INTRODUCING THE WORK OF PETER OCHS

Peter Ochs' work offers a rehabilitation of the wisdom tradition celebrated by rabbinic Judaism. While Jewish philosophy, long occupied by the particular names and categories of the given order, has neglected the deepest insights of the rabbinic appreciation of wisdom, Ochs' work recovers wisdom as a metaphysically imaginative and pragmatically effective exercise of reasoning. The four articles offered in this symposium on the work of Peter Ochs by David Lamberth, James K. A. Smith, Nicholas Adams and Leora Batnitzky, together with Peter Ochs' response and Steven Kepnes' conclusion, offer a striking illustration of the reach and depth of Ochs' recovery of wisdom. This reach extends but is not limited to a 'new thinking' and agenda for philosophical theology applied to its specific areas of concern, including the relationship between philosophy and theology, the nature of religious studies, and the practice of Scriptural Reasoning.     

Autopoietic enactivism: action and representation re-examined under Peirce’s light

The purpose of this article is to start a dialogue between the so-called autopoietic enactivism and the semiotic pragmatism of C. S. Peirce, in order to re-examine both action and representation under a Peircean light. The focus lays on autopoietic enactivism because this approach offers a wider theoretical scope to cognition based on the continuity of life and mind, embodiment, dynamic and non-linear interaction between a system and its environment which are compatible ideas with Peirce’s semiotic pragmatism. The term ‘pragmatic’ has been introduced in cognitive science to reinforce the idea that cognition is a form of practice and to help action-oriented viewpoints to escape representationalism. In this paper, I shall try to demonstrate that Peirce’s semiotic pragmatism can be a meaningful methodological path to guide a reconciliation between not only anti-Cartesianism and representation but also representation and action. In order to accomplish this purpose, Peirce’s account to action, habit, thought and mind will be addressed through some of the guiding principles of his semiotic—sign and sign action. What follows is the re-examining of the problem of representation—as refuted by autopoietic enactivism—under the light of Peirce’s semiotic pragmatism.

     

Between Peirce (1878) and James (1898): G. Stanley Hall,the origins of pragmatism,and the history of psychology

This article focuses on the 20‐year gap between Charles S. Peirce's classic proposal of pragmatism in 1877–1878 and William James's equally classic call for pragmatism in 1898. It fills the gap by reviewing relevant developments in the work of Peirce and James and by introducing G. Stanley Hall, for the first time, as a figure in the history of pragmatism. In treating Hall and pragmatism, the article reveals a previously unnoted relation between the early history of pragmatism and the early history of the “new psychology” that Hall helped to pioneer. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Kidnapping an ugly child: is William James a pragmaticist?

Since the term ‘pragmatism’ was first coined, there have been debates about who is or is not a ‘real’ pragmatist, and what that might mean. The division most often drawn in contemporary pragmatist scholarship is between William James and Charles Peirce. Peirce is said to present a version of pragmatism which is scientific, logical and objective about truth, whereas James presents a version which is nominalistic, subjectivistic and leads to relativism. The first person to set out this division was in fact Peirce himself, when he distinguished his own ‘pragmaticism’ from the broad pragmatism of James and others. Peirce sets out six criteria which defines ‘pragmaticism’: the pragmatic maxim; a number of ‘preliminary propositions’; prope-positivism; metaphysical inquiry; critical common-sensism; and scholastic realism. This paper sets out to argue that in fact James meets each of these criteria, and should be seen as a ‘pragmaticist’ by Peirce’s own lights.     

Pragmatism,bioethics and the grand American social experiment

There is tension in bioethics between two strains of pragmatism. The most prominent strain, following John Dewey, proposes a content-rich ethos of controlled, collective moral inquiry. A second strain, descending from Charles Peirce and Josiah Royce, favors an open-ended approach where diverging moral communities evolve without extensive inter-communal oversight. This essay defends the second strain. The Deweyan approach, I argue, exhibits a problematic quasi-foundationalist character insofar as it canonizes a dubious constellation of "liberal" political values and seeks to establish these values by interposing a consensus of moral experts where genuine inter-communal dialogue, and compromise, would be more fruitful. I hold that the alternative approach of Peirce and Royce is preferable, and truer to the fundamental commitments of classical American pragmatism. Recognizing the epistemic fallibility of various content-rich moral-political formulations, Peirce and Royce hope to cultivate and sustain moral inquiry by allowing each moral community (1) to generate and test its own moral system (as long as it does so peaceably) and (2) to freely make or refuse to make collaborative arrangements with other moral communities. This approach is illustrated in a brief discussion of the Oregon Medical Experiment.     

C.S. Peirce on Mathematical Practice: Objectivity and the Community of Inquirers

Topoi - What understanding of mathematical objectivity is promoted by Peirce’s pragmatism? Can Peirce’s theory help us to further comprehend the role of intersubjectivity in...     

On Generalization： Pragmatists＇ Contributions to Constructivism

Constructivism has been an important program in contemporary philosophy, but cannot itself cannot provide sufficient context for grasping its key points. To fully understand its power and potential we must borrow tools from other programs： specifically, Charles Peirce and John Dewey＇s pragmatism. By exploring these two pragmatists＇ articulations of ＂generalization,＂ which I hold is the most crucial question in constructivism, their prospective contributions to constructivism can be brought to light. If, as I argue, constructivism can incorporate the lessons of pragmatism, then it can still be considered a highly workable interpretation of reality and of human endeavors.     

Peirce on Education: Discussion of Peirce’s Definition of a University

I write this short essay in response to Peirce, as a feminist, pragmatist, and cultural studies scholar, in the hope that it will help to bring feminism and pragmatism together. I suggest that Peirce offers marginalized and colonized people a way to argue for the importance of their input, with his theory of fallibilism, even if he still claims a position of privilege. He also offers assistance through his concept of “a community of inquirers.” It is curious that Peirce’s definition of a university argues for a split between theory and practice that his earlier work sought to heal. Peirce opened a door to help diverse scholars be able to enter the university, and find a way to address issues of power, with his youthful connecting of theory to practice, that his more senior position draws our attention away from and seeks to hold off. Fortunately, it is too late. Peirce’s youthful pragmatism has been developed in important ways by other scholars and now serves as an example of a way to do philosophy that does connect theory to practice and does seek to address real problems in diverse peoples lives, and help to find solutions that effect change.     

Rascals,triflers, and pragmatists: developing a Peircean account of assertion*

While the topic of assertion has recently received a fresh wave of interest from Peirce scholars, to this point no systematic account of Peirce’s view of assertion has been attempted. We think that this is a lacuna that ought to be filled. Doing so will help make better sense of Peirce’s pragmatism; further, what is hidden amongst various fragments is a robust pragmatist theory of assertion with unique characteristics that may have significant contemporary value. Here we aim to uncover this theory, and to show that assertion for Peirce is not a mere corollary of pragmatic conceptions of truth, judgement, and belief, but is rather a central aspect of his philosophy.     

Varieties of Analytic Pragmatism

In his Locke Lectures Brandom proposes to extend what he calls the project of analysis to encompass various relationships between meaning and use. As the traditional project of analysis sought to clarify various logical relations between vocabularies so Brandom’s extended project seeks to clarify various pragmatically mediated semantic relations between vocabularies. The point of the exercise in both cases is to achieve what Brandom thinks of as algebraic understanding. Because the pragmatist critique of the traditional project of analysis was precisely to deny that such understanding is appropriate to the case of natural language, the very idea of an analytic pragmatism is called into question by that critique. My aim is to clarify the prospects for Brandom’s project, or at least something in the vicinity of that project, through a comparison of it with what I will suggest we can think of as Kant’s analytic pragmatism as developed by Peirce.     

Peirce on Educational Beliefs

This article contends that Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) may enhance our understanding of educational beliefs and that Peirce’s logic may be a tool to distinguish between a dogmatic and a pragmatic justification of such beliefs. The first part of the article elaborates on Peirce’s comprehension of beliefs as mediated, socially situated and future-oriented. The second part points to how Peirce promotes his “method of inquiry” as an ethos of science. The method is not judged by the conclusions it lead to or by the knowledge it may produce. Contrary, as the results are unavoidably provisional and rectifiable, Peirce holds the method productive due to the norms guiding the inquiry: (1) the pragmatic principle, (2) the social principle, (3) fallibilism and (4) abduction. In sum, when adopting a peircean conception, educational research, theory building and practice should be characterized as a mutual commitment towards shared processes of joint learning. In that, Peirce’s method of inquiry may be fruitful in sorting dogmatism from pragmatism.     

Peirce’s ‘Prescision’ as a Transcendental Method

Abstract

In this Paper I interpret Charles S. Peirce’s method of prescision as a transcendental method. In order to do so, I argue that Peirce’s pragmatism can be interpreted in a transcendental light only if we use a non‐justificatory understanding of transcendental philosophy. I show how Peirce’s prescision is similar to some abstracting procedure that Immanuel Kant used in his Critique of Pure Reason. Prescision abstracts from experience and thought in general those elements without which such experience and thought would be unaccountable. Similarly, in the Aesthetics, Kant isolated the a priori forms of intuition by showing how they could be abstracted from experience in general, while experience in general cannot be thought without them. However, if Peirce’s and Kant’s methods are similar in this respect, they reached very different conclusions.     

A Fallible Groom in the Religious Thought of C.S. Peirce – A Centenary Revisitation

Under the general tutelage of Kant, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) introduced American pragmatism to yet another philosophical dialectic: between a neglected transcendental instinct and earthly authorities. The dialectic became Peirce’s response to various evolutionary schemes in the 19th century. Guided by the recollected voices of Socrates, Jesus, St. John, Anselm, and Kant, as well as his own brand of pragmatism, Peirce eventually developed a “Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” a century ago, in 1908. Here, Peirce endorsed a more adventurous god than ecclesiastical or theological authorities could imagine, a god of love (agapism) and chance (tychism), but still rife with fallibility.

Temporal Synechism: A Peircean Philosophy of Time

Axiomathes - Charles Sanders Peirce is best known as the founder of pragmatism, but the name that he preferred for his overall system of thought was “synechism” because the principle of...     

Sources for Skinner's pragmatic selectionism in 1945

Skinner's pragmatic selectionism shows up strongly in his 1945 publication, "The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms," in which he introduced a probabilistic three-term contingency for verbal behavior. This probabilism was accompanied by an expanded contextualism and an increased emphasis on consequences with a clear alignment to pragmatism. In total, these changes represent Skinner's most striking shift from mechanistic and necessitarian values to pragmatic selectionism, and these changes may be indebted more to the conceptual contributions of others than Skinner acknowledged. Before 1945, Skinner made at least some positive associations with the views of Watson, Russell, and Carnap. From 1945 and afterwards, he strongly disassociated his views on verbal behavior from theirs. Before 1945, Skinner did not associate his views with those of Darwin or Peirce. After 1945, he strongly associated his views with those of Darwin and Peirce (in one published interview). No sources for his pragmatic selectionism, however, were referred to in 1945.     

Reviews

Books reviewed:
Kathryn Tanner: Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology
Charles Marsh: God's Long Summer: Stories of Faith and Civil Rights
John D. Caputo: The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion
David Toole: Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo: Theological Reflections on Nihilism, Tragedy and Apocalypse
George R. Hunsberger: Bearing the Witness of the Spirit: Lesslie Newbigin's Theology of Cultural Plurality
Peter Ochs: Peirce, Pragmatism and the Logic of Scripture
Elizabeth A. Johnson: Friends of God and Prophets: A Feminist Theological Reading of the Communion of Saints
Stephen H. Webb: On God and Dogs: A Christian Theology of Compassion for Animals
Elizabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza: Sharing Her Word: Feminist Biblical Interpretation in Context
Steven Kepnes, Peter Ochs and Robert Gibbs: Reasoning After Revelation: Dialogues in Postmodern Jewish Philosophy
Stephen L. Brock: Action and Conduct: Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action
Emmanuel Levinas: Of God Who Comes to Mind
Timothy Houston Polk: The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith
Robert Barron: And Now I See … A Theology of Transformation
Stephen Crites: Dialectic and Gospel in the Development of Hegel's Thinking
John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward (eds): Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology     

Some more similarities between Peirce and Skinner

C. S. Peirce is noted for pioneering a variety of views, and the case is made here for the similarities and parallels between his views and B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism. In addition to parallels previously noted, these similarities include an advancement of experimental science, a behavioral psychology, a shift from nominalism to realism, an opposition to positivism, a selectionist account for strengthening behavior, the importance of a community of selves, a recursive approach to method, and the probabilistic nature of truth. Questions are raised as to the extent to which Skinner's radical behaviorism, as distinguished from his S-R positivism, may be seen as an extension of Peirce's pragmatism.     

Freestanding Pragmatism in Law and Bioethics

This paper represents the first installment of alarger project devoted to the relevance of pragmatism forbioethics. One self-consciously pragmatist move would be toreturn to the classical pragmatist canon of Peirce, James andDewey in search of substantive doctrines or methodologicalapproaches that might be applied to current bioethicalcontroversies. Another pragmatist (or neopragmatist) move wouldbe to subject the regnant principlist paradigm to Richard Rorty'ssubversive assaults on foundationalism in epistemology andethics. A third pragmatist method, dubbed ``freestandingpragmatism' by its proponents, embraces a ``pragmatist' approachto practical reasoning without discernable moorings either to theclassical canon or to Rorty's neopragmatism. This thirdpragmatist approach to method in practical ethics is the subjectof this article. I begin with an examination of freestandingpragmatism in the theory of judicial decision making. I arguethat this version of legal pragmatism – so described on account ofits commitments to contextualism, instrumentalism, eclecticism,and freedom from grand theory – bears a striking resemblance tomuch self-described pragmatist work in bioethics today. Ifurther argue that if this is what we mean by ``pragmatism,' thenin a certain sense ``we are all pragmatists now.'