To become an expert in a technical domain means acquiring the tacit knowledge pertaining to the relevant domain of expertise, at least, according to the programme known as “Studies of Expertise and Experience” (SEE). We know only one way to acquire tacit knowledge and that is through some form of sustained social contact with the group that has it. Those who do not have such contact cannot acquire the expertise needed to make technical judgments. They can, however, use social expertise to judge between experts or expert claims. Where social expertise is used to make technical judgments we refer to it as “transmuted expertise”. The various kinds of transmuted expertise are described and analysed.     

A learning system for adjustment processes based on human sensory perceptions

Creating, designing and adjusting products are essential decision processes underlying creative industries, such as painting, perfume, food and beverage industries. These processes require the participation and continuous supervision of professionals with highly-developed expert sensory abilities. Training of these experts is very complex due to the difficulty of transmitting intuitive knowledge obtained from perception. A new methodology for capturing this sensory expert knowledge that relies on a machine learning tool, previously trained with ‘state-action’ type patterns, jointly with an actions generator module, is proposed in this work. The method is based on a closed loop architecture together with the decomposition of complex sensory knowledge into basic elements capable of being handled by standard machine learning systems. A real case application to color-adjustment in the automotive paint manufacturing industry is presented showing the potential benefits of the method.